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March 22, 2023

Amadey Info Stealer and N-Day Vulnerabilities

Understand the implications of the Amadey info stealer on cybersecurity and how it exploits N-day vulnerabilities for data theft.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Zoe Tilsiter
Cyber Analyst
Written by
The Darktrace Threat Research Team
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22
Mar 2023

The continued prevalence of Malware as a Service (MaaS) across the cyber threat landscape means that even the most inexperienced of would-be malicious actors are able to carry out damaging and wide-spread cyber-attacks with relative ease. Among these commonly employed MaaS are information stealers, or info-stealers, a type of malware that infects a device and attempts to gather sensitive information before exfiltrating it to the attacker. Info-stealers typically target confidential information, such as login credentials and bank details, and attempt to lie low on a compromised device, allowing access to sensitive data for longer periods of time. 

It is essential for organizations to have efficient security measures in place to defend their networks from attackers in an increasing versatile and accessible threat landscape, however incident response alone is not enough. Having an autonomous decision maker able to not only detect suspicious activity, but also take action against it in real time, is of the upmost importance to defend against significant network compromise. 

Between August and December 2022, Darktrace detected the Amadey info-stealer on more than 30 customer environments, spanning various regions and industry verticals across the customer base. This shows a continual presence and overlap of info-stealer indicators of compromise (IOCs) across the cyber threat landscape, such as RacoonStealer, which we discussed last November (Part 1 and Part 2).

Background on Amadey

Amadey Bot, a malware that was first discovered in 2018, is capable of stealing sensitive information and installing additional malware by receiving commands from the attacker. Like other malware strains, it is being sold in illegal forums as MaaS starting from $500 USD [1]. 

Researchers at AhnLab found that Amadey is typically distributed via existing SmokeLoader loader malware campaigns. Downloading cracked versions of legitimate software causes SmokeLoader to inject malicious payload into Windows Explorer processes and proceeds to download Amadey.  

The botnet has also been used for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and as a vector to install malware spam campaigns, such as LockBit 3.0 [2]. Regardless of the delivery techniques, similar patterns of activity were observed across multiple customer environments. 

Amadey’s primary function is to steal information and further distribute malware. It aims to extract a variety of information from infected devices and attempts to evade the detection of security measures by reducing the volume of data exfiltration compared to that seen in other malicious instances.

Darktrace DETECT/Network™ and its built-in features, such as Wireshark Packet Captures (PCAP), identified Amadey activity on customer networks, whilst Darktrace RESPOND/Network™ autonomously intervened to halt its progress.

Attack Details

Figure 1: Timeline of Amadey info-stealer kill chain.

Initial Access  

User engagement with malicious email attachments or cracked software results in direct execution of the SmokeLoader loader malware on a device. Once the loader has executed its payload, it is then able to download additional malware, including the Amadey info-stealer.

Unusual Outbound Connections 

After initial access by the loader and download of additional malware, the Amadey info-stealer captures screenshots of network information and sends them to Amadey command and control (C2) servers via HTTP POST requests with no GET to a .php URI. An example of this can be seen in Figure 2.  

Figure 2: PCAP from an affected customer showing screenshots being sent out to the Amadey C2 server via a .jpg file. 

C2 Communications  

The infected device continues to make repeated connections out to this Amadey endpoint. Amadey's C2 server will respond with instructions to download additional plugins in the form of dynamic-link libraries (DLLs), such as "/Mb1sDv3/Plugins/cred64.dll", or attempt to download secondary info-stealers such as RedLine or RaccoonStealer. 

Internal Reconnaissance 

The device downloads executable and DLL files, or stealer configuration files to steal additional network information from software including RealVNC and Outlook. Most compromised accounts were observed downloading additional malware following commands received from the attacker.

Data Exfiltration 

The stolen information is then sent out via high volumes of HTTP connection. It makes HTTP POSTs to malicious .php URIs again, this time exfiltrating more data such as the Amadey version, device names, and any anti-malware software installed on the system.

How did the attackers bypass the rest of the security stack?

Existing N-Day vulnerabilities are leveraged to launch new attacks on customer networks and potentially bypass other tools in the security stack. Additionally, exfiltrating data via low and slow HTTP connections, rather than large file transfers to cloud storage platforms, is an effective means of evading the detection of traditional security tools which often look for large data transfers, sometimes to a specific list of identified “bad” endpoints.

Darktrace Coverage 

Amadey activity was autonomously identified by DETECT and the Cyber AI Analyst. A list of DETECT models that were triggered on deployments during this kill chain can be found in the Appendices. 

Various Amadey activities were detected and highlighted in DETECT model breaches and their model breach event logs. Figure 3 shows a compromised device making suspicious HTTP POST requests, causing the ‘Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname’ model to breach. It also downloaded an executable file (.exe) from the same IP.

Figure 3: Amadey activity on a customer deployment captured by model breaches and event logs. 

DETECT’s built-in features also assisted with detecting the data exfiltration. Using the PCAP integration, the exfiltrated data was captured for analysis. Figure 4 shows a connection made to the Amadey endpoint, in which information about the infected device, such as system ID and computer name, were sent. 

Figure 4: PCAP downloaded from Darktrace event logs highlighting data egress to the Amadey endpoint. 

Further information about the infected system can be seen in the above PCAP. As outlined by researchers at Ahnlab and shown in Figure 5, additional system information sent includes the Amadey version (vs=), the device’s admin privilege status (ar=), and any installed anti-malware or anti-virus software installed on the infected environment (av=) [3]. 

Figure 5: AhnLab’s glossary table explaining the information sent to the Amadey C2 server. 

Darktrace’s AI Analyst was also able to connect commonalities between model breaches on a device and present them as a connected incident made up of separate events. Figure 6 shows the AI Analyst incident log for a device having breached multiple models indicative of the Amadey kill chain. It displays the timeline of these events, the specific IOCs, and the associated attack tactic, in this case ‘Command and Control’. 

Figure 6: A screenshot of multiple IOCs and activity correlated together by AI Analyst. 

When enabled on customer’s deployments, RESPOND was able to take immediate action against Amadey to mitigate its impact on customer networks. RESPOND models that breached include: 

  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block 
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

On one customer’s environment, a device made a POST request with no GET to URI ‘/p84Nls2/index.php’ and unepeureyore[.]xyz. RESPOND autonomously enforced a previously established pattern of life on the device twice for 30 minutes each and blocked all outgoing traffic from the device for 10 minutes. Enforcing a device’s pattern of life restricts it to conduct activity within the device and/or user’s expected pattern of behavior and blocks anything anomalous or unexpected, enabling normal business operations to continue. This response is intended to reduce the potential scale of attacks by disrupting the kill chain, whilst ensuring business disruption is kept to a minimum. 

Figure 7: RESPOND actions taken on a customer deployment to disrupt the Amadey kill chain. 

The Darktrace Threat Research team conducted thorough investigations into Amadey activity observed across the customer base. They were able to identify and contextualize this threat across the fleet, enriching AI insights with collaborative human analysis. Pivoting from AI insights as their primary source of information, the Threat Research team were able to provide layered analysis to confirm this campaign-like activity and assess the threat across multiple unique environments, providing a holistic assessment to customers with contextualized insights.

Conclusion

The presence of the Amadey info-stealer in multiple customer environments highlights the continuing prevalence of MaaS and info-stealers across the threat landscape. The Amadey info-stealer in particular demonstrates that by evading N-day vulnerability patches, threat actors routinely launch new attacks. These malicious actors are then able to evade detection by traditional security tools by employing low and slow data exfiltration techniques, as opposed to large file transfers.

Crucially, Darktrace’s AI insights were coupled with expert human analysis to detect, respond, and provide contextualized insights to notify customers of Amadey activity effectively. DETECT captured Amadey activity taking place on customer deployments, and where enabled, RESPOND’s autonomous technology was able to take immediate action to reduce the scale of such attacks. Finally, the Threat Research team were in place to provide enhanced analysis for affected customers to help security teams future-proof against similar attacks.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections 

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname 

Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname 

Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

List of IOCs

f0ce8614cc2c3ae1fcba93bc4a8b82196e7139f7 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

e487edceeef3a41e2a8eea1e684bcbc3b39adb97 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

0f9006d8f09e91bbd459b8254dd945e4fbae25d9 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

4069fdad04f5e41b36945cc871eb87a309fd3442 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

193.106.191[.]201 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.134[.]66 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

78.153.144[.]60 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

62.204.41[.]252 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

45.153.240[.]94 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

185.215.113[.]204 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

85.209.135[.]11 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

185.215.113[.]205 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]146 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

5.154.181[.]119 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

45.130.151[.]191 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

193.106.191[.]184 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]15 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.133[.]72 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

89.163.249[.]231 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

193.56.146[.]243 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]158 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

85.209.135[.]109 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.134[.]45 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

moscow12[.]at - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

moscow13[.]at - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

unepeureyore[.]xyz - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/fb73jc3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panelis/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panelis/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/Plugins/cred.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/gjend7w/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/hfk3vK9/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/v3S1dl2/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/f9v33dkSXm/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/p84Nls2/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/p84Nls2/Plugins/cred.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/nB8cWack3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rest/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/Plugins/cred64.dll  - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/h8V2cQlbd3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/f5OknW/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/mBsjv2swweP/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

Mitre Attack and Mapping 

Collection:

T1185 - Man the Browser

Initial Access and Resource Development:

T1189 - Drive-by Compromise

T1588.001 - Malware

Persistence:

T1176 - Browser Extensions

Command and Control:

T1071 - Application Layer Protocol

T1071.001 - Web Protocols

T1090.002 - External Proxy

T1095 - Non-Application Layer Protocol

T1571 - Non-Standard Port

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

References 

[1] https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey

[2] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/41450/

[3] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/36634/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Zoe Tilsiter
Cyber Analyst
Written by
The Darktrace Threat Research Team

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September 30, 2025

Out of Character: Detecting Vendor Compromise and Trusted Relationship Abuse with Darktrace

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What is Vendor Email Compromise?

Vendor Email Compromise (VEC) refers to an attack where actors breach a third-party provider to exploit their access, relationships, or systems for malicious purposes. The initially compromised entities are often the target’s existing partners, though this can extend to any organization or individual the target is likely to trust.

It sits at the intersection of supply chain attacks and business email compromise (BEC), blending technical exploitation with trust-based deception. Attackers often infiltrate existing conversations, leveraging AI to mimic tone and avoid common spelling and grammar pitfalls. Malicious content is typically hosted on otherwise reputable file sharing platforms, meaning any shared links initially seem harmless.

While techniques to achieve initial access may have evolved, the goals remain familiar. Threat actors harvest credentials, launch subsequent phishing campaigns, attempt to redirect invoice payments for financial gain, and exfiltrate sensitive corporate data.

Why traditional defenses fall short

These subtle and sophisticated email attacks pose unique challenges for defenders. Few busy people would treat an ongoing conversation with a trusted contact with the same level of suspicion as an email from the CEO requesting ‘URGENT ASSISTANCE!’ Unfortunately, many traditional secure email gateways (SEGs) struggle with this too. Detecting an out-of-character email, when it does not obviously appear out of character, is a complex challenge. It’s hardly surprising, then, that 83% of organizations have experienced a security incident involving third-party vendors [1].  

This article explores how Darktrace detected four different vendor compromise campaigns for a single customer, within a two-week period in 2025.  Darktrace / EMAIL successfully identified the subtle indicators that these seemingly benign emails from trusted senders were, in fact, malicious. Due to the configuration of Darktrace / EMAIL in this customer’s environment, it was unable to take action against the malicious emails. However, if fully enabled to take Autonomous Response, it would have held all offending emails identified.

How does Darktrace detect vendor compromise?

The answer lies at the core of how Darktrace operates: anomaly detection. Rather than relying on known malicious rules or signatures, Darktrace learns what ‘normal’ looks like for an environment, then looks for anomalies across a wide range of metrics. Despite the resourcefulness of the threat actors involved in this case, Darktrace identified many anomalies across these campaigns.

Different campaigns, common traits

A wide variety of approaches was observed. Individuals, shared mailboxes and external contractors were all targeted. Two emails originated from compromised current vendors, while two came from unknown compromised organizations - one in an associated industry. The sender organizations were either familiar or, at the very least, professional in appearance, with no unusual alphanumeric strings or suspicious top-level domains (TLDs). Subject line, such as “New Approved Statement From [REDACTED]” and “[REDACTED] - Proposal Document” appeared unremarkable and were not designed to provoke heightened emotions like typical social engineering or BEC attempts.

All emails had been given a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating Microsoft did not consider them to be spam or malicious [2]. They also passed authentication checks (including SPF, and in some cases DKIM and DMARC), meaning they appeared to originate from an authentic source for the sender domain and had not been tampered with in transit.  

All observed phishing emails contained a link hosted on a legitimate and commonly used file-sharing site. These sites were often convincingly themed, frequently featuring the name of a trusted vendor either on the page or within the URL, to appear authentic and avoid raising suspicion. However, these links served only as the initial step in a more complex, multi-stage phishing process.

A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
Figure 1: A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.
Figure 2: Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.

If followed, the recipient would be redirected, sometimes via CAPTCHA, to fake Microsoft login pages designed to capturing credentials, namely http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html and https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html#.

The latter made use of homoglyphs to deceive the user, with a link referencing ‘s3cure0line’, rather than ‘secureonline’. Post-incident investigation using open-source intelligence (OSINT) confirmed that the domains were linked to malicious phishing endpoints [3] [4].

Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
Figure 3: Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.
Figure 4: Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.

Darktrace Anomaly Detection

Some senders were unknown to the network, with no previous outbound or inbound emails. Some had sent the email to multiple undisclosed recipients using BCC, an unusual behavior for a new sender.  

Where the sender organization was an existing vendor, Darktrace recognized out-of-character behavior, in this case it was the first time a link to a particular file-sharing site had been shared. Often the links themselves exhibited anomalies, either being unusually prominent or hidden altogether - masked by text or a clickable image.

Crucially, Darktrace / EMAIL is able to identify malicious links at the time of processing the emails, without needing to visit the URLs or analyze the destination endpoints, meaning even the most convincing phishing pages cannot evade detection – meaning even the most convincing phishing emails cannot evade detection. This sets it apart from many competitors who rely on crawling the endpoints present in emails. This, among other things, risks disruption to user experience, such as unsubscribing them from emails, for instance.

Darktrace was also able to determine that the malicious emails originated from a compromised mailbox, using a series of behavioral and contextual metrics to make the identification. Upon analysis of the emails, Darktrace autonomously assigned several contextual tags to highlight their concerning elements, indicating that the messages contained phishing links, were likely sent from a compromised account, and originated from a known correspondent exhibiting out-of-character behavior.

A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.
Figure 5: Tags assigned to offending emails by Darktrace / EMAIL.

Figure 6: A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.

Out-of-character behavior caught in real-time

In another customer environment around the same time Darktrace / EMAIL detected multiple emails with carefully crafted, contextually appropriate subject lines sent from an established correspondent being sent to 30 different recipients. In many cases, the attacker hijacked existing threads and inserted their malicious emails into an ongoing conversation in an effort to blend in and avoid detection. As in the previous, the attacker leveraged a well-known service, this time ClickFunnels, to host a document containing another malicious link. Once again, they were assigned a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating that they were not considered malicious.

The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.
Figure 7: The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.

This time, however, the customer had Darktrace / EMAIL fully enabled to take Autonomous Response against suspicious emails. As a result, when Darktrace detected the out-of-character behavior, specifically, the sharing of a link to a previously unused file-sharing domain, and identified the likely malicious intent of the message, it held the email, preventing it from reaching recipients’ inboxes and effectively shutting down the attack.

Figure 8: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of malicious emails inserted into an existing thread.*

*To preserve anonymity, all real customer names, email addresses, and other identifying details have been redacted and replaced with fictitious placeholders.

Legitimate messages in the conversation were assigned an Anomaly Score of 0, while the newly inserted malicious emails identified and were flagged with the maximum score of 100.

Key takeaways for defenders

Phishing remains big business, and as the landscape evolves, today’s campaigns often look very different from earlier versions. As with network-based attacks, threat actors are increasingly leveraging legitimate tools and exploiting trusted relationships to carry out their malicious goals, often staying under the radar of security teams and traditional email defenses.

As attackers continue to exploit trusted relationships between organizations and their third-party associates, security teams must remain vigilant to unexpected or suspicious email activity. Protecting the digital estate requires an email solution capable of identifying malicious characteristics, even when they originate from otherwise trusted senders.

Credit to Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst), Patrick Anjos (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), Kiri Addison (Director of Product)

Appendices

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence  

- http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html#p – fake Microsoft login page

- https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html# - link to domain used in homoglyph attack

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping  

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Initial Access - Phishing – (T1566)  

References

1.     https://gitnux.org/third-party-risk-statistics/

2.     https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-spam-spam-confidence-level-scl-about

3.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/5df9aae8f78445a590f674d7b64c69630c1473c294ce5337d73732c03ab7fca2/detection

4.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/695d0d173d1bd4755eb79952704e3f2f2b87d1a08e2ec660b98a4cc65f6b2577/details

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content

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Jennifer Beckett
Cyber Analyst

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OT

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October 1, 2025

Announcing Unified OT Security with Dedicated OT Workflows, Segmentation-Aware Risk Insights, and Next-Gen Endpoint Visibility for Industrial Teams

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The challenge of convergence without clarity

Convergence is no longer a roadmap idea, it is the daily reality for industrial security teams. As Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) environments merge, the line between a cyber incident and an operational disruption grows increasingly hard to define. A misconfigured firewall rule can lead to downtime. A protocol misuse might look like a glitch. And when a pump stalls but nothing appears in the Security Operations Center (SOC) dashboard, teams are left asking: is this operational or is this a threat?

The lack of shared context slows down response, creates friction between SOC analysts and plant engineers, and leaves organizations vulnerable at exactly the points where IT and OT converge. Defenders need more than alerts, they need clarity that both sides can trust.

The breakthrough with Darktrace / OT

This latest Darktrace / OT release was built to deliver exactly that. It introduces shared context between Security, IT, and OT operations, helping reduce friction and close the security gaps at the intersection of these domains.

With a dedicated dashboard built for operations teams, extended visibility into endpoints for new forms of detection and CVE collection, expanded protocol coverage, and smarter risk modeling aligned to segmentation policies, teams can now operate from a shared source of truth. These enhancements are not just incremental upgrades, they are foundational improvements designed to bring clarity, efficiency, and trust to converged environments.

A dashboard built for OT engineers

The new Operational Overview provides OT engineers with a workspace designed for them, not for SOC analysts. It brings asset management, risk insights and operational alerts into one place. Engineers can now see activity like firmware changes, controller reprograms or the sudden appearance of a new workstation on the network, providing a tailored view for critical insights and productivity gains without navigating IT-centric workflows. Each device view is now enriched with cross-linked intelligence, make, model, firmware version and the roles inferred by Self-Learning AI, making it easier to understand how each asset behaves, what function it serves, and where it fits within the broader industrial process. By suppressing IT-centric noise, the dashboard highlights only the anomalies that matter to operations, accelerating triage, enabling smoother IT/OT collaboration, and reducing time to root cause without jumping between tools.

This is usability with purpose, a view that matches OT workflows and accelerates response.

Figure 1: The Operational Overview provides an intuitive dashboard summarizing all OT Assets, Alerts, and Risk.

Full-spectrum coverage across endpoints, sensors and protocols

The release also extends visibility into areas that have traditionally been blind spots. Engineering workstations, Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs), contractor laptops and field devices are often the entry points for attackers, yet the hardest to monitor.

Darktrace introduces Network Endpoint eXtended Telemetry (NEXT) for OT, a lightweight collector built for segmented and resource-constrained environments. NEXT for OT uses Endpoint sensors to capture localized network, and now process-level telemetry, placing it in context alongside other network and asset data to:

  1. Identify vulnerabilities and OS data, which is leveraged by OT Risk Management for risk scoring and patching prioritization, removing the need for third-party CVE collection.
  1. Surface novel threats using Self-Learning AI that standalone Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) would miss.
  1. Extend Cyber AI Analyst investigations through to the endpoint root cause.

NEXT is part of our existing cSensor endpoint agent, can be deployed standalone or alongside existing EDR tools, and allows capabilities to be enabled or disabled depending on factors such as security or OT team objectives and resource utilization.

Figure 2: Darktrace / OT delivers CVE patch priority insights by combining threat intelligence with extended network and endpoint telemetry

The family of Darktrace Endpoint sensors also receive a boost in deployment flexibility, with on-prem server-based setups, as well as a Windows driver tailored for zero-trust and high-security environments.

Protocol coverage has been extended where it matters most. Darktrace now performs protocol analysis of a wider range of GE and Mitsubishi protocols, giving operators real-time visibility into commands and state changes on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), robots and controllers. Backed by Self-Learning AI, this inspection does more than parse traffic, it understands what normal looks like and flags deviations that signal risk.

Integrated risk and governance workflows

Security data is only valuable when it drives action. Darktrace / OT delivers risk insights that go beyond patching, helping teams take meaningful steps even when remediation isn't possible. Risk is assessed not just by CVE presence, but by how network segmentation, firewall policies, and attack path logic neutralize or contain real-world exposure. This approach empowers defenders to deprioritize low-impact vulnerabilities and focus effort where risk truly exists. Building on the foundation introduced in release 6.3, such as KEV enrichment, endpoint OS data, and exploit mapping, this release introduces new integrations that bring Darktrace / OT intelligence directly into governance workflows.

Fortinet FortiGate firewall ingestion feeds segmentation rules into attack path modeling, revealing real exposure when policies fail and closing feeds into patching prioritization based on a policy to CVE exposure assessment.

  • ServiceNow Configuration Management Database (CMDB) sync ensures asset intelligence stays current across governance platforms, eliminating manual inventory work.

Risk modeling has also been made more operationally relevant. Scores are now contextualized by exploitability, asset criticality, firewall policy, and segmentation posture. Patch recommendations are modeled in terms of safety, uptime and compliance rather than just Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) numbers. And importantly, risk is prioritized across the Purdue Model, giving defenders visibility into whether vulnerabilities remain isolated to IT or extend into OT-critical layers.

Figure 3: Attack Path Modeling based on NetFlow and network topology reveals high risk points of IT/OT convergence.

The real-world impact for defenders

In today’s environments, attackers move fluidly between IT and OT. Without unified visibility and shared context, incidents cascade faster than teams can respond.

With this release, Darktrace / OT changes that reality. The Operational Overview gives Engineers a dashboard they can use daily, tailored to their workflows. SOC analysts can seamlessly investigate telemetry across endpoints, sensors and protocols that were once blind spots. Operators gain transparency into PLCs and controllers. Governance teams benefit from automated integrations with platforms like Fortinet and ServiceNow. And all stakeholders work from risk models that reflect what truly matters: safety, uptime and compliance.

This release is not about creating more alerts. It is about providing more clarity. By unifying context across IT and OT, Darktrace / OT enables defenders to see more, understand more and act faster.

Because in environments where safety and uptime are non-negotiable, clarity is what matters most.

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About the author
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
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