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January 4, 2023

BlackMatter's Smash-and-Grab Ransom Attack Incident Analysis

Stay informed on cybersecurity trends! Read about a BlackMatters ransom attack incident and Darktrace's analysis on how RESPOND could have stopped the attack.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Analyst Team
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04
Jan 2023

Only a few years ago, popular reporting announced that the days of smash-and-grab attacks were over and that a new breed of hackers were taking over with subtler, ‘low-and-slow’ tactics [1]. Although these have undoubtedly appeared, smash-and-grab have quickly become overlooked – perhaps with worrying consequences. Last year, Google saw repeated phishing campaigns using cookie theft malware and most recently, reports of hacktivists using similar techniques have been identified during the 2022 Ukraine Conflict [2 & 3]. Where did their inspiration come from? For larger APT groups such as BlackMatter, which first appeared in the summer of 2021, smash-and-grabs never went out of fashion.

This blog dissects a BlackMatter ransomware attack that hit an organization trialing Darktrace back in 2021. The case reveals what can happen when a security team does not react to high-priority alerts. 

When entire ransomware attacks can be carried out over the course of just 48 hours, there is a high risk to relying on security teams to react to detection notifications and prevent damage before the threat escalates. Although there has been hesitancy in its uptake [4], this blog also demonstrates the need for automated response solutions like Darktrace RESPOND.

The Name Game: Untangling BlackMatter, REvil, and DarkSide

Despite being a short-lived criminal organization on the surface [5], a number of parallels have now been drawn between the TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) of the newer BlackMatter group and those of the retired REvil and DarkSide organizations [6]. 

Prior to their retirement, DarkSide and REvil were perhaps the biggest names in cyber-crime, responsible for two of last year’s most devastating ransomware attacks. Less than two weeks after the Colonial Pipeline attack, DarkSide announced it was shutting down its operation [7]. Meanwhile the FBI shutdown REvil in January 2022 after its devastating Fourth of July Kaseya attacks and a failed return in September [8]. It is now suspected that members from one or both went on to form BlackMatter.

This rebranding strategy parallels the smash-and-grab attacks these groups now increasingly employ: they make their money, and a lot of noise, and when they’re found out, they disappear before organizations or governments can pull together their threat intelligence and organize an effective response. When they return days, weeks or months later, they do so having implemented enough small changes to render themselves and their attacks unrecognizable. That is how DarkSide can become BlackMatter, and how its attacks can slip through security systems trained on previously encountered threats. 

Attack Details

In September 2021 Darktrace was monitoring a US marketing agency which became the victim of a double extortion ransomware attack that bore hallmarks of a BlackMatter operation. This began when a single domain-authenticated device joined the company’s network. This was likely a pre-infected company device being reconnected after some time offline. 

Only 15 minutes after joining, the device began SMB and ICMP scanning activities towards over 1000 different internal IPs. There was also a large spike of requests for Epmapper, which suggested an intent for RPC-based lateral movement. Although one credential was particularly prominent, multiple were used including labelled admin credentials. Given it’s unexpected nature, this recon quickly triggered a chain of DETECT/Network model breaches which ensured that Darktrace’s SOC were alerted via the Proactive Threat Notification service. Whilst SOC analysts began to triage the activity, the organization failed to act on any of the alerts they received, leaving the detected threat to take root within their digital environment. 

Shortly after, a series of C2 beaconing occurred towards an endpoint associated with Cobalt Strike [9]. This was accompanied by a range of anomalous WMI bind requests to svcctl, SecAddr and further RPC connections. These allowed the initial compromised device to quickly infect 11 other devices. With continued scanning over the next day, valuable data was soon identified. Across several transfers, 230GB of internal data was then exfiltrated from four file servers via SSH port 22. This data was then made unusable to the organization through encryption occurring via SMB Writes and Moves/Renames with the randomly generated extension ‘.qHefKSmfd’. Finally a ransom note titled ‘qHefKSmfd.README.txt’ was dropped.

This ransom note was appended with the BlackMatter ASCII logo:

Figure 1- The ASCII logo which accompanied BlackMatter’s ransom note

Although Darktrace DETECT and Cyber AI Analyst continued to provide live alerting, the actor successfully accomplished their mission.  

There are numerous reasons that an organization may fail to organize a response to a threat, (including resource shortages, out of hours attacks, and groups that simply move too fast). Without Darktrace’s RESPOND capabilities enabled, the threat actors could proceed this attack without obstacles. 

Figure 2- Cyber AI Analyst breaks down the stages of the attack [Note: this screenshot is from V5 of DETECT/Network] 

How would the attack have unfolded with RESPOND?

Armed with Darktrace’s evolving knowledge of ‘self’ for the customer’s unique digital environment, RESPOND would have activated within seconds of the first network scan, which was recognized as highly anomalous. The standard action taken here would usually involve enforcing the standard ‘pattern of life’ for the compromised device over a set time period in order to halt the anomaly while allowing the business to continue operating as normal.

RESPOND constantly re-evaluates threats as attacks unfold. Had the first stage still been successful, it would have continued to take targeted action at each corresponding stage of this attack. RESPOND models would have alerted to block the external connections to C2 servers over port 443, the outbound exfil attempts and crucially the SMB write activity over port 445 related to encryption.

As DETECT and RESPOND feed into one another, Darktrace would have continued to assess its actions as BlackMatter pivoted tactics. These actions buy back critical time for security teams that may not be in operation over the weekend, and stun the attacker into place without applying overly aggressive responses that create more problems than they solve.

Ultimately although this incident did not resolve autonomously, in response to the ransom event, Darktrace offered to enable RESPOND and set it in active mode for ransomware indicators across all client and server devices. This ensured an event like this would not occur again. 

Why does RESPOND work?

Response solutions must be accurate enough to fire only when there is a genuine threat, configurable enough to let the user stay in the driver’s seat, and intelligent enough to know the right action to take to contain only the malicious activity- without disrupting normal business operations. 

This is only possible if you can establish what ‘normal’ is for any one organization. And this is how Darktrace’s RESPOND product family ensures its actions are targeted and proportionate. By feeding off DETECT alerting which highlights subtle or large deviations across the network, cloud and SaaS, RESPOND can provide a measured response to the potential threat. This includes actions such as:

  • Enforcing the device’s ‘pattern of life’ for a given length of time 
  • Enforcing the ‘group pattern of life’ (stopping a device from doing anything its peers haven’t done in the past)
  • Blocking connections of a certain type to a certain destination
  • Logging out of a cloud account 
  • ‘Smart quarantining’ an endpoint device- maintaining access to VPNs and company’s AV solution

Conclusion 

In its report on BlackMatter [10], CISA recommended that organizations invest in network monitoring tools with the capacity to investigate anomalous activity. Picking up on unusual behavior rather than predetermined rules and signatures is an important step in fighting back against new threats. As this particular story shows, however, detection alone is not always enough. Turning on RESPOND, which takes immediate and precise action to contain threats, regardless of when and where they come in, is the best way to counter smash-and-grab attacks and protect organizations’ digital assets. There is little doubt that the threat actors behind BlackMatter will or have already returned with new names and strategies- but organizations with RESPOND will be ready for them.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections (in order of breach)

Those with the ‘PTN’ prefix were alerted directly to Darktrace’s 24/7 SOC team.

  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • (PTN) Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement
  • Device / Active Directory Reconnaissance
  • Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
  • Compliance / Default Credential Usage
  • Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
  • Device / SMB Session Bruteforce
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • (PTN) Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • (PTN) Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • (PTN) Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

List of IOCs 

Reference List 

[1] https://www.designnews.com/industrial-machinery/new-age-hackers-are-ditching-smash-and-grab-techniques 

[2] https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/how-do-smash-and-grab-cyberattacks-help-ukraine-in-waging-war/

[3] https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/phishing-campaign-targets-youtube-creators-cookie-theft-malware/

[4] https://www.ukcybersecuritycouncil.org.uk/news-insights/articles/the-benefits-of-automation-to-cyber-security/

[5] https://techcrunch.com/2021/11/03/blackmatter-ransomware-shut-down/ 

[6] https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/blackmatter-ransomware-analysis-the-dark-side-returns.html

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/business/darkside-pipeline-hack.html

[8] https://techcrunch.com/2022/01/14/fsb-revil-ransomware/ 

[9] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/georgiaonsale.com/community

[10] https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-291a

Credit to: Andras Balogh, SOC Analyst and Gabriel Few-Wiegratz, Threat Intelligence Content Production Lead

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Analyst Team

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June 16, 2026

Hola VPN Abuse: From Proxy Traffic to Malware and Cryptomining

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Introduction

In enterprise environments, non-compliant software traffic can introduce unexpected exposure by creating unmanaged paths for outbound connectivity. Hola VPN is a notable example because of its peer-to-peer design, which can effectively turn user devices into routing or exit nodes for other parties’ traffic, shifting the risk profile from that of a traditional virtual private network (VPN) to something closer to a distributed proxy.

As a result, the appearance of Hola-related activity, whether from prior installation or unintended background connections, should be treated with caution.  Such activity may provide a foothold for malicious behavior, including lateral movement or command-and-control communication.

This blog explores how Hola-associated activity appeared as part of broader patterns of suspicious behavior observed across the Darktrace customer base.

The campaign

In February and March 2026, Darktrace observed similar anomalous activity across multiple customer environments, with affected devices showing consistent behavioral patterns. These included connections to multiple *.hola[.]org endpoints using Hola-related user agents, suggesting interaction with Hola infrastructure rather than isolated or incidental traffic.

Following these connections, affected customer environments showed downloads of suspicious executable files from rare external endpoints 188.241.219[.]55 and 184.241.218[.]111. Both endpoints have been flagged as potentially malicious by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [1][2].

These downloads were conducted using consistent user agents across impacted customers, specifically ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408’ and ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.251.389’, suggesting a possible association with Hola-related activity.

Notably, this pattern aligns with recent reporting that, in some cases, Hola distributed an undeclared executable component, me[.]exe, which was later assessed to be a likely Monero-mining binary introduced via a compromised delivery pipeline [3].

Case Study 1

Darktrace first observed a new device on January 19, 2026, within a customer environment based in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. On the same day it appeared on the network, the device communicated with multiple pieces of Hola VPN-linked infrastructure before downloading a binary from a hola[.]org subdomain.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.

Subsequent Darktrace telemetry revealed a recurring pattern of activity from the day the device was first observed through to March 4, 2026. During this period, the device repeatedly issued HTTP GET requests to the URI /bwfile?size=1048576, each returning a 200 OK response, indicating successful file retrieval.

This behavior was accompanied by a POST request to /bwfile, followed by an additional GET request for a significantly larger file at /bwfile?size=26214400, suggesting a deliberate and structured file transfer pattern.

Notably, the binary download activity was not tied to a single static host. Instead, it was observed across multiple URLs that changed over time while remaining within the same hola[.]org domain. This pattern suggests the use of rotating or distributed delivery infrastructure rather than a fixed endpoint.

Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.
Figure 2: Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.

Across these events, the activity was consistently associated with the user agent Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408, further linking the traffic to Hola-related service components. Amid these persistent and unusual connections, on February 22, Darktrace observed the device connecting to 188.241.219[.]55/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe, resulting in the download of an executable file.

 File transfer event showing the download of an executable  from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.
Figure 3: File transfer event showing the download of an executable  from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.

Based on its file hash, the downloaded file was assessed as a likely Trojan downloader [4], with import hash (imphash) values showing similarities to samples linked to Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and Stealc according to OSINT [5]. Overall, this sequence of activity suggests that Hola-related connectivity may have been leveraged as part of a broader malware delivery chain.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

Due to the highly unusual activity observed, Darktrace Autonomous Response was triggered by the device’s behavior. However, as the customer deployment was configured in “Human Confirmation” mode, manual approval was required before any action could be taken.

Had the deployment been set to “Fully Autonomous” mode, Darktrace would have automatically:

  1. Blocked connections to the associated ports and external endpoints
  2. Prevented all outgoing network connections from the device
  3. Enforced the device’s established ‘pattern of life’, allowing normal activity to continue while restricting any anomalous behavior
Figure 4: Example of a Darktrace Autonomous Response model highlighting the action that would have been taken, demonstrating how the system identifies anomalous behavior and applies targeted containment measures to restrict suspicious network activity.

Case Study 2

While the first case focused on anomalous activity from a newly observed device, Darktrace also identified cases in which devices had already been communicating with Hola-related endpoints prior to the suspected campaign. This may suggest pre-existing Hola usage within the environment, potentially increasing exposure and creating an avenue for subsequent suspicious activity.

One case involved three devices within a customer network based in the Americas (AMS). In this instance, a different payload was identified: me[.]exe, a potentially malicious cryptocurrency miner also referred to as HolaMonitorService[.]exe [6][7]. The downloads were observed from infrastructure similar to that seen in Case 1, including an IP address within the same 188.241.0.0/16 subnet.

Connections to *.hola[.]org, alongside the use of potential Hola-related user agents consistent with those in Case 1, were also identified, further suggesting a link between the observed activity and Hola-associated infrastructure.

Darktrace observed activity indicative of unusual VPN usage on the first affected device on February 2, followed by telemetry suggesting potential Tor usage. This was later followed by the download of me[.]exe on March 10 from 188.241.218[.]111. Notably, this device was the earliest among the three within the deployment to exhibit the presence of the suspicious executable.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst detection highlighting the download of a suspicious executable from a similar external endpoint in a separate deployment.

On March 5, 2026, the second affected device exhibited a slightly different progression, initiating connections to http-test1[.]hola[.]org using the user agent ‘hola_get’. This activity was followed by the download of me[.]exe from the same endpoint on March 13, consistent with the broader pattern of Hola-related downloads observed across the environment.

 Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.
Figure 6: Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.

The final affected device within this customer’s network demonstrated a more limited but related pattern, also downloading me[.]exe on March 17 using the same ‘hola_get’ user agent.

While the earlier Hola VPN usage observed across the deployment may not have been directly related to the suspected malware campaign, it may nonetheless have contributed to reduced visibility. The presence of pre-existing Hola-related traffic could have obscured malicious activity, making it more difficult to distinguish legitimate usage from attacker-driven behavior and, in turn, hindering the timely identification of the emerging compromise.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

For this deployment, the customer had their Autonomous Response capability configured in “Fully Autonomous” mode, allowing Darktrace to take action without human intervention. As a result, the system was able to autonomously disrupt the activity as soon as relevant events were identified through model detections.

Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response actions taken against suspicious activity linked to Hola VPN.

Suspected cryptomining activity

As previously noted, some of the observed executable payloads appear to be linked to cryptomining malware. Across a subset of affected customer environments, this assessment was further supported by subsequent device activity consistent with Monero mining. Affected devices established follow-on connections to multiple external endpoints aligned with known mining infrastructure, indicating post-download execution.

Considering the broader sequence of activity, this pattern may point to a wider form of abuse in which legitimate VPN-related traffic is used to mask or facilitate malicious behavior following compromise.

On several devices, the download of executable files, including a newly observed peer[.]exe, was followed by alerts indicative of cryptocurrency mining activity. Mining-related credentials such as ‘x’ were observed using the Minergate protocol to communicate with endpoints within the 89.125.255.0/24 subnet and 188.241.218[.]111, the same endpoint involved in earlier download activity. Additional credentials appeared to reflect device-specific CPU identifiers, for example ‘12th Gen Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-1235U’.

Observed mining methods included login, submit, and job, consistent with active participation in a pool-based mining workflow rather than passive or incidental contact. The login method indicates that the host authenticated to the mining service as a worker, job reflects the assignment of computational tasks, and submit shows completed work being returned to the pool [8]. This sequence suggests that affected devices were actively contributing processing resources as part of an unauthorized distributed mining operation.

The presence of unauthorized cryptominers can lead to degraded system performance and reduced device stability. Beyond the immediate resource impact, such activity often serves as an indicator of a broader compromise rather than an isolated issue. This may increase the risk of further malware deployment, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement, particularly in environments where the initial intrusion has not been fully contained.

Conclusion

Across affected environments, detections such as unusual VPN usage, connections to Hola infrastructure, anomalous HTTP activity, suspicious file downloads, and subsequent cryptomining behavior were linked into a single, evolving incident narrative. This aggregation provided a clearer view of attack progression, enabling security teams to understand not just isolated alerts, but the full sequence of compromise from initial contact through to post-exploitation.

Ultimately, these activities show that the risk posed by non-compliant software such as Hola VPN can extend far beyond simple policy violations. What began as traffic to Hola-related infrastructure was, in multiple cases, followed by behavior suggesting deliberate misuse, including suspicious executable downloads using Hola-related user agents and, in some instances, evidence of active cryptomining. These were not isolated anomalies, but elements of a broader pattern in which seemingly benign proxy or VPN-related communications may have created a pathway for malicious delivery and unauthorized resource exploitation.

The significance of this activity lies not only in the downloads or mining, but in what it reveals about an attacker’s ability to blend malicious operations into traffic associated with software that may already have a foothold in the environment. When unapproved software operates within an enterprise, it can reduce visibility, blur the distinction between legitimate and malicious traffic, and create opportunities to extend compromise in ways that are persistent and difficult to detect. Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enables these behavioral distinctions to be identified, regardless of whether the device is new or long established within the network.

Credit to Min Kim (Associate Principal Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.219.55

[2]  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.218.111

[3] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/you-do-surprise-me-exe-an-unexpected-executable-in-hola-browser

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/detection

[5] https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/

[6] https://any.run/report/4cdeb5df217764a8b6a20d518b76ccb30cbe623365a13d9dcd40900950f1ed99/de3a756a-3101-4369-8922-52c586c939fb

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721/community

[8] https://bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/stratum

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity

·      Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining (EM)

·      Device / New User Agent

·      Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Tor Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

·      Antigena / Network / External threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC –Type -Description + Confidence

188.241.219[.]55 - IP Address - Malware distribution source

188.241.218[.]111 - IP Address -Malware distribution source

hxxp://188.241.218[.]111:8080/me[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/peer[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

C8088f3c8bc3542eb1ad78a7cc5306d866c8ac81 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

b595a6de0f6a18975b29e6f8ebe604956a173478 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

e9139a2e0839e8b9e5c9787ea936347ae56e5460 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c2e80073e4cafe757d5643bd8fd45f28ad89bff9 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

695355eceedcdd337d8fcbd35e6a531cda75b847 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

f0b0d8068a1b9ab5d68a8a46842d72b870b292e7 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

a21c8b8cabc7670ea45bc175e185a0f9bfcf4733 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

0353ca44b9f397d8f492db0b2f7a1d00a9e4406a - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

56824c8a110e35ab303dc27a6c758cd50c36174c - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

c141fa0fa505fe7f9ad5dd21d9d4d6d411739682 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0417ec988b16f1267065185a6eea98f0bd2e17cd - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c54f7eaaeb3e0b528cd2584bdcb3a4b13cc0f8a2 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

11c78f15fafd53f8cc5a52b828d7cbf2a99e0b09 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0258bf7dbb0123247db29e8799991140bbdbd9bb - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

b46043a06dd9bbd63e4214d5fbc7fd56e1ff0618 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

753afdecd9f5402d004e8e5f768170ae9a468ca5 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

8f533c7cb1524b00f7b0311c2ea8603298d6b2ca - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

3a3bc6a5b4db1a4e961abcb002d26fe9d5e5c349 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

897f70eb41d302b045fcb05ed0693675e778ce57 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

6ddd5644809606e3dc1e2cc06059c3f5e6176f85 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

68a94f7cdcaf8853ea99251c1ecc67ae9b32eba8 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1659 -Initial Access, Command and Control -Content Injection

T1588.001 -Resource Development -Malware

T1189 -Initial Access -Drive-by Compromise

T1105 -Command and Control -Ingress Tool Transfer

T1657 -Impact -Financial Theft

T1497.001 -Impact -Compute Hijacking

T1496 -Impact -Resource Hijacking

T1210 -Lateral Movement -Exploitation of Remote Services

T1036.012 -Stealth -Browser Fingerprint

T1071.001 -Command and Control -Web Protocols

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About the author
Min Kim
Cyber Security Analyst

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June 15, 2026

スポーツ産業のサイバーセキュリティ: デジタル化した2026年のスポーツ産業が直面する脅威

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2026年のスポーツイベントを保護する

試合開催日にスタジアムに足を踏み入れるとき、あなたは小さなスマートシティを訪れています。チケット販売、回転ゲート、決済システム、何万ものファンが利用する公共Wi-Fi、CCTV、照明、そしてHVACまでもがすべて、相互に接続されたシステム上で稼働しています。ファンの体験はこれまでになく向上しましたが、この接続への依存は人々が想像するよりもはるかに大きなアタックサーフェスを作り出しています。

私たちの最新の調査結果はそれを裏付けています。ダークトレースが委託して実施した調査によれば、調査対象のプロスポーツ組織の84%は過去1年間に少なくとも1回のサイバーインシデントを経験しており、57%は複数回遭遇していました。試合が行われるライブ時間にすべてがかかっている業界にとって、これらの数字は直接的に運営上のリスクを意味します。

なぜスポーツがサイバー攻撃の標的になるのか

スポーツは非常に目立つターゲットであり、スケジュールが決まっているため、攻撃者は障害が最も影響を与える時期を正確に知っています。また、貴重なデータであるアスリートの医療記録、契約書、スポンサー契約書などが保管されており、これらが漏洩すれば財務上、評判上、規制上のリスクを伴います。同時に、イベントの開催もチケット発行、放送局、クラウドサービス、スタジアム関連テクノロジーなど、多くの第三者に依存しています。それらのシステムとの接続はいずれも侵入点になる可能性があります。注目度、スケジュール、データ、依存関係、これらが組み合わされることにより、小さな足がかりから、影響の大きな、時間的余裕の許されないインシデントに発展する環境が生まれます。

攻撃者はどのようにEメールとアイデンティティを標的にするか

Eメールとアイデンティティは主要な侵入経路です。2025年10月から2026年3月にかけて、Darktrace / EMAIL™は当社の顧客ベースにおいてスポーツ組織を狙った11万6,000通以上のフィッシングEメールを検知しました。また、スポーツ業界の顧客は他の業界の組織よりも19%多くのフィッシングEメールを受け取っています。数字がこれを物語っています:

数値が示すもの

  • フィッシングEメールの21%はVIPを標的
  • 37%は新手のソーシャルエンジニアリングを使用
  • 悪意あるEメールの84%がDMARC認証を通過

これらのEメールの大部分は認証チェックを通過しており、従来のセキュリティ対策がもはや信頼できる防壁ではないことを意味しています。攻撃者はなりすましドメインに頼っているのではなく、正規のインフラストラクチャと信頼されたプラットフォームを利用しています。ここで、動作が大きな意味を持ちます。アカウントが侵害されると、動作は急速に変化します。ログインパターンが変わり、返信を隠すための受信トレイルールが作成され、アカウントが内部偵察やさらなるフィッシングに使用され始めます。これらは大きな騒音を伴う出来事ではありません。それらは通常のワークフローに紛れ込み、多くのケースで見落とされています。

ランサムウェアも同じような経緯で発生しています。あるスポーツ関連の顧客内では、攻撃者は暗号化を開始する前の2週間もの間、静かにデータを外部サーバーに移動していました。身代金要求文が出現するときには、すでにお膳立てができていたというわけです。一貫して見られるシーケンスとして、まずアクセスがあり、次に移動があり、そして最後に障害が発生しています。暗号化の時点で検知されても、既に手遅れです。

AIがスポーツ組織の新たなブラインドスポットとなる理由

AI導入の増加は潜在的アタックサーフェスを拡大させています。当社が調査を行ったセキュリティプロフェッショナルの72%は、今後1年間でAIがリスク増大につながると予想しています。しかし35%はスタジアムの運営という保護すべき最も重要な機能に既にAIを使用しているか、使用を計画しているのです。プロンプトインジェクションやAI構築リスクに加えて、シャドーAIがより切迫したリスクとなりつつあります。スタッフはすでに、パフォーマンス指標、スカウティングレポート、契約、健康データなどの機密データを、ほとんどまたはまったく管理されていないツールに入力しています。AIのもたらす利点は明らかですが、リスクも同様に明白であり、しかもそれはほとんどの組織が何の可視性やコントロールも持たないうちに発生しています。その一方で、攻撃者は同じAI技術を使ってフィッシングやソーシャルエンジニアリングを拡大しています。その結果はシンプルです-より大きな露出リスクが、より速いスピードで発生しているのです。

サイバーセキュリティプロフェッショナルはどう備えるべきか

大規模なイベントにおいて、効果的なサイバー防御には準備、リアルタイムの可視性が重要です。限られたタイミング、複雑さ、一般の注目、そしてこれらが重なるなかで、動的かつ決定的に対応する能力が必要であることを、ダークトレースの経験は物語っています。

サイバーセキュリティチームにとって戦略的に重要ないくつかの項目があります:

  • コーポレートシステムだけでなく、ITおよびOT全体の動作の可視性を確保すること。
  • アイデンティティをコントロールプレーンとして扱うこと。 この分野でのほとんどの攻撃は、マルウェアではなく認証情報から始まります。ビヘイビア検知を用いた多要素認証(MFA)は、その課題の解決に役立ちます。
  • 自社の環境を管理するのと同じように第三者とAIのアクセスも制御すること。
  • 数分で意思決定を行う、ライブ条件で対応を訓練すること。 検知と対応は、エンジニアにプレッシャーがかかり、時間が制約される非理想的な条件を考慮する必要があります。スポーツにおいて小さな問題を重大インシデントに発展させるのは、このタイミング条件です。平日であれば問題なく対応できる事象も、イベント開催中は重大な事態になりかねません。

2026年、スポーツにおいてサイバーセキュリティのリスクが拡大する理由

FIFAワールドカップ2026は3か国と数十の開催都市にまたがるため、アタックサーフェスは広範であり、スケジュールも厳しいものとなります。

地政学的なシグナリングは脅威プロファイルをさらに深刻化させています。これまでの国際スポーツイベントでは、国家を背後に持つ脅威アクターがサイバー領域を利用してその意思を示し、ナラティブに影響を及ぼし、象徴的な報復を行うことが実証されています。2026年ワールドカップの文脈において、国際スポーツからのロシアの継続的な排除、ウクライナでの現在の紛争、米国のウクライナへの防衛支援、そしてイランの大会参加の可能性は、国家に関係したアクター、そして非伝統的なアフィリエイト達が武力攻撃未満のサイバー攻撃を展開するさらなる動機を与えています。それには新しい技術は必要ありません — ただ適切なタイミングと注目度があればよいのです。

実務においては、結局準備に行きつくことになります。ITとOT全体で正常な状態がどのようなものかを把握し、第三者のアクセスを管理し、動作の変化を識別することです。

スポーツにおいて、障害は徐々に蓄積するのではなく、リアルタイムに、衆人環視の下で発生します。試合開始のホイッスルが鳴るずっと前に、その段取りはすでに完了しているのです。

調査について

調査結果は、スポーツセクターの顧客におけるDarktraceの脅威調査テレメトリー(2025年第4四半期~2026年第1四半期)および2026年5月28日から6月3日にOpinion Mattersが実施した米国、英国、オーストラリア、ドイツの875人のITサイバーセキュリティ専門家を対象とした調査に基づいています。調査手法の詳細、インシデント分析、および戦略的推奨事項については、レポート全文をお読みください。

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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