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Inside the SOC

Walking through the front door: Compromises of Internet-facing systems

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04
Apr 2022
04
Apr 2022

By virtue of their exposure, Internet-facing systems (i.e., systems which have ports open/exposed to the wider Internet) are particularly susceptible to compromise. Attackers typically compromise Internet-facing systems by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in applications they run. During 2021, critical zero-day vulnerabilities in the following applications were publicly disclosed:

Internet-facing systems running these applications were consequently heavily targeted by attackers. In this post, we will provide examples of compromises of these systems observed by Darktrace’s SOC team in 2021. As will become clear, successful exploitation of weaknesses in Internet-facing systems inevitably results in such systems doing things which they do not normally do. Rather than focusing on identifying attempts to exploit these weaknesses, Darktrace focuses on identifying the unusual behaviors which inevitably ensue. The purpose of this post is to highlight the effectiveness of this approach.

Exchange server compromise

In January, researchers from the cyber security company DEVCORE reported a series of critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange which they dubbed ‘ProxyLogon’.[1] ProxyLogon consists of a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) and a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2021-27065). Attackers were observed exploiting these vulnerabilities in the wild from as early as January 6.[2] In April, DEVCORE researchers reported another series of critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange which they dubbed ‘ProxyShell’.[3] ProxyShell consists of a pre-authentication path confusion vulnerability (CVE-2021-34473), a privilege elevation vulnerability (CVE-2021-34523), and a post-authentication RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-31207). Attackers were first observed exploiting these vulnerabilities in the wild in August.[4] In many cases, attackers exploited the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities in order to create web shells on the targeted Exchange servers. The presence of these web shells provided attackers with the means to remotely execute commands on the compromised servers.

In early August 2021, by exploiting the ProxyShell vulnerabilities, an attacker gained the rights to remotely execute PowerShell commands on an Internet-facing Exchange server within the network of a US-based transportation company. The attacker subsequently executed a number of PowerShell commands on the server. One of these commands caused the server to make a 28-minute-long SSL connection to a highly unusual external endpoint. Within a couple of hours, the attacker managed to strengthen their foothold within the network by installing AnyDesk and CobaltStrike on several internal devices. In mid-August, the attacker got the devices on which they had installed Cobalt Strike to conduct network reconnaissance and to transfer terabytes of data to the cloud storage service, MEGA. At the end of August, the attacker got the devices on which they had installed AnyDesk to execute Conti ransomware and to spread executable files and script files to further internal devices.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of ProxyShell immediately resulted in the Exchange Server making a long SSL connection to an unusual external endpoint. This connection caused the model Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint to breach. The subsequent reconnaissance, lateral movement, C2, external data transfer, and encryption behavior brought about by the attacker were also picked up by Darktrace’s models.

A non-exhaustive list of the models that breached as a result of the behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual Internal Data Volume as Client or Server
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Masqueraded Executable SMB Write
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Confluence server compromise

Atlassian’s Confluence is an application which provides the means for building collaborative, virtual workspaces. In the era of remote working, the value of such an application is undeniable. The public disclosure of a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2021-26084) in Confluence in August 2021 thus provided a prime opportunity for attackers to cause havoc. The vulnerability, which arises from the use of Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) in Confluence’s tag system, provides attackers with the means to remotely execute code on vulnerable Confluence server by sending a crafted HTTP request containing a malicious parameter.[5] Attackers were first observed exploiting this vulnerability towards the end of August, and in the majority of cases, attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install crypto-mining tools onto vulnerable servers.[6]

At the beginning of September 2021, an attacker was observed exploiting CVE-2021-26084 in order to install the crypto-mining tool, XMRig, as well as a shell script, onto an Internet-facing Confluence server within the network of an EMEA-based television and broadcasting company. Within a couple of hours, the attacker installed files associated with the crypto-mining malware, Kinsing, onto the server. The Kinsing-infected server then immediately began to communicate over HTTP with the attacker’s C2 infrastructure. Around the time of this activity, the server was observed using the MinerGate crypto-mining protocol, indicating that the server had begun to mine cryptocurrency.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 immediately resulted in the Confluence server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with curl in this case) to a rare external IP. This behavior caused the models Device / New User Agent, Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname, and Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location to breach. The subsequent file downloads, C2 traffic and crypto-mining activity also resulted in several models breaching.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the unusual behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

GitLab server compromise

GitLab is an application providing services ranging from project planning to source code management. Back in April 2021, a critical RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-22205) in GitLab was publicly reported by a cyber security researcher via the bug bounty platform, HackerOne.[7] The vulnerability, which arises from GitLab’s use of ExifTool for removing metadata from image files, [8] enables attackers to remotely execute code on vulnerable GitLab servers by uploading specially crafted image files.[9] Attackers were first observed exploiting CVE-2021-22205 in the wild in June/July.[10] A surge in exploitations of the vulnerability was observed at the end of October, with attackers exploiting the flaw in order to assemble botnets.[11] Darktrace observed a significant number of cases in which attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install crypto-mining tools onto vulnerable GitLab servers.

On October 29, an attacker successfully exploited CVE-2021-22205 on an Internet-facing GitLab server within the network of a UK-based education provider. The organization was trialing Darktrace when this incident occurred. The attacker installed several executable files and shell scripts onto the server by exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker communicated with the compromised server (using unusual ports) for several days, before making the server transfer large volumes of data externally and download the crypto-mining tool, XMRig, as well as the botnet malware, Mirai. The server was consequently observed making connections to the crypto-mining pool, C3Pool.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of the vulnerability in GitLab immediately resulted in the server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with Wget in this case) to a rare external IP. The models Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname and Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location breached as a result of this behavior. The attacker’s subsequent activity on the server over the next few days resulted in frequent model breaches.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the attacker’s activity on the server:

  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New IPs
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compliance / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Anomalous File / Numeric Exe Download

Log4j server compromise

On December 9 2021, a critical RCE vulnerability (dubbed ‘Log4Shell’) in version 2 of Apache’s Log4j was publicly disclosed by researchers at LunaSec.[12] As a logging library present in potentially millions of Java applications,[13] Log4j constitutes an obscured, yet ubiquitous feature of the digital world. The vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228), which arises from Log4j’s Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) Lookup feature, enables an attacker to make a vulnerable server download and execute a malicious Java class file. To exploit the vulnerability, all the attacker must do is submit a specially crafted JNDI lookup request to the server. The fact that Log4j is present in so many applications and that the exploitation of this vulnerability is so simple, Log4Shell has been dubbed the ‘most critical vulnerability of the last decade’.[14] Attackers have been exploiting Log4Shell in the wild since at least December 1.[15] Since then, attackers have been observed exploiting the vulnerability to install crypto-mining tools, Cobalt Strike, and RATs onto vulnerable servers.[16]

On December 10, one day after the public disclosure of Log4Shell, an attacker successfully exploited the vulnerability on a vulnerable Internet-facing server within the network of a US-based architecture company. By exploiting the vulnerability, the attacker managed to get the server to download and execute a Java class file named ‘Exploit69ogQNSQYz.class’. Executing the code in this file caused the server to download a shell script file and a file related to the Kinsing crypto-mining malware. The Kinsing-infected server then went on to communicate over HTTP with a C2 server. Since the customer was using the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, they were immediately alerted to this activity, and the server was subsequently quarantined, preventing crypto-mining activity from taking place.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of the zero-day vulnerability immediately resulted in the vulnerable server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with Java in this case) to a rare external IP. The models Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device and Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname breached as a result of this behavior. The device’s subsequent file downloads and C2 activity caused several Darktrace models to breach.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the unusual behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Round-up

It is inevitable that attackers will attempt to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in applications running on Internet-facing devices. Whilst identifying these attempts is useful, the fact that attackers regularly exploit new zero-days makes the task of identifying attempts to exploit them akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Whilst it is uncertain which zero-day vulnerability attackers will exploit next, what is certain is that their exploitation of it will bring about unusual behavior. No matter the vulnerability, whether it be a vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange, Confluence, GitLab, or Log4j, Darktrace will identify the unusual behaviors which inevitably result from its exploitation. By identifying unusual behaviors displayed by Internet-facing devices, Darktrace thus makes it almost impossible for attackers to successfully exploit zero-day vulnerabilities without being detected.

For Darktrace customers who want to find out more about detecting potential compromises of internet-facing devices, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

Thanks to Andy Lawrence for his contributions.

Footnotes

1. https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-1-ProxyLogon/

2. https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/

3. https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell

4. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/12/proxyshell-more-widespread-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-servers/

5. https://www.kaspersky.co.uk/blog/confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/23376/

6. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/atlassian-confluence-flaw-actively-exploited-to-install-cryptominers/

7. https://hackerone.com/reports/1154542

8. https://security.humanativaspa.it/gitlab-ce-cve-2021-22205-in-the-wild/

9.https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2021/04/14/security-release-gitlab-13-10-3-released/

10. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/11/01/gitlab-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-cve-2021-22205-exploited-in-the-wild/

11. https://www.hackmageddon.com/2021/12/16/1-15-november-2021-cyber-attacks-timeline/

12. https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/

13. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3644472/apache-log4j-vulnerability-actively-exploited-impacting-millions-of-java-based-apps.html

14. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/dec/10/software-flaw-most-critical-vulnerability-log-4-shell

15. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/15/the-everypersons-guide-to-log4shell-cve-2021-44228/

16. https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/

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INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Inside the SOC

How Abuse of ‘PerfectData Software’ May Create a Perfect Storm: An Emerging Trend in Account Takeovers  

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05
Jun 2023

Amidst the ever-changing threat landscape, new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) seem to emerge daily, creating extreme challenges for security teams. The broad range of attack methods utilized by attackers seems to present an insurmountable problem: how do you defend against a playbook that does not yet exist?

Faced with the growing number of novel and uncommon attack methods, it is essential for organizations to adopt a security solution able to detect threats based on their anomalies, rather than relying on threat intelligence alone.   

In March 2023, Darktrace observed an emerging trend in the use of an application known as ‘PerfectData Software’ for probable malicious purposes in several Microsoft 365 account takeovers.

Using its anomaly-based detection, Darktrace DETECT™ was able to identify the activity chain surrounding the use of this application, potentially uncovering a novel piece of threat actor tradecraft in the process.

Microsoft 365 Intrusions

In recent years, Microsoft’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) suite, Microsoft 365, along with its built-in identity and access management (IAM) service, Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), have been heavily targeted by threat actors due to their near-ubiquitous usage across industries. Four out of every five Fortune 500 companies, for example, use Microsoft 365 services [1].  

Malicious actors typically gain entry to organizations’ Microsoft 365 environments by abusing either stolen account credentials or stolen session cookies [2]. Once inside, actors can access sensitive data within mailboxes or SharePoint repositories, and send out emails or Teams messages. This activity can often result in serious financial harm, especially in cases where the malicious actor’s end-goal is to elicit fraudulent transactions.  

Darktrace regularly observes malicious actors behaving in predictable ways once they gain access to customer Microsoft 365 environment. One typical example is the creation of new inbox rules and sending deceitful emails intended to convince recipients to carry out subsequent actions, such as following a malicious link or providing sensitive information. It is also common for actors to register new applications in Azure AD so that they can be used to conduct follow-up activities, like mass-mailing or data theft. The registration of applications in Azure AD therefore seems to be a relatively predictable threat actor behavior [3][4]. Darktrace DETECT understands that unusual application registrations in Azure AD may constitute a deviation in expected behavior, and therefore a possible indicator of account compromise.

These registrations of applications in Azure AD are evidenced by creations of, as well as assignments of permissions to, Service Principals in Azure AD. Darktrace has detected a growing trend in actors creating and assigning permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’. Further investigation of this Azure AD activity revealed it to be part of an ongoing account takeover. 

 ‘PerfectData Software’ Activity 

Darktrace observed variations of the following pattern of activity relating to an application named ‘PerfectData Software’ within its customer base:

  1. Actor signs in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint associated with a Virtual Private Server (VPS) or Virtual Private Network (VPN) service
  2. Actor registers an application called 'PerfectData Software' with Azure AD, and then grants permissions to the application
  3. Actor accesses mailbox data and creates inbox rule 

In two separate incidents, malicious actors were observed conducting their activities from endpoints associated with VPN services (HideMyAss (HMA) VPN and Surfshark VPN, respectively) and from endpoints within the Autonomous System AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01. 

In March 2023, Darktrace observed a malicious actor signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from a Kuwait-based IP address within the Autonomous System, AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o. This IP address is associated with the VPN service, HMA VPN. Over the next couple of days, an actor (likely the same malicious actor) signed in to the account several more times from two different Nigeria-based endpoints, as well as a VPS-related endpoint and a HMA VPN endpoint. 

During their login sessions, the actor performed a variety of actions. First, they created and assigned permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’. This Service Principal creation represents the registration of an application called ‘PerfectData Software’ in Azure AD.  Although the reason for registering this application is unclear, within a few days the actor registered and granted permission to another application, ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’, and created a new inbox rule names ‘s’ on the mailbox of the hijacked account. This inbox rule moved emails meeting certain conditions to a folder named ‘RSS Subscription. The ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’ application was likely registered by the actor to facilitate mass-mailing activity.

Immediately after these actions, Darktrace detected the actor sending out thousands of malicious emails from the account. The emails included an attachment named ‘Credit Transfer Copy.html’, which contained a suspicious link. Further investigation revealed that the customer’s network had received several fake invoice emails prior to this initial intrusion activity. Additionally, there was an unusually high volume of failed logins to the compromised account around the time of the initial access. 

Figure 1: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.
Figure 1: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.

In a separate case also observed by Darktrace in March 2023, a malicious actor was observed signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint within the Autonomous System, AS397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON. The endpoint appears to be related to the VPN service, Surfshark VPN. This login was followed by several failed and successful logins from a VPS-related within the Autonomous System, AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01. The actor was then seen registering and assigning permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’. As with the previous example, the motives for this registration are unclear. The actor proceeded to log in several more times from a Surfshark VPN endpoint, however, they were not observed carrying out any further suspicious activity. 

Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.
Figure 2: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.

It was not clear in either of these examples, nor in fact any of cases observed by Darktrace, why actors had registered and assigned permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’, and there do not appear to be any open-source intelligence (OSINT) resources or online literature related to the malicious usage of an application by that name. That said, there are several websites which appear to provide email migration and data recovery/backup tools under the moniker ‘PerfectData Software’. 

It is unclear whether the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ by malicious actors observed on the networks of Darktrace customers was one of these tools. However, given the nature of the tools, it is possible that the actors intended to use them to facilitate the exfiltration of email data from compromises mailboxes.

If the legitimate software ‘PerfectData’ is the application in question in these incidents, it is likely being purchased and misused by attackers for malicious purposes. It is also possible the application referenced in the incidents is a spoof of the legitimate ‘PerfectData’ software designed to masquerade a malicious application as legitimate.

Darktrace Coverage

Cases of ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains detected by Darktrace typically began with an actor signing into an internal user’s Microsoft 365 account from a VPN or VPS-related endpoint. These login events, along with the suspicious email and/or brute-force activity which preceded them, caused the following DETECT models to breach:

  • SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use
  • SaaS / Access / Suspicious Login Attempt
  • SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Following Suspicious Login Attempt(s)
  • SaaS / Email Nexus / Unusual Location for SaaS and Email Activity

Subsequent activities, including inbox rule creations, registration of applications in Azure AD, and mass-mailing activity, resulted in breaches of the following DETECT models.

  • SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant 
  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Logic Following OAuth Grant 
  • SaaS / Admin / New Application Service Principal
  • IaaS / Admin / Azure Application Administration Activities
  • SaaS / Compliance / New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Email Nexus / Suspicious Internal Exchange Activity
  • SaaS / Email Nexus / Possible Outbound Email Spam
  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Outbound Email Spam
  • SaaS / Compromise / Suspicious Login and Suspicious Outbound Email(s)
DETECT Model Breaches highlighting unusual login and 'PerfectData Software' registration activity from a malicious actor
Figure 3: DETECT Model Breaches highlighting unusual login and 'PerfectData Software' registration activity from a malicious actor.

In cases where Darktrace RESPOND™ was enabled in autonomous response mode, ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains resulted in breaches of the following RESPOND models:

• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block

• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Significant Compliance Activity Block

In response to these model breaches, Darktrace RESPOND took immediate action, performing aggressive, inhibitive actions, such as forcing the actor to log out of the SaaS platform, and disabling the user entirely. When applied autonomously, these RESPOND actions would seriously impede an attacker’s progress and minimize network disruption.

Figure 4: A RESPOND model breach created in response to a malicious actor's registration of 'PerfectData Software'

In addition, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously investigate registrations of the ‘PerfectData Software’ application and summarized its findings into digestible reports. 

A Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event log
Figure 5: A Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event log showing AI Analyst autonomously pivoting off a breach of 'SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant' to uncover details of an account hijacking.

Conclusion 

Due to the widespread adoption of Microsoft 365 services in the workplace and continued emphasis on a remote workforce, account hijackings now pose a more serious threat to organizations around the world than ever before. The cases discussed here illustrate the tendency of malicious actors to conduct their activities from endpoints associated with VPN services, while also registering new applications, like PerfectData Software, with malicious intent. 

While it was unclear exactly why the malicious actors were using ‘PerfectData Software’ as part of their account hijacking, it is clear that either the legitimate or spoofed version of the application is becoming an very likely emergent piece of threat actor tradecraft.

Darktrace DETECT’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection allowed it to recognize that the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ represented a deviation in the SaaS user’s expected behavior. While Darktrace RESPOND, when enabled in autonomous response mode, was able to quickly take preventative action against threat actors, blocking the potential use of the application for data exfiltration or other nefarious purposes.

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Reconnaissance:

T1598 ­– Phishing for Information

Credential Access:

T1110 – Brute Force

Initial Access:

T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Command and Control:

T1105 ­– Ingress Tool Transfer

Persistence:

T1098.003 – Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles 

Collection:

• T1114 – Email Collection 

Defense Evasion:

• T1564.008 ­– Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules­

Lateral Movement:

T1534 – Internal Spearphishing

Unusual Source IPs

• 5.62.60[.]202  (AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o.) 

• 160.152.10[.]215 (AS37637 Smile-Nigeria-AS)

• 197.244.250[.]155 (AS37705 TOPNET)

• 169.159.92[.]36  (AS37122 SMILE)

• 45.62.170[.]237 (AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01)

• 92.38.180[.]49 (AS202422 G-Core Labs S.A)

• 129.56.36[.]26 (AS327952 AS-NATCOM)

• 92.38.180[.]47 (AS202422 G-Core Labs S.A.)

• 107.179.20[.]214 (AS397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON)

• 45.62.170[.]31 (AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01)

References

[1] https://www.investing.com/academy/statistics/microsoft-facts/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/countering-the-problem-of-credential-theft

[3] https://darktrace.com/blog/business-email-compromise-to-mass-phishing-campaign-attack-analysis

[4] https://darktrace.com/blog/breakdown-of-a-multi-account-compromise-within-office-365

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About the author
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst

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Cloud

Darktrace Integrates Self-Learning AI with Amazon Security Lake to Support Security Investigations

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31
May 2023

Darktrace has deepened its relationship with AWS by integrating its detection and response capabilities with Amazon Security Lake

This development will allow mutual customers to seamlessly combine Darktrace AI’s bespoke understanding of their organization with the Threat Intelligence offered by other security tools, and investigate all of their alerts in one central location. 

This integration will improve the value security teams get from both products, streamlining analyst workflows and improving their ability to detect and respond to the full spectrum of known and unknown cyber-threats. 

How Darktrace and Amazon Security Lake augment security teams

Amazon Security Lake is a newly-released service that automatically centralizes an organization’s security data from cloud, on-premises, and custom sources into a customer owned purpose-built data lake. Both Darktrace and Amazon Security Lake support the Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF), an open standard to simplify, combine, and analyze security logs.  

Customers can store security logs, events, alerts, and other relevant data generated by various AWS services and security tools. By consolidating security data in a central lake, organizations can gain a holistic view of their security posture, perform advanced analytics, detect anomalies and open investigations to improve their security practices.

With Darktrace DETECT and RESPOND AI engines covering all assets across IT, OT, network, endpoint, IoT, email and cloud, organizations can augment the value of their security data lakes by feeding Darktrace’s rich and context-aware datapoints to Amazon Security Lake. 

Amazon Security Lake empowers security teams to improve the protection of your digital estate:

  • Quick and painless data normalization 
  • Fast-tracks ability to investigate, triage and respond to security events
  • Broader visibility aids more effective decision-making
  • Surfaces and prioritizes anomalies for further investigation
  • Single interface for seamless data management

How will Darktrace customers benefit?

Across the Cyber AI Loop, all Darktrace solutions have been architected with AWS best practices in mind. With this integration, Darktrace is bringing together its understanding of ‘self’ for every organization with the centralized data visibility of the Amazon Security Lake. Darktrace’s unique approach to cyber security, powered by groundbreaking AI research, delivers a superior dataset based on a deep and interconnected understanding of the enterprise. 

Where other cyber security solutions are trained to identify threats based on historical attack data and techniques, Darktrace DETECT gains a bespoke understanding of every digital environment, continuously analyzing users, assets, devices and the complex relationships between them. Our AI analyzes thousands of metrics to reveal subtle deviations that may signal an evolving issue – even unknown techniques and novel malware. It distinguishes between malicious and benign behavior, identifying harmful activity that typically goes unnoticed. This rich dataset is fed into RESPOND, which takes precise action to neutralize threats against any and every asset, no matter where data resides.

Both DETECT and RESPOND are supported by Darktrace Self-Learning AI, which provides full, real-time visibility into an organization’s systems and data. This always-on threat analysis already makes humans better at cyber security, improving decisions and outcomes based on total visibility of the digital ecosystem, supporting human performance with AI coverage and empowering security teams to proactively protect critical assets.  

Converting Darktrace alerts to the Amazon Security Lake Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF) supplies the Security Operations Center (SOC) and incident response team with contextualized data, empowering them to accelerate their investigation, triage and response to potential cyber threats. 

Darktrace is available for purchase on the AWS Marketplace.

Learn more about how Darktrace provides full-coverage, AI-powered cloud security for AWS, or see how our customers use Darktrace in their AWS cloud environments.

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About the author
Nabil Zoldjalali
VP, Technology Innovation

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