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April 5, 2022

Explore Internet-Facing System Vulnerabilities

Read about 2021's top four incidents and how Darktrace's advanced threat detection technology identified and mitigated vulnerabilities. Learn more.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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05
Apr 2022

By virtue of their exposure, Internet-facing systems (i.e., systems which have ports open/exposed to the wider Internet) are particularly susceptible to compromise. Attackers typically compromise Internet-facing systems by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in applications they run. During 2021, critical zero-day vulnerabilities in the following applications were publicly disclosed:

Internet-facing systems running these applications were consequently heavily targeted by attackers. In this post, we will provide examples of compromises of these systems observed by Darktrace’s SOC team in 2021. As will become clear, successful exploitation of weaknesses in Internet-facing systems inevitably results in such systems doing things which they do not normally do. Rather than focusing on identifying attempts to exploit these weaknesses, Darktrace focuses on identifying the unusual behaviors which inevitably ensue. The purpose of this post is to highlight the effectiveness of this approach.

Exchange server compromise

In January, researchers from the cyber security company DEVCORE reported a series of critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange which they dubbed ‘ProxyLogon’.[1] ProxyLogon consists of a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) and a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2021-27065). Attackers were observed exploiting these vulnerabilities in the wild from as early as January 6.[2] In April, DEVCORE researchers reported another series of critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange which they dubbed ‘ProxyShell’.[3] ProxyShell consists of a pre-authentication path confusion vulnerability (CVE-2021-34473), a privilege elevation vulnerability (CVE-2021-34523), and a post-authentication RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-31207). Attackers were first observed exploiting these vulnerabilities in the wild in August.[4] In many cases, attackers exploited the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities in order to create web shells on the targeted Exchange servers. The presence of these web shells provided attackers with the means to remotely execute commands on the compromised servers.

In early August 2021, by exploiting the ProxyShell vulnerabilities, an attacker gained the rights to remotely execute PowerShell commands on an Internet-facing Exchange server within the network of a US-based transportation company. The attacker subsequently executed a number of PowerShell commands on the server. One of these commands caused the server to make a 28-minute-long SSL connection to a highly unusual external endpoint. Within a couple of hours, the attacker managed to strengthen their foothold within the network by installing AnyDesk and CobaltStrike on several internal devices. In mid-August, the attacker got the devices on which they had installed Cobalt Strike to conduct network reconnaissance and to transfer terabytes of data to the cloud storage service, MEGA. At the end of August, the attacker got the devices on which they had installed AnyDesk to execute Conti ransomware and to spread executable files and script files to further internal devices.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of ProxyShell immediately resulted in the Exchange Server making a long SSL connection to an unusual external endpoint. This connection caused the model Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint to breach. The subsequent reconnaissance, lateral movement, C2, external data transfer, and encryption behavior brought about by the attacker were also picked up by Darktrace’s models.

A non-exhaustive list of the models that breached as a result of the behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual Internal Data Volume as Client or Server
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Masqueraded Executable SMB Write
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Confluence server compromise

Atlassian’s Confluence is an application which provides the means for building collaborative, virtual workspaces. In the era of remote working, the value of such an application is undeniable. The public disclosure of a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2021-26084) in Confluence in August 2021 thus provided a prime opportunity for attackers to cause havoc. The vulnerability, which arises from the use of Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) in Confluence’s tag system, provides attackers with the means to remotely execute code on vulnerable Confluence server by sending a crafted HTTP request containing a malicious parameter.[5] Attackers were first observed exploiting this vulnerability towards the end of August, and in the majority of cases, attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install crypto-mining tools onto vulnerable servers.[6]

At the beginning of September 2021, an attacker was observed exploiting CVE-2021-26084 in order to install the crypto-mining tool, XMRig, as well as a shell script, onto an Internet-facing Confluence server within the network of an EMEA-based television and broadcasting company. Within a couple of hours, the attacker installed files associated with the crypto-mining malware, Kinsing, onto the server. The Kinsing-infected server then immediately began to communicate over HTTP with the attacker’s C2 infrastructure. Around the time of this activity, the server was observed using the MinerGate crypto-mining protocol, indicating that the server had begun to mine cryptocurrency.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 immediately resulted in the Confluence server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with curl in this case) to a rare external IP. This behavior caused the models Device / New User Agent, Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname, and Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location to breach. The subsequent file downloads, C2 traffic and crypto-mining activity also resulted in several models breaching.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the unusual behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

GitLab server compromise

GitLab is an application providing services ranging from project planning to source code management. Back in April 2021, a critical RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-22205) in GitLab was publicly reported by a cyber security researcher via the bug bounty platform, HackerOne.[7] The vulnerability, which arises from GitLab’s use of ExifTool for removing metadata from image files, [8] enables attackers to remotely execute code on vulnerable GitLab servers by uploading specially crafted image files.[9] Attackers were first observed exploiting CVE-2021-22205 in the wild in June/July.[10] A surge in exploitations of the vulnerability was observed at the end of October, with attackers exploiting the flaw in order to assemble botnets.[11] Darktrace observed a significant number of cases in which attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install crypto-mining tools onto vulnerable GitLab servers.

On October 29, an attacker successfully exploited CVE-2021-22205 on an Internet-facing GitLab server within the network of a UK-based education provider. The organization was trialing Darktrace when this incident occurred. The attacker installed several executable files and shell scripts onto the server by exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker communicated with the compromised server (using unusual ports) for several days, before making the server transfer large volumes of data externally and download the crypto-mining tool, XMRig, as well as the botnet malware, Mirai. The server was consequently observed making connections to the crypto-mining pool, C3Pool.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of the vulnerability in GitLab immediately resulted in the server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with Wget in this case) to a rare external IP. The models Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname and Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location breached as a result of this behavior. The attacker’s subsequent activity on the server over the next few days resulted in frequent model breaches.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the attacker’s activity on the server:

  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New IPs
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compliance / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Anomalous File / Numeric Exe Download

Log4j server compromise

On December 9 2021, a critical RCE vulnerability (dubbed ‘Log4Shell’) in version 2 of Apache’s Log4j was publicly disclosed by researchers at LunaSec.[12] As a logging library present in potentially millions of Java applications,[13] Log4j constitutes an obscured, yet ubiquitous feature of the digital world. The vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228), which arises from Log4j’s Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) Lookup feature, enables an attacker to make a vulnerable server download and execute a malicious Java class file. To exploit the vulnerability, all the attacker must do is submit a specially crafted JNDI lookup request to the server. The fact that Log4j is present in so many applications and that the exploitation of this vulnerability is so simple, Log4Shell has been dubbed the ‘most critical vulnerability of the last decade’.[14] Attackers have been exploiting Log4Shell in the wild since at least December 1.[15] Since then, attackers have been observed exploiting the vulnerability to install crypto-mining tools, Cobalt Strike, and RATs onto vulnerable servers.[16]

On December 10, one day after the public disclosure of Log4Shell, an attacker successfully exploited the vulnerability on a vulnerable Internet-facing server within the network of a US-based architecture company. By exploiting the vulnerability, the attacker managed to get the server to download and execute a Java class file named ‘Exploit69ogQNSQYz.class’. Executing the code in this file caused the server to download a shell script file and a file related to the Kinsing crypto-mining malware. The Kinsing-infected server then went on to communicate over HTTP with a C2 server. Since the customer was using the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, they were immediately alerted to this activity, and the server was subsequently quarantined, preventing crypto-mining activity from taking place.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of the zero-day vulnerability immediately resulted in the vulnerable server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with Java in this case) to a rare external IP. The models Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device and Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname breached as a result of this behavior. The device’s subsequent file downloads and C2 activity caused several Darktrace models to breach.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the unusual behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Round-up

It is inevitable that attackers will attempt to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in applications running on Internet-facing devices. Whilst identifying these attempts is useful, the fact that attackers regularly exploit new zero-days makes the task of identifying attempts to exploit them akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Whilst it is uncertain which zero-day vulnerability attackers will exploit next, what is certain is that their exploitation of it will bring about unusual behavior. No matter the vulnerability, whether it be a vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange, Confluence, GitLab, or Log4j, Darktrace will identify the unusual behaviors which inevitably result from its exploitation. By identifying unusual behaviors displayed by Internet-facing devices, Darktrace thus makes it almost impossible for attackers to successfully exploit zero-day vulnerabilities without being detected.

For Darktrace customers who want to find out more about detecting potential compromises of internet-facing devices, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

Thanks to Andy Lawrence for his contributions.

Footnotes

1. https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-1-ProxyLogon/

2. https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/

3. https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell

4. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/12/proxyshell-more-widespread-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-servers/

5. https://www.kaspersky.co.uk/blog/confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/23376/

6. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/atlassian-confluence-flaw-actively-exploited-to-install-cryptominers/

7. https://hackerone.com/reports/1154542

8. https://security.humanativaspa.it/gitlab-ce-cve-2021-22205-in-the-wild/

9.https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2021/04/14/security-release-gitlab-13-10-3-released/

10. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/11/01/gitlab-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-cve-2021-22205-exploited-in-the-wild/

11. https://www.hackmageddon.com/2021/12/16/1-15-november-2021-cyber-attacks-timeline/

12. https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/

13. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3644472/apache-log4j-vulnerability-actively-exploited-impacting-millions-of-java-based-apps.html

14. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/dec/10/software-flaw-most-critical-vulnerability-log-4-shell

15. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/15/the-everypersons-guide-to-log4shell-cve-2021-44228/

16. https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/

Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

Security After Signatures: Operating in a World of Pre‑CVE Disclosure Exploitation, Collapsed Trust Boundaries, and Autonomous Systems

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July 22, 2026

When AI Agents Go Off Script: What the OpenAI and Hugging Face Incident Means for Defenders

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The recent security incident disclosed jointly by OpenAI and Hugging Face is quickly becoming one of the most discussed AI security stories of the year; it's one that has generated great discussion amongst our researchers and technical teams here at Darktrace.

During an internal evaluation of advanced OpenAI models, an autonomous agent reportedly escaped its intended testing boundaries, obtained internet access, and compromised Hugging Face infrastructure while attempting to evaluate and benchmark the model's cyber capabilities. OpenAI has described it as an unprecedented cyber incident and is collaborating with Hugging Face to investigate and share its findings publicly to help defenders understand the implications and improve AI safety across the community.

What this means for organizations deploying AI agents

The most important takeaway for security leaders is not that the AI model is capable of complex and effective chained attacks. It's what this tells us about the guardrails and protections that need to be put in place to ensure these increasingly capable models are safely used within our businesses.

According to OpenAI's investigation, the models were not acting with malicious intent. They were attempting to achieve a legitimate assigned objective. In pursuing that objective, they identified a path that involved obtaining information from a third party's environment and followed it to completion. From the model's perspective, that appears to have been an effective solution to the problem it was given.

Many organizations still hold the assumption that giving an AI agent a legitimate goal will naturally result in legitimate behavior. Increasingly, that is not something defenders can safely assume.

A human who encounters a "permission denied" message generally understands the technical restriction as well as the social meaning behind it. An agent may interpret that message only as evidence that one method to achieve its objective has failed. What makes this incident notable is the agent’s ability to keep pursuing the objective, revise its plan, and combine many individually useful actions into an outcome its designers did not intend.

This is not an isolated challenge. Recent research from the UK's AI Security Institute found that frontier models often attempt to "cheat" evaluations by finding unintended shortcuts to success. More interestingly, that behavior is not always reflected in chain-of-thought outputs and is not always admitted when models are questioned about their actions. One lesson for defenders is that understanding what an AI system says it is doing is not always the same as understanding its behavior and what it is actually doing.

Why behavioral security is an essential security foundation

That's the principle behind Darktrace / SECURE AI and our broader approach to behavioral security. Understanding intent or putting in place static guardrails is not enough; security teams need visibility into how agents behave over time, what resources they interact with, how their behavior changes, and whether they begin pursuing objectives in unexpected ways. Research released by NIST earlier this summer reinforced that rules alone are not sufficient to defend against AI threats, with one conclusion being that "there will always be a way to prompt an AI system to disregard its rules - it's just a matter of finding it."

Another interesting lesson is that nothing described in OpenAI's preliminary findings appears fundamentally impossible for a skilled human attacker. But it does highlight the accessibility and scale that could be unlocked for attackers as increasingly capable models become more widely available. Resource constraints that attackers deal with will decrease as frontier models can help execute elements of those attack workflows autonomously, persist through failure, and iterate towards an objective. Capabilities that were once limited to skilled attackers can increasingly be supplemented with these systems, lowering the barrier to entry to conduct complex cyber operations.

It is incredibly positive to see OpenAI and Hugging Face investigating this incident collaboratively and sharing their findings publicly. Transparency and collaboration around incidents like these helps the entire security community better understand how rapidly AI capabilities are evolving and where we need to improve safeguards. It also reinforces why Darktrace is excited to be partnering with OpenAI through the Daybreak Cyber Partner Program: to explore how advanced AI can be used safely and responsibly in support of defenders while developing the visibility, governance, and security controls needed for increasingly autonomous systems.

This incident is an important reminder that capable AI systems will not always behave in the ways we expect. As organizations deploy AI agents across critical workflows, understanding behavior is an even more important foundation for effective security.

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July 22, 2026

How to Secure AI in Stadium Operations?

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Key takeaways

  • AI is entering high-impact stadium functions such as access control, crowd management, ticketing, facilities, and surveillance.  
  • Shadow AI and third-party AI use can create risks that stadium security teams cannot readily see.  
  • Security teams must understand not only which AI systems exist, but also what they can access and what actions they can take.  
  • Live-event resilience requires continuous monitoring and response across AI, IT, OT, identities, and third parties.

‍

Modern stadiums are infrastructure unlike any other. I’ve written before on event day sparking stadiums into life with shops and food stands, transport hubs, vast telecommunications infrastructure, field-side technology and beyond, acting as one super-sized, connected ecosystem. Stadiums’ scale and complexity make them some of the toughest environments in cybersecurity. Now, we’re adding AI to those operations and bringing a new dimension of risk.

The benefits of AI in stadium operations are easy to see. It can help stadium operators move fans safely through crowded gates, forecast demand at concession stands, support biometric entry, identify suspicious behavior on CCTV, and manage heating and ventilation. Used well, it can make live events safer, faster, and more efficient.

But it also changes the security model.

In Darktrace’s recent research into the threat landscape surrounding sports, we asked cybersecurity professionals protecting professional sports organizations where in their footprint a cyber compromise would have the greatest impact. The area they named most, highlighted by 34% of the professionals we spoke to, was stadium operations. At the same time, 35% said their organizations are already using AI in stadium operations, or plan to do so in the next 12 months.

Security teams are no longer just protecting traditional IT systems around a stadium. They are increasingly being asked to protect AI systems that are operating in the stadium’s most fundamental functions.

Approved AI vs. shadow AI in stadium operations

There is a clear difference between AI a stadium’s security team knows about and AI it does not.

Approved AI is the AI that has been reviewed, tested, and integrated into the venue’s operating environment. It may support CCTV analytics, access control, facility management, ticketing, logistics, broadcast operations, or anti-piracy monitoring. It should have clear ownership, access controls, logging, vendor review, and data protection rules. That does not make it risk-free, but it allows security teams to institute proper governance.

Shadow AI is different. It is the unapproved use of AI tools by employees, contractors, or suppliers. It often starts with good intent. Someone wants to work faster. A staff member pastes internal information into a public AI tool to draft a briefing. A developer uses an AI assistant to debug ticketing code. A supplier connects an AI scheduling tool to delivery routes. A designer uploads unreleased venue plans or sponsor material to generate a mockup.

None of those actions may feel like a security decision to the person doing them. But each one can move sensitive operational data into an environment the stadium does not control, creating hidden risk.

The approved AI stack may be visible to security teams. The shadow AI stack often is not.

Why game day increases AI cybersecurity risk

In a typical enterprise environment, a security team may have hours to investigate a strange login or an unexpected connection to a third-party service. Within a stadium, the moment an incident is likely to occur is also the moment when teams are at their most stretched and the incident can have the greatest repercussions: game day.

If an AI system used for crowd management behaves unexpectedly, the issue is not only technical. It may affect physical movement inside the venue.

If a supplier tool is sending operational data to an unapproved AI platform, the issue is not only data governance. It may expose delivery routes, restricted access schedules, or staffing plans.

The most dangerous scenario is not always a loud, dramatic attack but a hidden dependency that no one has mapped such as a vendor adding an AI feature through a software update or a staff workflow using an unapproved tool.

By the time the venue is live, those hidden connections can become operational risk.

The supply chain is part of the stadium attack surface

Any major sporting event is made by its supply chain and partnerships: catering firms, transport providers, broadcast systems, facilities teams. Every piece is necessary and each creates a security channel. The risk of supply chain compromise has been well established for some time and has been the source of some of the most high-profile breaches we’ve seen. The data breach at MSG Entertainment, owner of Madison Square Garden, that was widely reported in March, originated in a breach of Oracle’s E-Business Suite, used in MSG Entertainment’s back-office systems, while the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics reportedly began with the compromise of the main IT service provider for the Games. The addition of AI is heightening the risk.

A stadium can have strict rules for its own AI systems, but its vendors may be using separate tools. Some may use AI to manage staffing, delivery windows, inventory, or customer communications. Others may not realize that AI features have been added into software they already use.

This is one of the hardest parts of securing AI in stadium operations. The risk does not always come from a tool the venue selected. It may come from a tool a supplier selected or a feature the supplier did not know had been turned on.

Security teams need to treat vendor AI the same way they treat vendor access. They need to know what suppliers can connect to, what data they can see, what tools they use, and whether those tools introduce new routes for data exposure or lateral movement.

A third-party AI tool does not need deep access to create risk. Sometimes it only needs the right operational detail at the wrong time.

Four questions for securing AI in stadium operations

As AI becomes part of stadium operations, security teams need to move beyond basic approval lists. There are four questions they need to ask:

1. Where is AI being used?

This includes obvious tools, such as computer vision, access control, ticketing, logistics, and facility management. But it also includes less visible AI inside SaaS platforms, vendor tools, browser extensions, developer workflows, smart building systems, and collaboration tools.

2. What can the AI access?

Can it see incident logs, staffing plans, ticketing data, video feeds, building controls, fan information, credentials, or supplier systems? Can it only analyze information, or can it also trigger actions?

3. What can the AI do?

AI agents are not just passive tools. Some can call APIs, update records, generate instructions, trigger workflows, or act with the permissions of a user or service account. In a stadium, that distinction is critical. There is a big difference between an AI system that recommends an action and one that can take an action.

4. What does normal look like?

In your security architecture, static rules will not be enough. AI use changes quickly: tools appear inside existing platforms, vendors add new services, and staff find workarounds when they are under pressure. Security teams need to understand normal behavior across people, identities, devices, networks, cloud services, suppliers, and AI tools so they can spot when something changes.

That is especially important in live-event environments, where small anomalies can matter. A connection to an unapproved AI service may be harmless in one context and serious in another, and an AI agent taking action at 3 a.m. may be expected during setup but suspicious during a match. Context is what turns raw activity into useful security insight. It’s also what enables rapid response. Your own AI-based security systems can respond to threats at machine speed if they can build the live context to know action needs to be taken.

AI can make stadiums safer, but only if it is secured

AI has a real role to play in stadium operations. It can help teams detect crowd pressure earlier, reduce bottlenecks, manage facilities more efficiently, improve the fan experience, and support event teams during high-pressure moments.

The answer is not to slow all AI adoption. That's not the goal. The answer is to make AI visible, governed, and secure before it becomes part of match-day operations.

For stadium operators and event organizers, that means mapping AI use across the venue and supplier ecosystem. It means understanding what each AI system can access and what actions it can take. It means giving staff approved tools that meet their needs, rather than leaving them to find workarounds. It means writing AI use into vendor contracts and audits. And it means monitoring behavior across the full environment, not only the systems that are easiest to see. A stadium cannot secure what it cannot see.

When AI becomes part of how a stadium moves people, controls access, manages facilities, supports suppliers, and protects media rights, it stops being a side project. It becomes part of the event infrastructure.

Event infrastructure must be thoroughly prepared before venue gates open and sustained with the operational resilience required to support a secure, seamless, and reliable event experience.

How Darktrace helps secure AI in stadium operations

Darktrace brings more than a decade of behavioral AI expertise, built on an enterprise‑wide platform designed to operate in complex, ambiguous environments. We protect the large-scale integrated IT and OT environments that underpin stadium operations from the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, to Formula 1 Grand Prixes around the world and stadiums across the USA.

Other cybersecurity technologies try to predict each new attack based on historical attacks. The problem is that AI operates like humans do. Every action introduces new information that changes how AI behaves, making it unpredictable in nature. Historical attack tactics are now only a small part of the equation, forcing vendors to retrofit unproven acquisitions to secure AI.  

Darktrace is fundamentally different. Our Adaptive AI continuously learns how your people and AI behave, building an understanding of your organization so it can detect and respond autonomously when behavior deviates. Our Behavioral Defense Platform secures your AI, people, and infrastructure as you onboard new workflows, agents, and applications, enabling your AI transformation at scale.

As AI changes what organizations can do, Darktrace helps them move forward with confidence. We give the security teams defending the people and technology within stadium infrastructure the understanding, visibility, and autonomous action they need to protect new technologies as they are integrated into operations, so their organizations drive the progress that will define the AI era.

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