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May 11, 2023

Securing OT Systems: The Limits of the Air Gap Approach

Air-gapped security measures are not enough for resilience against cyber attacks. Read about how to gain visibility & reduce your cyber vulnerabilities.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Lesser
Head of U.S. Policy Analysis and Engagement
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11
May 2023

At a Glance:

  • Air gaps reduce cyber risk, but they do not prevent modern cyber attacks
  • Having visibility into an air-gapped network is better than assuming your defenses are impenetrable and having zero visibility
  • Darktrace can provide visibility and resiliency without jeopardizing the integrity of the air gap

What is an 'Air Gap'?

Information technology (IT) needs to fluidly connect with the outside world in order channel a flow of digital information across everything from endpoints and email systems to cloud and hybrid infrastructures. At the same time, this high level of connectivity makes IT systems particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks.  

Operational technology (OT), which controls the operations of physical processes, are considerably more sensitive. OT often relies on a high degree of regularity to maintain continuity of operations. Even the slightest disturbance can lead to disastrous results. Just a few seconds of delay on a programmable logic controller (PLC), for example, can significantly disrupt a manufacturing assembly line, leading to downtime at a considerable cost. In worst-case scenarios, disruptions to OT can even threaten human safety. 

An air gap is a ‘digital moat’ where data cannot enter or leave OT environments unless it is transferred manually.

Organizations with OT have traditionally tried to reconcile this conflict between IT and OT by attempting to separate them completely. Essentially, the idea is to let IT do what IT does best — facilitate activities like communication and data transfer at rapid speeds, thus allowing people to connect with each other and access information and applications in an efficient capacity. But at the same time, erect an air gap between IT and OT so that any cyber threats that slip into IT systems do not then spread laterally into highly sensitive, mission-critical OT systems. This air gap is essentially a ‘digital moat’ where data cannot enter or leave OT environments unless it is transferred manually.

Limitations of the Air Gap

The air gap approach makes sense, but it is far from perfect. First, many organizations that believe they have completely air-gapped systems in fact have unknown points of IT/OT convergence, that is, connections between IT and OT networks of which they are unaware. 

Many organizations today are also intentionally embracing IT/OT convergence to reap the benefits of digital transformation of their OT, in what is often called Industry 4.0. Examples include the industrial cloud (or ICSaaS), the industrial internet of things (IIoT), and other types of cyber-physical systems that offer increased efficiency and expanded capabilities when compared to more traditional forms of OT. Organizations may also embrace IT/OT convergence due to a lack of human capital, as convergence can make processes simpler and more efficient.

Even when an organization does have a true air gap (which is nearly impossible to confirm without full visibility across IT and OT environments), the fact is that there are a variety of ways for attackers to ‘jump the air gap'. Full visibility across IT and OT ecosystems in a single pane of glass is thus essential for organizations seeking to secure their OT. This is not only to illuminate any points of IT/OT convergence and validate the fact that an air gap exists in the first place, but also to see when an attack slips through the air gap.

Figure 1: Darktrace/OT's unified view of IT and OT environments.

Air Gap Attack Vectors

Even a perfect air gap will be vulnerable to a variety of different attack vectors, including (but not limited to) the following: 

  • Physical compromise: An adversary bypasses physical security and gains access directly to the air-gapped network devices. Physical access is by far the most effective and obvious technique.
  • Insider threats: Someone who is part of an organization and has access to air-gapped secure systems intentionally or unintentionally compromises a system.
  • Supply chain compromise: A vendor with legitimate access to air-gapped systems unwittingly is compromised and brings infected devices into a network. 
  • Misconfiguration: Misconfiguration of access controls or permissions allows an attacker to access the air-gapped system through a separate device on the network.
  • Social engineering (media drop): If an attacker was able to successfully conduct a malicious USB/media drop and an employee was to use that media within the air-gapped system, the network could be compromised. 
  • Other advanced tactics: Thermal manipulation, covert surface vibrations, LEDs, ultrasonic transmissions, radio signals, and magnetic fields are among a range of advanced tactics documented and demonstrated by researchers at Ben Gurion University. 

Vulnerabilities of Air-Gapped Systems

Aside from susceptibility to advanced techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) such as thermal manipulation and magnetic fields, more common vulnerabilities associated with air-gapped environments include factors such as unpatched systems going unnoticed, lack of visibility into network traffic, potentially malicious devices coming on the network undetected, and removable media being physically connected within the network. 

Once the attack is inside OT systems, the consequences can be disastrous regardless of whether there is an air gap or not. However, it is worth considering how the existence of the air gap can affect the time-to-triage and remediation in the case of an incident. For example, the existence of an air gap may seriously limit an incident response vendor’s ability to access the network for digital forensics and response. 

Kremlin Hackers Jumping the Air Gap 

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an alert documenting the TTPs used by Russian threat actors known as Dragonfly and Energetic Bear. Further reporting alleged that these groups ‘jumped the air gap,’ and, concerningly, gained the ability to disable the grid at the time of their choosing. 

These attackers successfully gained access to sensitive air-gapped systems across the energy sector and other critical infrastructure sectors by targeting vendors and suppliers through spear-phishing emails and watering hole attacks. These vendors had legitimate access to air-gapped systems, and essentially brought the infection into these systems unintentionally when providing support services such as patch deployment.

This incident reveals that even if a sensitive OT system has complete digital isolation, this robust air gap still cannot fully eliminate one of the greatest vulnerabilities of any system—human error. Human error would still hold if an organization went to the extreme of building a faraday cage to eliminate electromagnetic radiation. Air-gapped systems are still vulnerable to social engineering, which exploits human vulnerabilities, as seen in the tactics that Dragonfly and Energetic Bear used to trick suppliers, who then walked the infection right through the front door. 

Ideally, a technology would be able to identify an attack regardless of whether it is caused by a compromised supplier, radio signal, or electromagnetic emission. By spotting subtle deviations from a device, human, or network’s normal ‘pattern of life’, Self-Learning AI detects even the most nuanced forms of threatening behavior as they emerge — regardless of the source or cause of the threat.

Darktrace/OT for Air-Gapped Environments

Darktrace/OT for air-gapped environments is a physical appliance that deploys directly to the air-gapped system. Using raw digital data from an OT network to understand the normal pattern of life, Darktrace/OT does not need any data or threat feeds from external sources because the AI builds an innate understanding of self without third-party support. 

Because all data-processing and analytics are performed locally on the Darktrace appliance, there is no requirement for Darktrace to have a connection out to the internet. As a result, Darktrace/OT provides visibility and threat detection to air-gapped or highly segmented networks without jeopardizing their integrity. If a human or machine displays even the most nuanced forms of threatening behavior, the solution can illuminate this in real time. 

Security professionals can then securely access Darktrace alerts from anywhere within the network, using a web browser and encrypted HTTPS, and in line with your organization’s network policies.

Figure 2: Darktrace/OT detecting anomalous connections to a SCADA ICS workstation.

With this deployment, Darktrace offers all the critical insights demonstrated in other Darktrace/OT deployments, including (but not limited to) the following:

Organizations seeking to validate whether they have an air gap in the first place and maintain the air gap as their IT and OT environments evolve will greatly benefit from the comprehensive visibility and continuous situational awareness offered by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI. Also, organizations looking to poke holes in their air gap to embrace the benefits of IT/OT convergence will find that Self-Learning AI’s vigilance spots cyber-attacks that slip through. 

Whatever your organizations goals—be it embracing IIoT or creating a full-blown DMZ—by learning ‘you’, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI can help you achieve them safely and securely. 

Learn more about Darktrace/OT

Credit to: Daniel Simonds and Oakley Cox for their contribution to this blog.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Lesser
Head of U.S. Policy Analysis and Engagement

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May 2, 2025

SocGholish: From loader and C2 activity to RansomHub deployment

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Over the past year, a clear pattern has emerged across the threat landscape: ransomware operations are increasingly relying on compartmentalized affiliate models. In these models, initial access brokers (IABs) [6], malware loaders, and post-exploitation operators work together.

Due to those specialization roles, a new generation of loader campaigns has risen. Threat actors increasingly employ loader operators to quietly establish footholds on the target network. These entities then hand off access to ransomware affiliates. One loader that continues to feature prominently in such campaigns is SocGholish.

What is SocGholish?

SocGholish is a loader malware that has been utilized since at least 2017 [7].  It has long been associated with fake browser updates and JavaScript-based delivery methods on infected websites.

Threat actors often target outdated or poorly secured CMS-based websites like WordPress. Through unpatched plugins, or even remote code execution flaws, they inject malicious JavaScript into the site’s HTML, templates or external JS resources [8].  Historically, SocGholish has functioned as a first-stage malware loader, ultimately leading to deployment of Cobalt Strike beacons [9], and further facilitating access persistence to corporate environments. More recently, multiple security vendors have reported that infections involving SocGholish frequently lead to the deployment of RansomHub ransomware [3] [5].

This blog explores multiple instances within Darktrace's customer base where SocGholish deployment led to subsequent network compromises. Investigations revealed indicators of compromise (IoCs) similar to those identified by external security researchers, along with variations in attacker behavior post-deployment. Key innovations in post-compromise activities include credential access tactics targeting authentication mechanisms, particularly through the abuse of legacy protocols like WebDAV and SCF file interactions over SMB.

Initial access and execution

Since January 2025, Darktrace’s Threat Research team observed multiple cases in which threat actors leveraged the SocGholish loader for initial access. Malicious actors commonly deliver SocGholish by compromising legitimate websites by injecting malicious scripts into the HTML of the affected site. When the visitor lands on an infected site, they are typically redirected to a fake browser update page, tricking them into downloading a ZIP file containing a JavaScript-based loader [1] [2]. In one case, a targeted user appears to have visited the compromised website garagebevents[.]com (IP: 35.203.175[.]30), from which around 10 MB of data was downloaded.

Device Event Log showing connections to the compromised website, following by connections to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.
Figure 1: Device Event Log showing connections to the compromised website, following by connections to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.

Within milliseconds of the connection establishment, the user’s device initiated several HTTPS sessions over the destination port 443 to the external endpoint 176.53.147[.]97, linked to the following Keitaro TDS domains:

  • packedbrick[.]com
  • rednosehorse[.]com
  • blackshelter[.]org
  • blacksaltys[.]com

To evade detection, SocGholish uses highly obfuscated code and relies on traffic distribution systems (TDS) [3].  TDS is a tool used in digital and affiliate marketing to manage and distribute incoming web traffic based on predefined rules. More specifically, Keitaro is a premium self-hosted TDS frequently utilized by attackers as a payload repository for malicious scripts following redirects from compromised sites. In the previously noted example, it appears that the device connected to the compromised website, which then retrieved JavaScript code from the aforementioned Keitaro TDS domains. The script served by those instances led to connections to the endpoint virtual.urban-orthodontics[.]com (IP: 185.76.79[.]50), successfully completing SocGholish’s distribution.

Advanced Search showing connections to the compromised website, following by those to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.
Figure 2: Advanced Search showing connections to the compromised website, following by those to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.

Persistence

During some investigations, Darktrace researchers observed compromised devices initiating HTTPS connections to the endpoint files.pythonhosted[.]org (IP: 151.101.1[.]223), suggesting Python package downloads. External researchers have previously noted how attackers use Python-based backdoors to maintain access on compromised endpoints following initial access via SocGholish [5].

Credential access and lateral movement

Credential access – external

Darktrace researchers identified observed some variation in kill chain activities following initial access and foothold establishment. For example, Darktrace detected interesting variations in credential access techniques. In one such case, an affected device attempted to contact the rare external endpoint 161.35.56[.]33 using the Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) protocol. WebDAV is an extension of the HTTP protocol that allows users to collaboratively edit and manage files on remote web servers. WebDAV enables remote shares to be mounted over HTTP or HTTPS, similar to how SMB operates, but using web-based protocols. Windows supports WebDAV natively, which means a UNC path pointing to an HTTP or HTTPS resource can trigger system-level behavior such as authentication.

In this specific case, the system initiated outbound connections using the ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’ user-agent, targeting the URI path of /s on the external endpoint 161.35.56[.]33. During these requests, the host attempted to initiate NTML authentication and even SMB sessions over the web, both of which failed. Despite the session failures, these attempts also indicate a form of forced authentication. Forced authentication exploits a default behavior in Windows where, upon encountering a UNC path, the system will automatically try to authenticate to the resource using NTML – often without any user interaction. Although no files were directly retrieved, the WebDAV server was still likely able to retrieve the user’s NTLM hash during the session establishment requests, which can later be used by the adversary to crack the password offline.

Credential access – internal

In another investigated incident, Darktrace observed a related technique utilized for credential access and lateral movement. This time, the infected host uploaded a file named ‘Thumbs.scf’ to multiple internal SMB network shares. Shell Command File ( SCF) is a legacy Windows file format used primarily for Windows Explorer shortcuts. These files contain instructions for rendering icons or triggering shell commands, and they can be executed implicitly when a user simply opens a folder containing the file – no clicks required.

The ‘Thumbs.scf’ file dropped by the attacker was crafted to exploit this behavior. Its contents included a [Shell] section with the Command=2 directive and an IconFile path pointing to a remote UNC resource on the same external endpoint, 161.35.56[.]33, seen in the previously described case – specifically, ‘\\161.35.56[.]33\share\icon.ico’. When a user on the internal network navigates to the folder containing the SCF file, their system will automatically attempt to load the icon. In doing so, the system issues a request to the specified UNC path, which again prompts Windows to initiate NTML authentication.

This pattern of activity implies that the attacker leveraged passive internal exposure; users who simply browsed a compromised share would unknowingly send their NTML hashes to an external attacker-controlled host. Unlike the WebDAV approach, which required initiating outbound communication from the infected host, this SCF method relies on internal users to interact with poisoned folders.

Figure 3: Contents of the file 'Thumbs.scf' showing the UNC resource hosted on the external endpoint.
Figure 3: Contents of the file 'Thumbs.scf' showing the UNC resource hosted on the external endpoint.

Command-and-control

Following initial compromise, affected devices would then attempt outbound connections using the TLS/SSL protocol over port 443 to different sets of command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with SocGholish. The malware frequently uses obfuscated JavaScript loaders to initiate its infection chain, and once dropped, the malware communicates back to its infrastructure over standard web protocols, typically using HTTPS over port 443. However, this set of connections would precede a second set of outbound connections, this time to infrastructure linked to RansomHub affiliates, possibly facilitating the deployed Python-based backdoor.

Connectivity to RansomHub infrastructure relied on defense evasion tactics, such as port-hopping. The idea behind port-hopping is to disguise C2 traffic by avoiding consistent patterns that might be caught by firewalls, and intrusion detection systems. By cycling through ephemeral ports, the malware increases its chances of slipping past basic egress filtering or network monitoring rules that only scrutinize common web traffic ports like 443 or 80. Darktrace analysts identified systems connecting to destination ports such as 2308, 2311, 2313 and more – all on the same destination IP address associated with the RansomHub C2 environment.

Figure 4: Advanced Search connection logs showing connections over destination ports that change rapidly.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of 2025, Darktrace analysts identified a campaign whereby ransomware affiliates leveraged SocGholish to establish network access in victim environments. This activity enabled multiple sets of different post exploitation activity. Credential access played a key role, with affiliates abusing WebDAV and NTML over SMB to trigger authentication attempts. The attackers were also able to plant SCF files internally to expose NTML hashes from users browsing shared folders. These techniques evidently point to deliberate efforts at early lateral movement and foothold expansion before deploying ransomware. As ransomware groups continue to refine their playbooks and work more closely with sophisticated loaders, it becomes critical to track not just who is involved, but how access is being established, expanded, and weaponized.

Credit to Chrisina Kreza (Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

·       Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Compliance / External Windows Communication

·       Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·       Compromise / Large DNS Volume for Suspicious Domain

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·       Device / Anonymous NTML Logins

·       Device / External Network Scan

·       Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

·       Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·       Device / Suspicious SMB Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·       User / Kerberos Username Brute Force

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

·       Credential Access – T1187 Forced Authentication

·       Credential Access – T1110 Brute Force

·       Command and Control – T1071.001 Web Protocols

·       Command and Control – T1571 Non-Standard Port

·       Discovery – T1083 File and Directory Discovery

·       Discovery – T1018 Remote System Discovery

·       Discovery – T1046 Network Service Discovery

·       Discovery – T1135 Network Share Discovery

·       Execution – T1059.007 JavaScript

·       Lateral Movement – T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares

·       Resource Deployment – T1608.004 Drive-By Target

List of indicators of compromise (IoCs)

·       garagebevents[.]com – 35.203.175[.]30 – Possibly compromised website

·       packedbrick[.]com – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       rednosehorse[.]com – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       blackshelter[.]org – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       blacksaltys[.]com – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       virtual.urban-orthodontics[.]com – 185.76.79[.]50

·       msbdz.crm.bestintownpro[.]com – 166.88.182[.]126 – SocGholish C2

·       185.174.101[.]240 – RansomHub Python C2

·       185.174.101[.]69 – RansomHub Python C2

·       108.181.182[.]143 – RansomHub Python C2

References

[1] https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/socgholish-malware/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/threat-hunting-case-study-socgholish

[3] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html

[4] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/update-fake-updates-two-new-actors-and-new-mac-malware

[5] https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/ransomhub-affiliate-leverage-python-based-backdoor/

[6] https://www.cybereason.com/blog/how-do-initial-access-brokers-enable-ransomware-attacks

[7] https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124/

[8] https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-spotting-socgholish-wordpress-injection/

[9] https://www.esentire.com/blog/socgholish-to-cobalt-strike-in-10-minutes

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About the author
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst

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May 1, 2025

Your Vendors, Your Risk: Rethinking Third-Party Security in the Age of Supply Chain Attacks

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When most people hear the term supply chain attack, they often imagine a simple scenario: one organization is compromised, and that compromise is used as a springboard to attack another. This kind of lateral movement is common, and often the entry vector is as mundane and as dangerous as email.

Take, for instance, a situation where a trusted third-party vendor is breached. An attacker who gains access to their systems can then send malicious emails to your organization, emails that appear to come from a known and reputable source. Because the relationship is trusted, traditional phishing defenses may not be triggered, and recipients may be more inclined to engage with malicious content. From there, the attacker can establish a foothold, move laterally, escalate privileges, and launch a broader campaign.

This is one dimension of a supply chain cyber-attack, and it’s well understood in many security circles. But the risk doesn’t end there. In fact, it goes deeper, and it often hits the most important asset of all: your customers' data.

The risk beyond the inbox

What happens when customer data is shared with a third party for legitimate processing purposes for example billing, analytics, or customer service and that third party is then compromised?

In that case, your customer data is breached, even if your own systems were never touched. That’s the uncomfortable truth about modern cybersecurity: your risk is no longer confined to your own infrastructure. Every entity you share data with becomes an extension of your attack surface. Thus, we should rethink how we perceive responsibility.

It’s tempting to think that securing our environment is our job, and securing their environment is theirs. But if a breach of their environment results in the exposure of our customers, the accountability and reputational damage fall squarely on our shoulders.

The illusion of boundaries

In an era where digital operations are inherently interconnected, the lines of responsibility can blur quickly. Legally and ethically, organizations are still responsible for the data they collect even if that data is processed, stored, or analyzed by a third party. A customer whose data is leaked because of a vendor breach will almost certainly hold the original brand responsible, not the third-party processor they never heard of.

This is particularly important for industries that rely on extensive outsourcing and platform integrations (SaaS platforms, marketing tools, CRMs, analytics platforms, payment processors). The list of third-party vendors with access to customer data grows year over year. Each integration adds convenience, but also risk.

Encryption isn’t a silver bullet

One of the most common safeguards used in these data flows is encryption. Encrypting customer data in transit is a smart and necessary step, but it’s far from enough. Once data reaches the destination system, it typically needs to be decrypted for use. And the moment it is decrypted, it becomes vulnerable to a variety of attacks like ransomware, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and more.

In other words, the question isn’t just is the data secure in transit? The more important question is how is it protected once it arrives?

A checklist for organizations evaluating third-parties

Given these risks, what should responsible organizations do when they need to share customer data with third parties?

Start by treating third-party security as an extension of your own security program. Here are some foundational controls that can make a difference:

Due diligence before engagement: Evaluate third-party vendors based on their security posture before signing any contracts. What certifications do they hold? What frameworks do they follow? What is their incident response capability?

Contractual security clauses: Build in specific security requirements into vendor contracts. These can include requirements for encryption standards, access control policies, and data handling protocols.

Third-party security assessments: Require vendors to provide evidence of their security controls. Independent audits, penetration test results, and SOC 2 reports can all provide useful insights.

Ongoing monitoring and attestations: Security isn’t static. Make sure vendors provide regular security attestations and reports. Where possible, schedule periodic reviews or audits, especially for vendors handling sensitive data.

Minimization and segmentation: Don’t send more data than necessary. Data minimization limits the exposure in the event of a breach. Segmentation, both within your environment and within vendor access levels, can further reduce risk.

Incident response planning: Ensure you have a playbook for handling third-party incidents, and that vendors do as well. Coordination in the event of a breach should be clear and rapid.

The human factor: Customers and communication

There’s another angle to supply chain cyber-attacks that’s easy to overlook: the post-breach exploitation of public knowledge. When a breach involving customer data hits the news, it doesn’t take long for cybercriminals to jump on the opportunity.

Attackers can craft phishing emails that appear to be follow-ups from the affected organization: “Click here to reset your password,” “Confirm your details due to the breach,” etc.

A breach doesn’t just put customer data at risk it also opens the door to further fraud, identity theft, and financial loss through social engineering. This is why post-breach communication and phishing mitigation strategies are valuable components of an incident response strategy.

Securing what matters most

Ultimately, protecting against supply chain cyber-attacks isn’t just about safeguarding your own perimeter. It’s about defending the integrity of your customers’ data, wherever it goes. When customer data is entrusted to you, the duty of care doesn’t end at your firewall.

Relying on vendors to “do their part” is not enough. True due diligence means verifying, validating, and continuously monitoring those extended attack surfaces. It means designing controls that assume failure is possible, and planning accordingly.

In today’s threat landscape, cybersecurity is no longer just a technical discipline. It’s a trust-building exercise. Your customers expect you to protect their information, and rightly so. And when a supply chain attack happens, whether the breach originated with you or your partner, the damage lands in the same place: your brand, your customers, your responsibility.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Tony Jarvis
VP, Field CISO | Darktrace
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