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April 4, 2022

Explore Internet-Facing System Vulnerabilities

Read about 2021's top four incidents and how Darktrace's advanced threat detection technology identified and mitigated vulnerabilities. Learn more.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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04
Apr 2022

By virtue of their exposure, Internet-facing systems (i.e., systems which have ports open/exposed to the wider Internet) are particularly susceptible to compromise. Attackers typically compromise Internet-facing systems by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in applications they run. During 2021, critical zero-day vulnerabilities in the following applications were publicly disclosed:

Internet-facing systems running these applications were consequently heavily targeted by attackers. In this post, we will provide examples of compromises of these systems observed by Darktrace’s SOC team in 2021. As will become clear, successful exploitation of weaknesses in Internet-facing systems inevitably results in such systems doing things which they do not normally do. Rather than focusing on identifying attempts to exploit these weaknesses, Darktrace focuses on identifying the unusual behaviors which inevitably ensue. The purpose of this post is to highlight the effectiveness of this approach.

Exchange server compromise

In January, researchers from the cyber security company DEVCORE reported a series of critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange which they dubbed ‘ProxyLogon’.[1] ProxyLogon consists of a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) and a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2021-27065). Attackers were observed exploiting these vulnerabilities in the wild from as early as January 6.[2] In April, DEVCORE researchers reported another series of critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange which they dubbed ‘ProxyShell’.[3] ProxyShell consists of a pre-authentication path confusion vulnerability (CVE-2021-34473), a privilege elevation vulnerability (CVE-2021-34523), and a post-authentication RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-31207). Attackers were first observed exploiting these vulnerabilities in the wild in August.[4] In many cases, attackers exploited the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities in order to create web shells on the targeted Exchange servers. The presence of these web shells provided attackers with the means to remotely execute commands on the compromised servers.

In early August 2021, by exploiting the ProxyShell vulnerabilities, an attacker gained the rights to remotely execute PowerShell commands on an Internet-facing Exchange server within the network of a US-based transportation company. The attacker subsequently executed a number of PowerShell commands on the server. One of these commands caused the server to make a 28-minute-long SSL connection to a highly unusual external endpoint. Within a couple of hours, the attacker managed to strengthen their foothold within the network by installing AnyDesk and CobaltStrike on several internal devices. In mid-August, the attacker got the devices on which they had installed Cobalt Strike to conduct network reconnaissance and to transfer terabytes of data to the cloud storage service, MEGA. At the end of August, the attacker got the devices on which they had installed AnyDesk to execute Conti ransomware and to spread executable files and script files to further internal devices.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of ProxyShell immediately resulted in the Exchange Server making a long SSL connection to an unusual external endpoint. This connection caused the model Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint to breach. The subsequent reconnaissance, lateral movement, C2, external data transfer, and encryption behavior brought about by the attacker were also picked up by Darktrace’s models.

A non-exhaustive list of the models that breached as a result of the behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual Internal Data Volume as Client or Server
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Masqueraded Executable SMB Write
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Confluence server compromise

Atlassian’s Confluence is an application which provides the means for building collaborative, virtual workspaces. In the era of remote working, the value of such an application is undeniable. The public disclosure of a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2021-26084) in Confluence in August 2021 thus provided a prime opportunity for attackers to cause havoc. The vulnerability, which arises from the use of Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) in Confluence’s tag system, provides attackers with the means to remotely execute code on vulnerable Confluence server by sending a crafted HTTP request containing a malicious parameter.[5] Attackers were first observed exploiting this vulnerability towards the end of August, and in the majority of cases, attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install crypto-mining tools onto vulnerable servers.[6]

At the beginning of September 2021, an attacker was observed exploiting CVE-2021-26084 in order to install the crypto-mining tool, XMRig, as well as a shell script, onto an Internet-facing Confluence server within the network of an EMEA-based television and broadcasting company. Within a couple of hours, the attacker installed files associated with the crypto-mining malware, Kinsing, onto the server. The Kinsing-infected server then immediately began to communicate over HTTP with the attacker’s C2 infrastructure. Around the time of this activity, the server was observed using the MinerGate crypto-mining protocol, indicating that the server had begun to mine cryptocurrency.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 immediately resulted in the Confluence server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with curl in this case) to a rare external IP. This behavior caused the models Device / New User Agent, Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname, and Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location to breach. The subsequent file downloads, C2 traffic and crypto-mining activity also resulted in several models breaching.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the unusual behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

GitLab server compromise

GitLab is an application providing services ranging from project planning to source code management. Back in April 2021, a critical RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-22205) in GitLab was publicly reported by a cyber security researcher via the bug bounty platform, HackerOne.[7] The vulnerability, which arises from GitLab’s use of ExifTool for removing metadata from image files, [8] enables attackers to remotely execute code on vulnerable GitLab servers by uploading specially crafted image files.[9] Attackers were first observed exploiting CVE-2021-22205 in the wild in June/July.[10] A surge in exploitations of the vulnerability was observed at the end of October, with attackers exploiting the flaw in order to assemble botnets.[11] Darktrace observed a significant number of cases in which attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install crypto-mining tools onto vulnerable GitLab servers.

On October 29, an attacker successfully exploited CVE-2021-22205 on an Internet-facing GitLab server within the network of a UK-based education provider. The organization was trialing Darktrace when this incident occurred. The attacker installed several executable files and shell scripts onto the server by exploiting the vulnerability. The attacker communicated with the compromised server (using unusual ports) for several days, before making the server transfer large volumes of data externally and download the crypto-mining tool, XMRig, as well as the botnet malware, Mirai. The server was consequently observed making connections to the crypto-mining pool, C3Pool.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of the vulnerability in GitLab immediately resulted in the server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with Wget in this case) to a rare external IP. The models Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname and Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location breached as a result of this behavior. The attacker’s subsequent activity on the server over the next few days resulted in frequent model breaches.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the attacker’s activity on the server:

  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New IPs
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compliance / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Anomalous File / Numeric Exe Download

Log4j server compromise

On December 9 2021, a critical RCE vulnerability (dubbed ‘Log4Shell’) in version 2 of Apache’s Log4j was publicly disclosed by researchers at LunaSec.[12] As a logging library present in potentially millions of Java applications,[13] Log4j constitutes an obscured, yet ubiquitous feature of the digital world. The vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228), which arises from Log4j’s Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) Lookup feature, enables an attacker to make a vulnerable server download and execute a malicious Java class file. To exploit the vulnerability, all the attacker must do is submit a specially crafted JNDI lookup request to the server. The fact that Log4j is present in so many applications and that the exploitation of this vulnerability is so simple, Log4Shell has been dubbed the ‘most critical vulnerability of the last decade’.[14] Attackers have been exploiting Log4Shell in the wild since at least December 1.[15] Since then, attackers have been observed exploiting the vulnerability to install crypto-mining tools, Cobalt Strike, and RATs onto vulnerable servers.[16]

On December 10, one day after the public disclosure of Log4Shell, an attacker successfully exploited the vulnerability on a vulnerable Internet-facing server within the network of a US-based architecture company. By exploiting the vulnerability, the attacker managed to get the server to download and execute a Java class file named ‘Exploit69ogQNSQYz.class’. Executing the code in this file caused the server to download a shell script file and a file related to the Kinsing crypto-mining malware. The Kinsing-infected server then went on to communicate over HTTP with a C2 server. Since the customer was using the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, they were immediately alerted to this activity, and the server was subsequently quarantined, preventing crypto-mining activity from taking place.

In this example, the attacker’s exploitation of the zero-day vulnerability immediately resulted in the vulnerable server making an HTTP GET request with an unusual user-agent string (one associated with Java in this case) to a rare external IP. The models Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device and Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname breached as a result of this behavior. The device’s subsequent file downloads and C2 activity caused several Darktrace models to breach.

A non-exhaustive list of the models which breached as a result of the unusual behavior brought about by the attacker:

  • Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Round-up

It is inevitable that attackers will attempt to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in applications running on Internet-facing devices. Whilst identifying these attempts is useful, the fact that attackers regularly exploit new zero-days makes the task of identifying attempts to exploit them akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Whilst it is uncertain which zero-day vulnerability attackers will exploit next, what is certain is that their exploitation of it will bring about unusual behavior. No matter the vulnerability, whether it be a vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange, Confluence, GitLab, or Log4j, Darktrace will identify the unusual behaviors which inevitably result from its exploitation. By identifying unusual behaviors displayed by Internet-facing devices, Darktrace thus makes it almost impossible for attackers to successfully exploit zero-day vulnerabilities without being detected.

For Darktrace customers who want to find out more about detecting potential compromises of internet-facing devices, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

Thanks to Andy Lawrence for his contributions.

Footnotes

1. https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-1-ProxyLogon/

2. https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/

3. https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell

4. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/12/proxyshell-more-widespread-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-servers/

5. https://www.kaspersky.co.uk/blog/confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/23376/

6. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/atlassian-confluence-flaw-actively-exploited-to-install-cryptominers/

7. https://hackerone.com/reports/1154542

8. https://security.humanativaspa.it/gitlab-ce-cve-2021-22205-in-the-wild/

9.https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2021/04/14/security-release-gitlab-13-10-3-released/

10. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/11/01/gitlab-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-cve-2021-22205-exploited-in-the-wild/

11. https://www.hackmageddon.com/2021/12/16/1-15-november-2021-cyber-attacks-timeline/

12. https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/

13. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3644472/apache-log4j-vulnerability-actively-exploited-impacting-millions-of-java-based-apps.html

14. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/dec/10/software-flaw-most-critical-vulnerability-log-4-shell

15. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/15/the-everypersons-guide-to-log4shell-cve-2021-44228/

16. https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher

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November 18, 2026

Darktrace qualifies for NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace

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Darktrace has been selected to join NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace (CSDM), an initiative designed to give NATO faster, more flexible access to cybersecurity technology and services in support of its missions.  

Established by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), the marketplace brings together qualified suppliers whose technical capabilities have been reviewed, helping NATO match specialist expertise to project needs and respond more quickly to changing operational priorities.

Qualified across all eight cybersecurity categories

The program’s first phase, known as Lot 1, covers eight cybersecurity categories. Suppliers can qualify in individual categories; Darktrace has qualified to compete for future work across all eight:

  • Identity, Credential and Access Management
  • Endpoint Protection and Platforms
  • Network and Perimeter Security
  • Cloud Security
  • Threat Detection and Analytics Platforms
  • Vulnerability and Exposure Management
  • Digital Forensics and Evidence Platforms
  • Professional Services

Darktrace’s qualification across all eight categories reflects the breadth of our technology and services.

Supporting government and defense organizations

Nation-state attacks, compromised suppliers, the rapid exploitation of security weaknesses and attackers’ growing use of AI are increasing pressure on public-sector organizations. At the same time, agencies are adopting cloud services, connecting the technology that runs physical operations, and introducing automation and AI. Security teams must manage these changes while keeping essential operations running and sensitive information secure.

Protecting these environments requires an understanding of how people, AI and connected systems interact, and the ability to recognize when their activity creates risk. Threats can span several systems, making it essential for security teams to connect related activity and respond quickly.

The Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform™ supports this approach through unified visibility, continuous behavioral monitoring and autonomous response across AI, people and infrastructure.

At its core, Darktrace’s Adaptive AI™ continuously learns how each organization behaves, building a unique understanding of its people, AI agents and connected systems. This enables the platform to help identify activity that does not belong, connect related behavior across the organization, and investigate and respond to threats autonomously in real time, helping prevent disruption to essential operations.

Our selection builds on work to meet government security requirements internationally. Darktrace recently completed an independent assessment under Australia’s InfoSec Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) for Darktrace / NETWORK™ and Darktrace / OT™ against the Australian Government’s Information Security Manual PROTECTED-level controls. In the United States, Darktrace Federal continues to deliver the Darktrace technology to Department of War, Department of State, and Federal civilian organizations via its on-premises and FedRAMP CLASS D (High) Authorization platforms.

Together, these achievements demonstrate Darktrace’s ability to meet rigorous public-sector security requirements and reinforce its position as a trusted provider of mission-critical cybersecurity technology for government environments.

Meet us at NATO Edge 2026

Darktrace representatives will attend NATO Edge 2026, NCIA’s flagship technology event, in İzmir, Türkiye, from 17 to 19 November. We look forward to meeting government, military, and industry partners to discuss their cybersecurity priorities and how we can support them.

To learn more about the Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform, visit the platform hub.

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November 17, 2026

GTA VI Cyber Threats: Fake downloads, ransomware and account hijacking

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Key findings

  • Darktrace detected GTA VI-themed suspicious activity across organizations in multiple sectors ahead of the game’s release, showing how malicious gaming content can reach corporate environments outside the gaming industry.
  • Twelve Darktrace customer environments connected to gta6demo[.]asia, a domain that public threat research has associated with a fake GTA VI demo used to distribute the Vidar infostealer. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.
  • Darktrace investigated ransomware activity at two European games companies. One incident involved DireWolf ransomware alongside reported data exfiltration. A separate Qilin incident included Active Directory reconnaissance, new administrative credentials, possible lateral movement and substantial cloud-storage transfers before ransomware deployment.
  • Another incident on a gaming organization involved a SaaS account hijack in which a compromised account authenticated from unusual IP addresses, created a new privileged account and subsequently sent a high volume of suspected malicious email. An administrative account later authenticated from rare endpoints.‍
  • Darktrace's new report highlights how threat actors continue to weaponize launch hype to breach corporate networks and target gaming infrastructure following the guilty plea of hacker Arion Kurtaj. These findings demonstrate that global enterprises remain actively exposed to franchise-related social engineering and exploitation attempts.

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GTA VI gives criminals an audience

Grand Theft Auto VI arrives on November 19 with the kind of attention few entertainment releases command [1]. Before launch, that interest is already being exploited by sites offering supposed demos and downloads.

During September and October 2026, Darktrace detected devices across multiple customer environments connecting to GTA VI-themed sites associated with suspicious activity. The organizations involved were spread across EMEA and the Americas and included Manufacturing, Finance, and Public administration and defense sectors.

Darktrace has also investigated multiple incidents affecting gaming organizations including ransomware and a SaaS account hijack. Those investigations show a separate side of the threat: attackers operating inside corporate infrastructure and accounts, sometimes well before the eventual impact becomes apparent.

Following a fake GTA VI download

On October 7, 2026, Darktrace detected a device making suspicious DNS requests for gta6-play[.]ru, an unofficial Russian-language GTA VI site that had also been flagged as likely malicious in open-source intelligence (OSINT).

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Figure 1: A screenshot of the suspicious endpoint gta6-play[.]ru .

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Figure 2: A screenshot of a “Download Studio” endpoint led to on gta6-play[.]ru.

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The site advertised a GTA VI download. The site led to a separate “Download Studio” page offering a Windows executable. Analysis found the file was packaged using InstallMate, a commercial installation framework, with an embedded .tsuarch section containing a compressed tiz3 archive.


Further examination identified functionality designed to inspect the environment in which the installer was running. This included checking registry entries for installed software and disk devices, enumerating network adapters, inspecting MAC addresses, and searching for running processes and window titles.


The installer also searched for processes associated with virtualization, debugging, and network analysis, including VMware and VirtualBox components, alongside debugging and monitoring utilities such as OllyDbg, WinDbg, Process Hacker, Process Monitor, Wireshark and Fiddler.

The presence of those checks did not prove that the executable was malicious. The installer contained functionality capable of extracting embedded files, but the investigation did not establish that it was being used to deploy a malicious payload. No definitive malicious payload or command-and-control infrastructure was identified. The software appeared to be InstallRex, which is classified by several security vendors as a potentially unwanted program.

That is still a useful finding; A user looking for GTA VI content could move from an unofficial gaming site to an executable that inspected the local environment, including checking for software commonly used by security researchers.

A second GTA VI lure appeared across twelve organizations

During September 2026, Darktrace alerted on HTTP connections to gta6demo[.]asia across twelve customer environments. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.

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Figure 3: An example model alert generated due to a suspicious connection to gta6demo[.]asia.

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In a case affecting a UK-based customer, Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst further investigated connections to gta6demo[.]asia and generated an incident due to the highly suspicious nature of the behavior.

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Figure 4: A Real-Time AI Analyst incident highlighting the suspicious activity for further investigation

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Public threat research has associated gta6demo[.]asia with a campaign advertising a fake GTA VI demo. Users clicking "Play Now" were reportedly directed towards an executable containing the Vidar infostealer [2].

There is a practical difference between this activity and an attack against a games company. The users encountering GTA VI-themed infrastructure can work anywhere. Darktrace saw the activity across several sectors outside Gaming, including Finance, Manufacturing, and Public administration and defense.

A major game release can therefore create security exposure well beyond its publisher. A search for a demo or unofficial download on a corporate device is enough to bring gaming-themed infrastructure into an enterprise environment.

Ransomware operators inside the gaming industry

The attacks Darktrace observed against Gaming companies themselves show different patterns.

In August 2026, Darktrace threat research identified possible malicious activity at a European game developer. Ransomware was ultimately deployed and data was exfiltrated, with the DireWolf ransomware group claiming responsibility.

Darktrace observed suspicious file downloads and beaconing from several devices to rare endpoints alongside Monero cryptocurrency mining, Active Directory and network reconnaissance, unusual administrative RDP connections, activity associated with data staging and HTTP-based exfiltration.

Much of the intrusion was therefore visible before ransomware appeared; the environment was already showing evidence of ingress tooling, external command-and-control communications (C2), reconnaissance, unusual administrative access and data movement.

A separate investigation in December 2025 provides a closer view of this pre-ransomware activity. A European games company was targeted by Qilin ransomware with Darktrace observing scanning and LDAP searches involving userAccountControl, which can expose information useful for identifying accounts and Service Principal Names within Active Directory.

New administrative credentials then appeared on a Domain Controller and the Domain Controller also generated scanning, anomalous RPC, SMB, and SSH activity, and NetShareEnum activity through srvsvc. Elsewhere in the environment, long Remote Desktop sessions and SMB enumeration appeared consistent with lateral movement.

Several devices also transferred data to cloud storage services including WebDrive and Amazon Web Services (AWS). In some cases, large downloads preceded subsequent uploads. Darktrace observed the transfer pattern, although the available telemetry does not establish that every transfer represented attacker-controlled exfiltration.

The activity preceding the Qilin deployment included Active Directory reconnaissance, privileged credential use, network and share enumeration, unusual remote access and significant data movement. Each appeared before ransomware became the defining feature of the incident.

SaaS hijacking shifts the attacker evidence

A separate investigation in May 2026 involved the hijacking of a SaaS account at a Gaming organization.

The compromised account authenticated from several IP addresses that were unusual for the organization. It then performed suspicious SaaS group administration, including creating a new privileged account. The account subsequently sent a high volume of emails assessed as likely malicious spam and potentially intended to compromise additional users.

The following day, an administrative SaaS account authenticated from rare endpoints, raising the possibility that further privileged access had been obtained.

The activity presented a different detection problem from the ransomware cases. Authentication from rare infrastructure, administrative changes, creation of a privileged account and subsequent email activity provided the strongest indications that a legitimate identity had been compromised.

For a Gaming company using hosted platforms for development, communication and business operations, a compromised account with the right permissions can provide considerable access without requiring the attacker to reproduce a conventional network intrusion.

Detecting the intrusion before impact

The ransomware investigations show why encryption should not be the first point at which an incident comes into focus. Darktrace observed LDAP and Active Directory-related reconnaissance, new privileged credentials, unusual Domain Controller activity, remote sessions, network enumeration and abnormal data movement before ransomware deployment.

The SaaS case produced different evidence: authentication from rare infrastructure, unexpected administrative changes and activity performed through a compromised account. GTA VI-themed activity required another approach again, following users through unofficial sites and redirects and examining the software offered for download.

GTA VI has put gaming back into the headlines ahead of its November release. The security activity around it is already visible beyond the games industry, while ransomware and account-compromise investigations show attackers operating inside gaming companies through very different routes.

For defenders, those routes leave evidence before the incident reaches its most damaging stage. The practical work is in recognizing those changes early enough to investigate them.

Credit to Gemma Stubberfield (Cyber Analyst), Ahmed Gardezi (Senior Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead), Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence)

References:

1.        https://www.rockstargames.com/VI

2.     https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/08/fake-gta-6-extended-look-and-demo-sites-deliver-an-infostealer

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About the author
Gemma Stubberfield
Cyber Analyst
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