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September 18, 2024

FortiClient EMS Exploited: Inside the Attack Chain and Post-Exploitation Tactics

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18
Sep 2024
Soon after CVE-2023-48788 was publicly disclosed in late March 2024, Darktrace began to see compromises in FortiClient EMS devices on customer networks. Read on to find out more about what our Threat Research team uncovered.

Cyber attacks on internet-facing systems

In the first half of 2024, the Darktrace Threat Research team observed multiple campaigns of threat actors targeting vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, including Ivanti CS/PS appliances, Palo Alto firewall devices, and TeamCity on-premises.

These systems, which are exposed to the internet, are often targeted by threat actors to gain initial access to a network. They are constantly being scanned for vulnerabilities, known or unknown, by opportunistic actors hoping to exploit gaps in security. Unfortunately, this exposure remains a significant blind spot for many security teams, as monitoring edge infrastructure can be particularly challenging due to its distributed nature and the sheer volume of external traffic it processes.

In this blog, we discuss a vulnerability that was exploited in Fortinet’s FortiClient Endpoint Management Server (EMS) and the post-exploitation activity that Darktrace observed across multiple customer environments.

What is FortiClient EMS?

FortiClient is typically used for endpoint security, providing features such as virtual private networks (VPN), malware protection, and web filtering. The FortiClient EMS is a centralized platform used by administrators to enforce security policies and manage endpoint compliance. As endpoints are remote and distributed across various locations, the EMS needs to be accessible over the internet.

However, being exposed to the internet presents significant security risks, and exploiting vulnerabilities in the system may give an attacker unauthorized access. From there, they could conduct further malicious activities such as reconnaissance, establishing command-and-control (C2), moving laterally across the network, and accessing sensitive data.

CVE-2023-48788

CVE-2023-48788 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in FortiClient EMS that can allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the system. It stems from improper neutralization of special elements used in SQL commands, which allows attackers to exploit the system through specially crafted requests, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) [1]. This critical vulnerability was given a CVSS score of 9.8 and can be exploited without authentication.

The affected versions of FortiClient EMS include:

  • FortiClient EMS 7.2.0 to 7.2.2 (fixed in 7.2.3)
  • FortiClient EMS 7.0.1 to 7.0.10 (fixed in 7.0.11)

The vulnerability was publicly disclosed on March 12, 2024, and an exploit proof of concept was released by Horizon3.ai on March 21 [2]. Starting from March 24, almost two weeks after the initial disclosure, Darktrace began to observe at least six instances where the FortiClient EMS vulnerability had likely been exploited on customer networks. Seemingly exploited devices in multiple customer environments were observed performing anomalous activities, including the installation of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, which was also reported by other security vendors around the same time [3].

Darktrace’s Coverage

Initial Access

To understand how the vulnerability can be exploited to gain initial access, we first need to explain some components of the FortiClient EMS:

  • The service FmcDaemon.exe is used for communication between the EMS and enrolled endpoint clients. It listens on port 8013 for incoming client connections.
  • Incoming requests are then sent to FCTDas.exe, which translates requests from other server components into SQL requests. This service interacts with the Microsoft SQL database.
  • Endpoint clients communicate with the FmcDaemon on the server on port 8013 by default.

Therefore, an SQL injection attack can be performed by crafting a malicious payload and sending it over port 8013 to the server. To carry out RCE, an attacker may send further SQL statements to enable and use the xp_cmdshell functionality of the Microsoft SQL server [2].

Shortly before post-exploitation activity began, Darktrace had observed incoming connections to some of the FortiClient EMS devices over port 8013 from the external IPs 77.246.103[.]110, 88.130.150[.]101, and 45.155.141[.]219. This likely represented the threat actors sending an SQL injection payload over port 8013 to the EMS device to validate the exploit.

Establish C2

After exploiting the vulnerability and gaining access to an EMS device on one customer network, two additional devices were seen with HTTP POST requests to 77.246.103[.]110 and 212.113.106[.]100 with a new PowerShell user agent.

Interestingly, the IP 212.113.106[.]100 has been observed in various other campaigns where threat actors have also targeted internet-facing systems and exploited other vulnerabilities. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) suggests that this indicator of compromise (IoC) is related to the Sliver C2 framework and has been used by threat actors such as APT28 (Fancy Bear) and APT29 (Cozy Bear) [4].

Unusual file downloads were also observed on four devices, including:

  • “SETUP.MSI” from 212.32.243[.]25 and 89.149.200[.]91 with a cURL user agent
  • “setup.msi” from 212.113.106[.]100 with a Windows Installer user agent
  • “run.zip” from 95.181.173[.]172 with a PowerShell user agent

The .msi files would typically contain the RMM tools Atera or ScreenConnect [5]. By installing RMM tools for C2, attackers can leverage their wide range of functionalities to carry out various tasks, such as file transfers, without the need to install additional tools. As RMM tools are designed to maintain a stable connection to remote systems, they may also allow the attackers to ensure persistent access to the compromised systems.

A scan of the endpoint 95.181.173[.]172 shows various other files such as “RunSchedulerTask.ps1” and “anydesk.exe” being hosted.

Screenshot of the endpoint 95.181.173[.]172 hosting various files [6].
Figure 1: Screenshot of the endpoint 95.181.173[.]172 hosting various files [6].

Shortly after these unusual file downloads, many of the devices were also seen with usage of RMM tools such as Splashtop, Atera, and AnyDesk. The devices were seen connecting to the following endpoints:

  • *[.]relay.splashtop[.]com
  • agent-api[.]atera[.]com
  • api[.]playanext[.]com with user agent AnyDesk/8.0.9

RMM tools have a wide range of legitimate capabilities that allow IT administrators to remotely manage endpoints. However, they can also be repurposed for malicious activities, allowing threat actors to maintain persistent access to systems, execute commands remotely, and even exfiltrate data. As the use of RMM tools can be legitimate, they offer threat actors a way to perform malicious activities while blending into normal business operations, which could evade detection by human analysts or traditional security tools.

One device was also seen making repeated SSL connections to a self-signed endpoint “azure-documents[.]com” (104.168.140[.]84) and further HTTP POSTs to “serv1[.]api[.]9hits[.]com/we/session” (128.199.207[.]131). Although the contents of these connections were encrypted, they were likely additional infrastructure used for C2 in addition to the RMM tools that were used. Self-signed certificates may also be used by an attacker to encrypt C2 communications.

Internal Reconnaissance

Following the exploit, two of the compromised devices then started to conduct internal reconnaissance activity. The following figure shows a spike in the number of internal connections made by one of the compromised devices on the customer’s environment, which typically indicates a network scan.

Advanced Search results of internal connections made an affected device.
Figure 2: Advanced Search results of internal connections made an affected device.

Reconnaissance tools such as Advanced Port Scanner (“www[.]advanced-port-scanner[.]com”) and Nmap were also seen being used by one of the devices to conduct scanning activities. Nmap is a network scanning tool commonly used by security teams for legitimate purposes like network diagnostics and vulnerability scanning. However, it can also be abused by threat actors to perform network reconnaissance, a technique known as Living off the Land (LotL). This not only reduces the need for custom or external tools but also reduces the risk of exposure, as the use of a legitimate tool in the network is unlikely to raise suspicion.

Privilege Escalation

In another affected customer network, the threat actor’s attempt to escalate their privileges was also observed, as a FortiClient EMS device was seen with an unusually large number of SMB/NTLM login failures, indicative of brute force activity. This attempt was successful, and the device was later seen authenticating with the credential “administrator”.

Figure 3: Advanced Search results of NTLM (top) and SMB (bottom) login failures.

Lateral Movement

After escalating privileges, attempts to move laterally throughout the same network were seen. One device was seen transferring the file “PSEXESVC.exe” to another device over SMB. This file is associated with PsExec, a command-line tool that allows for remote execution on other systems.

The threat actor was also observed leveraging the DCE-RPC protocol to move laterally within the network. Devices were seen with activity such as an increase in new RPC services, unusual requests to the SVCCTL endpoint, and the execution of WMI commands. The DCE-RPC protocol is typically used to facilitate communication between services on different systems and can allow one system to request services or execute commands on another.

These are further examples of LotL techniques used by threat actors exploiting CVE-2023-48788, as PsExec and the DCE-RPC protocol are often also used for legitimate administrative operations.

Accomplish Mission

In most cases, the threat actor’s end goal was not clearly observed. However, Darktrace did detect one instance where an unusually large volume of data had been uploaded to “put[.]io”, a cloud storage service, indicating that the end goal of the threat actor had been to steal potentially sensitive data.

In a recent investigation of a Medusa ransomware incident that took place in July 2024, Darktrace’s Threat Research team found that initial access to the environment had likely been gained through a FortiClient EMS device. An incoming connection from 209.15.71[.]121 over port 8013 was seen, suggesting that CVE-2023-48788 had been exploited. The device had been compromised almost three weeks before the ransomware was actually deployed, eventually resulting in the encryption of files.

Conclusion

Threat actors have continued to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain initial access to a network. This highlights the importance of addressing and patching vulnerabilities as soon as they are disclosed and a fix is released. However, due to the rapid nature of exploitation, this may not always be enough. Furthermore, threat actors may even be exploiting vulnerabilities that are not yet publicly known.

As the end goals for a threat actor can differ – from data exfiltration to deploying ransomware – the post-exploitation behavior can also vary from actor to actor. However, AI security tools such as Darktrace / NETWORK can help identify and alert for post-exploitation behavior based on abnormal activity seen in the network environment.

Despite CVE-2023-48788 having been publicly disclosed and fixed in March, it appears that multiple threat actors, such as the Medusa ransomware group, have continued to exploit the vulnerability on unpatched systems. With new vulnerabilities being disclosed almost every other day, security teams may find it challenging continuously patch their systems.

As such, Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management could also alleviate the workload of security teams by helping them identify and prioritize the most critical vulnerabilities in their network.

Credit to Emily Megan Lim (Cyber Security Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead)

Appendices

References

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48788

[2] https://www.horizon3.ai/attack-research/attack-blogs/cve-2023-48788-fortinet-forticlientems-sql-injection-deep-dive/

[3] https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/cve-2023-48788/

[4] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/teamcity-intrusion-saga-apt29-suspected-exploiting-cve-2023-42793

[5] https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/cve-2023-48788/

[6] https://urlscan.io/result/3678b9e2-ad61-4719-bcef-b19cadcdd929/

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

  • 212.32.243[.]25/SETUP.MSI - URL - Payload
  • 89.149.200[.]9/SETUP.MSI - URL - Payload
  • 212.113.106[.]100/setup.msi - URL - Payload
  • 95.181.173[.]172/run.zip - URL - Payload
  • serv1[.]api[.]9hits[.]com - Domain - Likely C2 endpoint
  • 128.199.207[.]131 - IP - Likely C2 endpoint
  • azure-documents[.]com - Domain - C2 endpoint
  • 104.168.140[.]84 - IP - C2 endpoint
  • 77.246.103[.]110 - IP - Likely C2 endpoint
  • 212.113.106[.]100 - IP - C2 endpoint

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Server Activity / Server Activity on New Non-Standard Port - External

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Device / New User Agent

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Network Range Scan

Device / Network Scan

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous Connection / Multiple SMB Admin Session

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Device / Increase in New RPC Services

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Breaches

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Unusual Activity / Successful Admin Brute-Force Activity

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – ID: Technique

Initial Access – T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application

Resource Development – T1587.003: Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates

Resource Development – T1608.003: Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate

Command and Control – T1071.001: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1219: Remote Access Software

Execution – T1059.001: Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Reconnaissance – T1595: Active Scanning

Reconnaissance – T1590.005: Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses

Discovery – T1046: Network Service Discovery

Credential Access – T1110: Brute Force

Defense Evasion,Initial Access,Persistence,Privilege Escalation – T1078: Valid Accounts

Lateral Movement – T1021.002: Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Lateral Movement – T1021.003: Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model

Execution – T1569.002: System Services: Service Execution

Execution – T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation

Exfiltration – T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Exfiltration – T1567.002: Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Emily Megan Lim
Cyber Analyst
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October 10, 2024

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Email

How Darktrace won an email security trial by learning the business, not the breach

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Recently, Darktrace ran a customer trial of our email security product for a leading European infrastructure operator looking to upgrade its email protection.

During this prospective customer trial, Darktrace encountered several security incidents that penetrated existing security layers. Two of these incidents were Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks, which we’re going to take a closer look at here.  

Darktrace was deployed for a trial at the same time as two other email security vendors, who were also being evaluated by the prospective customer. Darktrace’s superior detection of threats in this trial laid the groundwork for the respective company to choose our product.

Let’s dig into some of the elements of this Darktrace tech win and how they came to light during this trial.

Why truly intelligent AI starts learning from scratch

Darktrace’s detection capabilities are powered by true unsupervised machine learning, which detects anomalous activity from its ever-evolving understanding of normal for every unique environment. Consequently, it learns every business from the beginning, training on an organization’s data to understand normal for its users, devices, assets and the millions of connections between them.  

This learning period takes around a week, during which the AI hones its understanding of the business to a precise degree. At this stage, the system may produce some noise or lack precision, but this is a testament to our unsupervised machine learning. Unlike solutions that promise faster results by relying on preset assumptions, our AI takes the necessary time to learn from scratch, ensuring a deeper understanding and increasingly accurate detection over time.

Real threats detected by Darktrace

Attack 1: Supply chain attack

BEC and supply chain attacks are notoriously difficult to detect, as they take advantage of established, trusted senders.  

This attack came from a legitimate server via a known supplier with which the prospective customer had active and ongoing communication. Using the compromised account, the attacker didn’t just send out randomized spam, they crafted four sophisticated social engineering emails with the aim of soliciting users to click on a link – directly tapping into existing conversations. Darktrace / EMAIL was configured in passive mode during this trial; it would otherwise have held the emails before they arrived in the inbox. Luckily in this instance, one user reported the email to the CISO before any other users clicked the link. Upon investigation, the link contained timed ransomware detonation.  

Darktrace was the only vendor that caught any of these four emails. Our unique behavioral AI approach enables Darktrace / EMAIL to protect customers from even the most sophisticated attacks that abuse prior trust and relationships.

How did Darktrace catch this attack that other vendors missed?

With traditional email security, security teams have been obliged to allow entire organizations to eliminate false positives – on the premise that it’s easier to make a broad decision based on an entire known domain and assume that potential risk of a supply chain attack.

By contrast, Darktrace adopts a zero trust mentality, analyzing every email to understand whether communication that has previously been safe remains safe. That’s why Darktrace is uniquely positioned to detect BEC, based on its deep learning of internal and external users. Because it creates individual profiles for every account, group and business composed of multiple signals, it can detect deviations in their communication patterns based on the context and content of each message. We think of this as the ‘self-learning’ vs ‘learning the breach’ differentiator.

Fig 1: Darktrace analysis of one of four malicious emails sent by the trusted supplier. It gives it an anomaly score of 100, despite it being from a known correspondent with a known domain relationship and moderate mailing history.

If set in autonomous mode where it can apply actions, Darktrace / EMAIL would have quarantined all four emails. Using machine learning indicators such as ‘Inducement Shift’ and ‘General Behavioral Anomaly’, it deemed the four emails ‘Out of Character’. It also identified the link as highly likely to be phishing, based purely on its context. These indicators are critical because the link itself belonged to a widely used legitimate domain, leveraging their established internet reputation to appear safe.  

Around an hour later the supplier regained control of the account and sent a legitimate email alerting a wide distribution list to the phishing emails sent. Darktrace was able to discern the previously sent malicious emails from the current legitimate emails and allowed these emails through. Compared to other vendors that have a static understanding of malicious which needs to be updated (in cases like this, once a supplier is de-compromised), Darktrace’s deep understanding of external entities enables further nuance and precision in determining good from bad.

Fig 2: Darktrace let through four emails (subject line: Virus E-Mail) from the supplier once they had regained control of the compromised account, with a limited anomaly score despite having held the previous malicious emails. If any actions had been taken a red icon would show on the right-hand side – in this instance Darktrace did not take action and let the emails through.

Attack 2: Microsoft 365 account takeover

As part of building behavioral profiles of every email user, Darktrace analyzes their wider account activity. Account activity, such as unusual login patterns and administrative activity, is a key variable to detect account compromise before malicious activity occurs, but it also feeds into Darktrace’s understanding of which emails should belong in every user’s inbox.  

When the customer experienced an account compromise on day two of the trial, Darktrace began an investigation and was able to provide the full breakdown and scope of the incident.

The account was compromised via an email, which Darktrace would have blocked if it had been deployed autonomously at the time. Once the account had been compromised, detection details included:

  • Unusual Login and Account Update
  • Multiple Unusual External Sources for SaaS Credential
  • Unusual Activity Block
  • Login From Rare Endpoint While User is Active
Fig 3: Darktrace flagged the following indicators of compromise that deviated from normal behavior for the user in question, signaling an account takeover

With Darktrace / EMAIL, every user is analyzed for behavioral signals including authentication and configuration activity. Here the unusual login, credential input and rare endpoint were all clear signals a compromised account, contextualized against what is normal for that employee. Because Darktrace isn’t looking at email security merely from the perspective of the inbox. It constantly reevaluates the identity of each individual, group and organization (as defined by their behavioral signals), to determine precisely what belongs in the inbox and what doesn’t.  

In this instance, Darktrace / EMAIL would have blocked the incident were it not deployed in passive mode. In the initial intrusion it would have blocked the compromising email. And once the account was compromised, it would have taken direct blocking actions on the account based on the anomalous activity it detected, providing an extra layer of defense beyond the inbox.  

Account takeover protection is always part of Darktrace / EMAIL, which can be extended to fully cover Microsoft 365 SaaS with Darktrace / IDENTITY. By bringing SaaS activity into scope, security teams also benefit from an extended set of use cases including compliance and resource management.

Why this customer committed to Darktrace / EMAIL

“Darktrace was the only AI vendor that showed learning,” – CISO, Trial Customer

Throughout this trial, Darktrace evolved its understanding of the trial customer’s business and its email users. It identified attacks that other vendors did not, while allowing safe emails through. Furthermore, the CISO explicitly cited Darktrace as the only technology that demonstrated autonomous learning. As well as catching threats that other vendors did not, the CISO saw maturity areas such as how Darktrace dealt with non-productive mail and business-as-usual emails, without any user input.  Because of the nature of unsupervised ML, Darktrace’s learning of right and wrong will never be static or complete – it will continue to revise its understanding and adapt to the changing business and communications landscape.

This case study highlights a key tenet of Darktrace’s philosophy – that a rules and tuning-based approach will always be one step behind. Delivering benign emails while holding back malicious emails from the same domain demonstrates that safety is not defined in a straight line, or by historical precedent. Only by analyzing every email in-depth for its content and context can you guarantee that it belongs.  

While other solutions are making efforts to improve a static approach with AI, Darktrace’s AI remains truly unsupervised so it is dynamic enough to catch the most agile and evolving threats. This is what allows us to protect our customers by plugging a vital gap in their security stack that ensures they can meet the challenges of tomorrow's email attacks.

Interested in learning more about Darktrace / EMAIL? Check out our product hub.

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About the author
Carlos Gray
Product Manager

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October 4, 2024

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Inside the SOC

From Call to Compromise: Darktrace’s Response to a Vishing-Induced Network Attack

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What is vishing?

Vishing, or voice phishing, is a type of cyber-attack that utilizes telephone devices to deceive targets. Threat actors typically use social engineering tactics to convince targets that they can be trusted, for example, by masquerading as a family member, their bank, or trusted a government entity. One method frequently used by vishing actors is to intimidate their targets, convincing them that they may face monetary fines or jail time if they do not provide sensitive information.

What makes vishing attacks dangerous to organizations?

Vishing attacks utilize social engineering tactics that exploit human psychology and emotion. Threat actors often impersonate trusted entities and can make it appear as though a call is coming from a reputable or known source.  These actors often target organizations, specifically their employees, and pressure them to obtain sensitive corporate data, such as privileged credentials, by creating a sense of urgency, intimidation or fear. Corporate credentials can then be used to gain unauthorized access to an organization’s network, often bypassing traditional security measures and human security teams.

Darktrace’s coverage of vishing attack

On August 12, 2024, Darktrace / NETWORK identified malicious activity on the network of a customer in the hospitality sector. The customer later confirmed that a threat actor had gained unauthorized access through a vishing attack. The attacker successfully spoofed the IT support phone number and called a remote employee, eventually leading to the compromise.

Figure 1: Timeline of events in the kill chain of this attack.

Establishing a Foothold

During the call, the remote employee was requested to authenticate via multi-factor authentication (MFA). Believing the caller to be a member of their internal IT support, using the legitimate caller ID, the remote user followed the instructions and confirmed the MFA prompt, providing access to the customer’s network.

This authentication allowed the threat actor to login into the customer’s environment by proxying through their Virtual Private Network (VPN) and gain a foothold in the network. As remote users are assigned the same static IP address when connecting to the corporate environment, the malicious actor appeared on the network using the correct username and IP address. While this stealthy activity might have evaded traditional security tools and human security teams, Darktrace’s anomaly-based threat detection identified an unusual login from a different hostname by analyzing NTLM requests from the static IP address, which it determined to be anomalous.

Observed Activity

  • On 2024-08-12 the static IP was observed using a credential belonging to the remote user to initiate an SMB session with an internal domain controller, where the authentication method NTLM was used
  • A different hostname from the usual hostname associated with this remote user was identified in the NTLM authentication request sent from a device with the static IP address to the domain controller
  • This device does not appear to have been seen on the network prior to this event.

Darktrace, therefore, recognized that this login was likely made by a malicious actor.

Internal Reconnaissance

Darktrace subsequently observed the malicious actor performing a series of reconnaissance activities, including LDAP reconnaissance, device hostname reconnaissance, and port scanning:

  • The affected device made a 53-second-long LDAP connection to another internal domain controller. During this connection, the device obtained data about internal Active Directory (AD) accounts, including the AD account of the remote user
  • The device made HTTP GET requests (e.g., HTTP GET requests with the Target URI ‘/nice ports,/Trinity.txt.bak’), indicative of Nmap usage
  • The device started making reverse DNS lookups for internal IP addresses.
Figure 2: Model alert showing the IP address from which the malicious actor connected and performed network scanning activities via port 9401.
Figure 3: Model Alert Event Log showing the affected device connecting to multiple internal locations via port 9401.

Lateral Movement

The threat actor was also seen making numerous failed NTLM authentication requests using a generic default Windows credential, indicating an attempt to brute force and laterally move through the network. During this activity, Darktrace identified that the device was using a different hostname than the one typically used by the remote employee.

Cyber AI Analyst

In addition to the detection by Darktrace / NETWORK, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into the ongoing activity. The investigation was able to correlate the seemingly separate events together into a broader incident, continuously adding new suspicious linked activities as they occurred.

Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst investigation showing the activity timeline, and the activities associated with the incident.

Upon completing the investigation, Cyber AI Analyst provided the customer with a comprehensive summary of the various attack phases detected by Darktrace and the associated incidents. This clear presentation enabled the customer to gain full visibility into the compromise and understand the activities that constituted the attack.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst displaying the observed attack phases and associated model alerts.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Despite the sophisticated techniques and social engineering tactics used by the attacker to bypass the customer’s human security team and existing security stack, Darktrace’s AI-driven approach prevented the malicious actor from continuing their activities and causing more harm.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology is able to enforce a pattern of life based on what is ‘normal’ and learned for the environment. If activity is detected that represents a deviation from expected activity from, a model alert is triggered. When Darktrace’s Autonomous Response functionality is configured in autonomous response mode, as was the case with the customer, it swiftly applies response actions to devices and users without the need for a system administrator or security analyst to perform any actions.

In this instance, Darktrace applied a number of mitigative actions on the remote user, containing most of the activity as soon as it was detected:

  • Block all outgoing traffic
  • Enforce pattern of life
  • Block all connections to port 445 (SMB)
  • Block all connections to port 9401
Figure 6: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response actions showing the actions taken in response to the observed activity, including blocking all outgoing traffic or enforcing the pattern of life.

Conclusion

This vishing attack underscores the significant risks remote employees face and the critical need for companies to address vishing threats to prevent network compromises. The remote employee in this instance was deceived by a malicious actor who spoofed the phone number of internal IT Support and convinced the employee to perform approve an MFA request. This sophisticated social engineering tactic allowed the attacker to proxy through the customer’s VPN, making the malicious activity appear legitimate due to the use of static IP addresses.

Despite the stealthy attempts to perform malicious activities on the network, Darktrace’s focus on anomaly detection enabled it to swiftly identify and analyze the suspicious behavior. This led to the prompt determination of the activity as malicious and the subsequent blocking of the malicious actor to prevent further escalation.

While the exact motivation of the threat actor in this case remains unclear, the 2023 cyber-attack on MGM Resorts serves as a stark illustration of the potential consequences of such threats. MGM Resorts experienced significant disruptions and data breaches following a similar vishing attack, resulting in financial and reputational damage [1]. If the attack on the customer had not been detected, they too could have faced sensitive data loss and major business disruptions. This incident underscores the critical importance of robust security measures and vigilant monitoring to protect against sophisticated cyber threats.

Credit to Rajendra Rushanth (Cyber Security Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Device / Unusual LDAP Bind and Search Activity
  • Device / Attack and Recon Tools
  • Device / Network Range Scan
  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / UDP Enumeration
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches (Enhanced Monitoring)
  • Device / Reverse DNS Sweep
  • Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type – Description

/nice ports,/Trinity.txt.bak - URI – Unusual Nmap Usage

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – ID – Technique

INITIAL ACCESS – T1200 – Hardware Additions

DISCOVERY – T1046 – Network Service Scanning

DISCOVERY – T1482 – Domain Trust Discovery

RECONNAISSANCE – T1590 – IP Addresses

T1590.002 – DNS

T1590.005 – IP Addresses

RECONNAISSANCE – T1592 – Client Configurations

T1592.004 – Client Configurations

RECONNAISSANCE – T1595 – Scanning IP Blocks

T1595.001 – Scanning IP Blocks

T1595.002 – Vulnerability Scanning

References

[1] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/securing-helpdesks-from-hackers-what-we-can-learn-from-the-mgm-breach/

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About the author
Rajendra Rushanth
Cyber Analyst
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