Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brianna Leddy
Director of Analyst Operations
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03
May 2021
It’s ten to five on a Friday afternoon. A technician has come in to perform a routine check on an electronic door. She enters the office with no issues – she works for a trusted third-party vendor, employees see her every week. She opens her laptop and connects to the Door Access Control Unit, a small Internet of Things (IoT) device used to operate the smart lock. Minutes later, trojans have been downloaded onto the company network, a crypto-mining operation has begun, and there is evidence of confidential data being exfiltrated. Where did things go wrong?
Threats in a business: A new dawn surfaces
As organizations keep pace with the demands of digital transformation, the attack surface has become broader than ever before. There are numerous points of entry for a cyber-criminal – from vulnerabilities in IoT ecosystems, to blind spots in supply chains, to insiders misusing their access to the business. Darktrace sees these threats every day. Sometimes, like in the real-world example above, which will be examined in this blog, they can occur in the very same attack.
Insider threats can use their familiarity and level of access to a system as a critical advantage when evading detection and launching an attack. But insiders don’t necessarily have to be malicious. Every employee or contractor is a potential threat: clicking on a phishing link or accidentally releasing data often leads to wide-scale breaches.
At the same time, connectivity in the workspace – with each IoT device communicating with the corporate network and the Internet on its own IP address – is an urgent security issue. Access control systems, for example, add a layer of physical security by tracking who enters the office and when. However, these same control systems imperil digital security by introducing a cluster of sensors, locks, alarm systems, and keypads, which hold sensitive user information and connect to company infrastructure.
Furthermore, a significant proportion of IoT devices are built without security in mind. Vendors prioritize time-to-market and often don’t have the resources to invest in baked-in security measures. Consider the number of start-ups which manufacture IoT – over 60% of home automation companies have fewer than ten employees.
Insider threat detected by Cyber AI
In January 2021, a medium-sized North American company suffered a supply chain attack when a third-party vendor connected to the control unit for a smart door.
Figure 1: The attack lasted 3.5 hours in total, commencing 16:50 local time.
The technician from the vendor’s company had come in to perform scheduled maintenance. They had been authorized to connect directly to the Door Access Control Unit, yet were unaware that the laptop they were using, brought in from outside of the organization, had been infected with malware.
As soon as the laptop connected with the control unit, the malware detected an open port, identified the vulnerability, and began moving laterally. Within minutes, the IoT device was seen making highly unusual connections to rare external IP addresses. The connections were made using HTTP and contained suspicious user agents and URIs.
Darktrace then detected that the control unit was attempting to download trojans and other payloads, including upsupx2.exe and 36BB9658.moe. Other connections were used to send base64 encoded strings containing the device name and the organization’s external IP address.
Cryptocurrency mining activity with a Monero (XMR) CPU miner was detected shortly afterwards. The device also utilized an SMB exploit to make external connections on port 445 while searching for vulnerable internal devices using the outdated SMBv1 protocol.
One hour later, the device connected to an endpoint related to the third-party remote access tool TeamViewer. After a few minutes, the device was seen uploading over 15 MB to a 100% rare external IP.
Figure 2: Timeline of the connections made by an example device on the days around an incident (blue). The connections associated with the compromise are a significant deviation from the device’s normal pattern of life, and result in multiple unusual activity events and repeated model breaches (orange).
Security threats in the supply chain
Cyber AI flagged the insider threat to the customer as soon as the control unit had been compromised. The attack had managed to bypass the rest of the organization’s security stack, for the simple reason that it was introduced directly from a trusted external laptop, and the IoT device itself was managed by the third-party vendor, so the customer had little visibility over it.
Traditional security tools are ineffective against supply chain attacks such as this. From the SolarWinds hack to Vendor Email Compromise, 2021 has put the nail in the coffin for signature-based security – proving that we cannot rely on yesterday’s attacks to predict tomorrow’s threats.
International supply chains and the sheer number of different partners and suppliers which modern organizations work with thus pose a serious security dilemma: how can we allow external vendors onto our network and keep an airtight system?
The first answer is zero-trust access. This involves treating every device as malicious, inside and outside the corporate network, and demanding verification at all stages. The second answer is visibility and response. Security products must shed a clear light into cloud and IoT infrastructure, and react autonomously as soon as subtle anomalies emerge across the enterprise.
IoT investigated
Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst reported on every stage of the attack, including the download of the first malicious executable file.
Figure 3: Example of Cyber AI Analyst detecting anomalous behavior on a device, including C2 connectivity and suspicious file downloads.
Cyber AI Analyst investigated the C2 connectivity, providing a high-level summary of the activity. The IoT device had accessed suspicious MOE files with randomly generated alphanumeric names.
Figure 4: A Cyber AI Analyst summary of C2 connectivity for a device.
Not only did the AI detect every stage of the activity, but the customer was also alerted via a Proactive Threat Notification following a high scoring model breach at 16:59, just minutes after the attack had commenced.
Stranger danger
Third parties coming in to tweak device settings and adjust the network can have unintended consequences. The hyper-connected world which we’re living in, with the advent of 5G and Industry 4.0, has become a digital playground for cyber-criminals.
In the real-world case study above, the IoT device was unsecured and misconfigured. With rushed creations of IoT ecosystems, intertwining supply chains, and a breadth of individuals and devices connecting to corporate infrastructure, modern-day organizations cannot expect simple security tools which rely on pre-defined rules to stop insider threats and other advanced cyber-attacks.
The organization did not have visibility over the management of the Door Access Control Unit. Despite this, and despite no prior knowledge of the attack type or the vulnerabilities present in the IoT device, Darktrace detected the behavioral anomalies immediately. Without Cyber AI, the infection could have remained on the customer’s environment for weeks or months, escalating privileges, silently crypto-mining, and exfiltrating sensitive company data.
Thanks to Darktrace analyst Grace Carballo for her insights on the above threat find.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Crypto Wallets Continue to be Drained in Elaborate Social Media Scam
Overview
Continued research by Darktrace has revealed that cryptocurrency users are being targeted by threat actors in an elaborate social engineering scheme that continues to evolve. In December 2024, Cado Security Labs detailed a campaign targeting Web 3 employees in the Meeten campaign. The campaign included threat actors setting up meeting software companies to trick users into joining meetings and installing the information stealer Realst disguised as video meeting software.
The latest research from Darktrace shows that this campaign is still ongoing and continues to trick targets to download software to drain crypto wallets. The campaign features:
Threat actors creating fake startup companies with AI, gaming, video meeting software, web3 and social media themes.
Use of compromised X (formerly Twitter) accounts for the companies and employees - typically with verification to contact victims and create a facade of a legitimate company.
Notion, Medium, Github used to provide whitepapers, project roadmaps and employee details.
Windows and macOS versions.
Stolen software signing certificates in Windows versions for credibility and defense evasion.
Anti-analysis techniques including obfuscation, and anti-sandboxing.
To trick as many victims as possible, threat actors try to make the companies look as legitimate as possible. To achieve this, they make use of sites that are used frequently with software companies such as Twitter, Medium, Github and Notion. Each company has a professional looking website that includes employees, product blogs, whitepapers and roadmaps. X is heavily used to contact victims, and to increase the appearance of legitimacy. Some of the observed X accounts appear to be compromised accounts that typically are verified and have a higher number of followers and following, adding to the appearance of a real company.
Figure 1: Example of a compromised X account to create a “BuzzuAI” employee.
The threat actors are active on these accounts while the campaign is active, posting about developments in the software, and product marketing. One of the fake companies part of this campaign, “Eternal Decay”, a blockchain-powered game, has created fake pictures pretending to be presenting at conferences to post on social media, while the actual game doesn’t exist.
Figure 2: From the Eternal Decay X account, threat actors have altered a photo from an Italian exhibition (original on the right) to make it look like Eternal Decay was presented.
In addition to X, Medium is used to post blogs about the software. Notion has been used in various campaigns with product roadmap details, as well as employee lists.
Figure 3: Notion project team page for Swox.
Github has been used to detail technical aspects of the software, along with Git repositories containing stolen open-source projects with the name changed in order to make the code look unique. In the Eternal Decay example, Gitbook is used to detail company and software information. The threat actors even include company registration information from Companies House, however they have linked to a company with a similar name and are not a real registered company.
Figure 4: From the Eternal Decay Gitbook linking to a company with a similar name on Companies House.
Figure 5: Gitbook for “Eternal Decay” listing investors.
Figure 6: Gameplay images are stolen from a different game “Zombie Within” and posted pretending to be Eternal Decay gameplay.
In some of the fake companies, fake merchandise stores have even been set up. With all these elements combined, the threat actors manage to create the appearance of a legitimate start-up company, increasing their chances of infection.
Each campaign typically starts with a victim being contacted through X messages, Telegram or Discord. A fake employee of the company will contact a victim asking to test out their software in exchange for a cryptocurrency payment. The victim will be directed to the company website download page, where they need to enter a registration code, provided by the employee to download a binary. Depending on their operating system, the victim will be instructed to download a macOS DMG (if available) or a Windows Electron application.
Figure 7: Example of threat actor messaging a victim on X with a registration code.
Windows Version
Similar to the aforementioned Meeten campaign, the Windows version being distributed by the fake software companies is an Electron application. Electron is an open-source framework used to run Javascript apps as a desktop application. Once the user follows directions sent to them via message, opening the application will bring up a Cloudflare verification screen.
Figure 8: Cloudflare verification screen.
The malware begins by profiling the system, gathering information like the username, CPU and core count, RAM, operating system, MAC address, graphics card, and UUID.
Figure 9: Code from the Electron app showing console output of system profiling.
A verification process occurs with a captcha token extracted from the app-launcher URL and sent along with the system info and UUID. If the verification is successful, an executable or MSI file is downloaded and executed quietly. Python is also retrieved and stored in /AppData/Temp, with Python commands being sent from the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Figure 10: Code from the Electron app looping through Python objects.
As there was no valid token, this process did not succeed. However, based on previous campaigns and reports from victims on social media, an information stealer targeting crypto wallets is executed at this stage. A common tactic in the observed campaigns is the use of stolen code signing certificates to evade detection and increase the appearance of legitimate software. The certificates of two legitimate companies Jiangyin Fengyuan Electronics Co., Ltd. and Paperbucketmdb ApS (revoked as of June 2025) were used during this campaign.
MacOS Version
For companies that have a macOS version of the malware, the user is directed to download a DMG. The DMG contains a bash script and a multiarch macOS binary. The bash script is obfuscated with junk, base64 and is XOR’d.
Figure 11: Obfuscated Bash script.
After decoding, the contents of the script are revealed showing that AppleScript is being used. The script looks for disk drives, specifically for the mounted DMG “SwoxApp” and moves the hidden .SwoxApp binary to /tmp/ and makes it executable. This type of AppleScript is commonly used in macOS malware, such as Atomic Stealer.
Figure 12: AppleScript used to mount the malware and make it executable.
The SwoxApp binary is the prominent macOS information stealer Atomic Stealer. Once executed the malware performs anti-analysis checks for QEMU, VMWare and Docker-OSX, the script exits if these return true. The main functionality of Atomic Stealer is to steal data from stores including browser data, crypto wallets, cookies and documents. This data is compressed into /tmp/out.zip and sent via POST request to 45[.]94[.]47[.]167/contact. An additional bash script is retrieved from 77[.]73[.]129[.]18:80/install.sh.
Figure 13: Additional Bash script ”install.sh”.
Install.sh, as shown in Figure 13, retrieves another script install_dynamic.sh from the server https://mrajhhosdoahjsd[.]com. Install_dynamic.sh downloads and extracts InstallerHelper.app, then sets up persistence via Launch Agent to run at login.
Figure 14: Persistence added via Plist configuration.
This plist configuration installs a macOS LaunchAgent that silently runs the app at user login. RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys are used to ensure the app starts automatically and remains persistent.
The retrieved binary InstallerHelper is an Objective-C/Swift binary that logs active application usage, window information, and user interaction timestamps. This data is written to local log files and periodically transmits the contents to https://mrajhhoshoahjsd[.]com/collect-metrics using scheduled network requests.
List of known companies
Darktrace has identified a number of the fake companies used in this scam. These can be found in the list below:
Pollens AI X: @pollensapp, @Pollens_app Website: pollens.app, pollens.io, pollens.tech Windows: 02a5b35be82c59c55322d2800b0b8ccc Notes: Posing as an AI software company with a focus on “collaborative creation”.
Buzzu X: @BuzzuApp, @AI_Buzzu, @AppBuzzu, @BuzzuApp Website: Buzzu.app, Buzzu.us, buzzu.me, Buzzu.space Windows: 7d70a7e5661f9593568c64938e06a11a Mac: be0e3e1e9a3fda76a77e8c5743dd2ced Notes: Same as Pollens including logo but with a different name.
Cloudsign X: @cloudsignapp Windows: 3a3b13de4406d1ac13861018d74bf4b2 Notes: Claims to be a document signing platform.
Swox X: @SwoxApp, @Swox_AI, @swox_app, @App_Swox, @AppSwox, @SwoxProject, @ProjectSwox Website: swox.io, swox.app, swox.cc, swoxAI.com, swox.us Windows: d50393ba7d63e92d23ec7d15716c7be6 Mac: 81996a20cfa56077a3bb69487cc58405ced79629d0c09c94fb21ba7e5f1a24c9 Notes: Claims to be a “Next gen social network in the WEB3”. Same GitHub code as Pollens.
KlastAI X: Links to Pollens X account Website: Links to pollens.tech Notes: Same as Pollens, still shows their branding on its GitHub readme page.
Wasper X: @wasperAI, @WasperSpace Website: wasper.pro, wasper.app, wasper.org, wasper.space Notes: Same logo and GitHub code as Pollens.
A “traffer” malware group is an organized cybercriminal operation that specializes in directing internet users to malicious content typically information-stealing malware through compromised or deceptive websites, ads, and links. They tend to operate in teams with hierarchical structures with administrators recruiting “traffers” (or affiliates) to generate traffic and malware installs via search engine optimization (SEO), YouTube ads, fake software downloads, or owned sites, then monetize the stolen credentials and data via dedicated marketplaces.
A prominent traffer group “CrazyEvil” was identified by Recorded Future in early 2025. The group, who have been active since at least 2021, specialize in social engineering attacks targeted towards cryptocurrency users, influencers, DeFi professionals, and gaming communities. As reported by Recorded Future, CrazyEvil are estimated to have made millions of dollars in revenue from their malicious activity. CrazyEvil and their sub teams create fake software companies, similar to the ones described in this blog, making use of Twitter and Medium to target victims. As seen in this campaign, CrazyEvil instructs users to download their software which is an info stealer targeting both macOS and Windows users.
While it is unclear if the campaigns described in this blog can be attributed to CrazyEvil or any sub teams, the techniques described are similar in nature. This campaign highlights the efforts that threat actors will go to make these fake companies look legitimate in order to steal cryptocurrency from victims, in addition to use of newer evasive versions of malware.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Manboon[.]com
https://gaetanorealty[.]com
Troveur[.]com
Bigpinellas[.]com
Dsandbox[.]com
Conceptwo[.]com
Aceartist[.]com
turismoelcasco[.]com
Ekodirect[.]com
https://mrajhhosdoahjsd[.]com
https://isnimitz.com/zxc/app[.]zip
http://45[.]94[.]47[.]112/contact
45[.]94[.]47[.]167/contact
77[.]73[.]129[.]18:80
Domain Keys associated with the C2s
YARA Rules
rule Suspicious_Electron_App_Installer
{
meta:
description = "Detects Electron apps collecting HWID, MAC, GPU info and executing remote EXEs/MSIs"
Defending the Cloud: Stopping Cyber Threats in Azure and AWS with Darktrace
Real-world intrusions across Azure and AWS
As organizations pursue greater scalability and flexibility, cloud platforms like Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services (AWS) have become essential for enabling remote operations and digitalizing corporate environments. However, this shift introduces a new set of security risks, including expanding attack surfaces, misconfigurations, and compromised credentials frequently exploited by threat actors.
This blog dives into three instances of compromise within a Darktrace customer’s Azure and AWS environment which Darktrace.
The first incident took place in early 2024 and involved an attacker compromising a legitimate user account to gain unauthorized access to a customer’s Azure environment.
The other two incidents, taking place in February and March 2025, targeted AWS environments. In these cases, threat actors exfiltrated corporate data, and in one instance, was able to detonate ransomware in a customer’s environment.
Case 1 - Microsoft Azure
Figure 1: Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s Azure environment.
In early 2024, Darktrace identified a cloud compromise on the Azure cloud environment of a customer in the Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region.
Initial access
In this case, a threat actor gained access to the customer’s cloud environment after stealing access tokens and creating a rogue virtual machine (VM). The malicious actor was found to have stolen access tokens belonging to a third-party external consultant’s account after downloading cracked software.
With these stolen tokens, the attacker was able to authenticate to the customer’s Azure environment and successfully modified a security rule to allow inbound SSH traffic from a specific IP range (i.e., securityRules/AllowCidrBlockSSHInbound). This was likely performed to ensure persistent access to internal cloud resources.
Detection and investigation of the threat
Darktrace / IDENTITY recognized that this activity was highly unusual, triggering the “Repeated Unusual SaaS Resource Creation” alert.
Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into additional suspicious cloud activities occurring around the same time from the same unusual location, correlating the individual events into a broader account hijack incident.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into unusual cloud activity performed by the compromised account.
Figure 3: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.
Figure 4: Surrounding resource creation events highlighted by Cyber AI Analyst.
“Create resource service limit” events typically indicate the creation or modification of service limits (i.e., quotas) for a specific Azure resource type within a region. Meanwhile, “Registers the Capacity Resource Provider” events refer to the registration of the Microsoft Capacity resource provider within an Azure subscription, responsible for managing capacity-related resources, particularly those related to reservations and service limits. These events suggest that the threat actor was looking to create new cloud resources within the environment.
Around ten minutes later, Darktrace detected the threat actor creating or modifying an Azure disk associated with a virtual machine (VM), suggesting an attempt to create a rogue VM within the environment.
Threat actors can leverage such rogue VMs to hijack computing resources (e.g., by running cryptomining malware), maintain persistent access, move laterally within the cloud environment, communicate with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, and stealthily deliver and deploy malware.
Persistence
Several weeks later, the compromised account was observed sending an invitation to collaborate to an external free mail (Google Mail) address.
Darktrace deemed this activity as highly anomalous, triggering a compliance alert for the customer to review and investigate further.
The next day, the threat actor further registered new multi-factor authentication (MFA) information. These actions were likely intended to maintain access to the compromised user account. The customer later confirmed this activity by reviewing the corresponding event logs within Darktrace.
Case 2 – Amazon Web Services
Figure 5: Simplified timeline of the attack on a customer’s AWS environment
In February 2025, another cloud-based compromised was observed on a UK-based customer subscribed to Darktrace’s Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service.
How the attacker gained access
The threat actor was observed leveraging likely previously compromised credential to access several AWS instances within customer’s Private Cloud environment and collecting and exfiltrating data, likely with the intention of deploying ransomware and holding the data for ransom.
Darktrace alerting to malicious activity
This observed activity triggered a number of alerts in Darktrace, including several high-priority Enhanced Monitoring alerts, which were promptly investigated by Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) and raised to the customer’s security team.
The earliest signs of attack observed by Darktrace involved the use of two likely compromised credentials to connect to the customer’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) environment.
Internal reconnaissance
Once inside, the threat actor performed internal reconnaissance activities and staged the Rclone tool “ProgramData\rclone-v1.69.0-windows-amd64.zip”, a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers, to an AWS instance whose hostname is associated with a public key infrastructure (PKI) service.
The threat actor was further observed accessing and downloading multiple files hosted on an AWS file server instance, notably finance and investment-related files. This likely represented data gathering prior to exfiltration.
Shortly after, the PKI-related EC2 instance started making SSH connections with the Rclone SSH client “SSH-2.0-rclone/v1.69.0” to a RockHoster Virtual Private Server (VPS) endpoint (193.242.184[.]178), suggesting the threat actor was exfiltrating the gathered data using the Rclone utility they had previously installed. The PKI instance continued to make repeated SSH connections attempts to transfer data to this external destination.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
In response to this activity, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability intervened, blocking unusual external connectivity to the C2 server via SSH, effectively stopping the exfiltration of data.
This activity was further investigated by Darktrace’s SOC analysts as part of the MDR service. The team elected to extend the autonomously applied actions to ensure the compromise remained contained until the customer could fully remediate the incident.
Continued reconissance
Around the same time, the threat actor continued to conduct network scans using the Nmap tool, operating from both a separate AWS domain controller instance and a newly joined device on the network. These actions were accompanied by further internal data gathering activities, with around 5 GB of data downloaded from an AWS file server.
The two devices involved in reconnaissance activities were investigated and actioned by Darktrace SOC analysts after additional Enhanced Monitoring alerts had triggered.
Lateral movement attempts via RDP connections
Unusual internal RDP connections to a likely AWS printer instance indicated that the threat actor was looking to strengthen their foothold within the environment and/or attempting to pivot to other devices, likely in response to being hindered by Autonomous Response actions.
This triggered multiple scanning, internal data transfer and unusual RDP alerts in Darktrace, as well as additional Autonomous Response actions to block the suspicious activity.
Suspicious outbound SSH communication to known threat infrastructure
Darktrace subsequently observed the AWS printer instance initiating SSH communication with a rare external endpoint associated with the web hosting and VPS provider Host Department (67.217.57[.]252), suggesting that the threat actor was attempting to exfiltrate data to an alternative endpoint after connections to the original destination had been blocked.
Further investigation using open-source intelligence (OSINT) revealed that this IP address had previously been observed in connection with SSH-based data exfiltration activity during an Akira ransomware intrusion [1].
Once again, connections to this IP were blocked by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response and subsequently these blocks were extended by Darktrace’s SOC team.
The above behavior generated multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts that were investigated by Darktrace SOC analysts as part of the Managed Threat Detection service.
Figure 5: Enhanced Monitoring alerts investigated by SOC analysts as part of the Managed Detection and Response service.
Final containment and collaborative response
Upon investigating the unusual scanning activity, outbound SSH connections, and internal data transfers, Darktrace analysts extended the Autonomous Response actions previously triggered on the compromised devices.
As the threat actor was leveraging these systems for data exfiltration, all outgoing traffic from the affected devices was blocked for an additional 24 hours to provide the customer’s security team with time to investigate and remediate the compromise.
Additional investigative support was provided by Darktrace analysts through the Security Operations Service, after the customer's opened of a ticket related to the unfolding incident.
Figure 8: Simplified timeline of the attack
Around the same time of the compromise in Case 2, Darktrace observed a similar incident on the cloud environment of a different customer.
Initial access
On this occasion, the threat actor appeared to have gained entry into the AWS-based Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) networkvia a SonicWall SMA 500v EC2 instance allowing inbound traffic on any port.
The instance received HTTPS connections from three rare Vultr VPS endpoints (i.e., 45.32.205[.]52, 207.246.74[.]166, 45.32.90[.]176).
Lateral movement and exfiltration
Around the same time, the EC2 instance started scanning the environment and attempted to pivot to other internal systems via RDP, notably a DC EC2 instance, which also started scanning the network, and another EC2 instance.
The latter then proceeded to transfer more than 230 GB of data to the rare external GTHost VPS endpoint 23.150.248[.]189, while downloading hundreds of GBs of data over SMB from another EC2 instance.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst incident generated following the unusual scanning and RDP connections from the initial compromised device.
The same behavior was replicated across multiple EC2 instances, whereby compromised instances uploaded data over internal RDP connections to other instances, which then started transferring data to the same GTHost VPS endpoint over port 5000, which is typically used for Universal Plug and Play (UPnP).
What Darktrace detected
Darktrace observed the threat actor uploading a total of 718 GB to the external endpoint, after which they detonated ransomware within the compromised VPC networks.
This activity generated nine Enhanced Monitoring alerts in Darktrace, focusing on the scanning and external data activity, with the earliest of those alerts triggering around one hour after the initial intrusion.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not configured to act on these devices. Therefore, the malicious activity was not autonomously blocked and escalated to the point of ransomware detonation.
Conclusion
This blog examined three real-world compromises in customer cloud environments each illustrating different stages in the attack lifecycle.
The first case showcased a notable progression from a SaaS compromise to a full cloud intrusion, emphasizing the critical role of anomaly detection when legitimate credentials are abused.
The latter two incidents demonstrated that while early detection is vital, the ability to autonomously block malicious activity at machine speed is often the most effective way to contain threats before they escalate.
Together, these incidents underscore the need for continuous visibility, behavioral analysis, and machine-speed intervention across hybrid environments. Darktrace's AI-driven detection and Autonomous Response capabilities, combined with expert oversight from its Security Operations Center, give defenders the speed and clarity they need to contain threats and reduce operational disruption, before the situation spirals.
Credit to Alexandra Sentenac (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Dylan Evans (Security Research Lead)