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January 26, 2024

Post-Exploitation Activities of Ivanti CS/PS Appliances

Darktrace’s teams have observed a surge in malicious activities targeting Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Ivanti Policy Secure (PS) appliances. Learn more!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst
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26
Jan 2024

Update:

Further investigation into the exploitation of Ivanti vulnerabilities CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 has uncovered an additional case within the Darktrace customer base, with the first signs of anomalous behavior on a device observed on December 21, 2023. The initial unusual activity involved SSL beaconing to a rare external IP address: 154.223.20[.]226. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) indicates that this IP was associated with the hostname api.d-n-s[.]name around January 2024 [10]. This hostname was also observed during Ivanti exploitation activities investigated by Mandiant [11]. A few days later, on December 28, 2023, the device began beaconing to a second rare IP address: 103.13.28[.]40, which has been directly linked to post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887. Beaconing to these IPs continued until December 28 and December 29, respectively.

What are 'Unknown Unknowns'?

When critical vulnerabilities in Internet-facing assets are not yet publicly disclosed, they can provide unfettered access to organizations’ networks. Threat actors’ exploitation of these vulnerabilities are prime examples of “unknown unknowns” – behaviors which security teams are not even aware that they are not aware of.  

Therefore, it is not surprising that zero-day vulnerabilities in Internet-facing assets are so attractive to state-linked actors and cybercriminals. These criminals will abuse the access these vulnerabilities afford them to progress towards harmful or disruptive objectives. This trend in threat actor activity was particularly salient in January 2024, following the disclosure of two critical vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Ivanti Policy Secure (PS) appliances. The widespread exploitation of these vulnerabilities was mirrored across Darktrace’s customer base in mid-January 2024, with Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) and Threat Research teams observing a surge in malicious activities targeting customers’ CS/PS appliances.

Vulnerabilities in Ivanti CS/PS

On January 10, 2024, Ivanti published a Security Advisory [1] and a Knowledge Base article [2] relating to the following two vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Ivanti Policy Secure (PS):

  • CVE-2023-46805 (CVSS: 8.2; Type: Authentication bypass vulnerability)
  • CVE-2024-21887 (CVSS: 9.1; Type: Command injection vulnerability)

Conjoined exploitation of these vulnerabilities allows for unauthenticated, remote code execution (RCE) on vulnerable Ivanti systems. Volexity [3] and Mandiant [4] reported clusters of CS/PS compromises, tracked as UTA0178 and UNC5221 respectively. UTA0178 and UNC5221 compromises involve exploitation of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 to deliver web shells and JavaScript credential harvesters to targeted CS/PS appliances. Both Volexity and Mandiant linked these compromises to a likely espionage-motivated, state-linked actor. GreyNoise [5] and Volexity [6] also reported likely cybercriminal activities targeting CS/PS appliances to deliver cryptominers.

The scale of this recent Ivanti CS/PS exploitation is illustrated by research findings recently shared by Censys [7]. According to these findings, as of January 22, around 1.5% of 26,000 Internet-exposed Ivanti CS appliances have been compromised, with the majority of compromised hosts falling within the United States. As cybercriminal interest in these Ivanti CS/PS vulnerabilities continues to grow, it is likely that so too will the number of attacks targeting them.

Observed Malicious Activities

Since January 15, 2024, Darktrace’s SOC and Threat Research team have observed a significant volume of malicious activities targeting customers’ Ivanti CS/PS appliances. Amongst the string of activities that were observed, the following threads were identified as salient:

  • Exploit validation activity
  • Exfiltration of system information
  • Delivery of C2 implant from AWS
  • Delivery of JavaScript credential stealer
  • SimpleHelp usage
  • Encrypted C2 on port 53
  • Delivery of cryptominer

Exploit Validation Activity

Malicious actors were observed using the out-of-band application security testing (OAST) services, Interactsh and Burp Collaborator, to validate exploits for CS/PS vulnerabilities. Malicious use of OAST services for exploit validation is common and has been seen in the early stages of previous campaigns targeting Ivanti systems [8]. In this case, the Interact[.]sh exploit tests were evidenced by CS/PS appliances making GET requests with a cURL User-Agent header to subdomains of 'oast[.]live', 'oast[.]site', 'oast[.]fun', 'oast[.]me', 'oast[.]online' and 'oast[.]pro'.  Burp Collaborator exploit tests were evidenced by CS/PS appliances making GET requests with a cURL User-Agent header to subdomains of ‘collab.urmcyber[.]xyz’ and ‘dnslog[.]store’.

Figure 1: Event Log showing a CS/PS appliance contacting an 'oast[.]pro' endpoint.
Figure 2: Event Log showing a CS/PS appliance contacting a 'collab.urmcyber[.]xyz' endpoint.
Figure 3: Packet capture (PCAP) of an Interactsh GET request.
Figure 4: PCAP of a Burp Collaborator GET request.

Exfiltration of System Information

The majority of compromised CS/PS appliances identified by Darktrace were seen using cURL to transfer hundreds of MBs of data to the external endpoint, 139.180.194[.]132. This activity appeared to be related to a threat actor attempting to exfiltrate system-related information from CS/PS appliances. These data transfers were carried out via HTTP on ports 443 and 80, with the Target URIs ‘/hello’ and ‘/helloq’ being seen in the relevant HTTP POST requests. The files sent over these data transfers were ‘.dat’ and ‘.sys’ files with what seems to be the public IP address of the targeted appliance appearing in each file’s name.

Figure 5: Event Log shows a CS/PS appliance making a POST request to 139.180.194[.]132 whilst simultaneously receiving connections from suspicious external endpoints.
Figure 6: PCAP of a POST request to 139.180.194[.]132.

Delivery of Command-and-Control (C2) implant from Amazon Web Services (AWS)

In many of the compromises observed by Darktrace, the malicious actor in question was observed delivering likely Rust-based ELF payloads to the CS/PS appliance from the AWS endpoints, archivevalley-media.s3.amazonaws[.]com, abode-dashboard-media.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws[.]com, shapefiles.fews.net.s3.amazonaws[.]com, and blooming.s3.amazonaws[.]com. In one particular case, these downloads were immediately followed by the delivery of an 18 MB payload (likely a C2 implant) from the AWS endpoint, be-at-home.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws[.]com, to the CS/PS appliance. Post-delivery, the implant seems to have initiated SSL beaconing connections to the external host, music.farstream[.]org. Around this time, Darktrace also observed the actor initiating port scanning and SMB enumeration activities from the CS/PS appliance, likely in preparation for moving laterally through the network.

Figure 7: Advanced Search logs showing a CS/PS appliance beaconing to music.farstream[.]org after downloading several payloads from AWS.

Delivery of JavaScript credential stealer

In a small number of observed cases, Darktrace observed malicious actors delivering what appeared to be a JavaScript credential harvester to targeted CS/PS appliances. The relevant JavaScript code contains instructions to send login credentials to likely compromised websites. In one case, the website, www.miltonhouse[.]nl, appeared in the code snippet, and in another, the website, cpanel.netbar[.]org, was observed. Following the delivery of this JavaScript code, HTTPS connections were observed to these websites.  This likely credential harvester appears to strongly resemble the credential stealer observed by Mandiant (dubbed ‘WARPWIRE’) in UNC5221 compromises and the credential stealer observed by Veloxity in UTA0178 compromises.

Figure 8: PCAP of ‘/3.js’ GET request for JavaScript credential harvester.
Figure 9: Snippet of response to '/3.js’ GET request.
Figure 10: PCAP of ‘/auth.js’ GET request for JavaScript credential harvester.
Figure 11: Snippet of response to '/auth.js’ GET request.
Figure 12: Advanced Search logs showing VPN-connected devices sending data to www.miltonhouse[.]nl after the Ivanti CS appliance received the JavaScript code.

The usage of this JavaScript credential harvester did not occur in isolation, but rather appears to have occurred as part of a chain of activity involving several further steps. The delivery of the ‘www.miltonhouse[.]nl’ JavaScript stealer seems to have occurred as a step in the following attack chain:  

1. Ivanti CS/PS appliance downloads a 8.38 MB ELF file over HTTP (with Target URI ‘/revsocks_linux_amd64’) from 188.116.20[.]38

2. Ivanti CS/PS appliance makes a long SSL connection (JA3 client fingerprint: 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e) over port 8444 to 185.243.112[.]245, with several MBs of data being exchanged

3. Ivanti CS/PS appliance downloads a Perl script over HTTP (with Target URI ‘/login.txt’) from 188.116.20[.]38

4. Ivanti CS/PS appliance downloads a 1.53 ELF MB file over HTTP (with Target URI ‘/aparche2’) from 91.92.240[.]113

5. Ivanti CS/PS appliance downloads a 4.5 MB ELF file over HTTP (with Target URI ‘/agent’) from 91.92.240[.]113

6. Ivanti CS/PS appliance makes a long SSL connection (JA3 client fingerprint: 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e) over port 11601 to 45.9.149[.]215, with several MBs of data being exchanged

7. Ivanti CS/PS appliance downloads Javascript credential harvester over HTTP (with Target URI ‘/auth.js’) from 91.92.240[.]113

8. Ivanti CS/PS appliance downloads a Perl script over HTTP (with Target URI ‘/login.cgi’) from 91.92.240[.]113

9. Ivanti CS/PS appliance makes a long SSL connection (JA3 client fingerprint: 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e) over port 11601 to 91.92.240[.]71, with several MBs of data being exchanged

10. Ivanti CS/PS appliance makes a long SSL connection (JA3 client fingerprint: 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e) over port 11601 to 45.9.149[.]215, with several MBs of data being exchanged

11. Ivanti CS/PS appliance makes a long SSL connection (JA3 client fingerprint: 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e) over port 8080 to 91.92.240[.]113, with several MBs of data being exchanged

12. Ivanti CS/PS appliance makes a long SSL connection (JA3 client fingerprint: 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e) over port 11601 to 45.9.149[.]112, with several MBs of data being exchanged  

These long SSL connections likely represent a malicious actor creating reverse shells from the targeted CS/PS appliance to their C2 infrastructure. Whilst it is not certain that these behaviors are part of the same attack chain, the similarities between them (such as the Target URIs, the JA3 client fingerprint and the use of port 11601) seem to suggest a link.  

Figure 13: Advanced Search logs showing a chain of malicious behaviours from a CS/PS appliance.
Figure 14: Advanced Search data showing the JA3 client fingerprint ‘19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e’ exclusively appearing in the aforementioned, long SSL connections from the targeted CS/PS appliance.
Figure 15: PCAP of ‘/login.txt’ GET request for a Perl script.
Figure 16: PCAP of ‘/login.cgi’ GET request for a Pearl script.

SimpleHelp Usage

After gaining a foothold on vulnerable CS/PS appliances, certain actors attempted to deepen their foothold within targeted networks. In several cases, actors were seen using valid account credentials to pivot over RDP from the vulnerable CS/PS appliance to other internal systems. Over these RDP connections, the actors appear to have installed the remote support tool, SimpleHelp, onto targeted internal systems, as evidenced by these systems’ subsequent HTTP requests. In one of the observed cases, a lateral movement target downloaded a 7.33 MB executable file over HTTP (Target URI: /ta.dat; User-Agent header: Microsoft BITS/7.8) from 45.9.149[.]215 just before showing signs of SimpleHelp usage. The apparent involvement of 45.9.149[.]215 in these SimpleHelp threads may indicate a connection between them and the credential harvesting thread outlined above.

Figure 17: Advanced Search logs showing an internal system making SimpleHelp-indicating HTTP requests immediately after receiving large volumes of data over RDP from an CS/PS appliance.
Figure 18: PCAP of a SimpleHelp-related GET request.

Encrypted C2 over port 53

In a handful of the recently observed CS/PS compromises, Darktrace identified malicious actors dropping a 16 MB payload which appears to use SSL-based C2 communication on port 53. C2 communication on port 53 is a commonly used attack method, with various malicious payloads, including Cobalt Strike DNS, being known to tunnel C2 communications via DNS requests on port 53. Encrypted C2 communication on port 53, however, is less common. In the cases observed by Darktrace, payloads were downloaded from 103.13.28[.]40 and subsequently reached back out to 103.13.28[.]40 over SSL on port 53.

Figure 19: PCAP of a ‘/linb64.png’ GET request.
Figure 20: Advanced Search logs showing a CS/PS appliance making SSL conns over port 53 to 103.13.28[.]40 immediately after downloading a 16 MB payload from 103.13.28[.]40.

Delivery of cryptominer

As is often the case, financially motivated actors also appeared to have sought to exploit the Ivanti appliances, with actors observed exploiting CS/PS appliances to deliver cryptomining malware. In one case, Darktrace observed an actor installing a Monero cryptominer onto a vulnerable CS/PS appliance, with the miner being downloaded via HTTP on port 8089 from 192.252.183[.]116.

Figure 21: PCAP of GET request for a Bash script which appeared to kill existing cryptominers.
Figure 22: PCAP of a GET request for a JSON config file – returned config file contains mining details such as ‘auto.3pool[.]org:19999’.
Figure 23: PCAP of a GET request for an ELF payload

Potential Pre-Ransomware Post-Compromise Activity

In one observed case, a compromise of a customer’s CS appliance was followed by an attacker using valid account credentials to connect to the customer’s CS VPN subnet. The attacker used these credentials to pivot to other parts of the customer’s network, with tools and services such as PsExec, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service, and Service Control being abused to facilitate the lateral movement. Other Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, such as AnyDesk and ConnectWise Control (previously known as ScreenConnect), along with certain reconnaissance tools such as Netscan, Nmap, and PDQ, also appear to have been used. The attacker subsequently exfiltrated data (likely via Rclone) to the file storage service, put[.]io, potentially in preparation for a double extortion ransomware attack. However, at the time of writing, it was not clear what the relation was between this activity and the CS compromise which preceded it.

Darktrace Coverage

Darktrace has observed malicious actors carrying out a variety of post-exploitation activities on Internet-exposed CS/PS appliances, ranging from data exfiltration to the delivery of C2 implants and crypto-miners. These activities inevitably resulted in CS/PS appliances displaying patterns of network traffic greatly deviating from their typical “patterns of life”.

Darktrace DETECT™ identified these deviations and generated a variety of model breaches (i.e, alerts) highlighting the suspicious activity. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ autonomously investigated the ongoing compromises and connected the individual model breaches, viewing them as related incidents rather than isolated events. When active and configured in autonomous response mode, Darktrace RESPOND™ containted attackers’ operations by autonomously blocking suspicious patterns of network traffic as soon as they were identified by Darktrace DETECT.

The exploit validation activities carried out by malicious actors resulted in CS/PS servers making HTTP connections with cURL User-Agent headers to endpoints associated with OAST services such as Interactsh and Burp Collaborator. Darktrace DETECT recognized that this HTTP activity was suspicious for affected devices, causing the following models to breach:

  • Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services
  • Device / Suspicious Domain
  • Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System
  • Device / New User Agent
Figure 24: Event Log showing a CS/PS appliance breaching models due to its Interactsh HTTP requests.
Figure 25: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event highlighting a CS/PS appliance's Interactsh connections.

Malicious actors’ uploads of system information to 139.180.194[.]132 resulted in cURL POST requests being sent from the targeted CS/PS appliances. Darktrace DETECT judged these HTTP POST requests to be anomalous, resulting in combinations of the following model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
Figure 26: Event Log showing the creation of a model breach due to a CS/PS appliance’s POST request to 139.180.194[.]132.
Figure 27: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event highlighting POST requests from a CS/PS appliance to 139.180.194[.]132.

The installation of AWS-hosted C2 implants onto vulnerable CS/PS appliances resulted in beaconing connections which Darktrace DETECT recognized as anomalous, leading to the following model breaches:

  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

When enabled in autonomous response mode, Darktrace RESPOND was able to follow up these detections by blocking affected devices from connecting externally over port 80, 443, 445 or 8081, effectively shutting down the attacker’s beaconing activity.

Figure 28: Event Log showing the creation of a model breach and the triggering of an autonomous RESPOND action due to a CS/PS appliance's beaconing connections.

The use of encrypted C2 on port 53 by malicious actors resulted in CS/PS appliances making SSL connections over port 53. Darktrace DETECT judged this port to be uncommon for SSL traffic and consequently generated the following model breach:

  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
Figure 29: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event highlighting a ‘/linb64.png’ GET request from a CS/PS appliance to 103.13.28[.]40.
Figure 30: Event Log showing the creation of a model breach due to CS/PS appliance’s external SSL connection on port 53.
Figure 31: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event highlighting a CS/PS appliance’s SSL connections over port 53 to 103.13.28[.]40.

Malicious actors’ attempts to run cryptominers on vulnerable CS/PS appliances resulted in downloads of Bash scripts and JSON files from external endpoints rarely visited by the CS/PS appliances themselves or by neighboring systems. Darktrace DETECT identified these deviations in device behavior and generated the following model breaches:

  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

Darktrace RESPOND, when configured to respond autonomously, was subsequently able to carry out a number of actions to contain the attacker’s activity. This included blocking all outgoing traffic on offending devices and enforcing a “pattern of life” on devices ensuring they had to adhere to expected network behavior.

Figure 32: Event Log showing the creation of model breaches and the triggering of autonomous RESPOND actions in response to a CS/PS appliance’s cryptominer download.
Figure 33: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event highlighting a CS/PS appliance’s cryptominer download.

The use of RDP to move laterally and spread SimpleHelp to other systems resulted in CS/PS appliances using privileged credentials to initiate RDP sessions. These RDP sessions, and the subsequent traffic resulting from usage of SimpleHelp, were recognized by Darktrace DETECT as being highly out of character, prompting the following model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Compromise / Suspicious HTTP Beacons to Dotted Quad
  • Anomalous File / Anomalous Octet Stream (No User Agent)
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Figure 34: Event Log showing the creation of a model breach due to a CS/PS appliance’s usage of an admin credential to RDP to another internal system.
Figure 35: Event Log showing the creation of model breaches due to SimpleHelp-HTTP requests from a device targeted for lateral movement.
Figure 36: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event highlighting the SimpleHelp-indicating HTTP requests made by an internal system.

Conclusion

The recent widespread exploitation of Ivanti CS/PS is a stark reminder of the threat posed by malicious actors armed with exploits for Internet-facing assets.

Based on the telemetry available to Darktrace, a wide range of malicious activities were carried out against CS/PS appliances, likely via exploitation of the recently disclosed CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 vulnerabilities.

These activities include the usage of OAST services for exploit validation, the exfiltration of system information to 139.180.194[.]132, the delivery of AWS-hosted C2 implants, the delivery of JavaScript credential stealers, the usage of SimpleHelp, the usage of SSL-based C2 on port 53, and the delivery of crypto-miners. These activities are far from exhaustive, and many more activities will undoubtedly be uncovered as the situation develops and our understanding grows.

While there were no patches available at the time of writing, Ivanti stated that they were expected to be released shortly, with the “first version targeted to be available to customers the week of 22 January 2023 and the final version targeted to be available the week of 19 February” [9].

Fortunately for vulnerable customers, in their absence of patches Darktrace DETECT was able to identify and alert for anomalous network activity that was carried out by malicious actors who had been able to successfully exploit the Ivanti CS and PS vulnerabilities. While the activity that followed these zero-day vulnerabilities may been able to have bypass traditional security tools reliant upon existing threat intelligence and indicators of compromise (IoCs), Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach allows it to identify such activity based on the subtle deviations in a devices behavior that typically emerge as threat actors begin to work towards their goals post-compromise.

In addition to Darktrace’s ability to identify this type of suspicious behavior, its autonomous response technology, Darktrace RESPOND is able to provide immediate follow-up with targeted mitigative actions to shut down malicious activity on affected customer environments as soon as it is detected.

Credit to: Nahisha Nobregas, SOC Analyst, Emma Foulger, Principle Cyber Analyst, and the Darktrace Threat Research Team

Appendices

List of IoCs Possible IoCs:

-       curl/7.19.7 (i686-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.63.0 OpenSSL/1.0.2n zlib/1.2.3

-       curl/7.19.7 (i686-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.63.0 OpenSSL/1.0.2n zlib/1.2.7

Mid-high confidence IoCs:

-       http://139.180.194[.]132:443/hello

-       http://139.180.194[.]132:443/helloq

-       http://blooming.s3.amazonaws[.]com/Ea7fbW98CyM5O (SHA256 hash: 816754f6eaf72d2e9c69fe09dcbe50576f7a052a1a450c2a19f01f57a6e13c17)

-       http://abode-dashboard-media.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws[.]com/kaffMm40RNtkg (SHA256 hash: 47ff0ae9220a09bfad2a2fb1e2fa2c8ffe5e9cb0466646e2a940ac2e0cf55d04)

-       http://archivevalley-media.s3.amazonaws[.]com/bbU5Yn3yayTtV (SHA256 hash: c7ddd58dcb7d9e752157302d516de5492a70be30099c2f806cb15db49d466026)

-       http://shapefiles.fews.net.s3.amazonaws[.]com/g6cYGAxHt4JC1 (SHA256 hash: c26da19e17423ce4cb4c8c47ebc61d009e77fc1ac4e87ce548cf25b8e4f4dc28)

-       http://be-at-home.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws[.]com/2ekjMjslSG9uI

-       music.farstream[.]org  • 104.21.86[.]153 / 172.67.221[.]78

-       http://197.243.22[.]27/3.js

-       http://91.92.240[.]113/auth.js

-       www.miltonhouse[.]nl • 88.240.53[.]22

-       cpanel.netbar[.]org • 146.19.212[.]12

-       http://188.116.20[.]38/revsocks_linux_amd64

-       185.243.112[.]245:8444

-        http://188.116.20[.]38/login.txt

-       http://91.92.240[.]113/aparche2 (SHA256 hash: 9d11c3cf10b20ff5b3e541147f9a965a4e66ed863803c54d93ba8a07c4aa7e50)

-       http://91.92.240[.]113/agent (SHA256 hash: 7967def86776f36ab6a663850120c5c70f397dd3834f11ba7a077205d37b117f)

-       45.9.149[.]215:11601

-       45.9.149[.]112:11601

-       http://91.92.240[.]113/login.cgi

-       91.92.240[.]71:11601

-       91.92.240[.]113:8080

-       http://45.9.149[.]215/ta.dat (SHA256 hash: 4bcf1333b3ad1252d067014c606fb3a5b6f675f85c59b69ca45669d45468e923)

-       91.92.241[.]18

-       94.156.64[.]252

-       http://144.172.76[.]76/lin86

-       144.172.122[.]14:443

-       http://185.243.115[.]58:37586/

-       http://103.13.28[.]40/linb64.png

-       103.13.28[.]40:53

-       159.89.82[.]235:8081

-       http://192.252.183[.]116:8089/u/123/100123/202401/d9a10f4568b649acae7bc2fe51fb5a98.sh

-       http://192.252.183[.]116:8089/u/123/100123/202401/sshd

-       http://192.252.183[.]116:8089/u/123/100123/202401/31a5f4ceae1e45e1a3cd30f5d7604d89.json

-       http://103.27.110[.]83/module/client_amd64

-       http://103.27.110[.]83/js/bootstrap.min.js?UUID=...

-       http://103.27.110[.]83/js/jquery.min.js

-       http://95.179.238[.]3/bak

-       http://91.92.244[.]59:8080/mbPHenSdr6Cf79XDAcKEVA

-       31.220.30[.]244

-       http://172.245.60[.]61:8443/SMUkbpX-0qNtLGsuCIuffAOLk9ZEBCG7bIcB2JT6GA/

-       http://172.245.60[.]61/ivanti

-       http://89.23.107[.]155:8080/l-5CzlHWjkp23gZiVLzvUg

-       http://185.156.72[.]51:8080/h7JpYIZZ1-rrk98v3YEy6w

-       http://185.156.72[.]51:8080/8uSQsOTwFyEAsXVwbAJ2mA

-       http://185.156.72[.]51:8080/vuln

-       185.156.72[.]51:4440

-       185.156.72[.]51:8080

-       185.156.72[.]51:4433

-       185.156.72[.]51:4446

-       185.156.72[.]51:4445

-       http://185.156.72[.]51/set.py

-       185.156.72[.]51:7777

-       45.9.151[.]107:7070

-       185.195.59[.]74:7070

-       185.195.59[.]74:20958

-       185.195.59[.]74:34436

-       185.195.59[.]74:37464

-       185.195.59[.]74:41468    

References

[1] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_US

[2] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/KB-CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_US

[3] https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/01/10/active-exploitation-of-two-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-ivanti-connect-secure-vpn/

[4] https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-targets-ivanti-zero-day

[5] https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ivanti-connect-secure-exploited-to-install-cryptominers

[6] https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/01/18/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-exploitation-new-observations/

[7] https://censys.com/the-mass-exploitation-of-ivanti-connect-secure/

[8] https://darktrace.com/blog/entry-via-sentry-analyzing-the-exploitation-of-a-critical-vulnerability-in-ivanti-sentry

[9] https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_US  

[10] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/154.223.20.226/relations

[11] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/investigating-ivanti-zero-day-exploitation/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Sam Lister
SOC Analyst

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August 7, 2025

How CDR & Automated Forensics Transform Cloud Incident Response

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Introduction: Cloud investigations

In cloud security, speed, automation and clarity are everything. However, for many SOC teams, responding to incidents in the cloud is often very difficult especially when attackers move fast, infrastructure is ephemeral, and forensic skills are scarce.

In this blog we will walk through an example that shows exactly how Darktrace Cloud Detection and Response (CDR) and automated cloud forensics together, solve these challenges, automating cloud detection, and deep forensic investigation in a way that’s fast, scalable, and deeply insightful.

The Problem: Cloud incidents are hard to investigate

Security teams often face three major hurdles when investigating cloud detections:

Lack of forensic expertise: Most SOCs and security teams aren’t natively staffed with forensics specialists.

Ephemeral infrastructure: Cloud assets spin up and down quickly, leaving little time to capture evidence.

Lack of existing automation: Gathering forensic-level data often requires manual effort and leaves teams scrambling around during incidents — accessing logs, snapshots, and system states before they disappear. This process is slow and often blocked by permissions, tooling gaps, or lack of visibility.

How Darktrace augments cloud investigations

1. Darktrace’s CDR finds anomalous activity in the cloud

An alert is generated for a large outbound data transfer from an externally facing EC2 instance to a rare external endpoint. It’s anomalous, unexpected, and potentially serious.

2. AI-led investigation stitches together the incident for a SOC analyst to look into

When a security incident unfolds, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst TM is the first to surface it, automatically correlating behaviors, surfacing anomalies, and presenting a cohesive incident summary. It’s fast, detailed, and invaluable.

Once the incident is created, more questions are raised.

  • How were the impacted resources compromised?
  • How did the attack unfold over time – what tools and malware were used?
  • What data was accessed and exfiltrated?

What you’ll see as a SOC analyst: The incident begins in Darktrace’s Threat Visualizer, where a Cyber AI Analyst incident has been generated automatically highlighting large anomalous data transfer to a suspicious external IP. This isn’t just another alert, it’s a high-fidelity signal backed by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI.

Cyber AI Analyst incident created for anomalous outbound data transfer
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst incident created for anomalous outbound data transfer

The analyst can then immediately pivot to Darktrace / CLOUD’s architecture view (see below), gaining context on the asset’s environment, ingress/egress points, connected systems, potential attack paths and whether there are any current misconfigurations detected on the asset.

Darktrace / CLOUD architecture view providing critical cloud context
Figure 2: Darktrace / CLOUD architecture view providing critical cloud context

3. Automated forensic capture — No expertise required

Then comes the game-changer, Darktrace’s recent acquisition of Cado enhances its cloud forensics capabilities. From the first alert triggered, Darktrace has already kicked in and automatically processed and analyzed a full volume capture of the EC2. Everything, past and present, is preserved. No need for manual snapshots, CLI commands, or specialist intervention.

Darktrace then provides a clear timeline highlighting the evidence and preserving it. In our example we identify:

  • A brute-force attempt on a file management app, followed by a successful login
  • A reverse shell used to gain unauthorized remote access to the EC2
  • A reverse TCP connection to the same suspicious IP flagged by Darktrace
  • Attacker commands showing how the data was split and prepared for exfiltration
  • A file (a.tar) created from two sensitive archives: product_plans.zip and research_data.zip

All of this is surfaced through the timeline view, ranked by significance using machine learning. The analyst can pivot through time, correlate events, and build a complete picture of the attack — without needing cloud forensics expertise.

Darktrace even gives the ability to:

  • Download and inspect gathered files in full detail, enabling teams to verify exactly what data was accessed or exfiltrated.
  • Interact with the file system as if it were live, allowing investigators to explore directories, uncover hidden artifacts, and understand attacker movement with precision.
Figure 3 Cado critical forensic investigation automated insights
Figure 3: Cado critical forensic investigation automated insights
Figure 4: Cado forensic file analysis of reverse shell and download option
Figure 5: a.tar created from two sensitive archives: product_plans.zip and research_data.zip
Figure 6: Traverse the full file system of the asset

Why this matters?

This workflow solves the hardest parts of cloud investigation:

  1. Capturing evidence before it disappears
  2. Understanding attacker behavior in detail - automatically
  3. Linking detections to impact with full incident visibility

This kind of insight is invaluable for organizations especially regulated industries, where knowing exactly what data was affected is critical for compliance and reporting. It’s also a powerful tool for detecting insider threats, not just external attackers.

Darktrace / CLOUD and Cado together acts as a force multiplier helping with:

  • Reducing investigation time from hours to minutes
  • Preserving ephemeral evidence automatically
  • Empowering analysts with forensic-level visibility

Cloud threats aren’t slowing down. Your response shouldn’t either. Darktrace / CLOUD + Cado gives your SOC the tools to detect, contain, and investigate cloud incidents — automatically, accurately, and at scale.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Adam Stevens
Director of Product, Cloud Security

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August 6, 2025

2025 Cyber Threat Landscape: Darktrace’s Mid-Year Review

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2025: Threat landscape in review

The following is a retrospective of the first six months of 2025, highlighting key findings across the threat landscape impacting Darktrace customers.

Darktrace observed a wide range of tactics during this period, used by various types of threat actors including advanced persistent threats (APTs), Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) and Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) groups.

Methodology

Darktrace’s Analyst team conduct investigations and research into threats facing organizations and security teams across our customer base.  This includes direct investigations with our 24/7 Security Operations Centre (SOC), via services such as Managed Detection and Response (MDR) and Managed Threat Detection, as well as broader cross-fleet research through our Threat Research function.

At the core of our research is Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection, which the Analyst team contextualizes and analyzes to provide additional support to customers and deepen our understanding of the threats they face.

Threat actors are incorporating AI into offensive operations

Threat actors are continuously evolving their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), posing an ongoing challenge to effective defense hardening. Increasingly, many threat actors are adopting AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), into their operations to enhance the scale, sophistication, and efficacy of their attacks.

The evolving functionality of malware, such as the recently reported LameHug malware by CERT-UA, which uses an open-source LLM, exemplifies this observation [1].

Threat landscape trends in 2025

Threat actors applying AI to Email attacks

LLMs present a clear opportunity for attackers to take advantage of AI and create effective phishing emails at speed. While Darktrace cannot definitively confirm the use of AI to create the phishing emails observed across the customer base, the high volume of phishing emails and notable shifts in tactic could potentially be explained by threat actors adopting new tooling such as LLMs.

  • The total number of malicious emails detected by Darktrace from January to May 2025 was over 12.6 million
  • VIP users continue to face significant threat, with over 25% of all phishing emails targeting these users in the first five months of 2025
  • QR code-based phishing emails have remained a consistent tactic, with a similar proportion observed in January-May 2024 and 2025. The highest numbers were observed in February 2025, with over 1 million detected in that month alone.
  • Shifts towards increased sophistication within phishing emails are emerging, with a year-on-year increase in the proportion of phishing emails containing either a high text volume or multistage payloads. In the first five months of 2025, 32% of phishing emails contained a high volume of text.

The increase in proportion of phishing emails with a high volume of text in particular could point towards threat actors leveraging LLMs to create phishing emails with large, but believable, text in an easy and efficient way.

The above email statistics are derived from analysis of monitored Darktrace / EMAIL model data for all customer deployments hosted in the cloud between January 1 and May 31, 2025.

Campaign Spotlight: Simple, Quick - ClickFix

An interesting technique Darktrace observed multiple times throughout March and April was ClickFix social engineering, which exploits the intersection between humans and technology to trick users into executing malicious code on behalf of the attacker.

  • While this technique has been around since 2024, Darktrace observed campaign activity in the first half of 2025 suggesting a resurgence.  
  • A range of threat actors – from APTs to MaaS and RaaS have adopted this technique to deliver secondary payloads, like information stealing malware.
  • Attackers use fraudulent or compromised legitimate websites to inject malicious plugins that masquerade as fake CAPTCHAs.
  • Targeted users believe they are completing human verification or resolving a website issue, unaware that they are being guided through a series of simple steps to execute PowerShell code on their system.
  • Darktrace observed campaign activity during the first half of 2025 across a range of sectors, including Government, Healthcare, Insurance, Retail and, Non-profit.

Not just AI: Automation is enabling Ransomware and SaaS exploitation

The rise of phishing kits like FlowerStorm and Mamba2FA, which enable phishing and abuse users’ trust by mimicking legitimate services to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), highlight how the barriers to entry for sophisticated attacks continue to fall, enabling new threat actors. Combined with Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) account compromise, these techniques make up a substantial portion of cybercriminal activity observed by Darktrace so far this year.

Credentials remain the weak link

A key theme across multiple cases of ransomware was threat actors abusing compromised credentials to gain initial entry into networks via:

  • Unauthorized access to internet-facing technology such as RDP servers and virtual private networks (VPNs).
  • Unauthorized access to SaaS accounts.

SaaS targeted ransomware is on the rise

The encryption of files within SaaS environments observed by Darktrace demonstrates a continued trend of ransomware actors targeting these platforms over traditional networks, potentially driven by a higher return on investment.

SaaS accounts are often less protected than traditional systems because of Single Sign-On (SSO).  Additionally, platforms like Salesforce often host sensitive data, including emails, financial records, customer information, and network configuration details. This stresses the need for robust identity management practices and continuous monitoring.

RaaS is adding complexity and speed to cyber attacks

RaaS has dominated the attack landscape, with groups like Qilin, RansomHub, and Lynx all appearing multiple times in cases across Darktrace’s customer base over the past six months. Detecting ransomware attacks before the encryption stage remains a significant challenge, particularly in RaaS operations where different affiliates often use varying techniques for initial entry and earlier stages of the attack. Darktrace’s recent analysis of Scattered Spider underscores the challenge of hardening defenses against such varying techniques.

CVE exploitation continues despite available patches

Darktrace has also observed ransomware gangs exploiting known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), including the Medusa ransomware group’s use of the SimpleHelp vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-57727 and CVE-2024-57728 in March, despite patches being made available in January [2].

Misused tools + delayed patches = growing cyber risk

The exploitation of common remote management tools like SimpleHelp highlights the serious challenges defenders face when patch management cycles are suboptimal. As threat actors continue to abuse legitimate services for malicious purposes, the challenges facing defenders will only grow more complex.

Edge exploitation

It comes as no surprise that exploitation of internet-facing devices continued to feature prominently in Darktrace’s Threat Research investigations during the first half of 2025.

Observed CVE exploitation included:

Many of Darktrace’s observations of CVE exploitation so far in 2025 align with wider industry reporting, which suggests that Chinese-nexus threat actors were deemed to likely have exploited these technologies prior to public disclosure. In the case of CVE-2025-0994 - a vulnerability affecting Trimble Cityworks, an asset management system designed for use by local governments, utilities, airports, and public work agencies [3].

Darktrace observed signs of exploitation as early as January 19, well before vulnerability’s public disclosure on February 6 [4]. Darktrace’s early identification of the exploitation stemmed from the detection of a suspicious file download from 192.210.239[.]172:3219/z44.exe - later linked to Chinese-speaking threat actors in a campaign targeting the US government [5].

This case demonstrates the risks posed by the exploitation of internet-facing devices, not only those hosting more common technologies, but also software associated specifically tied to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI); a lucrative target for threat actors. This also highlights Darktrace’s ability to detect exploitation of internet-facing systems, even without a publicly disclosed CVE. Further examples of how Darktrace’s anomaly detection can uncover malicious activity ahead of public vulnerability disclosures can be found here.

New threats and returning adversaries

In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed a wide range of threats, from sophisticated techniques employed by APT groups to large-scale campaigns involving phishing and information stealers.

BlindEagle (APT-C-36)

Among the observed APT activity, BlindEagle (APT-C-36) was seen targeting customers in Latin America (LATM), first identified in February, with additional cases seen as recently as June.

Darktrace also observed a customer targeted in a China-linked campaign involving the LapDogs ORB network, with activity spanning from December 2024 and June 2025. These likely nation-state attacks illustrate the continued adoption of cyber and AI capabilities into the national security goals of certain countries.

Sophisticated malware functionality

Further sophistication has been observed within specific malware functionality - such as the malicious backdoor Auto-Color, which has now been found to employ suppression tactics to cover its tracks if it is unable to complete its kill chain - highlighting the potential for advanced techniques across every layer of an attack.

Familiar foes

Alongside new and emerging threats, previously observed and less sophisticated tools, such as worms, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and information stealers, continue to impact Darktrace customers.

The Raspberry Robin worm... First seen in 2021, has been repeatedly identified within Darktrace’s customer base since 2022. Most recently, Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified cases in April and May this year. Recent open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting suggests that Raspberry Robin continues to evolve its role as an Initial Access Broker (IAB), paving the way for various attacks and remaining a concern [6].

RATs also remain a threat, with examples like AsyncRAT and Gh0st RAT impacting Darktrace customers.

In April multiple cases of MaaS were observed in Darktrace’s customer base, with information stealers Amadey and Stealc, as well as GhostSocks being distributed as a follow up payload after an initial Amadey infection.

Conclusion

As cyber threats evolve, attackers are increasingly harnessing AI to craft highly convincing email attacks, automating phishing campaigns at unprecedented scale and speed. This, coupled with rapid exploitation of vulnerabilities and the growing sophistication of ransomware gangs operating as organized crime syndicates, makes today’s threat landscape more dynamic and dangerous than ever. Cyber defenders collaborate to combat these threats – the coordinated takedown of Lumma Stealer in May was a notable win for both industry and law-enforcement [7], however OSINT suggests that this threat persists [8], and new threats will continue to arise.

Traditional security tools that rely on static rules or signature-based detection often struggle to keep pace with these fast-moving, adaptive threats. In this environment, anomaly-based detection tools are no longer optional—they are essential. By identifying deviations in normal user and system behavior, tools like Darktrace provide a proactive layer of defense capable of detecting novel and emerging threats, even those that bypass conventional security measures. Investing in anomaly-based detection is critical to staying ahead of attackers who now operate with automation, intelligence, and global coordination.

Credit to Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO),  Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead), Nahisha Nobregas (Senior Cyber Analyst), Nicole Wong (Principal Cyber Analyst), Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Matthew John (Director of Operations, SOC), Sam Lister (Specialist Security Researcher), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead) and the Darktrace Incident Management team.

The information contained in this blog post is provided for general informational purposes only and represents the views and analysis of Darktrace as of the date of publication. While efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the information, the cybersecurity landscape is dynamic, and new threats or vulnerabilities may have emerged since this report was compiled.

This content is provided “as is” and without warranties of any kind, either express or implied. Darktrace makes no representations or warranties regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or suitability of the information, and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog post should be interpreted as legal, technical, or professional advice. Users of this information assume full responsibility for any actions taken based on its content, and Darktrace shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from reliance on this material. Reference to any specific products, companies, or services does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or affiliation.

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Probability

LapDogs ORB network, December 2024-June 2025

www.northumbra[.]com – Hostname – Command and Control (C2) server

103.131.189[.]2 – IP Address - C2 server, observed December 2024 & June 2025

103.106.230[.]31 – IP Address - C2 server, observed December 2024

154.223.20[.]56 – IP Address – Possible C2 server, observed December 2024

38.60.214[.]23 – IP Address – Possible C2 server, observed January & February 2025

154.223.20[.]58:1346/systemd-log – URL – Possible ShortLeash payload, observed December 2024

CN=ROOT,OU=Police department,O=LAPD,L=LA,ST=California,C=US - TLS certificate details for C2 server

CVE-2025-0994, Trimble Cityworks exploitation, January 2025

192.210.239[.]172:3219/z44.exe – URL - Likely malicious file download

AsyncRAT, February-March 2025

windows-cam.casacam[.]net – Hostname – Likely C2 server

88.209.248[.]141 – IP Address – Likely C2 server

207.231.105[.]51 – IP Address – Likely C2 server

163.172.125[.]253 – IP Address – Likely C2 server

microsoft-download.ddnsfree[.]com – Hostname – Likely C2 server

95.217.34[.]113 – IP Address – Likely C2 server

vpnl[.]net – Hostname – Likely C2 server

157.20.182[.]16 – IP Address - Likely C2 server

185.81.157[.]19 – IP Address – Likely C2 server

dynamic.serveftp[.]net – IP Address – Likely C2 server

158.220.96.15 – IP Address – Likely C2 server

CVE-2024-57727 & CVE-2024-57728, SimpleHelp RMM exploitation, March 2025

213.183.63[.]41 – IP Address - C2 server

213.183.63[.]41/access/JWrapper-Windows64JRE-version.txt?time=3512082867 – URL - C2 server

213.183.63[.]41/access/JWrapper-Windows64JRE-00000000002-archive.p2.l2 – URL - C2 server

pruebas.pintacuario[.]mx – Hostname – Possible C2 server

144.217.181[.]205 – IP Address – Likely C2 server

erp.ranasons[.]com – Hostname – Possible destination for exfiltration

143.110.243[.]154 – IP Address – Likely destination for exfiltration

Blind Eagle, April-June 2025

sostenermio2024.duckdns[.]org/31agosto.vbs – URL – Possible malicious file download

Stealc, April 2025

88.214.48[.]93/ea2cb15d61cc476f[.]php – URL – C2 server

Amadey & GhostSocks, April 2025

195.82.147[.]98 – IP Address - Amadey C2 server

195.82.147[.]98/0Bdh3sQpbD/index.php – IP Address – Likely Amadey C2 activity

194.28.226.181 – IP Address – Likely GhostSocks C2 server

RaspberryRobin, May 2025

4j[.]pm – Hostname – C2 server

4xq[.]nl – Hostname – C2 server

8t[.]wf – Hostname – C2 server

Gh0stRAT, May 2025

lu.dssiss[.]icu  - Hostname – Likely C2 server

192.238.133[.]162:7744/1-111.exe – URL – Possible addition payload

8e9dec3b028f2406a8c546a9e9ea3d50609c36bb - SHA1 - Possible additional payload

f891c920f81bab4efbaaa1f7a850d484 - MD5 – Possible additional payload

192.238.133[.]162:7744/c3p.exe – URL - Possible additional payload

03287a15bfd67ff8c3340c0bae425ecaa37a929f - SHA1 - Possible additional payload

02aa02aee2a6bd93a4a8f4941a0e6310 - MD5 - Possible additional payload

192.238.133[.]162:7744/1-1111.exe – URL - Possible additional payload

1473292e1405882b394de5a5857f0b6fa3858fd1 - SHA1 - Possible additional payload

69549862b2d357e1de5bab899ec0c817 - MD5 - Possible additional payload

192.238.133[.]162:7744/1-25.exe – URL -  Possible additional payload

20189164c4cd5cac7eb76ba31d0bd8936761d7a7  - SHA1 - Possible additional payload

f42aa5e68b28a3f335f5ea8b6c60cb57 – MD5 - Possible additional payload

192.238.133[.]162:7744/Project1_se.exe – URL - Possible additional payload

fea1e30dfafbe9fa9abbbdefbcbe245b6b0628ad - SHA1 - Possible additional payload

5ea622c630ef2fd677868cbe8523a3d5 - MD5 - Possible additional payload

192.238.133[.]162:7744/Project1_se.exe - URL - Possible additional payload

aa5a5d2bd610ccf23e58bcb17d6856d7566d71b9  - SHA1 - Possible additional payload

9d33029eaeac1c2d05cf47eebb93a1d0 - MD5 - Possible additional payload

References and further reading

1.        https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/art28-atakuye-sektor-bezpeki-ta-oboroni-za-dopomogoyu-programnogo-zasobu-sho-vikoristovuye-shtuchnii-intelekt?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=113619842&utm_content=113619842&utm_source=hs_email

2.        https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/cyber-threat-advisory-medusa-and-the-simplehelp-vulnerability

3.        https://assetlifecycle.trimble.com/en/products/software/cityworks

4.     https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0994

5.     https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-6382-exploits-cityworks-vulnerability/

6.        https://www.silentpush.com/blog/raspberry-robin/

7.        https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2025/05/21/microsoft-leads-global-action-against-favored-cybercrime-tool/

8.     https://www.trendmicro.com/en_sg/research/25/g/lumma-stealer-returns.html

Related Darktrace investigations

-              ClickFix

-              FlowerStorm

-              Mamba 2FA

-              Qilin Ransomware

-              RansomHub Ransomware

-              RansomHub Revisited

-              Lynx Ransomware

-              Scattered Spider

-              Medusa Ransomware

-              Legitimate Services Malicious Intentions

-              CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283 – Ivanti CS, PS and ZTA

-              CVE-2025-31324 – SAP Netweaver

-              Pre-CVE Threat Detection

-              BlindEagle (APT-C-36)

-              Raspberry Robin Worm

-              AsyncRAT

-              Amadey

-              Lumma Stealer

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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