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July 26, 2022

Self-Learning AI for Zero-Day and N-Day Attack Defense

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26
Jul 2022
Explore the differences between zero-day and n-day attacks on different customer servers to learn how Darktrace detects and prevents cyber threats effectively.

Key Terms:

Zero-day | A recently discovered security vulnerability in computer software that has no currently available fix or patch. Its name come from the reality that vendors have “zero days” to act and respond.

N-day | A vulnerability that emerges in computer software in which a vendor is aware and may have already issued (or are currently working on) a patch or fix. Active exploits often already exist and await abuse by nefarious actors.

Traditional security solutions often apply signature-based-detection when identifying cyber threats, helping to defend against legacy attacks but consequently missing novel ones. Therefore, security teams often lend a lot of focus to ensuring that the risk of zero-day vulnerabilities is reduced [1]. As explored in this blog, however, organizations can face just as much of a risk from n-day attacks, since they invite the most attention from malicious actors [2]. This is due in part to the reduced complexity, cost and time invested in researching and finding new exploits compared with that found when attackers exploit zero-days. 

This blog will examine both a zero-day and n-day attack that two different Darktrace customers faced in the fall of 2021. This will include the activity Darktrace detected, along with the steps taken by Darktrace/Network to intervene. It will then compare the incidents, discuss the possible dangers of third-party integrations, and assess the deprecation of legacy security tools.

Revisiting zero-day attacks 

Zero-days are among the greatest concerns security teams face in the era of modern technology and networking. Defending critical systems from zero-day compromises is a task most legacy security solutions are often unable to handle. Due to the complexity of uncovering new security flaws and developing elaborate code that can exploit them, these attacks are often carried out by funded or experienced groups such as nation-state actors and APTs. One of history’s most prolific zero-days, ‘Stuxnet’, sent security teams worldwide into a global panic in 2010. This involved a widespread attack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure and was widely accepted to be a result of nation-state actors [3]. The Stuxnet worm took advantage of four zero-day exploits, compromising over 200,000 devices and physically damaging around 10% of the 9,000 critical centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear site. 

More recently, 2021 saw the emergence of several critical zero-day vulnerabilities within SonicWall’s product suite [4]. SonicWall is a security hardware manufacturer that provides hardware firewall devices, unified threat management, VPN gateways and network security solutions. Some of these vulnerabilities lie within their Secure Mobile Access (SMA) 100 series (for example, CVE-2019-7481, CVE-2021-20016 and CVE-2021-20038 to name a few). These directly affected VPN devices and often allowed attackers easy remote access to company devices. CVE-2021-20016 in particular incorporates an SQL-Injection vulnerability within SonicWall’s SSL VPN SMA 100 product line [5]. If exploited, this defect would allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to perform their own malicious SQL query in order to access usernames, passwords and other session related information. 

The N-day underdog

The shadow cast by zero-day attacks often shrouds that of n-day attacks. N-days, however, often pose an equal - if not greater - risk to the majority of organizations, particularly those in industrial sectors. Since these vulnerabilities have fixes available, all of the hard work around research is already done; malicious actors only need to view proof of concepts (POCs) or, if proficient in coding, reverse-engineer software to reveal code-changes (binary diffing) in order to exploit these security flaws in the wild. These vulnerabilities are typically attributed to opportunistic hackers and script-kiddies, where little research or heavy lifting is required.  

August 2021 gave rise to a critical vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence servers, namely CVE-2021-26084 [6]. Confluence is a widely used collaboration wiki tool and knowledge-sharing platform. As introduced and discussed a few months ago in a previous Darktrace blog (Explore Internet-Facing System Vulnerabilities), this vulnerability allows attackers to remotely execute code on internet-facing servers after exploiting injection vulnerabilities in Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL). Whilst Confluence had patches and fixes available to users, attackers still jumped on this opportunity and began scanning the internet for signs of critical devices serving this outdated software [7]. Once identified, they would  exploit the vulnerability, often installing crypto mining software onto the device. More recently, Darktrace explored a new vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134), disclosed midway through 2022, that affected Confluence servers and data centers using similar techniques to that found in CVE-2021-26084 [8]. 

SonicWall in the wild – 1. Zero-day attack

At the beginning of August 2021, Darktrace prevented an attack from taking place within a European automotive customer’s environment (Figure 1). The attack targeted a vulnerable internet-facing SonicWall VPN server, and while the attacker’s motive remains unclear, similar historic events suggest that they intended to perform ransomware encryption or data exfiltration. 

Figure 1: Timeline of the SonicWall attack 

Darktrace was unable to confirm the definite tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by the attacker to compromise the customer’s environment, as the device was compromised before Darktrace installation and coverage. However, from looking at recently disclosed SonicWall VPN vulnerabilities and patterns of behaviour, it is likely CVE-2021-20016 played a part. At some point after this initial infection, it is also believed the device was able to move laterally to a domain controller (DC) using administrative credentials; it was this server that then initiated the anomalous activity that Darktrace detected and alerted on. 

On August 5th 2021 , Darktrace observed this compromised domain controller engaging in unusual ICMP scanning - a protocol used to discover active devices within an environment and create a map of an organization’s network topology. Shortly after, the infected server began scanning devices for open RDP ports and enumerating SMB shares using unorthodox methods. SMB delete and HTTP requests (over port 445 and 80 respectively) were made for files named delete.me in the root directory of numerous network shares using the user agent Microsoft WebDAV. However, no such files appeared to exist within the environment. This may have been the result of an attacker probing devices in the network in an effort to see their responses and gather information on properties and vulnerabilities they could later exploit. 

Soon the infected DC began establishing RDP tunnels back to the VPN server and making requests to an internal DNS server for multiple endpoints relating to exploit kits, likely in an effort to strengthen the attacker’s foothold within the environment. Some of the endpoints requested relate to:

-       EternalBlue vulnerability 

-       Petit Potam NTLM hash attack tool

-       Unusual GitHub repositories

-       Unusual Python repositories  

The DC made outgoing NTLM requests to other internal devices, implying the successful installation of Petit Potam exploitation tools. The server then began performing NTLM reconnaissance, making over 1,000 successful logins under ‘Administrator’ to several other internal devices. Around the same time, the device was also seen making anonymous SMBv1 logins to numerous internal devices, (possibly symptomatic of the attacker probing machines for EternalBlue vulnerabilities). 

Interestingly, the device also made numerous failed authentication attempts using a spoofed credential for one of the organization’s security managers. This was likely in an attempt to hide themselves using ‘Living off the Land’ (LotL) techniques. However, whilst the attacker clearly did their research on the company, they failed to acknowledge the typical naming convention used for credentials within the environment. This ultimately backfired and made the compromise more obvious and unusual. 

In the morning of the following day, the initially compromised VPN server began conducting further reconnaissance, engaging in similar activity to that observed by the domain controller. Until now, the customer had set Darktrace RESPOND to run in human confirmation mode, meaning interventions were not made autonomously but required confirmation by a member of the internal security team. However, thanks to Proactive Threat Notifications (PTNs) delivered by Darktrace’s dedicated SOC team, the customer was made immediately aware of this unusual behaviour, allowing them to apply manual Darktrace RESPOND blocks to all outgoing connections (Figure 2). This gave the security team enough time to respond and remediate before serious damage could be done.

Figure 2: Darktrace RESPOND model breach showing the manually applied “Quarantine Device” action taken against the compromised VPN server. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

Confluence in the wild – 2. N-day attack

Towards the end of 2021, Darktrace saw a European broadcasting customer leave an Atlassian Confluence internet-facing server unpatched and vulnerable to crypto-mining malware using CVE-2021-26084. Thanks to Darktrace, this attack was entirely immobilized within only a few hours of the initial infection, protecting the organization from damage (Figure 3). 

Figure 3: Timeline of the Confluence attack

On midday on September 1st 2021, an unpatched Confluence server was seen receiving SSL connections over port 443 from a suspicious new endpoint, 178.238.226[.]127.  The connections were encrypted, meaning Darktrace was unable to view the contents and ascertain what requests were being made. However, with the disclosure of CVE-2021-26084 just 7 days prior to this activity, it is likely that the TTPs used involved injecting OGNL expressions to Confluence server memory; allowing the attacker to remotely execute code on the vulnerable server.

Immediately after successful exploitation of the Confluence server, the infected device was observed making outgoing HTTP GET requests to several external endpoints using a new user agent (curl/7.61.1). Curl was used to silently download and configure multiple suspicious files relating to XMRig cryptocurrency miner, including ld.sh, XMRig and config.json. Subsequent outgoing connections were then made to europe.randomx-hub.miningpoolhub[.]com · 172.105.210[.]117 using the JSON-RPC protocol, seen alongside the mining credential maillocal.confluence (Figure 4). Only 3 seconds after initial compromise, the infected device began attempting to mine cryptocurrency using the Minergate protocol but was instantly and autonomously blocked by Darktrace RESPOND. This prevented the server from abusing system resources and generating profits for the attacker.

Figure 4: A graph showing the frequency of external connections using the JSON-RPC protocol made by the breach device over a 48-hour window. The orange-red dots represent models that breached as a result of this activity, demonstrating the “waterfall” effect commonly seen when a device suffers a compromise. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

In the afternoon, the malware persisted with its infection. The compromised server began making successive HTTP GET requests to a new rare endpoint 195.19.192[.]28 using the same curl user agent (Figures 5 & 6). These requests were for executable and dynamic library files associated with Kinsing malware (but fortunately were also blocked by Darktrace RESPOND). Kinsing is a malware strain found in numerous attack campaigns which is often associated with crypto-jacking, and has appeared in previous Darktrace blogs [9].

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst summarising the unusual download of Kinsing software using the new curl user agent. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

The attacker then began making HTTP POST requests to an IP 185.154.53[.]140, using the same curl user agent; likely a method for the attacker to maintain persistence within the network and establish a foothold using its C2 infrastructure. The Confluence server was then again seen attempting to mine cryptocurrency using the Minergate protocol. It made outgoing JSON-RPC connections to a different new endpoint, 45.129.2[.]107, using the following mining credential: ‘42J8CF9sQoP9pMbvtcLgTxdA2KN4ZMUVWJk6HJDWzixDLmU2Ar47PUNS5XHv4Kmfdh8aA9fbZmKHwfmFo8Wup8YtS5Kdqh2’. This was once again blocked by Darktrace RESPOND (Figure 7). 

Figure 6: VirusTotal showing the unusualness of one of these external IPs [10]
Figure 7: Log data showing the action taken by Darktrace RESPOND in response to the device breaching the “Crypto Currency Mining Activity” model. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

The final activity seen from this device involved the download of additional shell scripts over HTTP associated with Kinsing, namely spre.sh and unk.sh, from 194.38.20[.]199 and 195.3.146[.]118 respectively (Figure 8). A new user agent (Wget/1.19.5 (linux-gnu)) was used when connecting to the latter endpoint, which also began concurrently initiating repeated connections indicative of C2 beaconing. These scripts help to spread the Kinsing malware laterally within the environment and may have been the attacker's last ditch efforts at furthering their compromise before Darktrace RESPOND blocked all connections from the infected Confluence server [11]. With Darktrace RESPOND's successful actions, the customer’s security team were then able to perform their own response and remediation. 

Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst revealing the last ditch efforts made by the threat actor to download further malicious software. This screenshot displays the UI from Darktrace version 5.1

Darktrace Coverage: N- vs Zero-days

In the SonicWall case the attacker was unable to achieve their actions on objectives (thanks to Darktrace's intervention). However, this incident displayed tactics of a more stealthy and sophisticated attacker - they had an exploited machine but waited for the right moment to execute their malicious code and initiate a full compromise. Due to the lack of visibility over attacker motive, it is difficult to deduce what type of actor led to this intrusion. However, with the disclosure of a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2021-20016) not long before this attack, along with a seemingly dormant initially compromised device, it is highly possible that it was carried out by a sophisticated cyber criminal or gang. 

On the other hand, the Confluence case engaged in a slightly more noisy approach; it dropped crypto mining malware on vulnerable devices in the hope that the target’s security team did not maintain visibility over their network or would merely turn a blind eye. The files downloaded and credentials observed alongside the mining activity heavily imply the use of Kinsing malware [11]. Since this vulnerability (CVE-2021-26084) emerged as an n-day attack with likely easily accessible POCs, as well as there being a lack of LotL techniques and the motive being long term monetary gain, it is possible this attack was conducted by a less sophisticated or amateur actor (script-kiddie); one that opportunistically exploits known vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices in order to make a quick profit [12].

Whilst Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in human confirmation mode only during the start of the SonicWall attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst still offered invaluable insight into the unusual activity associated with the infected machines during both the Confluence and SonicWall compromises. SOC analysts were able to see these uncharacteristic behaviours and escalate the incident through Darktrace’s PTN and ATE services. Analysts then worked through these tickets with the customers, providing support and guidance and, in the SonicWall case, quickly helping to configure Darktrace RESPOND. In both scenarios, Darktrace RESPOND was able to block abnormal connections and enforce a device’s pattern of life, affording the security team enough time to isolate the infected machines and prevent further threats such as ransomware detonation or data exfiltration. 

Concluding thoughts and dangers of third-party integrations 

Organizations with internet-facing devices will inevitably suffer opportunistic zero-day and n-day attacks. While little can be done to remove the risk of zero-days entirely, ensuring that organizations keep their systems up to date will at the very least help prevent opportunistic and script-kiddies from exploiting n-day vulnerabilities.  

However, it is often not always possible for organizations to keep their systems up to date, especially for those who require continuous availability. This may also pose issues for organizations that rely on, and put their trust in, third party integrations such as those explored in this blog (Confluence and SonicWall), as enforcing secure software is almost entirely out of their hands. Moreover, with the rising prevalence of remote working, it is essential now more than ever that organizations ensure their VPN devices are shielded from external threats, guidance on which has been released by the NSA/CISA [13].

These two case studies have shown that whilst organizations can configure their networks and firewalls to help identify known indicators of compromise (IoC), this ‘rearview mirror’ approach will not account for, or protect against, any new and undisclosed IoCs. With the aid of Self-Learning AI and anomaly detection, Darktrace can detect the slightest deviation from a device’s normal pattern of life and respond autonomously without the need for rules and signatures. This allows for the disruption and prevention of known and novel attacks before irreparable damage is caused- reassuring security teams that their digital estates are secure. 

Thanks to Paul Jennings for his contributions to this blog.

Appendices: SonicWall (Zero-day)

Darktrace model detections

·      AIA / Suspicious Chain of Administrative Credentials

·      Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

·      Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·      Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

·      Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Breach

·      Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

·      Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

·      Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

·      Device / ICMP Address Scan

·      Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

·      Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

·      Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

·      Device / Network Scan

·      Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

·      Device / RDP Scan

·      Device / Reverse DNS Sweep

·      Device / SMB Session Bruteforce

·      Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

·      Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

Darktrace RESPOND (Antigena) actions (as displayed in example)

·      Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Observed
IoCs

Appendices: Confluence (N-day)

Darktrace model detections

·      Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·      Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location

·      Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity

·      Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

·      Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise (PTN/Enhanced Monitoring model)

·      Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·      Device / New User Agent

Darktrace RESPOND (Antigena) actions (displayed in example)

·      Antigena / Network / Compliance / Antigena Crypto Currency Mining Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Block Enhanced Monitoring

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Observed
IOCs

References:

[1] https://securitybrief.asia/story/why-preventing-zero-day-attacks-is-crucial-for-businesses

[2] https://electricenergyonline.com/energy/magazine/1150/article/Security-Sessions-More-Dangerous-Than-Zero-Days-The-N-Day-Threat.htm

[3] https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/

[4] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=SonicWall+2021 

[5] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-20016

[6] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-26084

[7] https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-cybercom-says-mass-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-ongoing-and-expected-to-accelerate/

[8] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-26134

[9] https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599/

[10] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/195.19.192.28/detection 

[11] https://sysdig.com/blog/zoom-into-kinsing-kdevtmpfsi/

[12] https://github.com/alt3kx/CVE-2021-26084_PoC

[13] https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/2791320/nsa-cisa-release-guidance-on-selecting-and-hardening-remote-access-vpns/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Lewis Morgan
Cyber Analyst
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March 21, 2025

Cyberhaven Supply Chain Attack: Exploiting Browser Extensions

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The evolution of supply chain attacks

Supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated. As network defenses improve, threat actors continuously adapt and refine their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to achieve their goals. In recent years, this has led to a rise in the exploitation of trusted services and software, including legitimate browser extensions. Exploitation of these extensions can provide adversaries with a stealthy means to infiltrate target networks and access high-value accounts undetected.

A notable example of this trend was the compromise of the Cyberhaven Chrome extension at the end of 2024. This incident appeared to be part of a broader campaign targeting multiple Chrome browser extensions, highlighting the evolving nature of supply chain attacks [1].

What is Cyberhaven?

Cyberhaven, a US-based data security organization, experienced a security breach on December 24, 2024, when a phishing attack reportedly compromised one of their employee's credentials [2]. This allowed attackers to publish a malicious version of the Cyberhaven Chrome extension, which exfiltrated cookies and authenticated sessions from targeted websites. The malicious extension was active from December 25 to December 26 – a time when most businesses and employees were out of office and enjoying the festive period, a fact not lost on threat actors. The attackers, likely a well-organized and financially motivated group, compromised more than 30 additional Chrome extensions, affecting more than 2.6 million users [3]. They used sophisticated phishing techniques to authorize malicious OAuth applications, bypassing traditional security measures and exploiting vulnerabilities in OAuth authorizations. The primary motive appeared to be financial gain, targeting high-value platforms like social media advertising and AI services [4].

In late December 2024, multiple Darktrace customers were compromised via the Cyberhaven Chrome extension; this blog will primarily focus on Darktrace / NETWORK detections from one affected customer.

Darktrace’s coverage of Cyberhaven compromises

On December 26, 2024, Darktrace identified a series of suspicious activities across multiple customer environments, uncovering a structured attack sequence that progressed from initial intrusion to privilege escalation and data exfiltration. The attack was distributed through a malicious update to the Cyberhaven Chrome extension [2]. The malicious update established a foothold in customer environments almost immediately, leading to further anomalies.

As with other Chrome browser extensions, Cyberhaven Chrome extensions were updated automatically with no user interaction required. However, in this instance, the automatic update included a malicious version which was deployed to customer environments. This almost immediately introduced unauthorized activity, allowing attackers to establish a foothold in customer networks. The update allowed attackers to execute their objectives in the background, undetected by traditional security tools that rely on known indicators of compromise (IoCS) rather than identifying anomalies.

While multiple customer devices were seen connecting to cyberhaven[.]io, a legitimate Cyberhaven domain, Darktrace detected persistent beaconing behavior to cyberhavenext[.]pro, which appeared to be attempting to masquerade as another legitimate Cyberhaven domain. Darktrace recognized this activity as unusual, triggering several model alerts in Darktrace / NETWORK to highlight the persistent outbound connections to the suspicious domain.

Further analysis of external connectivity patterns indicated  an increase in anomalous HTTP requests alongside this beaconing activity. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources also suggest that the cyberhavenext[.]pro endpoint is associated with malicious activities [5].

Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of beaconing activity to cyberhavenext[.]pro
Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of beaconing activity to cyberhavenext[.]pro

Analysis using Darktrace’s Advanced Search revealed that some of these connections were directed to the suspicious external IP address 149.28.124[.]84. Further investigation confirmed that the IP correlated with two SSL hostnames, including the malicious cyberhavenext[.]pro, further reinforcing its connection to the attack infrastructure.

Darktrace Advanced Search analysis showing the IP address 149.28.124[.]84 correlating to two SSL hostnames, one of which is cyberhavenext[.]pro.
Figure 2: Darktrace Advanced Search analysis showing the IP address 149.28.124[.]84 correlating to two SSL hostnames, one of which is cyberhavenext[.]pro.

Between December 23 and December 27, Darktrace observed sustained beaconing-like activity from affected devices on the customer’s network.

Darktrace’s detection of beaconing activities from a customer device to the endpoint 149.28.124[.]84 between December 23 and December 27.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of beaconing activities from a customer device to the endpoint 149.28.124[.]84 between December 23 and December 27.

Darktrace observed 27 unique devices connecting to the malicious command-and-control (C2) infrastructure as far back as December 3. While most connections were brief, they represented an entry point for malicious activity. Over a two-day period, two devices transmitted 5.57 GiB of incoming data and 859.37 MiB of outgoing data, generating over 3 million log events across SSL, HTTP, and connection data.

Subsequent analysis identified a significant increase in unauthorized data transfers to the aforementioned 149.28.124[.]84 IP on another customer network, highlighting the potential broader impact of this compromise. The volume and frequency of these transfers suggested that attackers were leveraging automated data collection techniques, further underscoring the sophistication of the attack.

Darktrace’s detection of the likely exfiltration of 859.37 MiB to the endpoint 149.28.124[.]84.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the likely exfiltration of 859.37 MiB to the endpoint 149.28.124[.]84.

External research suggested that once active, the Cyberhaven extension would begin silently collecting session cookies and authentication tokens, specifically targeting high-value accounts such as Facebook Ads accounts [4]. Darktrace’s analysis of another affected customer noted many HTTP POST connections directed to a specific URI ("ai-cyberhaven"), while GET requests contained varying URIs prefixed with "/php/urlblock?args=AAAh....--redirect." This activity indicated an exfiltration mechanism, consistent with techniques observed in other compromised Chrome extensions. By compromising session cookies, attackers could potentially gain administrative access to connected accounts, further escalating their privileges [4].

Conclusion

This incident highlights the importance of monitoring not just endpoint security, but also cloud and browser-based security solutions, as attackers increasingly target these trusted and oft overlooked vectors.

Ultimately, by focusing on anomaly detection and behavioral analysis rather than static signatures and lists of ‘known bads’, Darktrace was able to successfully detect devices affected by the Cyberhaven Chrome browser extension compromise, by identifying activity that would likely have been considered legitimate and benign by traditional security solutions.

This compromise also serves as a reminder that supply chain attacks are not limited to traditional software vendors. Browser extensions, cloud-based applications, and SaaS services are equally vulnerable, as evidenced by Darktrace's detection of Balada Injector malware exploiting WordPress vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized network access [6]. Therefore, increased targeting of browser-based security tools, and a greater exploitation of OAuth and session hijacking techniques are to be expected. Attackers will undoubtedly refine their methods to infiltrate legitimate vendors and distribute malicious updates through trusted channels. By staying informed, vigilant, and proactive, organizations can mitigate exposure to evolving supply chain threats and safeguard their critical assets from emerging browser-based attack techniques.

Credit to Rajendra Rushanth (Cyber Analyst) Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Device / Suspicious Domain (AP: C2 Comms, AP: Tooling)

·       Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Email Nexus / Connection to Hijacked Correspondent Link

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External (AP: C2 Comms)

·       Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing (AP: C2 Comms)

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

cyberhavenext[.]pro - Hostname - Used for C2 communications and data exfiltration (cookies and session tokens)

149.28.124[.]84 - IP - Associated with malicious infrastructure

45.76.225[.]148 - IP - Associated with malicious infrastructure

136.244.115[.]219 - IP - Associated with malicious infrastructure

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique

INITIAL ACCESS - T1176 - Browser Extensions

EXECUTION - T1204.002 - Malicious Browser Extensions

PERSISTENCE - T1176 - Browser Extensions

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - Web Protocols

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001 - Data Obfuscation

CREDENTIAL ACCESS - T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie

DISCOVERY - T1518.001 - Security Software Discovery

LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1557.003 - Man-in-the-Browser

EXFILTRATION - T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 - Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

IMPACT - T1583.006 - Session Hijacking

References

[1] https://thehackernews.com/2024/12/16-chrome-extensions-hacked-exposing.html

[2] https://www.cyberhaven.com/blog/cyberhavens-chrome-extension-security-incident-and-what-were-doing-about-it

[3] https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/chrome-browser-extensions-hijacked/

[4] https://www.theverge.com/2024/12/28/24330758/chrome-extension-cyberhaven-hijack-phishing-cyberattack-facebook-ads-authentication-theft

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/cyberhavenext.pro

[6] https://darktrace.com/blog/balada-injector-darktraces-investigation-into-the-malware-exploiting-wordpress-vulnerabilities

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Rajendra Rushanth
Cyber Analyst

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March 19, 2025

Global Technology Provider Transforms Email Threat Detection with Darktrace

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At a glance

  • Within just one month of using Darktrace / EMAIL, the volume of suspicious emails requiring analyst attention dropped by 75%, saving analysts 45 hours per month on analysis and investigation.
  • By offloading most manual, repetitive tasks to Darktrace / EMAIL, the company’s skilled security analysts can focus on developing new capabilities and tackling more complex, rewarding projects.
  • Darktrace recently detected and blocked a highly sophisticated and personalized phishing email that spoofed a Microsoft SharePoint and Teams website and used advanced engineering to impersonate the school of an employee’s family member.
  • The transition from the incumbent solution to Darktrace / EMAIL was seamless and undetectable to the company’s vast of customers and partners, reinforcing the security organization’s role as a business enabler—protecting the company and reducing risk without adding friction.

Securing a complex, distributed business without disruption

The company remains at the forefront of technological innovation and transformation; however, its success and ambitions come with the challenges of managing a distributed global business—balancing digital advancements, existing technology investments, and evolving compliance requirements.

Optimizing a complex tech stack for scalable growth

The organization operates a diverse technology stack spanning Windows, Mac, Linux, and multiple cloud environments, creating a complex and challenging IT landscape. The company’s Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) emphasizes the need for efficiency and agility. “Our goal is to scale and deliver new capabilities without increasing headcount, ensuring that costs remain proportionate to growth.”

Balancing security, governance, and business agility

Committed to responsible practices, this industry leader prioritizes secure and trustworthy technology for its customers who rely on its solutions. “Balancing business agility with governance is a constant challenge," said the CISO. "There’s always a natural push and pull, which I believe is healthy—but achieving the right balance is delicate.”

Protecting critical workflows without impacting productivity

For the organization, email is much more than just a communication tool. “Email plays a critical role in our engineering workflows and is fundamental to how we build our products.” Because of this, the company is extremely cautious about implementing any solution that could introduce friction or disrupt productivity. “There is zero tolerance for disruption, which is why we take a deliberate and methodical approach when evaluating, selecting, and deploying our tools and solutions,” he said.  

More than a vendor: A security partner invested in success

To ensure an optimal security infrastructure, the enterprise security team regularly evaluates market technologies to their existing solutions. With the rapidly evolving threat landscape, the CISO said they “wanted to validate whether we still had best-in-class protection and the right controls in place to secure our organization. It was about assessing whether we could do better in our ongoing effort to fine-tuning our approach to achieve the best possible outcome.”

The team evaluated 15 different email security vendors based on the following criteria:

  1. Efficacy to detect threats
  2. Ability to integrate with existing tooling
  3. Ease of use
  4. A vendor’s approach to partnership  

They initially narrowed the list to five vendors, conducting demo sessions for deeper evaluations before selecting three finalists for a proof of value (POV). We analyzed actual malicious emails with each vendor to assess the accuracy of their detections, allowing for an objective comparison,” said the CISO. Through this rigorous process, the Darktrace / EMAIL security solution emerged as the best fit for their business. “Darktrace’s product performed well and showed a genuine commitment to partnering with us in the long-term to ensure our success.”

The team objectively understood where there were gaps across the different vendors, where they were strong, and where they could use improvement. “Based on the analysis, we knew that Darktrace / EMAIL could deliver as the data supported it, in our specific use cases.  

Partnership, integrity and respect

Throughout the evaluation process, the importance of partnership and mutual respect remained an essential factor to the CISO. “I wanted a company we could develop a long-term strategic partnership with, one that could extend far deeper than just email.” A key factor in choosing Darktrace was the commitment and engagement of its team at every level of the organization. “Darktrace showed integrity, patience and a genuine investment in building a strong relationship with my team.  That's why we're here today.”

“Together, we've delivered some fantastic outcomes”

For the organization, Darktrace / EMAIL has played a crucial role in reducing risk, empowering analysts, and enabling a lean, effective security strategy. “Together, we've delivered some fantastic outcomes,” said the CISO.  

Reducing risk. Empowering analysts

“Within that first month, we saw a 75% drop in suspicious emails that that required manual review, which reduced the time my team spent analyzing and investigating by 45 hours per month,” said the CISO. The security team values Darktrace / EMAIL not only for its ease of use but also for the time it frees up for more meaningful work. “Giving my team the opportunity to tackle complex challenges they enjoy and find more stimulating is important to me.” As they continue to fine-tune and optimize balance levels within Darktrace / EMAIL, he expects even greater efficiency gains in the coming months.

Maximizing protection while staying lean

It’s important for the security group to be proportionate with their spending, said the CISO. “It's all about what is enough security to enable the business. And that means, as our organization grows, it's important that we are as lean and as efficient as possible to deliver the best outcomes for the business.”  Embracing an AI-powered automated approach is an essential component to achieving that goal. By offloading most manual, repetitive tasks to Darktrace / EMAIL, the company’s skilled security analysts can focus on more strategic and proactive initiatives that enable the business.  

Protecting employees from advanced social engineering threats

Recently, Darktrace detected a malicious email targeting an employee, disguised as a spoofed Microsoft SharePoint and Teams website. What made this attack particularly sophisticated was its personalization — it impersonated the school where the employee’s family member attended. Unlike mass malicious emails sent to thousands of people, this was a highly targeted attack, leveraging advanced social engineering tactics to exploit connections within the education system and between family members.  

Protecting without disrupting

A seamless migration is often overlooked but is critical to success for any organization, said the CISO. With a wide ecosystem of partners, email is a highly visible, business-critical function for the organization — "any friction or downtime would have an immediate impact and could throttle the entire business,” he said. However, the transition from their previous solution to Darktrace / EMAIL was exceptionally smooth. “No one realized we changed providers because there was no disruption — no incidents at all. I cannot emphasize just how important that is when I'm trying to position our security organization as an enabling function for the business that protects and reduces risk without adding friction.”

A security partnership for the future

“To survive as a business over the next few years, adopting AI is no longer optional—it’s essential,” said the CISO. However, with the cybersecurity market becoming increasingly saturated, selecting the right solutions and vendors can be overwhelming. He stresses the importance of choosing strategic partners who not only deliver the outcomes you need, but also deeply understand your organization’s unique environment. “You’re only as strong as your partners. Technology innovation and the cybersecurity market are always changing.  At some point every solution will face a challenge—it’s inevitable. The differentiator will be how people respond when that happens.”  

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