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January 30, 2023

Qakbot Resurgence in the Cyber Landscape

Stay informed on the evolving threat Qakbot. Protect yourself from the Qakbot resurgence! Learn more from our Darktrace AI Cybersecurity experts!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nahisha Nobregas
SOC Analyst
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30
Jan 2023

In June 2022, Darktrace observed a surge in Qakbot infections across its client base. The detected Qakbot infections, which in some cases led to the delivery of secondary payloads such as Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC, were initiated through novel delivery methods birthed from Microsoft’s default blocking of XL4 and VBA macros in early 2022 [1]/[2]/[3]/[4] and from the public disclosure in May 2022 [5] of the critical Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190) in Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT). Despite the changes made to Qakbot’s delivery methods, Qakbot infections still inevitably resulted in unusual patterns of network activity. In this blog, we will provide details of these network activities, along with Darktrace/Network’s coverage of them. 

Qakbot Background 

Qakbot emerged in 2007 as a banking trojan designed to steal sensitive data such as banking credentials.  Since then, Qakbot has developed into a highly modular triple-threat powerhouse used to not only steal information, but to also drop malicious payloads and to serve as a backdoor. The malware is also versatile, with its delivery methods regularly changing in response to the changing threat landscape.  

Threat actors deliver Qakbot through email-based delivery methods. In the first half of 2022, Microsoft started rolling out versions of Office which block XL4 and VBA macros by default. Prior to this change, Qakbot email campaigns typically consisted in the spreading of deceitful emails with Office attachments containing malicious macros.  Opening these attachments and then enabling the macros within them would lead users’ devices to install Qakbot.  

Actors who deliver Qakbot onto users’ devices may either sell their access to other actors, or they may leverage Qakbot’s capabilities to pursue their own objectives [6]. A common objective of actors that use Qakbot is to drop Cobalt Strike beacons onto infected systems. Actors will then leverage the interactive access provided by Cobalt Strike to conduct extensive reconnaissance and lateral movement activities in preparation for widespread ransomware deployment. Qakbot’s close ties to ransomware activity, along with its modularity and versatility, make the malware a significant threat to organisations’ digital environments.

Activity Details and Qakbot Delivery Methods

During the month of June, variationsof the following pattern of network activity were observed in several client networks:

1.     User’s device contacts an email service such as outlook.office[.]com or mail.google[.]com

2.     User’s device makes an HTTP GET request to 185.234.247[.]119 with an Office user-agent string and a ‘/123.RES' target URI. The request is responded to with an HTML file containing a exploit for the Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190)

3.     User’s device makes an HTTP GET request with a cURL User-Agent string and a target URI ending in ‘.dat’ to an unusual external endpoint. The request is responded to with a Qakbot DLL sample

4.     User’s device contacts Qakbot Command and Control servers over ports such as 443, 995, 2222, and 32101

In some cases, only steps 1 and 4 were seen, and in other cases, only steps 1, 3, and 4 were seen. The different variations of the pattern correspond to different Qakbot delivery methods.

Figure 1: Geographic distribution of Darktrace clients affected by Qakbot

Qakbot is known to be delivered via malicious email attachments [7]. The Qakbot infections observed across Darktrace’s client base during June were likely initiated through HTML smuggling — a method which consists in embedding malicious code into HTML attachments. Based on open-source reporting [8]-[14] and on observed patterns of network traffic, we assess with moderate to high confidence that the Qakbot infections observed across Darktrace’s client base during June 2022 were initiated via one of the following three methods:

  • User opens HTML attachment which drops a ZIP file on their device. ZIP file contains a LNK file, which when opened, causes the user's device to make an external HTTP GET request with a cURL User-Agent string and a '.dat' target URI. If successful, the HTTP GET request is responded to with a Qakbot DLL.
  • User opens HTML attachment which drops a ZIP file on their device. ZIP file contains a docx file, which when opened, causes the user's device to make an HTTP GET request to 185.234.247[.]119 with an Office user-agent string and a ‘/123.RES' target URI. If successful, the HTTP GET request is responded to with an HTML file containing a Follina exploit. The Follina exploit causes the user's device to make an external HTTP GET with a '.dat' target URI. If successful, the HTTP GET request is responded to with a Qakbot DL.
  • User opens HTML attachment which drops a ZIP file on their device. ZIP file contains a Qakbot DLL and a LNK file, which when opened, causes the DLL to run.

The usage of these delivery methods illustrate how threat actors are adopting to a post-macro world [4], with their malware delivery techniques shifting from usage of macros-embedding Office documents to usage of container files, Windows Shortcut (LNK) files, and exploits for novel vulnerabilities. 

The Qakbot infections observed across Darktrace’s client base did not only vary in terms of their delivery methods — they also differed in terms of their follow-up activities. In some cases, no follow-up activities were observed. In other cases, however, actors were seen leveraging Qakbot to exfiltrate data and to deliver follow-up payloads such as Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC.  These follow-up activities were likely preparation for the deployment of ransomware. Darktrace’s early detection of Qakbot activity within client environments enabled security teams to take actions which likely prevented the deployment of ransomware. 

Darktrace Coverage 

Users’ interactions with malicious email attachments typically resulted in their devices making cURL HTTP GET requests with empty Host headers and target URIs ending in ‘.dat’ (such as as ‘/24736.dat’ and ‘/noFindThem.dat’) to rare, external endpoints. In cases where the Follina vulnerability is believed to have been exploited, users’ devices were seen making HTTP GET requests to 185.234.247[.]119 with a Microsoft Office User-Agent string before making cURL HTTP GET requests. The following Darktrace DETECT/Network models typically breached as a result of these HTTP activities:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Numeric Exe Download 

These DETECT models were able to capture the unusual usage of Office and cURL User-Agent strings on affected devices, as well as the downloads of the Qakbot DLL from rare external endpoints. These models look for unusual activity that falls outside a device’s usual pattern of behavior rather than for activity involving User-Agent strings, URIs, files, and external IPs which are known to be malicious.

When enabled, Darktrace RESPOND/Network autonomously intervened, taking actions such as ‘Enforce group pattern of life’ and ‘Block connections’ to quickly intercept connections to Qakbot infrastructure. 

Figure 2: This ‘New User Agent to IP Without Hostname’ model breach highlights an example of Darktrace’s detection of a device attempting to download a file containing a Follina exploit
Figure 3: This ‘New User Agent to IP Without Hostname’ model breach highlights an example of Darktrace’s detection of a device attempting to download Qakbot
Figure 4: The Event Log for an infected device highlights the moment a connection to the endpoint outlook.office365[.]com was made. This was followed by an executable file transfer detection and use of a new User-Agent, curl/7.9.1

After installing Qakbot, users’ devices started making connections to Command and Control (C2) endpoints over ports such as 443, 22, 990, 995, 1194, 2222, 2078, 32101. Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC may have been delivered over some of these C2 connections, as evidenced by subsequent connections to endpoints associated with Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC. These C2 activities typically caused the following Darktrace DETECT/Network models to breach: 

  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behavior
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
Figure 5: This Device Event Log illustrates the Command and Control activity displayed by a Qakbot-infected device

The Darktrace DETECT/Network models which detected these C2 activities do not look for devices making connections to known, malicious endpoints. Rather, they look for devices deviating from their ordinary patterns of activity, making connections to external endpoints which internal devices do not usually connect to, over ports which devices do not normally connect over. 

In some cases, actors were seen exfiltrating data from Qakbot-infected systems and dropping Cobalt Strike in order to conduct extensive discovery. These exfiltration activities typically caused the following models to breach:

  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoints

The reconnaissance and brute-force activities carried out by actors typically resulted in breaches of the following models:

  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  •  Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
  •  Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  •  Device / Increase in New RPC Services
  •  Device / Spike in LDAP Activity
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force
  • Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)
  • Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)
  • Device / Anomalous NTLM Brute Force

Conclusion

June 2022 saw Qakbot swiftly mould itself in response to Microsoft's default blocking of macros and the public disclosure of the Follina vulnerability. The evolution of the threat landscape in the first half of 2022 caused Qakbot to undergo changes in its delivery methods, shifting from delivery via macros-based methods to delivery via HTML smuggling methods. The effectiveness of these novel delivery methods where highlighted in Darktrace's client base, where large volumes of Qakbot infections were seen during June 2022. Leveraging Self-Learning AI, Darktrace DETECT/Network was able to detect the unusual network behaviors which inevitably resulted from these novel Qakbot infections. Given that the actors behind these Qakbot infections were likely seeking to deploy ransomware, these detections, along with Darktrace RESPOND/Network’s autonomous interventions, ultimately helped to protect affected Darktrace clients from significant business disruption.  

Appendices

List of IOCs

References

[1] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/excel-blog/excel-4-0-xlm-macros-now-restricted-by-default-for-customer/ba-p/3057905

[2] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805

[3] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/security/internet-macros-blocked

[4] https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/threat-insight/how-threat-actors-are-adapting-post-macro-world

[5] https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984

[6] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/09/a-closer-look-at-qakbots-latest-building-blocks-and-how-to-knock-them-down/

[7] https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/rise-qakbot-attacks-traced-evolving-threat-techniques

[8] https://www.esentire.com/blog/resurgence-in-qakbot-malware-activity

[9] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-qakbot-spread-by-phishing-emails

[10] https://twitter.com/pr0xylife/status/1539320429281615872

[11] https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1534220832242819072

[12] https://twitter.com/1zrr4h/status/1534259727059787783?lang=en

[13] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28728

[14] https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4616/qakbot-delivered-through-cve-2022-30190-follina

Credit to:  Hanah Darley, Cambridge Analyst Team Lead and Head of Threat Research and Sam Lister, Senior Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nahisha Nobregas
SOC Analyst

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April 22, 2025

Obfuscation Overdrive: Next-Gen Cryptojacking with Layers

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Out of all the services honeypotted by Darktrace, Docker is the most commonly attacked, with new strains of malware emerging daily. This blog will analyze a novel malware campaign with a unique obfuscation technique and a new cryptojacking technique.

What is obfuscation?

Obfuscation is a common technique employed by threat actors to prevent signature-based detection of their code, and to make analysis more difficult. This novel campaign uses an interesting technique of obfuscating its payload.

Docker image analysis

The attack begins with a request to launch a container from Docker Hub, specifically the kazutod/tene:ten image. Using Docker Hub’s layer viewer, an analyst can quickly identify what the container is designed to do. In this case, the container is designed to run the ten.py script which is built into itself.

 Docker Hub Image Layers, referencing the script ten.py.
Figure 1: Docker Hub Image Layers, referencing the script ten.py.

To gain more information on the Python file, Docker’s built in tooling can be used to download the image (docker pull kazutod/tene:ten) and then save it into a format that is easier to work with (docker image save kazutod/tene:ten -o tene.tar). It can then be extracted as a regular tar file for further investigation.

Extraction of the resulting tar file.
Figure 2: Extraction of the resulting tar file.

The Docker image uses the OCI format, which is a little different to a regular file system. Instead of having a static folder of files, the image consists of layers. Indeed, when running the file command over the sha256 directory, each layer is shown as a tar file, along with a JSON metadata file.

Output of the file command over the sha256 directory.
Figure 3: Output of the file command over the sha256 directory.

As the detailed layers are not necessary for analysis, a single command can be used to extract all of them into a single directory, recreating what the container file system would look like:

find blobs/sha256 -type f -exec sh -c 'file "{}" | grep -q "tar archive" && tar -xf "{}" -C root_dir' \;

Result of running the command above.
Figure 4: Result of running the command above.

The find command can then be used to quickly locate where the ten.py script is.

find root_dir -name ten.py

root_dir/app/ten.py

Details of the above ten.py script.
Figure 5: Details of the above ten.py script.

This may look complicated at first glance, however after breaking it down, it is fairly simple. The script defines a lambda function (effectively a variable that contains executable code) and runs zlib decompress on the output of base64 decode, which is run on the reversed input. The script then runs the lambda function with an input of the base64 string, and then passes it to exec, which runs the decoded string as Python code.

To help illustrate this, the code can be cleaned up to this simplified function:

def decode(input):
   reversed = input[::-1]

   decoded = base64.decode(reversed)
   decompressed = zlib.decompress(decoded)
   return decompressed

decoded_string = decode(the_big_text_blob)
exec(decoded_string) # run the decoded string

This can then be set up as a recipe in Cyberchef, an online tool for data manipulation, to decode it.

Use of Cyberchef to decode the ten.py script.
Figure 6: Use of Cyberchef to decode the ten.py script.

The decoded payload calls the decode function again and puts the output into exec. Copy and pasting the new payload into the input shows that it does this another time. Instead of copy-pasting the output into the input all day, a quick script can be used to decode this.

The script below uses the decode function from earlier in order to decode the base64 data and then uses some simple string manipulation to get to the next payload. The script will run this over and over until something interesting happens.

# Decode the initial base64

decoded = decode(initial)
# Remove the first 11 characters and last 3

# so we just have the next base64 string

clamped = decoded[11:-3]

for i in range(1, 100):
   # Decode the new payload

   decoded = decode(clamped)
   # Print it with the current step so we

   # can see what’s going on

   print(f"Step {i}")

   print(decoded)
   # Fetch the next base64 string from the

   # output, so the next loop iteration will

   # decode it

   clamped = decoded[11:-3]

Result of the 63rd iteration of this script.
Figure 7: Result of the 63rd iteration of this script.

After 63 iterations, the script returns actual code, accompanied by an error from the decode function as a stopping condition was never defined. It not clear what the attacker’s motive to perform so many layers of obfuscation was, as one round of obfuscation versus several likely would not make any meaningful difference to bypassing signature analysis. It’s possible this is an attempt to stop analysts or other hackers from reverse engineering the code. However,  it took a matter of minutes to thwart their efforts.

Cryptojacking 2.0?

Cleaned up version of the de-obfuscated code.
Figure 8: Cleaned up version of the de-obfuscated code.

The cleaned up code indicates that the malware attempts to set up a connection to teneo[.]pro, which appears to belong to a Web3 startup company.

Teneo appears to be a legitimate company, with Crunchbase reporting that they have raised USD 3 million as part of their seed round [1]. Their service allows users to join a decentralized network, to “make sure their data benefits you” [2]. Practically, their node functions as a distributed social media scraper. In exchange for doing so, users are rewarded with “Teneo Points”, which are a private crypto token.

The malware script simply connects to the websocket and sends keep-alive pings in order to gain more points from Teneo and does not do any actual scraping. Based on the website, most of the rewards are gated behind the number of heartbeats performed, which is likely why this works [2].

Checking out the attacker’s dockerhub profile, this sort of attack seems to be their modus operandi. The most recent container runs an instance of the nexus network client, which is a project to perform distributed zero-knowledge compute tasks in exchange for cryptocurrency.

Typically, traditional cryptojacking attacks rely on using XMRig to directly mine cryptocurrency, however as XMRig is highly detected, attackers are shifting to alternative methods of generating crypto. Whether this is more profitable remains to be seen. There is not currently an easy way to determine the earnings of the attackers due to the more “closed” nature of the private tokens. Translating a user ID to a wallet address does not appear to be possible, and there is limited public information about the tokens themselves. For example, the Teneo token is listed as “preview only” on CoinGecko, with no price information available.

Conclusion

This blog explores an example of Python obfuscation and how to unravel it. Obfuscation remains a ubiquitous technique employed by the majority of malware to aid in detection/defense evasion and being able to de-obfuscate code is an important skill for analysts to possess.

We have also seen this new avenue of cryptominers being deployed, demonstrating that attackers’ techniques are still evolving - even tried and tested fields. The illegitimate use of legitimate tools to obtain rewards is an increasingly common vector. For example,  as has been previously documented, 9hits has been used maliciously to earn rewards for the attack in a similar fashion.

Docker remains a highly targeted service, and system administrators need to take steps to ensure it is secure. In general, Docker should never be exposed to the wider internet unless absolutely necessary, and if it is necessary both authentication and firewalling should be employed to ensure only authorized users are able to access the service. Attacks happen every minute, and even leaving the service open for a short period of time may result in a serious compromise.

References

1. https://www.crunchbase.com/funding_round/teneo-protocol-seed--a8ff2ad4

2. https://teneo.pro/

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About the author
Nate Bill
Threat Researcher

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April 22, 2025

How NDR and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) Work Together to Achieve Network Security Outcomes

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Modern networks are evolving rapidly, with traffic patterns, user behavior, and critical assets extending far beyond the boundaries of traditional network security tools. As organizations adopt hybrid infrastructures, remote working, and cloud-native services, it is essential to maintain visibility and protect this expanding attack surface.

Network Detection and Response (NDR) and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) are two technologies commonly used to safeguard organizational networks. While both play crucial roles in enhancing security, one does not replace the other. Instead, NDR and SASE complement each other, taking on different roles to create a robust network security framework. This blog will unpack the relationship between NDR and SASE, including the component functionalities that comprise SASE, highlighting their unique contributions to maintaining a comprehensive and resilient network security strategy.

Network Detection and Response (NDR) and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) explained

NDR solutions, such as Darktrace / NETWORK, are designed to detect, investigate, and respond to suspicious activities within any network. By leveraging machine learning and behavioral analytics, NDR continuously monitors network traffic to identify anomalies that could indicate potential threats and to contain those threats at machine speed. These solutions analyze both North-South traffic (between internal and external networks) and East-West traffic (within internal networks), providing comprehensive visibility into network activities.

SASE, on the other hand, comprises multiple solutions, focused on providing hybrid and remote users access to services while adhering to the Zero Trust principle of "never trust, always verify". Within SASE architectures, Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solutions provide secure remote access to private applications and services the user has been explicitly granted, and Secure Web Gateways (SWG) provide Internet access, again based on policy groups. Unlike traditional security models that grant implicit trust to users within the network perimeter, ZTNA requires continuous verification of user identity and device health before granting access to resources. This approach minimizes the attack surface and reduces the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive data and internal applications. Similarly, SWGs filter web traffic based on the verified user identity and can block known malware, further reducing the attack surface for the client estate.

Limitations of SASE highlights the importance of NDR

While SASE, including ZTNA and SWG, is a powerful tool for enforcing secure access to company networks and resources as well as the Internet, it is not a comprehensive security solution, or a replacement for dedicated network monitoring and NDR capabilities. Some of the main limitations include:

  • Focused on policies rather than security: SASE delivers strong networking outcomes but provides policy-based protections, rather than a full suite of security features. It can provide simple alerting for disallowed actions, but it lacks the security context needed for comprehensive threat detection, such as knowing if user credentials have been compromised.
  • Can only detect known threats: SASE solutions cannot detect novel attacks such as zero-days and insider threats. This is because they rely on a rule-based approach that does not have a behavioral understanding of network entities that can detect anomalies or suspicious activity.
  • Limited response capabilities: Due to the limited detection capabilities of SASE solutions, it is not possible to automate response actions to threats that slip past existing policies.  While access to internal resources and the Internet can be revoked or severely limited as part of a response, this must be done after human investigation and analysis, allowing more time for the threat to continue before being contained.
  • Limited scope: SASE provides cloud-hosted secure networking, which lends itself much more toward the client estate of any organization. As a result, servers and unmanaged devices—whether IT/IoT/OT—are mostly out of scope and do not benefit from the policies SASE enforces.

The complementary roles of NDR and ZTNA

NDR solutions provide full visibility into network activity, with the ability to detect and respond to threats that may bypass initial access controls and filters. When combined, NDR and SASE create a layered security approach that addresses different aspects of network security, for example:

  • Detection of novel, unknown and insider threats: NDR solutions can monitor all network traffic using behavioral anomaly detection. This can identify suspicious activities, such as insider threats from authorized users who have passed policy checks, or novel attacks that have never been seen before.
  • Validation of policies: By continuously monitoring network traffic, NDR can validate the effectiveness of existing policies and identify any gaps in security that need addressing due to organizational changes or outdated rule sets.
  • Reducing risk and impact of threats: Together, SASE and NDR solutions shift toward proactive security by reducing the potential impact of a threat through predefined policies and by detecting and containing a threat in its earliest stages, even if it is novel or nuanced.
  • Enhanced contextual information: Alerts raised by SASE solutions can provide additional context into potential threats, which can be used by NDR solutions to increase investigation quality and context.
  • Containment of network threats: SASE solutions can prohibit access to resources on an internal company network or on the Internet if predefined access control criteria are not met or a site matches a threat signature. When combined with an NDR solution, organizations can go far beyond this, detecting and responding to a much wider variety of network threats to prevent attacks from escalating.

When implementing SASE and NDR solutions, it is also crucial to consider the best configurations to maximize interoperability, and integrations will often increase functionality. Well-designed implementations, combined with integrations, will strengthen both SASE and NDR solutions for organizations.

How Darktrace continues to secure SASE networks

With the latest 6.3 update, Darktrace continues to extend its capabilities with new innovations that support modern enterprise networks and the use of SASE across remote and hybrid worker devices. This expands on existing Darktrace integrations and partnerships with SASE vendors such as Netskope and Zscaler.

Traditional methods to contain remote access and internet-born threats are either signature or policy based, and response to nuanced threats requires manual, human-led investigation and decision-making. By the time security teams can react, the damage is often already done.

With Darktrace 6.3, customers using Zscaler can now configure Darktrace Autonomous Response to quarantine ZPA-connected user devices at machine speed. This provides a powerful new mechanism for containing remote threats at the earliest sign of suspicious activity, without disrupting broader operations.

By automatically shutting down ZPA access for compromised user accounts, Darktrace gives SOC teams valuable time to investigate and respond, while continuing to protect the rest of the organization. This integration enhances Darktrace’s ability to take actions for remote user devices, helping customers contain threats faster and keep the business running smoothly.

For organizations using SASE technologies to address the challenges of securing large, distributed networks across a range of geographies, SaaS applications and remote worker devices, Darktrace also now integrates with Netskope Cloud TAP to provide visibility into and analysis over tunneled traffic, reducing blind spots and enabling organizations to maintain detection capabilities across their expanding network perimeters.

Conclusion

While NDR and ZTNA serve distinct purposes, their integration is crucial for a comprehensive security strategy. ZTNA provides robust access controls, ensuring that only authorized users can access network resources. NDR, on the other hand, offers continuous visibility into network activities, detecting and responding to threats that may bypass initial access controls. By leveraging the strengths of both solutions, organizations can enhance their security posture and protect against a wide range of network security threats.

Understanding the complementary roles of NDR and ZTNA is essential for building a resilient security framework. As cyber threats continue to evolve, adopting a multi-layered, defense-in-depth security approach will be key to safeguarding organizational networks.

Click here for more information about the latest product innovations in Darktrace 6.3, or learn more about Darktrace / NETWORK here.

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About the author
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response
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