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Qakbot Resurgence in the Cyber Landscape| Darktrace

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30
Jan 2023
30
Jan 2023
Stay informed on the evolving threat Qakbot. Protect yourself from the Qakbot resurgence! Learn more from our Darktrace AI Cybersecurity experts!

In June 2022, Darktrace observed a surge in Qakbot infections across its client base. The detected Qakbot infections, which in some cases led to the delivery of secondary payloads such as Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC, were initiated through novel delivery methods birthed from Microsoft’s default blocking of XL4 and VBA macros in early 2022 [1]/[2]/[3]/[4] and from the public disclosure in May 2022 [5] of the critical Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190) in Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT). Despite the changes made to Qakbot’s delivery methods, Qakbot infections still inevitably resulted in unusual patterns of network activity. In this blog, we will provide details of these network activities, along with Darktrace/Network’s coverage of them. 

Qakbot Background 

Qakbot emerged in 2007 as a banking trojan designed to steal sensitive data such as banking credentials.  Since then, Qakbot has developed into a highly modular triple-threat powerhouse used to not only steal information, but to also drop malicious payloads and to serve as a backdoor. The malware is also versatile, with its delivery methods regularly changing in response to the changing threat landscape.  

Threat actors deliver Qakbot through email-based delivery methods. In the first half of 2022, Microsoft started rolling out versions of Office which block XL4 and VBA macros by default. Prior to this change, Qakbot email campaigns typically consisted in the spreading of deceitful emails with Office attachments containing malicious macros.  Opening these attachments and then enabling the macros within them would lead users’ devices to install Qakbot.  

Actors who deliver Qakbot onto users’ devices may either sell their access to other actors, or they may leverage Qakbot’s capabilities to pursue their own objectives [6]. A common objective of actors that use Qakbot is to drop Cobalt Strike beacons onto infected systems. Actors will then leverage the interactive access provided by Cobalt Strike to conduct extensive reconnaissance and lateral movement activities in preparation for widespread ransomware deployment. Qakbot’s close ties to ransomware activity, along with its modularity and versatility, make the malware a significant threat to organisations’ digital environments.

Activity Details and Qakbot Delivery Methods

During the month of June, variationsof the following pattern of network activity were observed in several client networks:

1.     User’s device contacts an email service such as outlook.office[.]com or mail.google[.]com

2.     User’s device makes an HTTP GET request to 185.234.247[.]119 with an Office user-agent string and a ‘/123.RES' target URI. The request is responded to with an HTML file containing a exploit for the Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190)

3.     User’s device makes an HTTP GET request with a cURL User-Agent string and a target URI ending in ‘.dat’ to an unusual external endpoint. The request is responded to with a Qakbot DLL sample

4.     User’s device contacts Qakbot Command and Control servers over ports such as 443, 995, 2222, and 32101

In some cases, only steps 1 and 4 were seen, and in other cases, only steps 1, 3, and 4 were seen. The different variations of the pattern correspond to different Qakbot delivery methods.

Figure 1: Geographic distribution of Darktrace clients affected by Qakbot

Qakbot is known to be delivered via malicious email attachments [7]. The Qakbot infections observed across Darktrace’s client base during June were likely initiated through HTML smuggling — a method which consists in embedding malicious code into HTML attachments. Based on open-source reporting [8]-[14] and on observed patterns of network traffic, we assess with moderate to high confidence that the Qakbot infections observed across Darktrace’s client base during June 2022 were initiated via one of the following three methods:

  • User opens HTML attachment which drops a ZIP file on their device. ZIP file contains a LNK file, which when opened, causes the user's device to make an external HTTP GET request with a cURL User-Agent string and a '.dat' target URI. If successful, the HTTP GET request is responded to with a Qakbot DLL.
  • User opens HTML attachment which drops a ZIP file on their device. ZIP file contains a docx file, which when opened, causes the user's device to make an HTTP GET request to 185.234.247[.]119 with an Office user-agent string and a ‘/123.RES' target URI. If successful, the HTTP GET request is responded to with an HTML file containing a Follina exploit. The Follina exploit causes the user's device to make an external HTTP GET with a '.dat' target URI. If successful, the HTTP GET request is responded to with a Qakbot DL.
  • User opens HTML attachment which drops a ZIP file on their device. ZIP file contains a Qakbot DLL and a LNK file, which when opened, causes the DLL to run.

The usage of these delivery methods illustrate how threat actors are adopting to a post-macro world [4], with their malware delivery techniques shifting from usage of macros-embedding Office documents to usage of container files, Windows Shortcut (LNK) files, and exploits for novel vulnerabilities. 

The Qakbot infections observed across Darktrace’s client base did not only vary in terms of their delivery methods — they also differed in terms of their follow-up activities. In some cases, no follow-up activities were observed. In other cases, however, actors were seen leveraging Qakbot to exfiltrate data and to deliver follow-up payloads such as Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC.  These follow-up activities were likely preparation for the deployment of ransomware. Darktrace’s early detection of Qakbot activity within client environments enabled security teams to take actions which likely prevented the deployment of ransomware. 

Darktrace Coverage 

Users’ interactions with malicious email attachments typically resulted in their devices making cURL HTTP GET requests with empty Host headers and target URIs ending in ‘.dat’ (such as as ‘/24736.dat’ and ‘/noFindThem.dat’) to rare, external endpoints. In cases where the Follina vulnerability is believed to have been exploited, users’ devices were seen making HTTP GET requests to 185.234.247[.]119 with a Microsoft Office User-Agent string before making cURL HTTP GET requests. The following Darktrace DETECT/Network models typically breached as a result of these HTTP activities:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Numeric Exe Download 

These DETECT models were able to capture the unusual usage of Office and cURL User-Agent strings on affected devices, as well as the downloads of the Qakbot DLL from rare external endpoints. These models look for unusual activity that falls outside a device’s usual pattern of behavior rather than for activity involving User-Agent strings, URIs, files, and external IPs which are known to be malicious.

When enabled, Darktrace RESPOND/Network autonomously intervened, taking actions such as ‘Enforce group pattern of life’ and ‘Block connections’ to quickly intercept connections to Qakbot infrastructure. 

Figure 2: This ‘New User Agent to IP Without Hostname’ model breach highlights an example of Darktrace’s detection of a device attempting to download a file containing a Follina exploit
Figure 3: This ‘New User Agent to IP Without Hostname’ model breach highlights an example of Darktrace’s detection of a device attempting to download Qakbot
Figure 4: The Event Log for an infected device highlights the moment a connection to the endpoint outlook.office365[.]com was made. This was followed by an executable file transfer detection and use of a new User-Agent, curl/7.9.1

After installing Qakbot, users’ devices started making connections to Command and Control (C2) endpoints over ports such as 443, 22, 990, 995, 1194, 2222, 2078, 32101. Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC may have been delivered over some of these C2 connections, as evidenced by subsequent connections to endpoints associated with Cobalt Strike and Dark VNC. These C2 activities typically caused the following Darktrace DETECT/Network models to breach: 

  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behavior
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
Figure 5: This Device Event Log illustrates the Command and Control activity displayed by a Qakbot-infected device

The Darktrace DETECT/Network models which detected these C2 activities do not look for devices making connections to known, malicious endpoints. Rather, they look for devices deviating from their ordinary patterns of activity, making connections to external endpoints which internal devices do not usually connect to, over ports which devices do not normally connect over. 

In some cases, actors were seen exfiltrating data from Qakbot-infected systems and dropping Cobalt Strike in order to conduct extensive discovery. These exfiltration activities typically caused the following models to breach:

  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoints

The reconnaissance and brute-force activities carried out by actors typically resulted in breaches of the following models:

  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  •  Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
  •  Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  •  Device / Increase in New RPC Services
  •  Device / Spike in LDAP Activity
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force
  • Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)
  • Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)
  • Device / Anomalous NTLM Brute Force

Conclusion

June 2022 saw Qakbot swiftly mould itself in response to Microsoft's default blocking of macros and the public disclosure of the Follina vulnerability. The evolution of the threat landscape in the first half of 2022 caused Qakbot to undergo changes in its delivery methods, shifting from delivery via macros-based methods to delivery via HTML smuggling methods. The effectiveness of these novel delivery methods where highlighted in Darktrace's client base, where large volumes of Qakbot infections were seen during June 2022. Leveraging Self-Learning AI, Darktrace DETECT/Network was able to detect the unusual network behaviors which inevitably resulted from these novel Qakbot infections. Given that the actors behind these Qakbot infections were likely seeking to deploy ransomware, these detections, along with Darktrace RESPOND/Network’s autonomous interventions, ultimately helped to protect affected Darktrace clients from significant business disruption.  

Appendices

List of IOCs

References

[1] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/excel-blog/excel-4-0-xlm-macros-now-restricted-by-default-for-customer/ba-p/3057905

[2] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805

[3] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/security/internet-macros-blocked

[4] https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/threat-insight/how-threat-actors-are-adapting-post-macro-world

[5] https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984

[6] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/09/a-closer-look-at-qakbots-latest-building-blocks-and-how-to-knock-them-down/

[7] https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/rise-qakbot-attacks-traced-evolving-threat-techniques

[8] https://www.esentire.com/blog/resurgence-in-qakbot-malware-activity

[9] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-qakbot-spread-by-phishing-emails

[10] https://twitter.com/pr0xylife/status/1539320429281615872

[11] https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1534220832242819072

[12] https://twitter.com/1zrr4h/status/1534259727059787783?lang=en

[13] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28728

[14] https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4616/qakbot-delivered-through-cve-2022-30190-follina

Credit to:  Hanah Darley, Cambridge Analyst Team Lead and Head of Threat Research and Sam Lister, Senior Cyber Analyst

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Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Hashing out TA577: Darktrace’s Detection of NTLM Hash Theft

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09
Jul 2024

What is credential theft and how does it work?

What began as a method to achieve unauthorized access to an account, often driven by the curiosity of individual attackers, credentials theft become a key tactic for malicious actors and groups, as stolen login credentials can be abused to gain unauthorized access to accounts and systems. This access can be leveraged to carry out malicious activities such as data exfiltration, fraud, espionage and malware deployment.

It is therefore no surprise that the number of dark web marketplaces selling privileged credentials has increased in recent years, making it easier for malicious actors to monetize stolen credentials [1]. This, in turn, has created new opportunities for threat actors to use increasingly sophisticated tactics such as phishing, social engineering and credential stuffing in their attacks, targeting individuals, organizations and government entities alike [1].

Credential theft example

TA577 Threat Actor

TA577 is a threat actor known to leverage stolen credentials, also known as Hive0118 [2], an initial access broker (IAB) group that was previously known for delivering malicious payloads [2]. On March 4, 2024, Proofpoint reported evidence of TA577 using a new attack chain with a different aim in mind: stealing NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hashes that can be used to authenticate to systems without needing to know plaintext passwords [3].

How does TA577 steal credentials?

Proofpoint reported that this new attack chain, which was first observed on February 26 and 27, was made up of two distinct campaigns. The first campaign consisted of a phishing attack featuring tens of thousands of emails targeting hundreds of organizations globally [3]. These phishing emails often appeared as replies to previous messages (thread hijacking) and contained zipped HTML attachments that each contained a unique file hash, customized for each recipient [3]. These attached files also contained a HTTP Meta refresh function, which triggered an automatic connection to a text file hosted on external IP addresses running as SMB servers [3].

When attempting to access the text file, the server requires an SMB session authentication via NTLM. This session is initiated when a client sends an ‘SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE’ request to the server, which answers with a ‘SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE’ response.

The client then proceeds to send a ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ request to start the SMB session setup process, which includes initiating the NTLM authentication process. The server responds with an ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ response, which includes an NTLM challenge message [6].

The client can then use the challenge message and its own credentials to generate a response by hashing its password using an NTLM hash algorithm. The response is sent to the server in an ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ request. The server validates the response and, if the authentication is successful, the server answers with a final ‘SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX’ response, which completes the session setup process and allows the client to access the file listed on the server [6].

What is the goal of threat actor TA577?

As no malware delivery was detected during these sessions, researchers have suggested that the aim of TA577 was not to deliver malware, but rather to take advantage of the NTLMV2 challenge/response to steal NTLM authentication hashes [3] [4]. Hashes stolen by attackers can be exploited in pass-the-hash attacks to authenticate to a remote server or service [4]. They can also be used for offline password cracking which, if successful, could be utilized to escalate privileges or perform lateral movement through a target network [4]. Under certain circumstances, these hashes could also permit malicious actors to hijack accounts, access sensitive information and evade security products [4].

The open-source toolkit Impacket, which includes modules for password cracking [5] and which can be identified by the default NTLM server challenge “aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa”[3], was observed during the SMB sessions. This indicates that TA577 actor aim to use stolen credentials for password cracking and pass-the-hash attacks.

TA577 has previously been associated with Black Basta ransomware infections and Qbot, and has been observed delivering various payloads including IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, and Cobalt Strike [2].This change in tactic to follow the current trend of credential theft may indicate that not only are TA577 actors aware of which methods are most effective in the current threat landscape, but they also have monetary and time resources needed to create new methods to bypass existing detection tools [3].  

Darktrace’s Coverage of TA577 Activity

On February 26 and 26, coinciding with the campaign activity reported by Proofpoint, Darktrace/Email™ observed a surge of inbound emails from numerous suspicious domains targeting multiple customer environments. These emails consistently included zip files with seemingly randomly generated names, containing HTLM content and links to an unusual external IP address [3].

A summary of anomaly indicators seen for a campaign email sent by TA577, as detected by Darktrace/Email.
Figure 1: A summary of anomaly indicators seen for a campaign email sent by TA577, as detected by Darktrace/Email.
Details of the name and size of the .zip file attached to a campaign email, along with the Darktrace/Email model alerts triggered by the email.
Figure 2: Details of the name and size of the .zip file attached to a campaign email, along with the Darktrace/Email model alerts triggered by the email.

The URL of these links contained an unusually named .txt file, which corresponds with Proofpoint reports of the automatic connection to a text file hosted on an external SMB server made when the attachment is opened [3].

A link to a rare external IP address seen within a campaign email, containing an unusually named .txt file.
Figure 3: A link to a rare external IP address seen within a campaign email, containing an unusually named .txt file.

Darktrace identified devices on multiple customer networks connecting to external SMB servers via the SMB protocol. It understood this activity was suspicious as the SMB protocol is typically reserved for internal connections and the endpoint in question had never previously been observed on the network.

The Event Log of a ‘Compliance / External Windows Communication’ model alert showing a connection to an external SMB server on destination port 445.
Figure 4: The Event Log of a ‘Compliance / External Windows Communication’ model alert showing a connection to an external SMB server on destination port 445.
External Sites Summary highlighting the rarity of the external SMB server.
Figure 5: External Sites Summary highlighting the rarity of the external SMB server.
External Sites Summary highlightin that the SMB server is geolocated in Moldova.
Figure 6: External Sites Summary highlightin that the SMB server is geolocated in Moldova.

During these connections, Darktrace observed multiple devices establishing an SMB session to this server via a NTLM challenge/response, representing the potential theft of the credentials used in this session. During this session, some devices also attempted to access an unusually named .txt file, further indicating that the affected devices were trying to access the .txt file hosted on external SMB servers [3].

Packet captures (PCAPs) of these sessions show the default NTLM server challenge, indicating the use of Impacket, suggesting that the captured NTLM hashes were to be used for password cracking or pass-the-hash-attacks [3]

PCAP analysis showing usage of the default NTLM server challenge associated with Impacket.
Figure 7: PCAP analysis showing usage of the default NTLM server challenge associated with Impacket.

Conclusions

Ultimately, Darktrace’s suite of products effectively detected and alerted for multiple aspects of the TA577 attack chain and NTLM hash data theft activity across its customer base. Darktrace/Email was able to uncover the inbound phishing emails that served as the initial access vector for TA577 actors, while Darktrace DETECT identified the subsequent external connections to unusual external locations and suspicious SMB sessions.

Furthermore, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enabled it to detect suspicious TA577 activity across the customer base on February 26 and 27, prior to Proofpoint’s report on their new attack chain. This showcases Darktrace’s ability to identify emerging threats based on the subtle deviations in a compromised device’s behavior, rather than relying on a static list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) or ‘known bads’.

This approach allows Darktrace to remain one step ahead of increasingly adaptive threat actors, providing organizations and their security teams with a robust AI-driven solution able to safeguard their networks in an ever-evolving threat landscape.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson, Cyber Analyst, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst.

References

1)    https://www.sentinelone.com/cybersecurity-101/what-is-credential-theft/

2)    https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/ta577

3)    https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta577s-unusual-attack-chain-leads-ntlm-data-theft

4)    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-steal-windows-ntlm-authentication-hashes-in-phishing-attacks/

5)    https://pawanjswal.medium.com/the-power-of-impacket-a-comprehensive-guide-with-examples-1288f3a4c674

6)    https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nlmp/c083583f-1a8f-4afe-a742-6ee08ffeb8cf

7)    https://www.hivepro.com/threat-advisory/ta577-targeting-windows-ntlm-hashes-in-global-campaigns/

Darktrace Model Detections

Darktrace/Email

·       Attachment / Unsolicited Archive File

·       Attachment / Unsolicited Attachment

·       Link / New Correspondent Classified Link

·       Link / New Correspondent Rare Link

·       Spoof / Internal User Similarities

Darktrace DETECT

·       Compliance / External Windows Communications

Darktrace RESPOND

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

IoCs

IoC - Type - Description

176.123.2[.]146 - IP address -Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.2[.]33 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.1[.]161 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

104.129.20[.]167 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.1[.]160 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

85.239.33[.]149 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

89.117.2[.]34 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

146.19.213[.]36 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

66.63.188[.]19 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

103.124.104[.]76 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

103.124.106[.]224 - IP address - Likely malicious SMB Server

\5aohv\9mn.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\hvwsuw\udrh.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\zkf2rj4\VmD.txt = SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\naams\p3aV.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\epxq\A.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

\dbna\H.txt - SMB Path and File - SMB Path and File

MAGNAMSB.zip – Filename - Phishing Attachment

e751f9dddd24f7656459e1e3a13307bd03ae4e67 - SHA1 Hash - Phishing Attachment

OMNIS2C.zip  - Filename - Phishing Attachment

db982783b97555232e28d5a333525118f10942e1 - SHA1 Hash - Phishing Attachment

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa - NTLM Server Challenge -Impacket Default NTLM Challenge

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

Tactic - Technique

TA0001            Initial Access

TA0002            Execution

TA0008            Lateral Movement

TA0003            Persistence

TA0005            Defense Evasion

TA0006            Credential Access

T1021.002       SMB/Windows Admin Shares

T1021  Remote Services

T1566.001       Spearfishing Attachment

T1566  Phishing

T1204.002       Malicious File

T1204  User Execution

T1021.002       SMB/Windows Admin Shares

T1574  Hijack Execution Flow

T1021  Remote Services

T1555.004       Windows Credential Manager

T1555  Credentials from Password Stores

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Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst

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Credential Phishing: Common attack methods and defense strategies 

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08
Jul 2024

Credential theft remains a top cybersecurity threat

Adversaries have many options in their arsenal to gain access into an organization.  

Exploitable vulnerabilities: This can provide access into a system’s processes and allow activity within the context of the service account.  

Weak or misconfigured systems: These can provide direct avenues of access into exposed systems.  

However, the more desirable option is to obtain user or API credentials permitting the adversary to authenticate and operate as one of the organization’s authorized entities.

While 2023 noted a marked increase in vulnerability exploits as the chosen vector of attack, the use of credentials by adversaries still ranked #1 at 24% in the latest Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report. Mandiant’s M-Trends report noted 14% of their investigations involved stolen credentials as the attack vector, and Darktrace’s 2023 End of Year Threat Report revealed that Credential Access was one of the most observed MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Credential phishing methods

There are many ways an adversary can obtain a user’s credentials. Some require gaining access to the target system or exploiting an application while others target the end-user directly. 

Joshua (WarGames) | Villains Wiki | Fandom

Social Engineering: Many users have a habit of incorporating things in their life into their passwords. Family members, important dates, hobbies, movies, and music favorites have all been used. Adversaries know this and will scour social media to gain knowledge about their intended target. This method was beautifully demonstrated in the 1983 movie, Wargames, where Matthew Broderick’s character scours articles, papers, and video about Dr. Stephen Falken, finally guessing that the password into the WOPR (War Operations Plan Response) computer is that of his deceased child, Joshua.  

Credential Cracking / Dumping: If the adversary has gained access to a targeted system, they may employ a password cracking, or credential dumping, program. For Unix-based solutions, obtaining the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files provides the users, groups, and encrypted passwords. Adversaries can exfiltrate these files and then utilize password crackers such as John the Ripper, Crack, or codebreaker003. Mimikatz(see more below) can also pass cache information for Mac / Unix and Linux systems.

Windows-based solutions: Adversaries have successfully utilized programs such as Mimikatz to dump credentials and hashes. Mimikatz can pass the hash string to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) to authorize user actions, as well as perform “kerberoasting”. Kerberos is how Windows systems authorize users utilizing a 3-entity authentication method and symmetric key cryptography to create “tickets” that authorize requested actions. Mimikatz can use Kerberos tickets to gain non-expiring domain administration credentials (Golden Tickets) or tickets to login as a service on the network (Silver Tickets).

Steve Carell Banana - Imgflip

Post-It Notes: As organizations and applications started requiring stronger passwords that met complexity requirements, users did what you would expect to ensure they didn’t forget them. They wrote them down (this was also demonstrated in Wargames). The modern-day equivalent is to create a text file with all your passwords (or API credentials) in it – something adversaries are delighted to find.

One of the funniest, yet totally on-point, comic routines I’ve seen on this topic is Michael McIntyre’s You Should Probably Change Your Password skit at the London Palladium.

Phishing Alert: Pay attention to NC State login pages and Duo prompts –  Office of Information Technology

Phishing / Smishing: Forged messages requesting users to reset their passwords or directing them to enter their credentials used to be easier to spot. However, the emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is allowing adversaries to create very realistic messages and web pages that mimic an organization’s authentication pages. These attempts are not just limited to email, adversaries are utilizing SMS messages and other collaborative communication solutions like Microsoft Teams to transmit fake messages to unsuspecting users. Also, security teams are seeing increased use of Quick Response (QR) codes in scam messages. QR codes are appearing in all aspects of everyday life (I’m finding it hard to go into a restaurant without having to scan a QR code to read the menu) and there is a false sense of security people have in thinking that QR codes are safe to scan.

Vulnerability Exploits: Gaining access to the credential cache or password file is not the only way adversaries can obtain user credentials. Some applications will store the user credentials in process memory (decrypted). If the application is vulnerable to a remote exploit, it can be possible for the adversary to dump the memory of the application process and locate these stored credentials. This was clearly illustrated in the Heartbleed exploit disclosed to the public in 2014.

Air Cracking: Air Cracking is specific to Wi-Fi networks and involves cracking programs that analyze wireless encrypted packets and extracting WEP or WPA/WPA2 PSK passwords (giving the adversary access to the Wi-Fi network).

Dark Web Purchase: Threat groups know how to monetize compromised credentials. Selling compromised credentials on the Dark Web occurs on a regular basis. Sites such as HaveIBeenPwned.com can assist users in determining if a particular password has been found to be compromised. Note: Users should ensure that the sites they are checking to see if their password has been compromised are actual legitimate sites and not a credential harvesting site!

You need a strong, unique password for EVERY account : r/memes

What is credential stuffing and why is it so effective?

Credential Stuffing is so successful because users tend to utilize the same, or very similar, passwords across all the systems and applications they access. This includes both personal and business accounts. Once an adversary harvests credentials from one site, they will try that password on other sites, and if that fails, they can utilize generative AI to predict potential variations of the password.

How to reduce the risk of credential stuffing?

Users can help reduce exposure of their credentials by creating passwords that meet complexity requirements but are also easy to remember. A good approach is to take a phrase and apply a substitution rule. For example, let’s take the start of Charles Dicken’s book A Tale of Two Cities and create a substitution rule for it:

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times  

Let’s shorten that to: Best of times Worst of times

Apply the following substitution rule: o = 0, i = 1, e = 3, spaces = @

Now my phrase becomes: B3st@0f@t1m3s@W0rst@0f@t1m3s

New Password - Imgflip

You now have a 28-character password that contains letters, a capital letter, number, and special character. Nobody is cracking that, and the phrase and substitution rule makes it much easier to remember (PS: 12-character passwords are also fine, taking ~34,000 years to crack using current technology).

Organizations can reduce exposure through implementation of two-factor authentication (2FA), so even if the passwords are compromised through the methods described above, another authentication layer stands in the way of the adversary.

Additionally, preventing phishing messages from landing in user’s inboxes (Email or collaborative solutions such as Microsoft Teams) is critical not only for reducing the potential exposure of user credentials, but also user’s opening malicious attachments or links. Generative AI tools such as ChatGPT have resulted in over an 135% increase in novel social engineering attacks.

How Darktrace protects against sophisticated credential phishing attempts

Malicious actors can exploit these leaked credentials to drastically lower the barrier to entry associated with brute-forcing access to their target networks. While implementing well-configured MFA and enforcing regular password changes can help protect organizations, these measures alone may not be enough to fully negate the advantage attackers gain with stolen credentials. 

In early 2024, one Darktrace customer was compromised by a malicious actor after their internal credentials had been leaked on the dark web. Subsequent attack phases were detected by Darktrace/Network and the customer was alerted to the suspicious activity via the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, following an investigation by Darktrace’s Security Operation Center (SOC). 

Darktrace detected a device on the network of a customer in the US carrying out a string of anomalous activity indicative of network compromise. The device was observed using a new service account to authenticate to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) server, before proceeding to perform a range of suspicious activity including internal reconnaissance and lateral movement. 

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace’s autonomous response was not enabled on the network at the time of the attack. Had it been active, it would have been able to autonomously act against the malicious activity by disabling users, strategically blocking suspicious connections and limiting devices to their expected patterns of activity. 

For the full in depth story with a step-by-step walk through of the attack visit our Inside the SOC blog post.

Conclusion

Head of security, and your password is "password"? | Scattered Quotes |  Funny marvel memes, Marvel funny, Marvel jokes

Adversaries have various methods available to compromise user and API credentials. There is no single silver bullet that will protect users and organizations, but rather, a layered approach that incorporates education, security controls such as 2FA, unsupervised AI to detect novel and sophisticated spear-phishing messages, as well as protection against exploits that give adversaries access to systems.  

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About the author
John Bradshaw
Sr. Director, Technical Marketing
Our ai. Your data.

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