November 20, 2023

Understanding and Mitigating Sectop RAT

Understand the risks posed by the Sectop remote access Trojan and how Darktrace implements strategies to enhance cybersecurity defenses.

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Nov 2023

Introduction

As malicious actors across the threat landscape continue to look for new ways to gain unauthorized access to target networks, it is unsurprising to see Remote Access Trojans (RATs) leveraged more and more. These RATs are downloaded discretely without the target’s knowledge, typically through seemingly legitimate software downloads, and are designed to gain highly privileged network credentials, ultimately allowing attackers to have remote control over compromised devices. [1]

SectopRAT is one pertinent example of a RAT known to adopt a number of stealth functions in order to gather and exfiltrate sensitive data from its targets including passwords, cookies, autofill and history data stores in browsers, as well as cryptocurrency wallet details and system hardware information. [2]

In early 2023, Darktrace identified a resurgence of the SectopRAT across customer environments, primarily targeting educational industries located in the United States (US), Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and Asia-Pacific (APAC) regions. Darktrace DETECT™ was able to successfully identify suspicious activity related to SectopRAT at the network level, as well as any indicators of post-compromise on customer environments that did not have Darktrace RESPOND™ in place to take autonomous preventative action.

What is SectopRAT?

First discovered in early 2019, the SectopRAT is a .NET RAT that contains information stealing capabilities. It is also known under the alias ‘ArechClient2’, and is commonly distributed through drive-by downloads of illegitimate software and utilizes malvertising, including via Google Ads, to increase the chances of it being downloaded.

The malware’s code was updated at the beginning of 2021, which led to refined and newly implemented features, including command and control (C2) communication encryption with Advanced Encryption Stanard 256 (AES256) and additional commands. SectopRAT also has a function called "BrowserLogging", ultimately sending any actions it conducts on web browsers to its C2 infrastructure. When the RAT is executed, it then connects to a Pastebin associated hostname to retrieve C2 information; the requested file reaches out to get the public IP address of the infected device. To receive commands, it connects to its C2 server primarily on port 15647, although other ports have been highlighted by open source intelligence (OSINT), which include 15678, 15649, 228 and 80. Ultimately, sensitive data data gathered from target networks is then exfiltrated to the attacker’s C2 infrastructure, typically in a JSON file [3].

Darktrace Coverage

During autonomous investigations into affected customer networks, Darktrace DETECT was able to identify SSL connections to the endpoint pastebin[.]com over port 443, followed by failed connections to one of the IPs and ports (i.e., 15647, 15648, 15649) associated with SectopRAT. This resulted in the devices breaching the ‘Compliance/Pastebin and Anomalous Connection/Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint’ models, respectively.

In some instances, Darktrace observed a higher number of attempted connections that resulted in the additional breach of the model ‘Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections’.

Over a period of three months, Darktrace investigated multiple instances of SectopRAT infections across multiple clients, highlighting indicators of compromise (IoCs) through related endpoints.Looking specififically at one customer’s activity which centred on January 25, 2023, one device was observed initially making suspicious connections to a Pastebin endpoint, 104.20.67[.]143, likely in an attempt to receive C2 information.

Darktrace DETECT recognized this activity as suspicious, causing the 'Compliance / Pastebin' DETECT models to breach. In response to this detection, Darktrace RESPOND took swift action against the Pastebin connections by blocking them and preventing the device from carrying out further connections with Pastebin endpoints. Darktrace RESPOND actions related to blocking Pastebin connections were commonly observed on this device throughout the course of the attack and likely represented threat actors attempting to exfiltrate sensitive data outside the network.

Darktrace UI image — Figure 1: Model breach event log highlighting the Darktrace DETECT model breach ‘Compliance / Pastebin’.

Around the same time, Darktrace observed the device making a large number of failed connections to an unusual exernal location in the Netherlands, 5.75.147[.]135, via port 15647. Darktrace recognized that this endpoint had never previously been observed on the customer’s network and that the frequency of the failed connections could be indicative of beaconing activity. Subsequent investigation into the endpoint using OSINT indicated it had links to malware, though Darktrace’s successful detection did not need to rely on this intelligence.

Darktrace model breach event log — Figure 2: Model breach event log highlighting the multiple failed connectiosn to the suspicious IP address, 5.75.147[.]135 on January 25, 2023, causing the Darktrace DETECT model ‘Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint’ to breach.

After these initial set of breaches on January 25, the same device was observed engaging in further external connectivity roughly a month later on February 27, including additional failed connections to the IP 167.235.134[.]14 over port 15647. Once more, multiple OSINT sources revealed that this endpoint was indeed a malicious C2 endpoint.

Darktrace model breach event log 2 — Figure 3: Model breach event log highlighting the multiple failed connectiosn to the suspicious IP address, 167.235.134[.]14 on February 27, 2023, causing the Darktrace DETECT model ‘Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint’ to breach.

While the initial Darktrace coverage up to this point has highlighted the attempted C2 communication and how DETECT was able to alert on the suspicious activity, Pastebin activity was commonly observed throughout the course of this attack. As a result, when enabled in autonomous response mode, Darktrace RESPOND was able to take swift mitigative action by blocking all connections to Pastebin associated hostnames and IP addresses. These interventions by RESPOND ultimately prevented malicious actors from stealing sensitive data from Darktrace customers.

Darktrace RESPOND action list — Figure 4: A total of nine Darktrace RESPOND actions were applied against suspicious Pastebin activity during the course of the attack.

In another similar case investigated by the Darktrace, multiple devices were observed engaging in external connectivity to another malicious endpoint, 88.218.170[.]169 (AS207651 Hosting technology LTD) on port 15647. On April 17, 2023, at 22:35:24 UTC, the breach device started making connections; of the 34 attempts, one connection was successful – this connection lasted 8 minutes and 49 seconds. Darktrace DETECT’s Self-Learning AI understood that these connections represented a deviation from the device’s usual pattern of behavior and alerted on the activity with the ‘Multiple Connections to new External TCP Port’ model.

Darktrace advanced search query — Figure 6: Advanced Search query highlighting the one successful connection to the endpoint 88.218.170[.]169 out of the 34 attempted connections.

A few days later, on April 20, 2023, at 12:33:59 (UTC) the source device connected to a Pastebin endpoint, 172.67.34[.]170 on port 443 using the SSL protocol, that had never previously be seen on the network. According to Advanced Search data, the first SSL connection lasted over two hours. In total, the device made 9 connections to pastebin[.]com and downloaded 85 KB of data from it.

Darktrace UI highlighting connections — Figure 7: Screenshot of the Darktrace UI highlighting the affected device making multiple connections to Pastebin and downloading 85 KB of data.

Within the same minute, Darktrace detected the device beginning to make a large number of failed connections to another suspicious endpoints, 34.107.84[.]7 (AS396982 GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM) via port 15647. In total the affected device was observed initiating 1,021 connections to this malicious endpoint, all occurring over the same port and resulting the failed attempts.

Darktrace advanced search query 2 — Figure 8: Advanced Search query highlighting the affected device making over one thousand connections to the suspicious endpoint 34.107.84[.]7, all of which failed.

Conclusion

Ultimately, thanks to its Self-Learning AI and anomaly-based approach to threat detection, Darktrace was able to preemptively identify any suspicious activity relating to SectopRAT at the network level, as well as post-compromise activity, and bring it to the immediate attention of customer security teams.

In addition to the successful and timely detection of SectopRAT activity, when enabled in autonomous response mode Darktrace RESPOND was able to shut down suspicious connections to endpoints used by threat actors as malicious infrastructure, thus preventing successful C2 communication and potential data exfiltration.

In the face of a Remote Access Trojan, like SectopRAT, designed to steal sensitive corporate and personal information, the Darktrace suite of products is uniquely placed to offer organizations full visibility over any emerging activity on their networks and respond to it without latency, safeguarding their digital estate whilst causing minimal disruption to business operations.

Credit to Justin Torres, Cyber Analyst, Brianna Leddy, Director of Analysis

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detection:

Compliance / Pastebin
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

5.75.147[.]135 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

5.75.149[.]1 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

34.27.150[.]38 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

34.89.247[.]212 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

34.107.84[.]7 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

34.141.16[.]89 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

34.159.180[.]55 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

35.198.132[.]51 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

35.226.102[.]12 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

35.234.79[.]173 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

35.234.159[.]213 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

35.242.150[.]95 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

88.218.170[.]169 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

162.55.188[.]246 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

167.235.134[.]14 - IP - SectopRAT C2 Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Model: Compliance / Pastebin

ID: T1537

Tactic: EXFILTRATION

Technique Name: Transfer Data to Cloud Account

Model: Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

ID: T1090.002

Sub technique of: T1090

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: External Proxy

ID: T1095

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: Non-Application Layer Protocol

ID: T1571

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: Non-Standard Port

Model: Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

ID: T1571

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: Non-Standard Port

ID: T1583.006

Sub technique of: T1583

Tactic: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Technique Name: Web Services

Model: Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

ID: T1095

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: Non-Application Layer Protocol

ID: T1571

Tactic: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Technique Name: Non-Standard Port

References

1. https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/RAT-remote-access-Trojan

2. https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.sectop_rat

3. https://threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/malware/win.sectop_rat

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

The Darktrace Community

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November 26, 2025

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery System

What is TAG-150?

TAG-150, a relatively new Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) operator, has been active since March 2025, demonstrating rapid development and an expansive, evolving infrastructure designed to support its malicious operations. The group employs two custom malware families, CastleLoader and CastleRAT, to compromise target systems, with a primary focus on the United States [1]. TAG-150’s infrastructure included numerous victim-facing components, such as IP addresses and domains functioning as command-and-control (C2) servers associated with malware families like SecTopRAT and WarmCookie, in addition to CastleLoader and CastleRAT [2].

As of May 2025, CastleLoader alone had infected a reported 469 devices, underscoring the scale and sophistication of TAG-150’s campaign [1].

What are CastleLoader and CastleRAT?

CastleLoader is a loader malware, primarily designed to download and install additional malware, enabling chain infections across compromised systems [3]. TAG-150 employs a technique known as ClickFix, which uses deceptive domains that mimic document verification systems or browser update notifications to trick victims into executing malicious scripts. Furthermore, CastleLoader leverages fake GitHub repositories that impersonate legitimate tools as a distribution method, luring unsuspecting users into downloading and installing malware on their devices [4].

CastleRAT, meanwhile, is a remote access trojan (RAT) that serves as one of the primary payloads delivered by CastleLoader. Once deployed, CastleRAT grants attackers extensive control over the compromised system, enabling capabilities such as keylogging, screen capturing, and remote shell access.

TAG-150 leverages CastleLoader as its initial delivery mechanism, with CastleRAT acting as the main payload. This two-stage attack strategy enhances the resilience and effectiveness of their operations by separating the initial infection vector from the final payload deployment.

How are they deployed?

Castleloader uses code-obfuscation methods such as dead-code insertion and packing to hinder both static and dynamic analysis. After the payload is unpacked, it connects to its command-and-control server to retrieve and running additional, targeted components.

Its modular architecture enables it to function both as a delivery mechanism and a staging utility, allowing threat actors to decouple the initial infection from payload deployment. CastleLoader typically delivers its payloads as Portable Executables (PEs) containing embedded shellcode. This shellcode activates the loader’s core module, which then connects to the C2 server to retrieve and execute the next-stage malware.[6]

Following this, attackers deploy the ClickFix technique, impersonating legitimate software distribution platforms like Google Meet or browser update notifications. These deceptive sites trick victims into copying and executing PowerShell commands, thereby initiating the infection kill chain. [1]

When a user clicks on a spoofed Cloudflare “Verification Step” prompt, a background request is sent to a PHP script on the distribution domain (e.g., /s.php?an=0). The server’s response is then automatically copied to the user’s clipboard using the ‘unsecuredCopyToClipboard()’ function. [7].

The Python-based variant of CastleRAT, known as “PyNightShade,” has been engineered with stealth in mind, showing minimal detection across antivirus platforms [2]. As illustrated in Figure 1, PyNightShade communicates with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com, demonstrating both request and response behavior

Figure 1: Packet Capture (PCAP) of PyNightShade, the Python-based variant of CastleRAT, communicating with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com.

Darktrace Coverage

In mid-2025, Darktrace observed a range of anomalous activities across its customer base that appeared linked to CastleLoader, including the example below from a US based organization.

The activity began on June 26, when a device on the customer’s network was observed connecting to the IP address 173.44.141[.]89, a previously unseen IP for this network along with the use of multiple user agents, which was also rare for the user. It was later determined that the IP address was a known indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with TAG-150’s CastleRAT and CastleLoader operations [2][5].

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of a device making unusual connections to the malicious endpoint 173.44.141[.]89.

The device was observed downloading two scripts from this endpoint, namely ‘/service/download/data_5x.bin’ and ‘/service/download/data_6x.bin’, which have both been linked to CastleLoader infections by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [8]. The archives contains embedded shellcode, which enables attackers to execute arbitrary code directly in memory, bypassing disk writes and making detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools significantly more difficult [2].

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of two scripts from the malicious endpoint.

In addition to this, the affected device exhibited a high volume of internal connections to a broad range of endpoints, indicating potential scanning activity. Such behavior is often associated with reconnaissance efforts aimed at mapping internal infrastructure.

Darktrace / NETWORK correlated these behaviors and generated an Enhanced Monitoring model, a high-fidelity security model designed to detect activity consistent with the early stages of an attack. These high-priority models are continuously monitored and triaged by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection and Managed Detection & Response services, ensuring that subscribed customers are promptly alerted to emerging threats.

Figure 4: Darktrace detected an unusual ZIP file download alongside the anomalous script, followed by internal connectivity. This activity was correlated under an Enhanced Monitoring model.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Fortunately, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was fully configured, enabling it to take immediate action against the offending device by blocking any further connections external to the malicious endpoint, 173.44.141[.]89. Additionally, Darktrace enforced a ‘group pattern of life’ on the device, restricting its behavior to match other devices in its peer group, ensuring it could not deviate from expected activity, while also blocking connections over 443, shutting down any unwanted internal scanning.

Figure 5: Actions performed by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to contain the ongoing attack.

Conclusion

The rise of the MaaS ecosystem, coupled with attackers’ growing ability to customize tools and techniques for specific targets, is making intrusion prevention increasingly challenging for security teams. Many threat actors now leverage modular toolkits, dynamic infrastructure, and tailored payloads to evade static defenses and exploit even minor visibility gaps. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its capability to counter these evolving tactics by identifying early-stage attack chain behaviors such as network scanning and the initial infection attempt. Autonomous Response then blocked the CastleLoader IP delivering the malicious ZIP payload, halting the attack before escalation and protecting the organization from a potentially damaging multi-stage compromise

Credit to Ahmed Gardezi (Cyber Analyst) Tyler Rhea (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections
Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T15588.001 - Resource Development – Malware
TG1599 – Defence Evasion – Network Boundary Bridging
T1046 – Discovery – Network Service Scanning
T1189 – Initial Access

List of IoCs
IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

173.44.141[.]89 – IP – CastleLoader C2 Infrastructure
173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_5x.bin – URI – CastleLoader Script
173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_6x.bin – URI - CastleLoader Script
wsc.zip – ZIP file – Possible Payload

References

[1] - https://blog.polyswarm.io/castleloader

[2] - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/from-castleloader-to-castlerat-tag-150-advances-operations

[3] - https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/34160-castleloader-malware

[4] - https://www.scworld.com/brief/malware-loader-castleloader-targets-devices-via-fake-github-clickfix-phishing

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/173.44.141.89/community

[6] https://thehackernews.com/2025/07/castleloader-malware-infects-469.html

[7] https://www.cryptika.com/new-castleloader-attack-using-cloudflare-themed-clickfix-technique-to-infect-windows-computers/

[8] https://www.cryptika.com/castlebot-malware-as-a-service-deploys-range-of-payloads-linked-to-ransomware-attacks/

About the author

Tyler Rhea

Senior Cyber Analyst

Blog

Compliance

November 26, 2025

UK Cyber Security & Resilience Bill: What Organizations Need to Know

Why the Bill has been introduced

The UK’s cyber threat landscape has evolved dramatically since the 2018 NIS regime was introduced. Incidents such as the Synnovis attack against hospitals and the British Library ransomware attack show how quickly operational risk can become public harm. In this context, the UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology estimates that cyber-attacks cost UK businesses around £14.7 billion each year.

At the same time, the widespread adoption of AI has expanded organisations’ attack surfaces and empowered threat actors to launch more effective and sophisticated activities, including crafting convincing phishing campaigns, exploiting vulnerabilities and initiating ransomware attacks at unprecedented speed and scale.

The CSRB responds to these challenges by widening who is regulated, accelerating incident reporting and tightening supply chain accountability, while enabling rapid updates that keep pace with technology and emerging risks.

Key provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill

A wider set of organisations in scope

The Bill significantly broadens the range of organisations regulated under the NIS framework.

Managed service providers (MSPs) - medium and large MSPs, including MSSPs, managed SOCs, SIEM providers and similar services,will now fall under NIS obligations due to their systemic importance and privileged access to client systems. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) will act as the regulator. Government analysis anticipates that a further 900 to 1,100 MSPs will be in scope.
Data infrastructure is now recognised as essential to the functioning of the economy and public services. Medium and large data centres, as well as enterprise facilities meeting specified thresholds, will be required to implement appropriate and proportionate measures to manage cyber risk. Oversight will be shared between DSIT and Ofcom, with Ofcom serving as the operational regulator.
Organisations that manage electrical loads for smart appliances, such as those supporting EV charging during peak times, are now within scope.

These additions sit alongside existing NIS-regulated sectors such as transport, energy, water, health, digital infrastructure, and certain digital services (including online marketplaces, search engines, and cloud computing).

Stronger supply chain requirements

Under the CSRB, regulators can now designate third-party suppliers as ‘designated critical suppliers’ (DCS) when certain threshold criteria are met and where disruption could have significant knock-on effects. Designated suppliers will be subject to the same security and incident-reporting obligations as Operators of Essential Services (OES) and Relevant Digital Service Providers (RDSPs).

Government will scope the supply chain duties for OES and RDSPs via secondary legislation, following consultation. infrastructure incidents where a single supplier’s compromise caused widespread disruption.

Faster incident reporting

Sector-specific regulators, 12 in total, will be responsible for implementing the CSRB, allowing for more effective and consistent reporting. In addition, the CSRB introduces a two-stage reporting process and expands incident reporting criteria. Regulated entities must submit an initial notification within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, followed by an incident report within 72 hours. Incident reporting criteria are also broadened to capture incidents beyond those which actually resulted in an interruption, ensuring earlier visibility for regulators and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). The importance of information sharing across agencies, law enforcement and regulators is also facilitated by the CSRB.

The reforms also require data centres and managed service providers to notify affected customers where they are likely to have been impacted by a cyber incident.

An agile regulatory framework

To keep pace with technological change, the CSRB will enable the Secretary of State to update elements of the framework via secondary legislation. Supporting materials such as the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) are to be "put on a stronger footing” allowing for requirements to be more easily followed, managed and updated. Regulators will also now be able to recover full costs associated with NIS duties meaning they are better resourced to carry out their associated responsibilities.

Relevant Managed Service Providers must identify and take appropriate and proportionate measures to manage risks to the systems they rely on for providing services within the UK. Importantly, these measures must, having regard to the state of the art, ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk posed, and prevent or minimise the impact of incidents.

The Secretary of State will also be empowered to issue a Statement of Strategic Priorities, setting cross-regime outcomes to drive consistency across the 12 competent authorities responsible for implementation.

Penalties

The enforcement framework will be strengthened, with maximum fines aligned with comparable regimes such as the GDPR, which incorporate maximums tied to turnover. Under the CSRB, maximum penalties for more serious breaches could be up to £17 million or 4% of global turnover, whichever is higher.

Next steps

The Bill is expected to progress through Parliament over the course of 2025 and early 2026, with Royal Assent anticipated in 2026. Once enacted, most operational measures will not take immediate effect. Instead, Government will bring key components into force through secondary legislation following further consultation, providing regulators and industry with time to adjust practices and prepare for compliance.

Anticipated timeline

2025-2026: Parliamentary scrutiny and passage;
2026: Royal Assent;
2026 consultation: DSIT intends to consult on detailed implementation;
From 2026 onwards: Phased implementation via secondary legislation, following further consultation led by DSIT.

How Darktrace can help

The CSRB represents a step change in how the UK approaches digital risk, shifting the focus from compliance to resilience.

Darktrace can help organisations operationalise this shift by using AI to detect, investigate and respond to emerging threats at machine speed, before they escalate into incidents requiring regulatory notification. Proactive tools which can be included in the Darktrace platform allow security teams to stress-test defences, map supply chain exposure and rehearse recovery scenarios, directly supporting the CSRB’s focus on resilience, transparency and rapid response. If an incident does occur, Darktrace’s autonomous agent, Cyber AI Analyst, can accelerate investigations and provide a view of every stage of the attack chain, supporting timely reporting.

Darktrace’s AI can provide organisations with a vital lens into both internal and external cyber risk. By continuously learning patterns of behaviour across interconnected systems, Darktrace can flag potential compromise or disruption to detect supply chain risk before it impacts your organisation.

In a landscape where compliance and resilience go hand in hand, Darktrace can equip organisations to stay ahead of both evolving threats and evolving regulatory requirements.

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Understanding and Mitigating Sectop RAT

Introduction

What is SectopRAT?

Darktrace Coverage

Conclusion

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detection:

List of IoCs

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

References

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery System

UK Cyber Security & Resilience Bill: What Organizations Need to Know

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November 26, 2025

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery System

What is TAG-150?

What are CastleLoader and CastleRAT?

How are they deployed?

Darktrace Coverage

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Conclusion

Appendices

References

Blog

Compliance

November 26, 2025

UK Cyber Security & Resilience Bill: What Organizations Need to Know

Why the Bill has been introduced

Key provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill

A wider set of organisations in scope

Stronger supply chain requirements

Faster incident reporting

An agile regulatory framework

Penalties

Next steps

Anticipated timeline

How Darktrace can help