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July 25, 2021

Detecting Lateral Movement in Crypto-Botnets

Explore how crypto botnets move laterally within networks and the implications for cybersecurity and threat detection.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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25
Jul 2021

Botnets have increasingly become the vehicle of choice to deliver crypto-mining malware. By infecting various corporate assets such as servers and IoT devices, cyber-criminals can use the collective processing power of hundreds – or thousands – of machines to mine cryptocurrency and spread to further devices.

This blog explores how an Internet-facing server was breached in a company in Singapore. The threat actors used the device to move laterally and deploy crypto-mining software. Within two days, several devices in the company had begun cryptocurrency mining.

Creating the botnet

Only a few days after Darktrace had been installed in a Proof of Value (POV) trial, it detected a server in the company downloading a malicious executable from a rare endpoint, 167.71.87[.]85.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack.

The server was observed making HTTP connections to a range of rare external endpoints, without a user agent header. The main hostname was t[.]amynx[.]com, a domain on open-source intelligence (OSINT) associated with crypto-mining trojans.

The device initiated repeated external connections to a range of external IPs over the TCP port 445 (SMB). This was followed by an unusually large number of internal connection attempts to a wide range of devices, suggesting scanning activity.

Figure 2: Details for the TCP scanning activity in a similar incident — note the consolidation of six relevant events into one summary.

Growing the botnet

The malware began to move laterally from the initially infected server, predominantly by establishing chains of unsual RDP connections. Subsequently, the server started making external SMB and RPC connections to rare endpoints on the Internet, in an attempt to find further vulnerable hosts.

Other lateral movement activities included the repeated failing attempts to access multiple internal devices over the SMB file-sharing protocol, with a range of different usernames. This implies bruteforce network access, as the threat actor attempted to guess correct account details through trial and error.

Existing tools such as RDP and Windows Service Control reveal that the attacker was employing ‘Living off the Land’ techniques. This makes a system administrator’s job inherently harder, as they must distinguish the malicious use of built-in tools versus their legitimate application.

Crypto-mining begins

Finally, the compromised server completed the lateral movement by transferring suspicious executable files over SMB to multiple internal devices, with names that appear randomly generated (e.g. gMtWAvEc.exe, daSsZhPf.exe) to deploy crypto-mining malware using the Minergate protocol.

Minergate is a public mining pool utilized for several types of cryptocurrency including Bitcoin, Monero, Ethereum, Zcash, and Grin. In recent months, ransomware actors have begun shifting away from Bitcoin towards Monero and other more anonymous cryptocurrences – but crypto-miners have been using altcoins for years.

Figure 3: The graph shows a clear increase in model breaches on a similar device, which easily identifies the time frame for the compromise.

As this was part of a trial, Antigena – Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability – was not in active mode and so could not take action to stop the initial vector of infection. However, the Antigena model “Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block” was breached on July 18 at 03:55:45. If active, Antigena would have instantly blocked connections to 167.71.87[.]85 on port 80 for two hours, allowing the security team enough time to remediate the breach.

Crypto-mining malware: All the rage

Crypto-mining attacks are extremely common. Although not as destructive as ransomware, they can have a serious impact on network latency and take a long time to detect and clean up. While the infection remains unnoticed, it provides a backdoor into the victim organization – and could switch from conducting crypto-mining to delivering ransomware at any moment. In this case, it is clear the attacker aimed to create maximum disruption by transferring malicious software with targets such as internal servers and domain controllers.

Darktrace detected every step of the attack without relying on known indicators of threat. Cyber AI Analyst automated the complete investigation process, saving the security team crucial time during the live incident.

Especially with the recent crackdowns on Bitcoin farms in China, underground botnets and cloud-based crypto-mining are likely to become more prominent. As we see more of these intrusions in the near future, AI-powered detection, investigation, and response, will prove critical in defending organizations of all sizes, at all times.

Learn more about crypto-mining malware

IoCs:

IoCComment167.71.87[.]85Malware Download — SHA1: 6a4c477ba19a7bb888540d02acdd9be0d5d3fd02VirusTotalt[.]amynx[.]comHTTP Command and Control – recently created domain with suspicious indicators on OSINT sites (associated with cryptomining trojans)AlienVaultVirusTotallplp[.]ackng[.]comCrypto Currency Mining Activity (Minergate)VirusTotalgMtWAvEc.exedaSsZhPf.exeyAElKPQi.exeExamples of malicious executables

Darktrace model breaches:

  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block
  • Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches (x2)
  • Unusual Activity / Successful Admin Bruteforce Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach (x2)
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint (x4)
  • Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena SMB Enumeration Block
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare (x5)
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Denial of Service Activity
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block (x4)
  • Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
  • Device / Network Scan - Low Anomaly Score
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control (x3)
  • Device / New User Agent To Internal Server
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches (x3)
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches (x3)
  • Device / SMB Session Bruteforce (x2)
  • Device / Increased External Connectivity
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score (x5)
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity (x3)
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write (x3)
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block (x14)
  • Compliance / Internet Facing RDP Server
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint (x5)
  • Compliance / Outbound RDP (x3)
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server (x5)
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare (x8)
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server (x2)
  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New Failed External Windows Connection (x5)
  • Compliance / External Windows Communications
  • Device / New Failed External Connections (x7)
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity (x9)
  • Compliance / Incoming Remote Desktop (x9)

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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June 27, 2025

Patch and Persist: Darktrace’s Detection of Blind Eagle (APT-C-36)

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What is Blind Eagle?

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombian organizations.

Blind Eagle characteristically targets government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure [1][2].

Attacks carried out by Blind Eagle actors typically start with a phishing email and the group have been observed utilizing various Remote Access Trojans (RAT) variants, which often have in-built methods for hiding command-and-control (C2) traffic from detection [3].

What we know about Blind Eagle from a recent campaign

Since November 2024, Blind Eagle actors have been conducting an ongoing campaign targeting Colombian organizations [1].

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

Despite Microsoft patching this vulnerability in November 2024 [1][4], Blind Eagle actors have continued to exploit the minimal interaction mechanism, though no longer with the intent of harvesting NTLMv2 password hashes. Instead, phishing emails are sent to targets containing a malicious URL which, when clicked, initiates the download of a malicious file. This file is then triggered by minimal user interaction.

Clicking on the file triggers a WebDAV request, with a connection being made over HTTP port 80 using the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19044’. WebDAV is a transmission protocol which allows files or complete directories to be made available through the internet, and to be transmitted to devices [5]. The next stage payload is then downloaded via another WebDAV request and malware is executed on the target device.

Attackers are notified when a recipient downloads the malicious files they send, providing an insight into potential targets [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of Blind Eagle

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be  associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia.

Within a period of just five hours, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device being redirected through a rare external location, downloading multiple executable files, and ultimately exfiltrating data from the customer’s environment.

Since the customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network, no actions were taken to contain the compromise, allowing it to escalate until the customer’s security team responded to the alerts provided by Darktrace.

Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers have since linked this endpoint with phishing and malware campaigns [9].

The device then proceeded to download the executable file hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe.

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.

The device was then observed making unusual connections to the rare endpoint 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and performing unusual external data activity.

This dynamic DNS endpoint allows a device to access an endpoint using a domain name in place of a changing IP address. Dynamic DNS services ensure the DNS record of a domain name is automatically updated when the IP address changes. As such, malicious actors can use these services and endpoints to dynamically establish connections to C2 infrastructure [6].

Further investigation into this dynamic endpoint using OSINT revealed multiple associations with previous likely Blind Eagle compromises, as well as Remcos malware, a RAT commonly deployed via phishing campaigns [7][8][10].

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.

Shortly after this, Darktrace observed the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’, indicating usage of the aforementioned transmission protocol WebDAV. The device was subsequently observed connected to an endpoint associated with Github and downloading data, suggesting that the device was retrieving a malicious tool or payload. The device then began to communicate to the malicious endpoint diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com over the new TCP port 1512 [11].

Around this time, the device was also observed uploading data to the endpoints 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com, with transfers of 60 MiB and 5.6 MiB observed respectively.

Figure 4: UI graph showing external data transfer activity.

This chain of activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK. These high-priority model alerts are designed to trigger in response to higher fidelity indicators of compromise (IoCs), suggesting that a device is performing activity consistent with a compromise.

 Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.

A second Enhanced Monitoring model was also triggered by this device following the download of the aforementioned executable file (hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe) and the observed increase in C2 activity.

Following this activity, Darktrace continued to observe the device beaconing to the 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com endpoint.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of the affected device’s broader connectivity throughout the course of the attack.

As the affected customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response configured at the time, the attack was able to progress unabated. Had Darktrace been properly enabled, it would have been able to take a number of actions to halt the escalation of the attack.

For example, the unusual beaconing connections and the download of an unexpected file from an uncommon location would have been shut down by blocking the device from making external connections to the relevant destinations.

Conclusion

The persistence of Blind Eagle and ability to adapt its tactics, even after patches were released, and the speed at which the group were able to continue using pre-established TTPs highlights that timely vulnerability management and patch application, while essential, is not a standalone defense.

Organizations must adopt security solutions that use anomaly-based detection to identify emerging and adapting threats by recognizing deviations in user or device behavior that may indicate malicious activity. Complementing this with an autonomous decision maker that can identify, connect, and contain compromise-like activity is crucial for safeguarding organizational networks against constantly evolving and sophisticated threat actors.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson (Senior Cyber Analyst), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

IoC – Type - Confidence
Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045 – User Agent

62[.]60[.]226[.]112 – IP – Medium Confidence

hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe – Payload Download – Medium Confidence

21ene.ip-ddns[.]com – Dynamic DNS Endpoint – Medium Confidence

diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com  - Hostname – Medium Confidence

Darktrace’s model alert coverage

Anomalous File / Suspicious HTTP Redirect
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Github Download
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Device / Large Number of Model Alert

Mitre Attack Mapping:

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access - T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access ICS - T0862 – Supply Chain Compromise
Initial Access ICS - T0865 – Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access ICS - T0817 - Drive-by Compromise
Resource Development - T1588.001 – Malware
Lateral Movement ICS - T0843 – Program Download
Command and Control - T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control - T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control - T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Command and Control - T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms
Command and Control ICS - T0869 – Standard Application Layer Protocol
Evasion ICS - T0849 – Masquerading
Exfiltration - T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration - T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

References

1)    https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/blind-eagle-and-justice-for-all/

2)    https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2025/04/kpmg-ctip-blind-eagle-01-apr-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

3)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-remote-access-trojan/#:~:text=They%20might%20be%20attached%20to,remote%20access%20or%20system%20administration

4)    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451

5)    https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/know-how/webdav/

6)    https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dynamic-dns-resolution-as-an-obfuscation-technique

7)    https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1437795

8)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/remcos-malware/

9)    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b3189db6ddc578005cb6986f86e9680e7f71fe69f87f9498fa77ed7b1285e268

10) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/21ene.ip-ddns.com

11) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/diciembrenotasenclub.longmusic.com/community

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About the author
Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst

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June 18, 2025

Darktrace Collaborates with Microsoft: Unifying Email Security with a Shared Vision

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In today’s threat landscape, email remains the most targeted vector for cyberattacks. Organizations require not only multi-layered defenses but also advanced, integrated systems that work collaboratively to proactively mitigate threats before they cause damage

That’s why we’re proud to announce a new integration between Darktrace / EMAIL and Microsoft Defender for Office 365, delivering a Unified Quarantine experience that empowers security teams with seamless visibility, control, and response across both platforms.

This announcement builds on a strong and growing collaboration. In 2024, Darktrace was honored as Microsoft UK Partner of the Year and recognized as a Security Trailblazer at the annual Microsoft Security 20/20 Awards, a testament to our shared commitment to innovation and customer-centric security.

A Shared Mission: Stopping Threats at Machine Speed

This integration is more than a technical milestone,as it’s a reflection of a shared mission: to protect organizations from both known and unknown threats, with efficiency, accuracy, and transparency.

  • Microsoft Defender for Office 365 delivers a comprehensive security framework that safeguards Microsoft 365 email and collaboration workloads leveraging advanced AI, global threat intelligence and information on known attack infrastructure.
  • Darktrace / EMAIL complements this with Self-Learning AI that understands the unique communication patterns within each organization, detecting subtle anomalies that evade traditional detection methods.

Together, we’re delivering multi-layered, adaptive protection that’s greater than the sum of its parts.

“Our integration with Microsoft gives security teams the tools they need to act faster and more precisely to detect and respond to threats,” said Jill Popelka, CEO of Darktrace. “Together, we’re strengthening defenses where it matters most to our customers: at the inbox.”

Unified Quarantine: One View, Total Clarity

The new Unified Quarantine experience gives customers a single pane of glass to view and manage email threatsregardless of which product took action. This means:

  • Faster investigations with consolidated visibility
  • Clear attribution of actions and outcomes across both platforms
  • Streamlined workflows for security teams managing complex environments

“This integration is a testament to the power of combining Microsoft’s global threat intelligence with Darktrace’s unique ability to understand the ‘self’ of an organization,” said Jack Stockdale, CTO of Darktrace. “Together, we’re delivering a new standard in proactive, adaptive email security.”

A New Era of Collaborative Cyber Defense

This collaboration represents a broader shift in cybersecurity: from siloed tools to integrated ecosystems. As attackers become more sophisticated, defenders must move faster, smarter, and in unison.

Through this integration, Darktrace and Microsoft establish a new standard for collaboration between native and third-party security solutions, enhancing not only threat detection but also comprehensive understanding and proactive measures against threats.

We’re excited to bring this innovation to our customers and continue building a future where AI and human expertise collaborate to secure the enterprise.

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About the author
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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