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October 26, 2022

Strategies to Prolong Quantum Ransomware Attacks

Learn more about how Darktrace combats Quantum Ransomware changing strategy for cyberattacks. Explore the power of AI-driven network cyber security!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst
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26
Oct 2022

Within science and engineering, the word ‘quantum’ may spark associations with speed and capability, referencing a superior computer that can perform tasks a classical computer cannot. In cyber security, some may recognize ‘quantum’ in relation to cryptography or, more recently, as the name of a new ransomware group, which achieved network-wide encryption a mere four hours after an initial infection.   

Although this group now has a reputation for carrying out fast and efficient attacks, speed is not their only tactic. In August 2022, Darktrace detected a Quantum Ransomware incident where attackers remained in the victim’s network for almost a month after the initial signs of infection, before detonating ransomware. This was a stark difference to previously reported attacks, demonstrating that as motives change, so do threat actors’ strategies. 

The Quantum Group

Quantum was first identified in August 2021 as the latest of several rebrands of MountLocker ransomware [1]. As part of this rebrand, the extension ‘.quantum’ is appended to filenames that are encrypted and the associated ransom notes are named ‘README_TO_DECRYPT.html’ [2].  

From April 2022, media coverage of this group has increased following a DFIR report detailing an attack that progressed from initial access to domain-wide ransomware within four hours [3]. To put this into perspective, the global median dwell time for ransomware in 2020 and 2021 is 5 days [4]. In the case of Quantum, threat actors gained direct keyboard access to devices merely 2 hours after initial infection. The ransomware was staged on the domain controller around an hour and a half later, and executed 12 minutes after that.   

Quantum’s behaviour bears similarities to other groups, possibly due to their history and recruitment. Several members of the disbanded Conti ransomware group are reported to have joined the Quantum and BumbleBee operations. Security researchers have also identified similarities in the payloads and C2 infrastructure used by these groups [5 & 6].  Notably, these are the IcedID initial payload and Cobalt Strike C2 beacon used in this attack. Darktrace has also observed and prevented IcedID and Cobalt Strike activity from BumbleBee across several customer environments.

The Attack

From 11th July 2022, a device suspected to be patient zero made repeated DNS queries for external hosts that appear to be associated with IcedID C2 traffic [7 & 8]. In several reported cases [9 & 10], this banking trojan is delivered through a phishing email containing a malicious attachment that loads an IcedID DLL. As Darktrace was not deployed in the prospect’s email environment, there was no visibility of the initial access vector, however an example of a phishing campaign containing this payload is presented below. It is also possible that the device was already infected prior to joining the network. 

Figure 1- An example phishing email used to distribute IcedID. If configured, Darktrace/Email would be able to detect that the email was sent from an anomalous sender, was part of a fake reply chain, and had a suspicious attachment containing compressed content of unusual mime type [11].    

 

Figure 2- The DNS queries to endpoints associated with IcedID C2 servers, taken from the infected device’s event log.  Additional DNS queries made to other IcedID C2 servers are in the list of IOCs in the appendices.  The repeated DNS queries are indicative of beaconing.


It was not until 22nd July that activity was seen which indicated the attack had progressed to the next stage of the kill chain. This contrasts the previously seen attacks where the progression to Cobalt Strike C2 beaconing and reconnaissance and lateral movement occurred within 2 hours of the initial infection [12 & 13]. In this case, patient zero initiated numerous unusual connections to other internal devices using a compromised account, connections that were indicative of reconnaissance using built-in Windows utilities:

·      DNS queries for hostnames in the network

·      SMB writes to IPC$ shares of those hostnames queried, binding to the srvsvc named pipe to enumerate things such as SMB shares and services on a device, client access permissions on network shares and users logged in to a remote session

·      DCE-RPC connections to the endpoint mapper service, which enables identification of the ports assigned to a particular RPC service

These connections were initiated using an existing credential on the device and just like the dwelling time, differed from previously reported Quantum group attacks where discovery actions were spawned and performed automatically by the IcedID process [14]. Figure 3 depicts how Darktrace detected that this activity deviated from the device’s normal behaviour.  

Figure 3- This figure displays the spike in active internal connections initiated by patient zero. The coloured dots represent the Darktrace models that were breached, detecting this unusual reconnaissance and lateral movement activity.

Four days later, on the 26th of July, patient zero performed SMB writes of DLL and MSI executables to the C$ shares of internal devices including domain controllers, using a privileged credential not previously seen on the patient zero device. The deviation from normal behaviour that this represents is also displayed in Figure 3. Throughout this activity, patient zero made DNS queries for the external Cobalt Strike C2 server shown in Figure 4. Cobalt Strike has often been seen as a secondary payload delivered via IcedID, due to IcedID’s ability to evade detection and deploy large scale campaigns [15]. It is likely that reconnaissance and lateral movement was performed under instructions received by the Cobalt Strike C2 server.   

Figure 4- This figure is taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, showing a DNS query for a Cobalt Strike C2 server occurring during SMB writes of .dll files and DCE-RPC requests to the epmapper service, demonstrating reconnaissance and lateral movement.


The SMB writes to domain controllers and usage of a new account suggests that by this stage, the attacker had achieved domain dominance. The attacker also appeared to have had hands-on access to the network via a console; the repetition of the paths ‘programdata\v1.dll’ and ‘ProgramData\v1.dll’, in lower and title case respectively, suggests they were entered manually.  

These DLL files likely contained a copy of the malware that injects into legitimate processes such as winlogon, to perform commands that call out to C2 servers [16]. Shortly after the file transfers, the affected domain controllers were also seen beaconing to external endpoints (‘sezijiru[.]com’ and ‘gedabuyisi[.]com’) that OSINT tools have associated with these DLL files [17 & 18]. Moreover, these SSL connections were made using a default client fingerprint for Cobalt Strike [19], which is consistent with the initial delivery method. To illustrate the beaconing nature of these connections, Figure 5 displays the 4.3 million daily SSL connections to one of the C2 servers during the attack. The 100,000 most recent connections were initiated by 11 unique source IP addresses alone.

Figure 5- The Advanced Search interface, querying for external SSL connections from devices in the network to an external host that appears to be a Cobalt Strike C2 server. 4.3 million connections were made over 8 days, even after the ransomware was eventually detonated on 2022-08-03.


Shortly after the writes, the attack progressed to the penultimate stage. The next day, on the 27th of July, the attackers moved to achieve their first objective: data exfiltration. Data exfiltration is not always performed by the Quantum ransomware gang. Researchers have noted discrepancies between claims of data theft made in their ransom notes versus the lack of data seen leaving the network, although this may have been missed due to covert exfiltration via a Cobalt Strike beacon [20]. 

In contrast, this attack displayed several gigabytes of data leaving internal devices including servers that had previously beaconed to Cobalt Strike C2 servers. This data was transferred overtly via FTP, however the attacker still attempted to conceal the activity using ephemeral ports (FTP in EPSV mode). FTP is an effective method for attackers to exfiltrate large files as it is easy to use, organizations often neglect to monitor outbound usage, and it can be shipped through ports that will not be blocked by traditional firewalls [21].   

Figure 6 displays an example of the FTP data transfer to attacker-controlled infrastructure, in which the destination share appears structured to identify the organization that the data was stolen from, suggesting there may be other victim organizations’ data stored. This suggests that data exfiltration was an intended outcome of this attack. 

Figure 6- This figure is from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, displaying some of the data transferred from an internal device to the attacker’s FTP server.

 
Data was continuously exfiltrated until a week later when the final stage of the attack was achieved and Quantum ransomware was detonated. Darktrace detected the following unusual SMB activity initiated from the attacker-created account that is a hallmark for ransomware (see Figure 7 for example log):

·      Symmetric SMB Read to Write ratio, indicative of active encryption

·      Sustained MIME type conversion of files, with the extension ‘.quantum’ appended to filenames

·      SMB writes of a ransom note ‘README_TO_DECRYPT.html’ (see Figure 8 for an example note)

Figure 7- The Model Breach Event Log for a device that had files encrypted by Quantum ransomware, showing the reads and writes of files with ‘.quantum’ appended to encrypted files, and an HTML ransom note left where the files were encrypted.

 

Figure 8- An example of the ransom note left by the Quantum gang, this one is taken from open-sources [22].


The example in Figure 8 mentions that the attacker also possessed large volumes of victim data.  It is likely that the gigabytes of data exfiltrated over FTP were leveraged as blackmail to further extort the victim organization for payment.  

Darktrace Coverage

 

Figure 9- Timeline of Quantum ransomware incident


If Darktrace/Email was deployed in the prospect’s environment, the initial payload (if delivered through a phishing email) could have been detected and held from the recipient’s inbox. Although DETECT identified anomalous network behaviour at each stage of the attack, since the incident occurred during a trial phase where Darktrace could only detect but not respond, the attack was able to progress through the kill chain. If RESPOND/Network had been configured in the targeted environment, the unusual connections observed during the initial access, C2, reconnaissance and lateral movement stages of the attack could have been blocked. This would have prevented the attackers from delivering the later stage payloads and eventual ransomware into the target network.

It is often thought that a properly implemented backup strategy is sufficient defense against ransomware [23], however as discussed in a previous Darktrace blog, the increasing frequency of double extortion attacks in a world where ‘data is the new oil’ demonstrates that backups alone are not a mitigation for the risk of a ransomware attack [24]. Equally, the lack of preventive defenses in the target’s environment enabled the attacker’s riskier decision to dwell in the network for longer and allowed them to optimize their potential reward. 

Recent crackdowns from law enforcement on ransomware groups have shifted these groups’ approaches to aim for a balance between low risk and significant financial rewards [25]. However, given the Quantum gang only have a 5% market share in Q2 2022, compared to the 13.2% held by LockBit and 16.9% held by BlackCat [26], a riskier strategy may be favourable, as a longer dwell time and double extortion outcome offers a ‘belt and braces’ approach to maximizing the rewards from carrying out this attack. Alternatively, the gaps in-between the attack stages may imply that more than one player was involved in this attack, although this group has not been reported to operate a franchise model before [27]. Whether assisted by others or driving for a risk approach, it is clear that Quantum (like other actors) are continuing to adapt to ensure their financial success. They will continue to be successful until organizations dedicate themselves to ensuring that the proper data protection and network security measures are in place. 

Conclusion 

Ransomware has evolved over time and groups have merged and rebranded. However, this incident of Quantum ransomware demonstrates that regardless of the capability to execute a full attack within hours, prolonging an attack to optimize potential reward by leveraging double extortion tactics is sometimes still the preferred action. The pattern of network activity mirrors the techniques used in other Quantum attacks, however this incident lacked the continuous progression of the group’s attacks reported recently and may represent a change of motives during the process. Knowing that attacker motives can change reinforces the need for organizations to invest in preventative controls- an organization may already be too far down the line if it is executing its backup contingency plans. Darktrace DETECT/Network had visibility over both the early network-based indicators of compromise and the escalation to the later stages of this attack. Had Darktrace also been allowed to respond, this case of Quantum ransomware would also have had a very short dwell time, but a far better outcome for the victim.

Thanks to Steve Robinson for his contributions to this blog.

Appendices

References

[1] https://community.ibm.com/community/user/security/blogs/tristan-reed/2022/07/13/ibm-security-reaqta-vs-quantum-locker-ransomware

 

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/quantum-ransomware-seen-deployed-in-rapid-network-attacks/

 

[3], [12], [14], [16], [20] https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/25/quantum-ransomware/

 

[4] https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-04/M-Trends%202022%20Executive%20Summary.pdf

 

[5] https://cyware.com/news/over-650-healthcare-organizations-affected-by-the-quantum-ransomware-attack-d0e776bb/

 

[6] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/bumblebee-loader-linked-conti-used-in-quantum-locker-attacks

 

[7] https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2022-06-28-IOCs-for-TA578-IcedID-Cobalt-Strike-and-DarkVNC.txt 

 

[8] https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail/blob/master/trails/static/malware/icedid.txt

 

[9], [15] https://www.cynet.com/blog/shelob-moonlight-spinning-a-larger-web-from-icedid-to-conti-a-trojan-and-ransomware-collaboration/

 

[10] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/04/09/investigating-a-unique-form-of-email-delivery-for-icedid-malware/

 

[11] https://twitter.com/0xToxin/status/1564289244084011014

 

[13], [27] https://cybernews.com/security/quantum-ransomware-gang-fast-and-furious/

 

[17] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/gedabuyisi.com/relations

 

[18] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/sezijiru.com/relations.

 

[19] https://github.com/ByteSecLabs/ja3-ja3s-combo/blob/master/master-list.txt 

 

[21] https://www.darkreading.com/perimeter/ftp-hacking-on-the-rise

 

[22] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/23352-quantum-ransomware

 

[23] https://www.cohesity.com/resource-assets/tip-sheet/5-ways-ransomware-renders-backup-useless-tip-sheet-en.pdf

 

[24] https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishatalagala/2022/03/02/data-as-the-new-oil-is-not-enough-four-principles-for-avoiding-data-fires/ 

 

[25] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/access-to-hacked-corporate-networks-still-strong-but-sales-fall/

 

[26] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransom-payments-fall-as-fewer-victims-choose-to-pay-hackers/ 

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst

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April 24, 2026

Email-Borne Cyber Risk: A Core Challenge for the CISO in the Age of Volume and Sophistication

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The challenge for CISOs

Despite continuous advances in security technologies, humans continue to be exploited by attackers. Credential abuse and social actions like phishing are major factors, accounting for around 60% of all breaches. These attacks rely less on technical vulnerabilities and more on exploiting human behavior and organizational processes. 

From my perspective as a former CISO, protecting humans concentrates three of today’s most pressing challenges: the sheer volume of email-based threats, their increasing sophistication, and the limitations of traditional employee awareness programs in moving the needle on risk. 

My personal experience of security awareness training as a CISO

With over 20 years’ experience as an ICT and Cybersecurity leader across various international organizations, I’ve seen security awareness training (SAT) in many guises. And while the cyber landscape is evolving in every direction, the effectiveness of SAT is reaching a plateau.  

Most programs I’ve seen follow a familiar pattern. Training is delivered through a combination of eLearning modules and internal sessions designed to reinforce IT policies. Employees are typically required to complete a slide deck or video, followed by a multiple-choice quiz. Occasional phishing simulations are distributed throughout the year.

The content is often static and unpersonalized, based on known threats that may already be outdated. Every employee regardless of role or risk exposure receives the same training and the same simulated phishing templates, from front-desk staff to the CEO.

The problem with traditional SAT programs

The issue with the approach to SAT outlined above is that the distribution of power is imbalanced. Humans will always be fallible, particularly when faced with increasingly sophisticated attacks. Providing generic, low-context training risks creating false confidence rather than genuine resilience. Let’s look at some of the problems in detail.

Timing and delivery

Employees today operate under constant cognitive load, making lots of rapid decisions every day to reduce their email volumes. Yet if employees are completing training annually, or on an ad hoc basis, it becomes a standalone occurrence rather than a continuous habit.  

As a result, retention is low. Employees often forget the lessons within weeks, a phenomenon known as the ‘Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve.’

The graph illustrates that when you first learn something, the information disappears at an exponential rate without retention. In fact, according to the curve, you forget 50% of all new information within a day, and 90% of all new information within a week.  

Simultaneously, most training is conducted within a separate interface. Because it takes place away from the actual moment of decision-making, the "teachable moment" is lost. There is a cognitive disconnect between the action (clicking a link in Outlook) and the education (watching a video in a browser). 

People

In the context of professional risk management, the risks faced by different users are different. Static learning such as everyone receiving the same ‘Password Reset’ email doesn’t help users prepare for the specific threats they are likely to face. It also contributes to user fatigue, driven by repetitive training. And if users receive tests at the same time, news spreads among colleagues, hurting the efficacy of the test.  

Staff turnover introduces further risk. In many organizations, new employees gain access to systems before receiving meaningful training, reducing onboarding to little more than policy acknowledgment.

Measuring success

In my experience, solutions are standalone, without any correlation to other tools in the security stack. In some cases, the programs are delivered by HR rather than the security team, creating a complete silo.  

As a result, SAT is often perceived as a compliance exercise rather than a capability building function. The result is that poor-quality training does little to reduce the likelihood of compromise, regardless of completion rates or quiz performance.

What a modern SAT solution should look like

For today’s CISO, email represents the convergence point of high-volume, high-impact, and human-centric threats. Despite significant security investments, it remains one of the most difficult channels to secure effectively. Given these constraints, CISOs must evolve their approach to SAT.

Success lies in a balanced strategy one that combines advanced technology, attack surface reduction, and pragmatic user enablement, without over-relying on human vigilance as the final line of defense.

This means moving beyond traditional SAT toward continuous, contextual awareness, realistic simulations, and tight integration with security outcomes.

Three requirements for a modern SAT solution

  • Invisible protection: The optimum security solution is one that assists users without impeding their experience. The objective is to enhance human capabilities, rather than simply delivering a lecture. 
  • Real-time feedback: Rather than a monthly quiz, the ideal system would provide a prompt or warning when a user is about to engage with something suspicious. 
  • Positive culture: Shifting the focus away from a "gotcha" culture, which is a contributing factor to a resentment, and instead empowers employees to serve as "sensors" for the company. 

Discover how personalized security coaching can strengthen your human layer and make your email defenses more resilient. Explore Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense.

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About the author
Karim Benslimane
VP, Field CISO

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April 27, 2026

How a Compromised eScan Update Enabled Multi‑Stage Malware and Blockchain C2

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The rise of supply chain attacks

In recent years, the abuse of trusted software has become increasingly common, with supply chain compromises emerging as one of the fastest growing vectors for cyber intrusions. As highlighted in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026, attackers and state-actors continue to find significant value in gaining access to networks through compromised trusted links, third-party tools, or legitimate software. In January 2026, a supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product was reported, with malicious updates distributed to customers through the legitimate update infrastructure. This, in turn, resulted in a multi‑stage loader malware being deployed on compromised devices [1][2].

An overview of eScan exploitation

According to eScan’s official threat advisory, unauthorized access to a regional update server resulted in an “incorrect file placed in the update distribution path” [3]. Customers associated with the affected update servers who downloaded the update during a two-hour window on January 20 were impacted, with affected Windows devices subsequently have experiencing various errors related to update functions and notifications [3].

While eScan did not specify which regional update servers were affected by the malicious update, all impacted Darktrace customer environments were located in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region.

External research reported that a malicious 32-bit executable file , “Reload.exe”, was first installed on affected devices, which then dropped the 64-bit downloader, “CONSCTLX.exe”. This downloader establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks such as “CorelDefrag”, which are responsible for executing PowerShell scripts. Subsequently, it evades detection by tampering with the Windows HOSTS file and eScan registry to prevent future remote updates intended for remediation. Additional payloads are then downloaded from its command-and-control (C2) server [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of eScan exploitation

Initial Access and Blockchain as multi-distributed C2 Infrastructure

On January 20, the same day as the aforementioned two‑hour exploit window, Darktrace observed multiple devices across affected networks downloading .dlz package files from eScan update servers, followed by connections to an anomalous endpoint, vhs.delrosal[.]net, which belongs to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The endpoint contained a self‑signed SSL certificate with the string “O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, ST=SomeState, C=AU”, a default placeholder commonly used in SSL/TLS certificates for testing and development environments, as well as in malicious C2 infrastructure [4].

Utilizing a multi‑distributed C2 infrastructure, the attackers also leveraged domains linked with the Solana open‑source blockchain for C2 purposes, namely “.sol”. These domains were human‑readable names that act as aliases for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. As browsers do not natively resolve .sol domains, the Solana Naming System (formerly known as Bonfida, an independent contributor within the Solana ecosystem) provides a proxy service, through endpoints such as sol-domain[.]org, to enable browser access.

Darktrace observed devices connecting to blackice.sol-domain[.]org, indicating that attackers were likely using this proxy to reach a .sol domain for C2 activity. Given this behavior, it is likely that the attackers leveraged .sol domains as a dead drop resolver, a C2 technique in which threat actors host information on a public and legitimate service, such as a blockchain. Additional proxy resolver endpoints, such as sns-resolver.bonfida.workers[.]dev, were also observed.

Solana transactions are transparent, allowing all activity to be viewed publicly. When Darktrace analysts examined the transactions associated with blackice[.]sol, they observed that the earliest records dated November 7, 2025, which coincides with the creation date of the known C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net as shown in WHOIS Lookup information [4][5].

WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
Figure 1: WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
 Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.
Figure 2: Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.

Subsequent instructions found within the transactions contained strings such as “CNAME= vhs[.]delrosal[.]net”, indicating attempts to direct the device toward the malicious endpoint. A more recent transaction recorded on January 28 included strings such as “hxxps://96.9.125[.]243/i;code=302”, suggesting an effort to change C2 endpoints. Darktrace observed multiple alerts triggered for these endpoints across affected devices.

Similar blockchain‑related endpoints, such as “tumama.hns[.]to”, were also observed in C2 activities. The hns[.]to service allows web browsers to access websites registered on Handshake, a decentralized blockchain‑based framework designed to replace centralized authorities and domain registries for top‑level domains. This shift toward decentralized, blockchain‑based infrastructure likely reflects increased efforts by attackers to evade detection.

In outgoing connections to these malicious endpoints across affected networks, Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the activity was 100% rare and anomalous for both the devices and the wider networks, likely indicative of malicious beaconing, regardless of the underlying trusted infrastructure. In addition to generating multiple model alerts to capture this malicious activity across affected networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to compile these separate events into broader incidents that summarized the entire attack chain, allowing customers’ security teams to investigate and remediate more efficiently. Moreover, in customer environments where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled, Darktrace took swift action to contain the attack by blocking beaconing connections to the malicious endpoints, even when those endpoints were associated with seemingly trustworthy services.

Conclusion

Attacks targeting trusted relationships continue to be a popular strategy among threat actors. Activities linked to trusted or widely deployed software are often unintentionally whitelisted by existing security solutions and gateways. Darktrace observed multiple devices becoming impacted within a very short period, likely because tools such as antivirus software are typically mass‑deployed across numerous endpoints. As a result, a single compromised delivery mechanism can greatly expand the attack surface.

Attackers are also becoming increasingly creative in developing resilient C2 infrastructure and exploiting legitimate services to evade detection. Defenders are therefore encouraged to closely monitor anomalous connections and file downloads. Darktrace’s ability to detect unusual activity amidst ever‑changing tactics and indicators of compromise (IoCs) helps organizations maintain a proactive and resilient defense posture against emerging threats.

Credit to Joanna Ng (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Min Kim (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Researcher Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • vhs[.]delrosal[.]net – C2 server
  • tumama[.]hns[.]to – C2 server
  • blackice.sol-domain[.]org – C2 server
  • 96.9.125[.]243 – C2 Server

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.001 - Command and Control: Web Protocols
  • T1588.001 - Resource Development
  • T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
  • T1195 – Supple Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.morphisec.com/blog/critical-escan-threat-bulletin/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

[3] hxxps://download1.mwti.net/documents/Advisory/eScan_Security_Advisory_2026[.]pdf

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/delrosal.net

[5] hxxps://explorer.solana[.]com/address/2wFAbYHNw4ewBHBJzmDgDhCXYoFjJnpbdmeWjZvevaVv

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About the author
Joanna Ng
Associate Principal Analyst
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