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[Part 2] Typical Steps of a Raccoon Stealer v2 Infection

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08
Nov 2022
08
Nov 2022
Since the release of version 2 of Raccoon Stealer, Darktrace’s SOC has observed a surge in activity. See the typical steps used by this new threat!

Raccoon Stealer Malware

Since the release of version 2 of Raccoon Stealer in May 2022, Darktrace has observed huge volumes of Raccoon Stealer v2 infections across its client base. The info-stealer, which seeks to obtain and then exfiltrate sensitive data saved on users’ devices, displays a predictable pattern of network activity once it is executed. In this blog post, we will provide details of this pattern of activity, with the goal of helping security teams to recognize network-based signs of Raccoon Stealer v2 infection within their own networks. 

What is Raccoon Stealer?

Raccoon Stealer is a classic example of information-stealing malware, which cybercriminals typically use to gain possession of sensitive data saved in users’ browsers and cryptocurrency wallets. In the case of browsers, targeted data typically includes cookies, saved login details, and saved credit card details. In the case of cryptocurrency wallets (henceforth, ‘crypto-wallets’), targeted data typically includes public keys, private keys, and seed phrases [1]. Once sensitive browser and crypto-wallet data is in the hands of cybercriminals, it will likely be used to conduct harmful activities, such as identity theft, cryptocurrency theft, and credit card fraud.

How do you obtain Raccoon Stealer?

Like most info-stealers, Raccoon Stealer is purchasable. The operators of Raccoon Stealer sell Raccoon Stealer samples to their customers (called ‘affiliates’), who then use the info-stealer to gain possession of sensitive data saved on users’ devices. Raccoon Stealer affiliates typically distribute their samples via SEO-promoted websites providing free or cracked software. 

Is Raccoon Stealer Still Active?

On the 25th of March 2022, the operators of Raccoon Stealer announced that they would be suspending their operations because one of their core developers had been killed during the Russia-Ukraine conflict [2]. The presence of the hardcoded RC4 key ‘edinayarossiya’ (Russian for ‘United Russia’) within observed Raccoon Stealer v2 samples [3] provides potential evidence of the Raccoon Stealer operators’ allegiances.

Recent details shared by the US Department of Justice [4]/[5] indicate that it was in fact the arrest, rather than the death, of an operator which led the Raccoon Stealer team to suspend their operations [6]. As a result of the FBI, along with law enforcement partners in Italy and the Netherlands, dismantling Raccoon Stealer infrastructure in March 2022 [4], the Raccoon Stealer team was forced to build a new version of the info-stealer.  

On the 17th May 2022, the completion of v2 of the info-stealer was announced on the Raccoon Stealer Telegram channel [7].  Since its release in May 2022, Raccoon Stealer v2 has become extremely popular amongst cybercriminals. The prevalence of Raccoon Stealer v2 in the wider landscape has been reflected in Darktrace’s client base, with hundreds of infections being observed within client networks on a monthly basis.   

Since Darktrace’s SOC first saw a Raccoon Stealer v2 infection on the 22nd May 2022, the info-stealer has undergone several subtle changes. However, the info-stealer’s general pattern of network activity has remained essentially unchanged.  

How Does Raccoon Stealer v2 Infection Work?

A Raccoon Stealer v2 infection typically starts with a user attempting to download cracked or free software from an SEO-promoted website. Attempting to download software from one of these cracked/free software websites redirects the user’s browser (typically via several .xyz or .cfd endpoints) to a page providing download instructions. In May, June, and July, many of the patterns of download behavior observed by Darktrace’s SOC matched the pattern of behavior observed in a cracked software campaign reported by Avast in June [8].   

webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2
Figure 1: Above is a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample hosted on Discord CDN
example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2
Figure 2: Above is an example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample hosted on Bitbucket
example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2
Figure 3: Above is an example of a webpage whose download instructions led to a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample hosted on MediaFire

Following the instructions on the download instruction page causes the user’s device to download a password-protected RAR file from a file storage service such as ‘cdn.discordapp[.]com’, ‘mediafire[.]com’, ‘mega[.]nz’, or ‘bitbucket[.]org’. Opening the downloaded file causes the user’s device to execute Raccoon Stealer v2. 

The Event Log for an infected device,
Figure 4: The Event Log for an infected device, taken from Darktrace’s Threat Visualiser interface, shows a device contacting two cracked software websites (‘crackedkey[.]org’ and ‘crackedpc[.]co’) before contacting a webpage (‘premiumdownload[.]org) providing instructions to download Raccoon Stealer v2 from Bitbucket

Once Raccoon Stealer v2 is running on a device, it will make an HTTP POST request with the target URI ‘/’ and an unusual user-agent string (such as ‘record’, ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’, or ‘TakeMyPainBack’) to a C2 server. This POST request consists of three strings: a machine GUID, a username, and a 128-bit RC4 key [9]. The posted data has the following form:

machineId=X | Y & configId=Z (where X is a machine GUID, Y is a username and Z is a 128-bit RC4 key) 

PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘record’ 
Figure 5:PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘record’ 
PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’
Figure 6: PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’
PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘TakeMyPainBack’
Figure 7: PCAP showing a device making an HTTP POST request with the User Agent header ‘TakeMyPainBack’

The C2 server responds to the info-stealer’s HTTP POST request with custom-formatted configuration details. These configuration details consist of fields which tell the info-stealer what files to download, what data to steal, and what target URI to use in its subsequent exfiltration POST requests. Below is a list of the fields Darktrace has observed in the configuration details retrieved by Raccoon Stealer v2 samples:

  • a ‘libs_mozglue’ field, which specifies a download address for a Firefox library named ‘mozglue.dll’
  • a ‘libs_nss3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘nss3.dll’ 
  • a ‘libs_freebl3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘freebl3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_softokn3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘softokn3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_nssdbm3’ field, which specifies a download address for a Network System Services (NSS) library named ‘nssdbm3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_sqlite3’ field, which specifies a download address for a SQLite command-line program named ‘sqlite3.dll’
  • a ‘libs_ msvcp140’ field, which specifies a download address for a Visual C++ runtime library named ‘msvcp140.dll’
  • a ‘libs_vcruntime140’ field, which specifies a download address for a Visual C++ runtime library named ‘vcruntime140.dll’
  • a ‘ldr_1’ field, which specifies the download address for a follow-up payload for the sample to download 
  • ‘wlts_X’ fields (where X is the name of a crypto-wallet application), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified crypto-wallet application
  • ‘ews_X’ fields (where X is the name of a crypto-wallet browser extension), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified browser extension
  • ‘xtntns_X’ fields (where X is the name of a password manager browser extension), which specify data for the sample to obtain from the specified browser extension
  • a ‘tlgrm_Telegram’ field, which specifies data for the sample to obtain from the Telegram Desktop application 
  • a ‘grbr_Desktop’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Desktop’ folder for the sample to obtain 
  • a ‘grbr_Documents’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Documents’ folder for the sample to obtain
  • a ‘grbr_Recent’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Recent’ folder for the sample to obtain
  • a ‘grbr_Downloads’ field, which specifies data within a local ‘Downloads’ folder for the sample to obtain
  • a ‘sstmnfo_System Info.txt’ field, which specifies whether the sample should gather and exfiltrate a profile of the infected host 
  • a ‘scrnsht_Screenshot.jpeg’ field, which specifies whether the sample should take and exfiltrate screenshots of the infected host
  • a ‘token’ field, which specifies a 32-length string of hexadecimal digits for the sample to use as the target URI of its HTTP POST requests containing stolen data 

After retrieving its configuration data, Raccoon Stealer v2 downloads the library files specified in the ‘libs_’ fields. Unusual user-agent strings (such as ‘record’, ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’, and ‘TakeMyPainBack’) are used in the HTTP GET requests for these library files. In all Raccoon Stealer v2 infections seen by Darktrace, the paths of the URLs specified in the ‘libs_’ fields have the following form:

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/X (where X is the name of the targeted DLL file) 

Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 8: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device making an HTTP POST request to retrieve configuration details, and then making HTTP GET requests with the User Agent header ‘record’ for DLL files
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 9: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device making an HTTP POST request to retrieve configuration details, and then making HTTP GET requests with the User Agent header ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’ for DLL files
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 10: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device making an HTTP POST request to retrieve configuration details, and then making HTTP GET requests with the User Agent header ‘TakeMyPainBack’ for DLL files

Raccoon Stealer v2 uses the DLLs which it downloads to gain access to sensitive data (such as cookies, credit card details, and login details) saved in browsers running on the infected host.  

Depending on the data provided in the configuration details, Raccoon Stealer v2 will typically seek to obtain, in addition to sensitive data saved in browsers, the following information:

  • Information about the Operating System and applications installed on the infected host
  • Data from specified crypto-wallet software
  • Data from specified crypto-wallet browser extensions
  • Data from specified local folders
  • Data from Telegram Desktop
  • Data from specified password manager browser extensions
  • Screenshots of the infected host 

Raccoon Stealer v2 exfiltrates the data which it obtains to its C2 server by making HTTP POST requests with unusual user-agent strings (such as ‘record’, ‘rc2.0/client’, ‘rqwrwqrqwrqw’, and ‘TakeMyPainBack’) and target URIs matching the 32-length string of hexadecimal digits specified in the ‘token’ field of the configuration details. The stolen data exfiltrated by Raccoon Stealer typically includes files named ‘System Info.txt’, ‘---Screenshot.jpeg’, ‘\cookies.txt’, and ‘\passwords.txt’. 

Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 11: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating files named ‘System Info.txt’ and ‘---Screenshot.jpeg’
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 12: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating a file named ‘System Info.txt’ 
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 13: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating files named ‘System Info.txt’, ‘\cookies.txt’ and ‘\passwords.txt’
Advanced Search logs for an infected host
Figure 14: Advanced Search logs for an infected host, found on Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show a device retrieving configuration details via a POST request, downloading several DLLs, and then exfiltrating a file named ‘System Info.txt’

If a ‘ldr_1’ field is present in the retrieved configuration details, then Raccoon Stealer will complete its operation by downloading the binary file specified in the ‘ldr_1’ field. In all observed cases, the paths of the URLs specified in the ‘ldr_1’ field end in a sequence of digits, followed by ‘.bin’. The follow-up payload seems to vary between infections, likely due to this additional-payload feature being customizable by Raccoon Stealer affiliates. In many cases, the info-stealer, CryptBot, was delivered as the follow-up payload. 

Darktrace Coverage of Raccoon Stealer

Once a user’s device becomes infected with Raccoon Stealer v2, it will immediately start to communicate over HTTP with a C2 server. The HTTP requests made by the info-stealer have an empty Host header (although Host headers were used by early v2 samples) and highly unusual User Agent headers. When Raccoon Stealer v2 was first observed in May 2022, the user-agent string ‘record’ was used in its HTTP requests. Since then, it appears that the operators of Raccoon Stealer have made several changes to the user-agent strings used by the info-stealer,  likely in an attempt to evade signature-based detections. Below is a timeline of the changes to the info-stealer’s user-agent strings, as observed by Darktrace’s SOC:

  • 22nd May 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘record’
  • 2nd July 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘mozzzzzzzzzzz’
  • 29th July 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘rc2.0/client’
  • 10th August 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent strings ‘qwrqrwrqwrqwr’ and ‘rqwrwqrqwrqw’
  • 16th Sep 2022: Samples seen using the user-agent string ‘TakeMyPainBack’

The presence of these highly unusual user-agent strings within infected devices’ HTTP requests causes the following Darktrace DETECT/Network models to breach:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Device / Three or More New User Agents

These DETECT models look for devices making HTTP requests with unusual user-agent strings, rather than specific user-agent strings which are known to be malicious. This method of detection enables the models to continually identify Raccoon Stealer v2 HTTP traffic, despite the changes made to the info-stealer’s user-agent strings.   

After retrieving configuration details from a C2 server, Raccoon Stealer v2 samples make HTTP GET requests for several DLL libraries. Since these GET requests are directed towards highly unusual IP addresses, the downloads of the DLLs cause the following DETECT models to breach:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Raccoon Stealer v2 samples send data to their C2 server via HTTP POST requests with an absent Host header. Since these POST requests lack a Host header and have a highly unusual destination IP, their occurrence causes the following DETECT model to breach:

  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Certain Raccoon Stealer v2 samples download (over HTTP) a follow-up payload once they have exfiltrated data. Since the target URIs of the HTTP GET requests made by v2 samples end in a sequence of digits followed by ‘.bin’, the samples’ downloads of follow-up payloads cause the following DETECT model to breach:

  • Anomalous File / Numeric File Download

If Darktrace RESPOND/Network is configured within a customer’s environment, then Raccoon Stealer v2 activity should cause the following inhibitive actions to be autonomously taken on infected systems: 

  • Enforce pattern of life — This action results in a device only being able to make connections which are normal for it to make
  • Enforce group pattern of life — This action results in a device only being able to make connections which are normal for it or any of its peers to make
  • Block matching connections — This action results in a device being unable to make connections to particular IP/Port pairs
  • Block all outgoing traffic — This action results in a device being unable to make any connections 
The Event Log for an infected device
Figure 15: The Event Log for an infected device, taken from Darktrace’s Threat Visualiser interface, shows Darktrace RESPOND taking inhibitive actions in response to the HTTP activities of a Raccoon Stealer v2 sample downloaded from MediaFire

Given that Raccoon Stealer v2 infections move extremely fast, with the time between initial infection and data exfiltration sometimes less than a minute, the availability of Autonomous Response technology such as Darktrace RESPOND is vital for the containment of Raccoon Stealer v2 infections.  

Timeline of Darktrace stopping raccoon stealer.
Figure 16: Figure displaying the steps of a Raccoon Stealer v2 infection, along with the corresponding Darktrace detections

Conclusion

Since the release of Raccoon Stealer v2 back in 2022, the info-stealer has relentlessly infected the devices of unsuspecting users. Once the info-stealer infects a user’s device, it retrieves and then exfiltrates sensitive information within a matter of minutes. The distinctive pattern of network behavior displayed by Raccoon Stealer v2 makes the info-stealer easy to spot. However, the changes which the Raccoon Stealer operators make to the User Agent headers of the info-stealer’s HTTP requests make anomaly-based methods key for the detection of the info-stealer’s HTTP traffic. The operators of Raccoon Stealer can easily change the superficial features of their malware’s C2 traffic, however, they cannot easily change the fact that their malware causes highly unusual network behavior. Spotting this behavior, and then autonomously responding to it, is likely the best bet which organizations have at stopping a Raccoon once it gets inside their networks.  

Thanks to the Threat Research Team for its contributions to this blog.

References

[1] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/17/in-hot-pursuit-of-cryware-defending-hot-wallets-from-attacks/

[2] https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1507312171914461188

[3] https://www.esentire.com/blog/esentire-threat-intelligence-malware-analysis-raccoon-stealer-v2-0

[4] https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/newly-unsealed-indictment-charges-ukrainian-national-international-cybercrime-operation

[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fsz6acw-ZJ

[6] https://riskybiznews.substack.com/p/raccoon-stealer-dev-didnt-die-in

[7] https://medium.com/s2wblog/raccoon-stealer-is-back-with-a-new-version-5f436e04b20d

[8] https://blog.avast.com/fakecrack-campaign

[9] https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-2-in-depth-analysis/

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Resource Development

• T1588.001 — Obtain Capabilities: Malware

• T1608.001 — Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

• T1608.005 — Stage Capabilities: Link Target

• T1608.006 — Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning

Execution

•  T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File

Credential Access

• T1555.003 — Credentials from Password Stores:  Credentials from Web Browsers

• T1555.005 — Credentials from Password Stores:  Password Managers

• T1552.001 — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials  In Files

Command and Control

•  T1071.001 — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

•  T1105 — Ingress Tool Transfer

IOCS

Type

IOC

Description

User-Agent String

record

String used in User Agent header of  Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent  String

mozzzzzzzzzzz

String used inUser Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent String

rc2.0/client

String used in User Agent header of  Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent  String

qwrqrwrqwrqwr

String used in  User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent String

rqwrwqrqwrqw

String used in User Agent header of  Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

User-Agent  String

TakeMyPainBack

String used in  User Agent header of Raccoon Stealer v2’s HTTP requests

Domain Name

brain-lover[.]xyz  

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

polar-gift[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

cool-story[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

fall2sleep[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

broke-bridge[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

use-freedom[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

just-trust[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

soft-viper[.]site

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

tech-lover[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain  Name

heal-brain[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

Domain Name

love-light[.]xyz

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

104.21.80[.]14

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

107.152.46[.]84

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

135.181.147[.]255

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

135.181.168[.]157

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

138.197.179[.]146

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

141.98.169[.]33

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.170[.]100

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.19.170[.]175

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.170[.]98

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.19.173[.]33

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.173[.]72

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.19.247[.]175

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

146.19.247[.]177

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

146.70.125[.]95

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

152.89.196[.]234

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

165.225.120[.]25

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

168.100.10[.]238

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

168.100.11[.]23

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

168.100.9[.]234

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

170.75.168[.]118

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

172.67.173[.]14

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

172.86.75[.]189

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

172.86.75[.]33

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

174.138.15[.]216

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

176.124.216[.]15

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.106.92[.]14

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.173.34[.]161

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.173.34[.]161  

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.225.17[.]198

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.225.19[.]190

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.225.19[.]229

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.53.46[.]103

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

185.53.46[.]76

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

185.53.46[.]77

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

188.119.112[.]230

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

190.117.75[.]91

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.106.191[.]182

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.149.129[.]135

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.149.129[.]144

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.149.180[.]210

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.149.185[.]192

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.233.193[.]50

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]138

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]17

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]192

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]213

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]214

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]215

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.43.146[.]26

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

193.43.146[.]45

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

193.56.146[.]177

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

194.180.174[.]180

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

195.201.148[.]250

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

206.166.251[.]156

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

206.188.196[.]200

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

206.53.53[.]18

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

207.154.195[.]173

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

213.252.244[.]2

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

38.135.122[.]210

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.10.20[.]248

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.11.19[.]99

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.133.216[.]110

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.133.216[.]145

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.133.216[.]148

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.133.216[.]249

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.133.216[.]71

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.140.146[.]169

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.140.147[.]245

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.142.212[.]100

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.142.213[.]24

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.142.215[.]91

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.142.215[.]91  

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.142.215[.]92

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.144.29[.]18

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.144.29[.]243

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.15.156[.]11

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.15.156[.]2

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.15.156[.]31

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.15.156[.]31

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.150.67[.]156

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.153.230[.]183

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.153.230[.]228

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.159.251[.]163

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.159.251[.]164

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.61.136[.]67

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.61.138[.]162

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.67.228[.]8

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.67.231[.]202

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.67.34[.]152

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.67.34[.]234

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.144[.]187

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.8.144[.]54

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.144[.]55

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.8.145[.]174

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.145[.]83

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.8.147[.]39

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.8.147[.]79

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.84.0.152

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.86.86[.]78

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.54[.]110

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.54[.]110

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.54[.]95

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.55[.]115

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.55[.]117

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.55[.]193

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.55[.]198

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.89.55[.]20

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

45.89.55[.]84

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

45.92.156[.]150

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.36[.]154

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.36[.]230

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.36[.]231

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.36[.]232

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.36[.]233

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.39[.]34

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.39[.]74

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.182.39[.]75

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.182.39[.]77

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.118[.]33

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.176[.]62

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.177[.]217

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.177[.]234

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.177[.]43

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.177[.]47

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.177[.]92

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.177[.]98

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.22[.]142

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.23[.]100

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

5.252.23[.]25

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

5.252.23[.]76

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

51.195.166[.]175

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

51.195.166[.]176

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

51.195.166[.]194

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

51.81.143[.]169

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

62.113.255[.]110

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

65.109.3[.]107

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

74.119.192[.]56

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

74.119.192[.]73

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.232.39[.]101

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.73.133[.]0

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.73.133[.]4

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.73.134[.]45

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.75.230[.]25

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.75.230[.]39

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.75.230[.]70

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.75.230[.]93

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.100[.]101

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.102[.]12

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.102[.]230

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.102[.]44

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.102[.]57

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.102[.]84

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.103[.]31

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.73[.]154

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.73[.]213

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

77.91.73[.]32

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

77.91.74[.]67

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

78.159.103[.]195

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

78.159.103[.]196

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

80.66.87[.]23

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

80.66.87[.]28

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

80.71.157[.]112

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

80.71.157[.]138

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

80.92.204[.]202

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

87.121.52[.]10

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

88.119.175[.]187

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

89.185.85[.]53

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

89.208.107[.]42

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

89.39.106[.]78

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

91.234.254[.]126

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.104[.]16

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.104[.]17

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.104[.]18

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.106[.]116

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.106[.]224

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.107[.]132

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.107[.]138

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.96[.]109

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.97[.]129

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.97[.]53

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.97[.]56

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.131.97[.]57

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.131.98[.]5

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.244[.]114

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.158.244[.]119

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.244[.]21

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.158.247[.]24

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.247[.]26

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

94.158.247[.]30

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

94.158.247[.]44

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

IP  Address

95.216.109[.]16

Raccoon Stealer  v2 C2 infrastructure

IP Address

95.217.124[.]179

Raccoon Stealer v2 C2 infrastructure

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/mozglue.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nss3.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/freebl3.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/softokn3.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/nssdbm3.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/sqlite3.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/msvcp140.dll

URI used in  download of library file

URI

/aN7jD0qO6kT5bK5bQ4eR8fE1xP7hL2vK/vcruntime140.dll

URI used in download of library file

URI

/C9S2G1K6I3G8T3X7/56296373798691245143.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/O6K3E4G6N9S8S1/91787438215733789009.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/Z2J8J3N2S2Z6X2V3S0B5/45637662345462341.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/rgd4rgrtrje62iuty/19658963328526236.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/sd325dt25ddgd523/81852849956384.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/B0L1N2H4R1N5I5S6/40055385413647326168.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/F5Q8W3O3O8I2A4A4B8S8/31427748106757922101.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/36141266339446703039.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/wH0nP0qH9eJ6aA9zH1mN/1.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/K2X2R1K4C6Z3G8L0R1H0/68515718711529966786.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/C3J7N6F6X3P8I0I0M/17819203282122080878.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/W9H1B8P3F2J2H2K7U1Y7G5N4C0Z4B/18027641.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/P2T9T1Q6P7Y5J3D2T0N0O8V/73239348388512240560937.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/W5H6O5P0E4Y6P8O1B9D9G0P9Y9G4/671837571800893555497.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/U8P2N0T5R0F7G2J0/898040207002934180145349.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/AXEXNKPSBCKSLMPNOMNRLUEPR/3145102300913020.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

URI

/wK6nO2iM9lE7pN7e/7788926473349244.bin

URI used in  download of follow-up payload

URI

/U4N9B5X5F5K2A0L4L4T5/84897964387342609301.bin

URI used in download of follow-up  payload

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Sam Lister
SOC Analyst
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Hashing out TA577: Darktrace’s Detection of NTLM Hash Theft

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09
Jul 2024

What is credential theft and how does it work?

What began as a method to achieve unauthorized access to an account, often driven by the curiosity of individual attackers, credentials theft become a key tactic for malicious actors and groups, as stolen login credentials can be abused to gain unauthorized access to accounts and systems. This access can be leveraged to carry out malicious activities such as data exfiltration, fraud, espionage and malware deployment.

It is therefore no surprise that the number of dark web marketplaces selling privileged credentials has increased in recent years, making it easier for malicious actors to monetize stolen credentials [1]. This, in turn, has created new opportunities for threat actors to use increasingly sophisticated tactics such as phishing, social engineering and credential stuffing in their attacks, targeting individuals, organizations and government entities alike [1].

Credential theft example

TA577 Threat Actor

TA577 is a threat actor known to leverage stolen credentials, also known as Hive0118 [2], an initial access broker (IAB) group that was previously known for delivering malicious payloads [2]. On March 4, 2024, Proofpoint reported evidence of TA577 using a new attack chain with a different aim in mind: stealing NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hashes that can be used to authenticate to systems without needing to know plaintext passwords [3].

How does TA577 steal credentials?

Proofpoint reported that this new attack chain, which was first observed on February 26 and 27, was made up of two distinct campaigns. The first campaign consisted of a phishing attack featuring tens of thousands of emails targeting hundreds of organizations globally [3]. These phishing emails often appeared as replies to previous messages (thread hijacking) and contained zipped HTML attachments that each contained a unique file hash, customized for each recipient [3]. These attached files also contained a HTTP Meta refresh function, which triggered an automatic connection to a text file hosted on external IP addresses running as SMB servers [3].

When attempting to access the text file, the server requires an SMB session authentication via NTLM. This session is initiated when a client sends an ‘SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE’ request to the server, which answers with a ‘SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE’ response.

The client then proceeds to send a ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ request to start the SMB session setup process, which includes initiating the NTLM authentication process. The server responds with an ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ response, which includes an NTLM challenge message [6].

The client can then use the challenge message and its own credentials to generate a response by hashing its password using an NTLM hash algorithm. The response is sent to the server in an ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ request. The server validates the response and, if the authentication is successful, the server answers with a final ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ response, which completes the session setup process and allows the client to access the file listed on the server [6].

What is the goal of threat actor TA577?

As no malware delivery was detected during these sessions, researchers have suggested that the aim of TA577 was not to deliver malware, but rather to take advantage of the NTLMV2 challenge/response to steal NTLM authentication hashes [3] [4]. Hashes stolen by attackers can be exploited in pass-the-hash attacks to authenticate to a remote server or service [4]. They can also be used for offline password cracking which, if successful, could be utilized to escalate privileges or perform lateral movement through a target network [4]. Under certain circumstances, these hashes could also permit malicious actors to hijack accounts, access sensitive information and evade security products [4].

The open-source toolkit Impacket, which includes modules for password cracking [5] and which can be identified by the default NTLM server challenge “aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa”[3], was observed during the SMB sessions. This indicates that TA577 actor aim to use stolen credentials for password cracking and pass-the-hash attacks.

TA577 has previously been associated with Black Basta ransomware infections and Qbot, and has been observed delivering various payloads including IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, and Cobalt Strike [2].This change in tactic to follow the current trend of credential theft may indicate that not only are TA577 actors aware of which methods are most effective in the current threat landscape, but they also have monetary and time resources needed to create new methods to bypass existing detection tools [3].  

Darktrace’s Coverage of TA577 Activity

On February 26 and 26, coinciding with the campaign activity reported by Proofpoint, Darktrace/Email™ observed a surge of inbound emails from numerous suspicious domains targeting multiple customer environments. These emails consistently included zip files with seemingly randomly generated names, containing HTLM content and links to an unusual external IP address [3].

A summary of anomaly indicators seen for a campaign email sent by TA577, as detected by Darktrace/Email.
Figure 1: A summary of anomaly indicators seen for a campaign email sent by TA577, as detected by Darktrace/Email.
Details of the name and size of the .zip file attached to a campaign email, along with the Darktrace/Email model alerts triggered by the email.
Figure 2: Details of the name and size of the .zip file attached to a campaign email, along with the Darktrace/Email model alerts triggered by the email.

The URL of these links contained an unusually named .txt file, which corresponds with Proofpoint reports of the automatic connection to a text file hosted on an external SMB server made when the attachment is opened [3].

A link to a rare external IP address seen within a campaign email, containing an unusually named .txt file.
Figure 3: A link to a rare external IP address seen within a campaign email, containing an unusually named .txt file.

Darktrace identified devices on multiple customer networks connecting to external SMB servers via the SMB protocol. It understood this activity was suspicious as the SMB protocol is typically reserved for internal connections and the endpoint in question had never previously been observed on the network.

The Event Log of a ‘Compliance / External Windows Communication’ model alert showing a connection to an external SMB server on destination port 445.
Figure 4: The Event Log of a ‘Compliance / External Windows Communication’ model alert showing a connection to an external SMB server on destination port 445.
External Sites Summary highlighting the rarity of the external SMB server.
Figure 5: External Sites Summary highlighting the rarity of the external SMB server.
External Sites Summary highlightin that the SMB server is geolocated in Moldova.
Figure 6: External Sites Summary highlightin that the SMB server is geolocated in Moldova.

During these connections, Darktrace observed multiple devices establishing an SMB session to this server via a NTLM challenge/response, representing the potential theft of the credentials used in this session. During this session, some devices also attempted to access an unusually named .txt file, further indicating that the affected devices were trying to access the .txt file hosted on external SMB servers [3].

Packet captures (PCAPs) of these sessions show the default NTLM server challenge, indicating the use of Impacket, suggesting that the captured NTLM hashes were to be used for password cracking or pass-the-hash-attacks [3]

PCAP analysis showing usage of the default NTLM server challenge associated with Impacket.
Figure 7: PCAP analysis showing usage of the default NTLM server challenge associated with Impacket.

Conclusions

Ultimately, Darktrace’s suite of products effectively detected and alerted for multiple aspects of the TA577 attack chain and NTLM hash data theft activity across its customer base. Darktrace/Email was able to uncover the inbound phishing emails that served as the initial access vector for TA577 actors, while Darktrace DETECT identified the subsequent external connections to unusual external locations and suspicious SMB sessions.

Furthermore, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enabled it to detect suspicious TA577 activity across the customer base on February 26 and 27, prior to Proofpoint’s report on their new attack chain. This showcases Darktrace’s ability to identify emerging threats based on the subtle deviations in a compromised device’s behavior, rather than relying on a static list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) or ‘known bads’.

This approach allows Darktrace to remain one step ahead of increasingly adaptive threat actors, providing organizations and their security teams with a robust AI-driven solution able to safeguard their networks in an ever-evolving threat landscape.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson, Cyber Analyst, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst.

References

1)    https://www.sentinelone.com/cybersecurity-101/what-is-credential-theft/

2)    https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/ta577

3)    https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta577s-unusual-attack-chain-leads-ntlm-data-theft

4)    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-steal-windows-ntlm-authentication-hashes-in-phishing-attacks/

5)    https://pawanjswal.medium.com/the-power-of-impacket-a-comprehensive-guide-with-examples-1288f3a4c674

6)    https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nlmp/c083583f-1a8f-4afe-a742-6ee08ffeb8cf

7)    https://www.hivepro.com/threat-advisory/ta577-targeting-windows-ntlm-hashes-in-global-campaigns/

Darktrace Model Detections

Darktrace/Email

·       Attachment / Unsolicited Archive File

·       Attachment / Unsolicited Attachment

·       Link / New Correspondent Classified Link

·       Link / New Correspondent Rare Link

·       Spoof / Internal User Similarities

Darktrace DETECT

·       Compliance / External Windows Communications

Darktrace RESPOND

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

IoCs

IoC - Type - Description

176.123.2[.]146 - IP address -Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.2[.]33 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.1[.]161 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

104.129.20[.]167 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.1[.]160 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

85.239.33[.]149 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.2[.]34 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

146.19.213[.]36 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

66.63.188[.]19 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

103.124.104[.]76 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

103.124.106[.]224 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

\5aohv\9mn.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\hvwsuw\udrh.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\zkf2rj4\VmD.txt = SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\naams\p3aV.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\epxq\A.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\dbna\H.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

MAGNAMSB.zip – Filename - Phishing Attachment

e751f9dddd24f7656459e1e3a13307bd03ae4e67 - SHA1 Hash - Phishing Attachment

OMNIS2C.zip  - Filename - Phishing Attachment

db982783b97555232e28d5a333525118f10942e1 - SHA1 Hash - Phishing Attachment

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa - NTLM Server Challenge -Impacket Default NTLM Challenge

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

Tactic - Technique

TA0001            Initial Access

TA0002            Execution

TA0008            Lateral Movement

TA0003            Persistence

TA0005            Defense Evasion

TA0006            Credential Access

T1021.002       SMB/Windows Admin Shares

T1021  Remote Services

T1566.001       Spearfishing Attachment

T1566  Phishing

T1204.002       Malicious File

T1204  User Execution

T1021.002       SMB/Windows Admin Shares

T1574  Hijack Execution Flow

T1021  Remote Services

T1555.004       Windows Credential Manager

T1555  Credentials from Password Stores

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About the author
Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst

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Credential Phishing: Common attack methods and defense strategies 

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08
Jul 2024

Credential theft remains a top cybersecurity threat

Adversaries have many options in their arsenal to gain access into an organization.  

Exploitable vulnerabilities: This can provide access into a system’s processes and allow activity within the context of the service account.  

Weak or misconfigured systems: These can provide direct avenues of access into exposed systems.  

However, the more desirable option is to obtain user or API credentials permitting the adversary to authenticate and operate as one of the organization’s authorized entities.

While 2023 noted a marked increase in vulnerability exploits as the chosen vector of attack, the use of credentials by adversaries still ranked #1 at 24% in the latest Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report. Mandiant’s M-Trends report noted 14% of their investigations involved stolen credentials as the attack vector, and Darktrace’s 2023 End of Year Threat Report revealed that Credential Access was one of the most observed MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Credential phishing methods

There are many ways an adversary can obtain a user’s credentials. Some require gaining access to the target system or exploiting an application while others target the end-user directly. 

Joshua (WarGames) | Villains Wiki | Fandom

Social Engineering: Many users have a habit of incorporating things in their life into their passwords. Family members, important dates, hobbies, movies, and music favorites have all been used. Adversaries know this and will scour social media to gain knowledge about their intended target. This method was beautifully demonstrated in the 1983 movie, Wargames, where Matthew Broderick’s character scours articles, papers, and video about Dr. Stephen Falken, finally guessing that the password into the WOPR (War Operations Plan Response) computer is that of his deceased child, Joshua.  

Credential Cracking / Dumping: If the adversary has gained access to a targeted system, they may employ a password cracking, or credential dumping, program. For Unix-based solutions, obtaining the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files provides the users, groups, and encrypted passwords. Adversaries can exfiltrate these files and then utilize password crackers such as John the Ripper, Crack, or codebreaker003. Mimikatz(see more below) can also pass cache information for Mac / Unix and Linux systems.

Windows-based solutions: Adversaries have successfully utilized programs such as Mimikatz to dump credentials and hashes. Mimikatz can pass the hash string to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) to authorize user actions, as well as perform “kerberoasting”. Kerberos is how Windows systems authorize users utilizing a 3-entity authentication method and symmetric key cryptography to create “tickets” that authorize requested actions. Mimikatz can use Kerberos tickets to gain non-expiring domain administration credentials (Golden Tickets) or tickets to login as a service on the network (Silver Tickets).

Steve Carell Banana - Imgflip

Post-It Notes: As organizations and applications started requiring stronger passwords that met complexity requirements, users did what you would expect to ensure they didn’t forget them. They wrote them down (this was also demonstrated in Wargames). The modern-day equivalent is to create a text file with all your passwords (or API credentials) in it – something adversaries are delighted to find.

One of the funniest, yet totally on-point, comic routines I’ve seen on this topic is Michael McIntyre’s You Should Probably Change Your Password skit at the London Palladium.

Phishing Alert: Pay attention to NC State login pages and Duo prompts –  Office of Information Technology

Phishing / Smishing: Forged messages requesting users to reset their passwords or directing them to enter their credentials used to be easier to spot. However, the emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is allowing adversaries to create very realistic messages and web pages that mimic an organization’s authentication pages. These attempts are not just limited to email, adversaries are utilizing SMS messages and other collaborative communication solutions like Microsoft Teams to transmit fake messages to unsuspecting users. Also, security teams are seeing increased use of Quick Response (QR) codes in scam messages. QR codes are appearing in all aspects of everyday life (I’m finding it hard to go into a restaurant without having to scan a QR code to read the menu) and there is a false sense of security people have in thinking that QR codes are safe to scan.

Vulnerability Exploits: Gaining access to the credential cache or password file is not the only way adversaries can obtain user credentials. Some applications will store the user credentials in process memory (decrypted). If the application is vulnerable to a remote exploit, it can be possible for the adversary to dump the memory of the application process and locate these stored credentials. This was clearly illustrated in the Heartbleed exploit disclosed to the public in 2014.

Air Cracking: Air Cracking is specific to Wi-Fi networks and involves cracking programs that analyze wireless encrypted packets and extracting WEP or WPA/WPA2 PSK passwords (giving the adversary access to the Wi-Fi network).

Dark Web Purchase: Threat groups know how to monetize compromised credentials. Selling compromised credentials on the Dark Web occurs on a regular basis. Sites such as HaveIBeenPwned.com can assist users in determining if a particular password has been found to be compromised. Note: Users should ensure that the sites they are checking to see if their password has been compromised are actual legitimate sites and not a credential harvesting site!

You need a strong, unique password for EVERY account : r/memes

What is credential stuffing and why is it so effective?

Credential Stuffing is so successful because users tend to utilize the same, or very similar, passwords across all the systems and applications they access. This includes both personal and business accounts. Once an adversary harvests credentials from one site, they will try that password on other sites, and if that fails, they can utilize generative AI to predict potential variations of the password.

How to reduce the risk of credential stuffing?

Users can help reduce exposure of their credentials by creating passwords that meet complexity requirements but are also easy to remember. A good approach is to take a phrase and apply a substitution rule. For example, let’s take the start of Charles Dicken’s book A Tale of Two Cities and create a substitution rule for it:

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times  

Let’s shorten that to: Best of times Worst of times

Apply the following substitution rule: o = 0, i = 1, e = 3, spaces = @

Now my phrase becomes: B3st@0f@t1m3s@W0rst@0f@t1m3s

New Password - Imgflip

You now have a 28-character password that contains letters, a capital letter, number, and special character. Nobody is cracking that, and the phrase and substitution rule makes it much easier to remember (PS: 12-character passwords are also fine, taking ~34,000 years to crack using current technology).

Organizations can reduce exposure through implementation of two-factor authentication (2FA), so even if the passwords are compromised through the methods described above, another authentication layer stands in the way of the adversary.

Additionally, preventing phishing messages from landing in user’s inboxes (Email or collaborative solutions such as Microsoft Teams) is critical not only for reducing the potential exposure of user credentials, but also user’s opening malicious attachments or links. Generative AI tools such as ChatGPT have resulted in over an 135% increase in novel social engineering attacks.

How Darktrace protects against sophisticated credential phishing attempts

Malicious actors can exploit these leaked credentials to drastically lower the barrier to entry associated with brute-forcing access to their target networks. While implementing well-configured MFA and enforcing regular password changes can help protect organizations, these measures alone may not be enough to fully negate the advantage attackers gain with stolen credentials. 

In early 2024, one Darktrace customer was compromised by a malicious actor after their internal credentials had been leaked on the dark web. Subsequent attack phases were detected by Darktrace/Network and the customer was alerted to the suspicious activity via the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, following an investigation by Darktrace’s Security Operation Center (SOC). 

Darktrace detected a device on the network of a customer in the US carrying out a string of anomalous activity indicative of network compromise. The device was observed using a new service account to authenticate to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) server, before proceeding to perform a range of suspicious activity including internal reconnaissance and lateral movement. 

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace’s autonomous response was not enabled on the network at the time of the attack. Had it been active, it would have been able to autonomously act against the malicious activity by disabling users, strategically blocking suspicious connections and limiting devices to their expected patterns of activity. 

For the full in depth story with a step-by-step walk through of the attack visit our Inside the SOC blog post.

Conclusion

Head of security, and your password is "password"? | Scattered Quotes |  Funny marvel memes, Marvel funny, Marvel jokes

Adversaries have various methods available to compromise user and API credentials. There is no single silver bullet that will protect users and organizations, but rather, a layered approach that incorporates education, security controls such as 2FA, unsupervised AI to detect novel and sophisticated spear-phishing messages, as well as protection against exploits that give adversaries access to systems.  

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About the author
John Bradshaw
Sr. Director, Technical Marketing
Our ai. Your data.

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