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January 4, 2023

BlackMatter's Smash-and-Grab Ransom Attack Incident Analysis

Stay informed on cybersecurity trends! Read about a BlackMatters ransom attack incident and Darktrace's analysis on how RESPOND could have stopped the attack.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Analyst Team
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04
Jan 2023

Only a few years ago, popular reporting announced that the days of smash-and-grab attacks were over and that a new breed of hackers were taking over with subtler, ‘low-and-slow’ tactics [1]. Although these have undoubtedly appeared, smash-and-grab have quickly become overlooked – perhaps with worrying consequences. Last year, Google saw repeated phishing campaigns using cookie theft malware and most recently, reports of hacktivists using similar techniques have been identified during the 2022 Ukraine Conflict [2 & 3]. Where did their inspiration come from? For larger APT groups such as BlackMatter, which first appeared in the summer of 2021, smash-and-grabs never went out of fashion.

This blog dissects a BlackMatter ransomware attack that hit an organization trialing Darktrace back in 2021. The case reveals what can happen when a security team does not react to high-priority alerts. 

When entire ransomware attacks can be carried out over the course of just 48 hours, there is a high risk to relying on security teams to react to detection notifications and prevent damage before the threat escalates. Although there has been hesitancy in its uptake [4], this blog also demonstrates the need for automated response solutions like Darktrace RESPOND.

The Name Game: Untangling BlackMatter, REvil, and DarkSide

Despite being a short-lived criminal organization on the surface [5], a number of parallels have now been drawn between the TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) of the newer BlackMatter group and those of the retired REvil and DarkSide organizations [6]. 

Prior to their retirement, DarkSide and REvil were perhaps the biggest names in cyber-crime, responsible for two of last year’s most devastating ransomware attacks. Less than two weeks after the Colonial Pipeline attack, DarkSide announced it was shutting down its operation [7]. Meanwhile the FBI shutdown REvil in January 2022 after its devastating Fourth of July Kaseya attacks and a failed return in September [8]. It is now suspected that members from one or both went on to form BlackMatter.

This rebranding strategy parallels the smash-and-grab attacks these groups now increasingly employ: they make their money, and a lot of noise, and when they’re found out, they disappear before organizations or governments can pull together their threat intelligence and organize an effective response. When they return days, weeks or months later, they do so having implemented enough small changes to render themselves and their attacks unrecognizable. That is how DarkSide can become BlackMatter, and how its attacks can slip through security systems trained on previously encountered threats. 

Attack Details

In September 2021 Darktrace was monitoring a US marketing agency which became the victim of a double extortion ransomware attack that bore hallmarks of a BlackMatter operation. This began when a single domain-authenticated device joined the company’s network. This was likely a pre-infected company device being reconnected after some time offline. 

Only 15 minutes after joining, the device began SMB and ICMP scanning activities towards over 1000 different internal IPs. There was also a large spike of requests for Epmapper, which suggested an intent for RPC-based lateral movement. Although one credential was particularly prominent, multiple were used including labelled admin credentials. Given it’s unexpected nature, this recon quickly triggered a chain of DETECT/Network model breaches which ensured that Darktrace’s SOC were alerted via the Proactive Threat Notification service. Whilst SOC analysts began to triage the activity, the organization failed to act on any of the alerts they received, leaving the detected threat to take root within their digital environment. 

Shortly after, a series of C2 beaconing occurred towards an endpoint associated with Cobalt Strike [9]. This was accompanied by a range of anomalous WMI bind requests to svcctl, SecAddr and further RPC connections. These allowed the initial compromised device to quickly infect 11 other devices. With continued scanning over the next day, valuable data was soon identified. Across several transfers, 230GB of internal data was then exfiltrated from four file servers via SSH port 22. This data was then made unusable to the organization through encryption occurring via SMB Writes and Moves/Renames with the randomly generated extension ‘.qHefKSmfd’. Finally a ransom note titled ‘qHefKSmfd.README.txt’ was dropped.

This ransom note was appended with the BlackMatter ASCII logo:

Figure 1- The ASCII logo which accompanied BlackMatter’s ransom note

Although Darktrace DETECT and Cyber AI Analyst continued to provide live alerting, the actor successfully accomplished their mission.  

There are numerous reasons that an organization may fail to organize a response to a threat, (including resource shortages, out of hours attacks, and groups that simply move too fast). Without Darktrace’s RESPOND capabilities enabled, the threat actors could proceed this attack without obstacles. 

Figure 2- Cyber AI Analyst breaks down the stages of the attack [Note: this screenshot is from V5 of DETECT/Network] 

How would the attack have unfolded with RESPOND?

Armed with Darktrace’s evolving knowledge of ‘self’ for the customer’s unique digital environment, RESPOND would have activated within seconds of the first network scan, which was recognized as highly anomalous. The standard action taken here would usually involve enforcing the standard ‘pattern of life’ for the compromised device over a set time period in order to halt the anomaly while allowing the business to continue operating as normal.

RESPOND constantly re-evaluates threats as attacks unfold. Had the first stage still been successful, it would have continued to take targeted action at each corresponding stage of this attack. RESPOND models would have alerted to block the external connections to C2 servers over port 443, the outbound exfil attempts and crucially the SMB write activity over port 445 related to encryption.

As DETECT and RESPOND feed into one another, Darktrace would have continued to assess its actions as BlackMatter pivoted tactics. These actions buy back critical time for security teams that may not be in operation over the weekend, and stun the attacker into place without applying overly aggressive responses that create more problems than they solve.

Ultimately although this incident did not resolve autonomously, in response to the ransom event, Darktrace offered to enable RESPOND and set it in active mode for ransomware indicators across all client and server devices. This ensured an event like this would not occur again. 

Why does RESPOND work?

Response solutions must be accurate enough to fire only when there is a genuine threat, configurable enough to let the user stay in the driver’s seat, and intelligent enough to know the right action to take to contain only the malicious activity- without disrupting normal business operations. 

This is only possible if you can establish what ‘normal’ is for any one organization. And this is how Darktrace’s RESPOND product family ensures its actions are targeted and proportionate. By feeding off DETECT alerting which highlights subtle or large deviations across the network, cloud and SaaS, RESPOND can provide a measured response to the potential threat. This includes actions such as:

  • Enforcing the device’s ‘pattern of life’ for a given length of time 
  • Enforcing the ‘group pattern of life’ (stopping a device from doing anything its peers haven’t done in the past)
  • Blocking connections of a certain type to a certain destination
  • Logging out of a cloud account 
  • ‘Smart quarantining’ an endpoint device- maintaining access to VPNs and company’s AV solution

Conclusion 

In its report on BlackMatter [10], CISA recommended that organizations invest in network monitoring tools with the capacity to investigate anomalous activity. Picking up on unusual behavior rather than predetermined rules and signatures is an important step in fighting back against new threats. As this particular story shows, however, detection alone is not always enough. Turning on RESPOND, which takes immediate and precise action to contain threats, regardless of when and where they come in, is the best way to counter smash-and-grab attacks and protect organizations’ digital assets. There is little doubt that the threat actors behind BlackMatter will or have already returned with new names and strategies- but organizations with RESPOND will be ready for them.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections (in order of breach)

Those with the ‘PTN’ prefix were alerted directly to Darktrace’s 24/7 SOC team.

  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • (PTN) Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement
  • Device / Active Directory Reconnaissance
  • Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
  • Compliance / Default Credential Usage
  • Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
  • Device / SMB Session Bruteforce
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • (PTN) Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • (PTN) Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • (PTN) Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

List of IOCs 

Reference List 

[1] https://www.designnews.com/industrial-machinery/new-age-hackers-are-ditching-smash-and-grab-techniques 

[2] https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/how-do-smash-and-grab-cyberattacks-help-ukraine-in-waging-war/

[3] https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/phishing-campaign-targets-youtube-creators-cookie-theft-malware/

[4] https://www.ukcybersecuritycouncil.org.uk/news-insights/articles/the-benefits-of-automation-to-cyber-security/

[5] https://techcrunch.com/2021/11/03/blackmatter-ransomware-shut-down/ 

[6] https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/blackmatter-ransomware-analysis-the-dark-side-returns.html

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/business/darkside-pipeline-hack.html

[8] https://techcrunch.com/2022/01/14/fsb-revil-ransomware/ 

[9] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/georgiaonsale.com/community

[10] https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-291a

Credit to: Andras Balogh, SOC Analyst and Gabriel Few-Wiegratz, Threat Intelligence Content Production Lead

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Analyst Team

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September 2, 2026

Botnet Behind the Camera: Mirai Katana Activity on a Video Recording Device

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace identified a camera device infected with the Mirai/Katana botnet in a sports-sector customer environment, showing how exposed IoT devices can become active participants in wider attack chains.
  • The compromise involved suspicious Wget behavior, file downloads from rare external IPs, unusual incoming HTTP connections to video recorder management interfaces, and large outbound data transfers to infrastructure associated with botnet activity.
  • The incident highlights the importance of extending visibility and response beyond traditional endpoints, as unmanaged or overlooked connected devices can be exploited for command-and-control, malware delivery, and data exfiltration.

Mirai and the Katana variant

Mirai is a botnet that first emerged in August 2016 and is well known for launching large-scale distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, typically targeting exposed Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It identifies vulnerable IoT devices ,often by abusing default credentials or exposed services, and recruiting them into a remotely controlled botnet that can be used in DDoS campaigns [1].

Katana, one of the many variants that arose after Mirai’s source code was released publicly, was first observed in late 2020 and has been seen using more advanced capabilities, including custom command-and-control (C2), persistence mechanisms, and DDoS functionality [2].

In March 2026, research from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified Katana as a Mirai-derived DDoS botnet targeting Android-based TV set-top boxes through exposed Android Debug Bridge (ADB) access.  Observed capabilities included custom C2, runtime domain rotation, multiple DDoS methods, and an on-device compiled kernel rootkit used for persistence and stealth [3].

Darktrace’s detection of Mirai Botnet activity on a camera device

In early 2026, Darktrace identified a Network/Digital Video Recorder (NVR/DVR) on the network of a sports-sector customer that had been infected with the Mirai Katana botnet and subsequently used to exfiltrate data from the customer’s environment. Seemingly related follow-up activity was observed on the same device several months later.

In both instances, the Darktrace Security Operations Centre (SOC) alerted the customer as part of the Managed Threat Detection (MTD) service. However, as Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not fully enabled on the affected device, Darktrace was unable to proactively block the suspicious activity or prevent the compromise from continuing and recurring.

The initial compromise appears to have occurred when the affected device was seen using Wget to download Linux-based Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) files from a rare external IP, 195.177.94[.]105, which had not previously been observed in the customer’s network. Further analysis downloaded file hashes identified files related to the Mirai botnet.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into the unusual outbound connection where the ELF files were downloaded.

Within a few hours, Darktrace detected the device uploading close to 3GB of data to another external IP, 50.7.49[.]4:3017 (ASN AS30058 FDCSERVERS), suggesting that the activity was likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by FDC Servers [2]. Attackers often abuse VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers to blend in with legitimate traffic and evade IP reputation and geolocation-based detections.

Figure 2:  Darktrace’s detection of the unusual data upload activity by the affected camera device.

Darktrace continued to observe similar data transfers to multiple rare endpoints  including 171.225.223[.]53, 95.161.128[.]62, 61.7.209[.]88, 95.161.128[.]62, which have been linked to Mirai by open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of spikes in unusual external data transfer activity from the camera device.

Exploitation continued

Several months later, Darktrace identified the same exfiltration pattern on the device again, this time with stronger indications of associations with Mirai Katana botnet infection.

The device received incoming HTTP connections from 129.121.114[.]124, an external IP known to be associated with the Katana botnet IP [3]. The connections targeted the ‘/dvr/cmd’ path using the root username and user agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246.

The ‘/dvr/cmd’ path appears to be associated with the affected device’s web management functionality. This API endpoint has historically been targeted by Mirai and other IoT botnets through the exploitation of critical command injection vulnerabilities and automated botnet exploitation [4].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s  detection of HTTP connectivity from the external IP associated with Mirai Katana Botnet.

A few days later, Darktrace observed the Wget utility being used to download ELF files, including “/lil”,  from the IP 129.121.114[.]124. OSINT reporting has since associated this IP address with the Mirai Katana botnet. Notably, the IP observed earlier in the year, 195.177.94[.]105, had also hosted a file named “lil”, indicating a link between the observed activity.

Over the following days, the device received a sudden spike in connections from multiple rare external endpoints, suggesting a possible successful brute force attack. Darktrace also observed the device exfiltrating just under 4GB of data to another Mirai-associated IP address,  66.92.198[.]194, over ports 3344, 954922, and 80. Finally, the device was seen uploading data to the Mirai botnet IP 5.175.249[.]53 over port138 and exhibited an increase in UDP connections to 34.18.28[.]10 over port 9068.

Following both file download events, Darktrace identified spikes in external data transfers and connection attempts to rare destinations. While Darktrace’s Threat Research team could not confirm with high confidence that this to activity was directly associated with Mirai, it may indicate that Mirai Katana includes data exfiltration functionality.

Darktrace’s threat researchers also identified an internet-facing NTP server belonging to a separate customer receiving incoming connection attempts from the same initially observed IP, 195.177.94[.]105,over the port 123. This suggests that Mirai Katana may not exclusively target IoT devices.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates how threat actors can exploit overlooked IoT and OT devices to support broader malicious objectives. Here, a camera device infected with a botnet was used to exfiltrate data from the customer's environment, showing how peripheral assets can become active participants in an attack chain.

This case also reinforces a challenge many organizations face today: extending security visibility beyond traditional endpoints and servers. Cameras, sensors, and other connected devices often operate with limited monitoring and may fall outside established security processes, despite maintaining network connectivity and access to potentially sensitive environments. This is particularly relevant in the sports sector, where growing reliance on connected cameras, smart stadium technologies, and other IoT devices continues to expand the attack surface, as highlighted in Darktrace's Sports Sector Threat Report.

As botnets like Kata and Mirai continue to evolve, defenders need visibility across unmanaged IoT and edge devices, as well as security solutions that can recognize subtle deviations in device behavior that may indicate an emerging compromise.

Credit to Parvatha Ananthakannan (Cyber Analyst), Signe Zaharka (Principal Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Device / Significant UDP Increase

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·      Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual DNS

·      Device / External Network Scan

·      Device / Suspicious DNS Activity

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator of Compromise Type Description
195.177.94[.]105 IP C2 endpoint
50.7.49[.]4:30171 IP Possible C2 endpoint
129.121.114[.]124 IP C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n3 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n2 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/lil URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/HHn URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/JFc URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/jum URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OaSf URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OPWg URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/vHwK URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/VLv URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/WbJ URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/zkR URL Possible C2 endpoint
Ab17883ae4c3bc6afa18c439166eeeb4b03186e3093d984e3a95f573e0fcb7d8 SHA-256 Mirai payload
3d587e809dac49d34a3f717e072fd0aebe5e71db63333e45c81577d6b4266f87 SHA-256 Mirai payload
Bf6e81733a7e209d3dce80d15bf3c5d300752d961fae6b45d90c9bbe7f8c89a2 SHA-256 Possible payload
f25488303813ab1ec0eaa71562938601aac185e8aaf93adb84522557f7cf4dd6 SHA-256 Possible payload
0cb4ff6b71f4423184bfa35c34e9090297637208b0e30205d4b224e56abde2ef SHA-256 Possible payload
19c24cbeaf06b2e7697083f33a85521a9315105c784691bde7420fde4cc69410 SHA-256 Likely Mirai payload
1e74f734fff8df91f4f7172d0de10c421eca78aeb800e8a48e16bc5dbde5d20e SHA-256 Possible payload
6e71f7763d1f29d5712106ebb122e281c32787540aa2342b0fe5351d585d18d7 SHA-256 Possible payload
71f4ff7cdb6d6a7d2673c543c5d2535093afbd707b20a5b9ddf735466c1105c1 SHA-256 Possible payload
76db7ee73ebf15e48a3cb24a074d92248671ef2c6ed3bc3e708377341fb7674d SHA-256 Possible payload
da87a65f7beb438e61f0b61964fed8aa305a380f569042f84c55eca8fa7929b8 SHA-256 Possible payload
e15809eb6ba66477175270d62cfa53e4bf278595f69938708c81c4bc457930fe SHA-256 Mirai payload

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique ID Technique / Sub-technique
Initial Access T1659 Content Injection
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 Non-Standard Port
Reconnaissance T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks
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Parvatha Ananthakannan
Cyber Analyst

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August 26, 2026

AI Agents: Securing the Path from Intent to Action

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The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently published guidance on managing the cyber risk of agentic AI. While the document is framed as interim advice as more formal guidance is developed, the framing reflects the current state of the industry: organizations are already deploying agents into production environments while standards, controls, and operating models for autonomous systems remain unsettled. Governance is evolving alongside adoption rather than preceding it, a reality which underscores the importance of robust controls.  

The NCSC’s guidance recommends aligning controls to an agent's level of autonomy, assigning distinct identities, limiting permissions, constraining access to systems and data, monitoring activity, maintaining human oversight, and preserving the ability to intervene when necessary. Most of these recommendations will sound familiar to security teams. The challenge is not the novelty of the controls. It is the type of system those controls now need to govern.

The shift from model security to agent security

For several years, AI security discussions have focused heavily on models. Can a model be manipulated? Jailbroken? Trusted? Can it expose information it should not? Those questions remain important, but they capture only part of the problem. A model generating text is one thing. A system connected to identities, applications, tools, workflows, and business data is another.

The difference becomes clearer when comparing a chatbot that answers questions with an agent that can retrieve customer records, update tickets, invoke tools, trigger workflows, and interact with external systems. The underlying model may be identical. Its access is not. The security question begins to shift from what the model knows to what the system can do.

The same theme appears in the Five Eyes statement released earlier this year, describing AI as a force multiplier that is accelerating both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The NCSC guidance explores what that reality looks like when autonomous systems begin operating inside enterprise environments.

Securing AI agents in operation

The NCSC spends relatively little time debating model behavior and considerably more time discussing identity, permissions, monitoring, oversight, containment, and response. Agents are treated as participants within an environment rather than isolated pieces of technology.  

That's broadly consistent with how we think about the problem at Darktrace.

An agent should not be treated as an extension of a user account. It develops its own behavioral patterns. It accesses systems, interacts with data, invokes tools, and moves across workflows in ways that can be observed independently. Understanding what an agent is permitted to do matters. Understanding how it actually behaves once deployed, and whether that behavior aligns with business intent, matters just as much.

Identity provides an obvious example. The NCSC recommends assigning distinct identities to agents rather than allowing them to disappear into surrounding human or service accounts. Most importantly, assigning agents distinct identities enables independent behavioral monitoring.

Development assumptions vs. real-world behavior

The same principle extends to monitoring. NCSC guidance places agent activity within normal security operations rather than treating it as a separate AI governance function. Many of the controls described are put in place before an agent begins operating. Sandboxing, credential design, approval workflows and human oversight all reflect judgments about how the system is expected to behave and what risks it is likely to create.

Actual use may challenge those assumptions. Access patterns change. Workflows expand. Systems begin interacting with resources they have never touched before. Processes that appeared reasonable during design behave differently in production. Human oversight requirements may turn out to be either excessive or inadequate once the system is operating at scale and operating within the context of unique business processes.

The Five Eyes statement points to a similar issue: organizations need confidence that controls continue to work as intended once systems are exposed to real users, data, tools and operational pressures. Often, the question is not whether an agent is technically allowed to perform an action, but whether its behavior remains consistent with the role it was intended to play.

Monitoring and governance of AI agents go hand-in-hand

This problem is exactly why monitoring and governance should be treated as part of the same process. Governance sets the initial parameters for deployment, while monitoring provides evidence about whether those parameters remain appropriate. That evidence should, in turn, inform changes to permissions, controls and oversight.

This matters increasingly as autonomous systems are integrated into business processes. The relevant risk is shaped not only by the model or agent itself, but by what it can access, what actions it can take, and how its behavior changes in practice.

Developing continuous oversight of AI agent behavior

The implication is clear: governance cannot end at deployment. Organizations need a way to understand how agents behave after deployment, test whether controls remain appropriate, and adjust them as conditions change. That requires visibility not just into technical activity, but into whether that activity makes sense in the context of the business process the agent is intended to support.

This is where business-centric behavioral security can become critical. Risk does not emerge from the model itself: it emerges from the actions an autonomous system takes within the enterprise and the downstream consequences of those actions.  

An agent can operate exactly as intended and still create risk if it accesses sensitive information in an unexpected context, exercises permissions in ways that create unintended exposure, or influences business processes in ways that were not anticipated during design and review.

Traditional governance vs. behavioral security

Traditional governance frameworks provide assurance at a point in time. Behavioral security can provide ongoing visibility into how autonomous systems interact with the organization they are meant to serve. Rather than focusing exclusively on model performance or policy compliance, organizations need to understand whether an agent's behavior aligns with business intent, operational expectations, and acceptable risk tolerances as conditions change.

As enterprises move from isolated AI deployments to interconnected ecosystems of agents, visibility into behavior becomes as important as visibility into code. Governance determines what an autonomous system is permitted to do. Behavioral analytics helps determine what it is doing, what business outcomes it is producing, and whether those outcomes remain aligned with the organization's objectives.

[related-resource]

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Margaret Cunningham, PhD
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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