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December 9, 2024

Darktrace’s view on Operation Lunar Peek: Exploitation of Palo Alto firewall devices (CVE 2024-0012 and 2024-9474)

Darktrace’s Threat Research team investigated a major campaign exploiting vulnerabilities in Palo Alto firewall devices (CVE 2024-0012 and 2024-9474). Learn about the spike in post-exploitation activities and understand the need for anomaly-based detection to stay ahead of evolving threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Adam Potter
Senior Cyber Analyst
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09
Dec 2024

Introduction: Spike in exploitation and post-exploitation activity affecting Palo Alto firewall devices

As the first line of defense for many organizations, perimeter devices such as firewalls are frequently targeted by threat actors. If compromised, these devices can serve as the initial point of entry to the network, providing access to vulnerable internal resources. This pattern of malicious behavior has become readily apparent within the Darktrace customer base. In 2024, Darktrace Threat Research analysts identified and investigated at least two major campaigns targeting internet-exposed perimeter devices. These included the exploitation of PAN-OS firewall exploitation via CVE 2024-3400 and FortiManager appliances via CVE 2024-47575.

More recently, at the end of November, Darktrace analysts observed a spike in exploitation and post-exploitation activity affecting, once again, Palo Alto firewall devices in the days following the disclosure of the CVE 2024-0012 and CVE-2024-9474 vulnerabilities.

Threat Research analysts had already been investigating potential exploitation of the firewalls’ management interface after Palo Alto published a security advisory (PAN-SA-2024-0015) on November 8. Subsequent analysis of data from Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) and external research uncovered multiple cases of Palo Alto firewalls being targeted via the likely exploitation of these vulnerabilities since November 13, through the end of the month. Although this spike in anomalous behavior may not be attributable to a single malicious actor, Darktrace Threat Research identified a clear increase in PAN-OS exploitation across the customer base by threat actors likely utilizing the recently disclosed vulnerabilities, resulting in broad patterns of post-exploitation activity.

How did exploitation occur?

CVE 2024-0012 is an authentication bypass vulnerability affecting unpatched versions of Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewalls. The vulnerability resides in the management interface application on the firewalls specifically, which is written in PHP. When attempting to access highly privileged scripts, users are typically redirected to a login page. However, this can be bypassed by supplying an HTTP request where a Palo Alto related authentication header can be set to “off”.  Users can supply this header value to the Nginx reverse proxy server fronting the application which will then send it without any prior processing [1].

CVE-2024-9474 is a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows a PAN-OS administrator with access to the management web interface to execute root-level commands, granting full control over the affected device [2]. When combined, these vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated adversaries to execute arbitrary commands on the firewall with root privileges.

Post-Exploitation Patterns of Activity

Darktrace Threat Research analysts examined potential indicators of PAN-OS software exploitation via CVE 2024-0012 and CVE-2024-9474 during November 2024. The investigation identified three main groupings of post-exploitation activity:

  1. Exploit validation and initial payload retrieval
  2. Command and control (C2) connectivity, potentially featuring further binary downloads
  3. Potential reconnaissance and cryptomining activity

Exploit Validation

Across multiple investigated customers, Darktrace analysts identified likely vulnerable PAN-OS devices conducting external network connectivity to bin services. Specifically, several hosts performed DNS queries for, and HTTP requests to Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domains, such as csv2im6eq58ujueonqs0iyq7dqpak311i.oast[.]pro. These endpoints are commonly used by network administrators to harden defenses, but they are increasingly used by threat actors to verify successful exploitation of targeted devices and assess their potential for further compromise. Although connectivity involving OAST domains were prevalent across investigated incidents, this activity was not necessarily the first indicator observed. In some cases, device behavior involving OAST domains also occurred shortly after an initial payload was downloaded.

Darktrace model alert logs detailing the HTTP request to an OAST domain immediately following PAN-OS device compromise.
Figure 1: Darktrace model alert logs detailing the HTTP request to an OAST domain immediately following PAN-OS device compromise.

Initial Payload Retrieval

Following successful exploitation, affected devices commonly performed behaviors indicative of initial payload download, likely in response to incoming remote command execution. Typically, the affected PAN-OS host would utilize the command line utilities curl and Wget, seen via use of user agents curl/7.61.1 and Wget/1.19.5 (linux-gnu), respectively.

In some cases, the use of these command line utilities by the infected devices was considered new behavior. Given the nature of the user agents, interaction with the host shell suggests remote command execution to achieve the outgoing payload requests.

While additional binaries and scripts were retrieved in later stages of the post-exploitation activity in some cases, this set of behaviors and payloads likely represent initial persistence and execution mechanisms that will enable additional functionality later in the kill chain. During the investigation, Darktrace analysts noted the prevalence of shell script payload requests. Devices analyzed would frequently make HTTP requests over the usual destination port 80 using the command line URL utility (curl), as seen in the user-agent field.

The observed URIs often featured requests for text files, such as “1.txt”, or shell scripts such as “y.sh”. Although packet capture (PCAP) samples were unavailable for review, external researchers have noted that the IP address hosting such “1.txt” files (46.8.226[.]75) serves malicious PHP payloads. When examining the contents of the “y.sh” shell script, Darktrace analysts noticed the execution of bash commands to upload a PHP-written web shell on the affected server.

PCAP showing the client request and server response associated with the download of the y.sh script from 45.76.141[.]166. The body content of the HTTP response highlights a shebang command to run subsequent code as bash script. The content is base64 encoded and details PHP script for what appears to be a webshell that will likely be written to the firewall device.
Figure 2: PCAP showing the client request and server response associated with the download of the y.sh script from 45.76.141[.]166. The body content of the HTTP response highlights a shebang command to run subsequent code as bash script. The content is base64 encoded and details PHP script for what appears to be a webshell that will likely be written to the firewall device.

While not all investigated cases saw initial shell script retrieval, affected systems would commonly make an external HTTP connection, almost always via Wget, for the Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) file “/palofd” from the rare external IP  38.180.147[.]18.

Such requests were frequently made without prior hostname lookups, suggesting that the process or script initiating the requests already contained the external IP address. Analysts noticed a consistent SHA1 hash present for all identified instances of “/palofd” downloads (90f6890fa94b25fbf4d5c49f1ea354a023e06510). Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors have associated this hash sample with Spectre RAT, a remote access trojan with capabilities including remote command execution, payload delivery, process manipulation, file transfers, and data theft [3][4].

Figure 3: Advanced Search log metrics highlighting details of the “/palofd” file download over HTTP.

Several targeted customer devices were observed initiating TLS/SSL connections to rare external IPs with self-signed TLS certificates following exploitation. Model data from across the Darktrace fleet indicated some overlap in JA3 fingerprints utilized by affected PAN-OS devices engaging in the suspicious TLS activity. Although JA3 hashes alone cannot be used for process attribution, this evidence suggests some correlation of source process across instances of PAN-OS exploitation.

These TLS/SSL sessions were typically established without the specification of a Server Name Indication (SNI) within the TLS extensions. The SNI extension prevents servers from supplying an incorrect certificate to the requesting client when multiple sites are hosted on the same IP. SSL connectivity without SNI specification suggests a potentially malicious running process as most software establishing TLS sessions typically supply this information during the handshake. Although the encrypted nature of the connection prevented further analysis of the payload packets, external sources note that JavaScript content is transmitted during these sessions, serving as initial payloads for the Sliver C2 platform using Wget [5].

C2 Communication and Additional Payloads

Following validation and preliminary post-compromise actions, examined hosts would commonly initiate varying forms of C2 connectivity. During this time, devices were frequently detected making further payload downloads, likely in response to directives set within C2 communications.

Palo Alto firewalls likely exploited via the newly disclosed CVEs would commonly utilize the Sliver C2 platform for external communication. Sliver’s functionality allows for different styles and formatting for communication. An open-source alternative to Cobalt Strike, this framework has been increasingly popular among threat actors, enabling the generation of dynamic payloads (“slivers”) for multiple platforms, including Windows, MacOS, Linux.

These payloads allow operators to establish persistence, spawn new shells, and exfiltrate data. URI patterns and PCAPs analysis yielded evidence of both English word type encoding within Sliver and Gzip formatting.

For example, multiple devices contacted the Sliver-linked IP address 77.221.158[.]154 using HTTP to retrieve Gzip files. The URIs present for these requests follow known Sliver Gzip formatted communication patterns [6]. Investigations yielded evidence of both English word encoding within Sliver, identified through PCAP analysis, and Gzip formatting.

Sample of URIs observed in Advanced Searchhighlighting HTTP requests to 77.221.158[.]154 for Gzip content suggest of Sliver communication.
Figure 4: Sample of URIs observed in Advanced Searchhighlighting HTTP requests to 77.221.158[.]154 for Gzip content suggest of Sliver communication.
PCAP showing English word encoding for Sliver communication observed during post-exploitation C2 activity.
Figure 5: PCAP showing English word encoding for Sliver communication observed during post-exploitation C2 activity.

External connectivity during this phase also featured TCP connection attempts over uncommon ports for common application protocols. For both Sliver and non-Sliver related IP addresses, devices utilized destination ports such as 8089, 3939, 8880, 8084, and 9999 for the HTTP protocol. The use of uncommon destination ports may represent attempts to avoid detection of connectivity to rare external endpoints. Moreover, some external beaconing within included URIs referencing the likely IP of the affected device. Such behavior can suggest the registration of compromised devices with command servers.

Targeted devices also proceeded to download additional payloads from rare external endpoints as beaconing/C2 activity was ongoing. For example, the newly registered domain repositorylinux[.]org (IP: 103.217.145[.]112) received numerous HTTP GET requests from investigated devices throughout the investigation period for script files including “linux.sh” and “cron.sh”. Young domains, especially those that present as similar to known code repositories, tend to host harmful content. Packet captures of the cron.sh file reveal commands within the HTTP body content involving crontab operations, likely to schedule future downloads. Some hosts that engaged in connectivity to the fake repository domain were later seen conducting crypto-mining connections, potentially highlighting the download of miner applications from the domain.

Additional payloads observed during this time largely featured variations of shell scripts, PHP content, and/or executables. Typically, shell scripts direct the device to retrieve additional content from external servers or repositories or contain potential configuration details for subsequent binaries to run on the device. For example, the “service.sh” retrieves a tar-compressed archive, a configuration JSON file as well as a file with the name “solr” from GitHub, potentially associated with the Apache Solr tool used for enterprise search. These could be used for further enumeration of the host and/or the network environment. PHP scripts observed may involve similar web shell functionality and were retrieved from both rare external IPs identified as well by external researchers [7]. Darktrace also detected the download of octet-stream data occurring mid-compromise from an Amazon Web Services (AWS) S3 bucket. Although no outside research confirmed the functionality, additional executable downloads for files such as “/initd”(IP: 178.215.224[.]246) and “/x6” (IP: 223.165.4[.]175) may relate to tool ingress, further Trojan/backdoor functionality, or cryptocurrency mining.

Figure 7: PCAP specifying the HTTP response headers and body content for the service.sh file request. The body content shown includes variable declarations for URLs that will eventually be called by the device shell via bash command.

Reconnaissance and Cryptomining

Darktrace analysts also noticed additional elements of kill chain operations from affected devices after periods of initial exploit activity. Several devices initiated TCP connections to endpoints affiliated with cryptomining pools such as us[.]zephyr[.]herominers[.]com and  xmrig[.]com. Connectivity to these domains indicates likely successful installation of mining software during earlier stages of post-compromise activity. In a small number of instances, Darktrace observed reconnaissance and lateral movement within the time range of PAN-OS exploitation. Firewalls conducted large numbers of internal connectivity attempts across several critical ports related to privileged protocols, including SMB and SSH. Darktrace detected anonymous NTLM login attempts and new usage of potential PAN-related credentials. These behaviors likely constitute attempts at lateral movement to adjacent devices to further extend network compromise impact.

Model alert connection logs detailing the uncommon failed NTLM logins using an anonymous user account following PAN-OS exploitation.
Figure 8: Model alert connection logs detailing the uncommon failed NTLM logins using an anonymous user account following PAN-OS exploitation.

Conclusion

Darktrace Threat Research and SOC analysts increasingly detect spikes in malicious activity on internet-facing devices in the days following the publication of new vulnerabilities. The latest iteration of this trend highlighted how threat actors quickly exploited Palo Alto firewall using authentication bypass and remote command execution vulnerabilities to enable device compromise. A review of the post-exploitation activity during these events reveals consistent patterns of perimeter device exploitation, but also some distinct variations.

Prior campaigns targeting perimeter devices featured activity largely confined to the exfiltration of configuration data and some initial payload retrieval. Within the current campaign, analysts identified a broader scope post-compromise activity consisting not only of payloads downloads but also extensive C2 activity, reconnaissance, and coin mining operations. While the use of command line tools like curl featured prominently in prior investigations, devices were seen retrieving a generally wider array of payloads during the latest round of activity. The use of the Sliver C2 platform further differentiates the latest round of PAN-OS compromises, with evidence of Sliver activity in about half of the investigated cases.

Several of the endpoints contacted by the infected firewall devices did not have any OSINT associated with them at the time of the attack. However, these indicators were noted as unusual for the devices according to Darktrace based on normal network traffic patterns. This reality further highlights the need for anomaly-based detection that does not rely necessarily on known indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with CVE exploitation for detection. Darktrace’s experience in 2024 of multiple rounds of perimeter device exploitation may foreshadow future increases in these types of comprise operations.  

Credit to Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst), Alexandra Sentenac (Senior Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Principal Cyber Analyst) and the Darktrace Threat Research team.

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References

[1]: https://labs.watchtowr.com/pots-and-pans-aka-an-sslvpn-palo-alto-pan-os-cve-2024-0012-and-cve-2024-9474/

[2]: https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-9474

[3]: https://threatfox.abuse[.]ch/ioc/1346254/

[4]:https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4911396d80baff80826b96d6ea7e54758847c93fdbcd3b86b00946cfd7d1145b/detection

[5]: https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-threat-campaign-targeting-palo-alto-networks-firewall-devices/

[6] https://www.immersivelabs.com/blog/detecting-and-decrypting-sliver-c2-a-threat-hunters-guide

[7] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-threat-campaign-targeting-palo-alto-networks-firewall-devices/

Appendices

Darktrace Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port  

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Incoming ELF File

Anomalous File / Mismatched MIME Type From Rare Endpoint

Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download

Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days

Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services

Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to New IP

Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behavior

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2

Compromise / Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Device / New User Agent

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique

INITIAL ACCESS – Exploit Public-Facing Application

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT – Malware

EXECUTION – Scheduled Task/Job (Cron)

EXECUTION – Unix Shell

PERSISTENCE – Web Shell

DEFENSE EVASION – Masquerading (Masquerade File Type)

DEFENSE EVASION - Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

CREDENTIAL ACCESS – Brute Force

DISCOVERY – Remote System Discovery

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Ingress Tool Transfer

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Application Layer Protocol (Web Protocols)

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Encrypted Channel

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Non-Standard Port

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Data Obfuscation

IMPACT – Resource Hijacking (Compute)

List of IoCs

IoC         –          Type         –        Description

  • sys.traceroute[.]vip     – Hostname - C2 Endpoint
  • 77.221.158[.]154     – IP - C2 Endpoint
  • 185.174.137[.]26     – IP - C2 Endpoint
  • 93.113.25[.]46     – IP - C2 Endpoint
  • 104.131.69[.]106     – IP - C2 Endpoint
  • 95.164.5[.]41     – IP - C2 Endpoint
  • bristol-beacon-assets.s3.amazonaws[.]com     – Hostname - Payload Server
  • img.dxyjg[.]com     – Hostname - Payload Server
  • 38.180.147[.]18     – IP - Payload Server
  • 143.198.1[.]178     – IP - Payload Server
  • 185.208.156[.]46     – IP - Payload Server
  • 185.196.9[.]154     – IP - Payload Server
  • 46.8.226[.]75     – IP - Payload Server
  • 223.165.4[.]175     – IP - Payload Server
  • 188.166.244[.]81     – IP - Payload Server
  • bristol-beaconassets.s3[.]amazonaws[.]com/Y5bHaYxvd84sw     – URL - Payload
  • img[.]dxyjg[.]com/KjQfcPNzMrgV     – URL - Payload
  • 38.180.147[.]18/palofd     – URL - Payload
  • 90f6890fa94b25fbf4d5c49f1ea354a023e06510     – SHA1 - Associated to file /palofd
  • 143.198.1[.]178/7Z0THCJ     – URL - Payload
  • 8d82ccdb21425cf27b5feb47d9b7fb0c0454a9ca     – SHA1 - Associated to file /7Z0THCJ
  • fefd0f93dcd6215d9b8c80606327f5d3a8c89712     – SHA1 - Associated to file /7Z0THCJ
  • e5464f14556f6e1dd88b11d6b212999dd9aee1b1     – SHA1 - Associated to file /7Z0THCJ
  • 143.198.1[.]178/o4VWvQ5pxICPm     – URL - Payload
  • 185.208.156[.]46/lUuL095knXd62DdR6umDig     – URL - Payload
  • 185.196.9[.]154/ykKDzZ5o0AUSfkrzU5BY4w     – URL - Payload
  • 46.8.226[.]75/1.txt     – URL - Payload
  • 223.165.4[.]175/x6     – URL - Payload
  • 45.76.141[.]166/y.sh     – URL - Payload
  • repositorylinux[.]org/linux.sh     – URL - Payload
  • repositorylinux[.]org/cron.sh     – URL - Payload

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Adam Potter
Senior Cyber Analyst

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November 17, 2026

GTA VI Cyber Threats: Fake downloads, ransomware and account hijacking

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Key findings

  • Darktrace detected GTA VI-themed suspicious activity across organizations in multiple sectors ahead of the game’s release, showing how malicious gaming content can reach corporate environments outside the gaming industry.
  • Twelve Darktrace customer environments connected to gta6demo[.]asia, a domain that public threat research has associated with a fake GTA VI demo used to distribute the Vidar infostealer. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.

·       Darktrace investigated ransomware activity at two European games companies. One incident involved DireWolf ransomware alongside reported data exfiltration. A separate Qilin incident included Active Directory reconnaissance, new administrative credentials, possible lateral movement and substantial cloud-storage transfers before ransomware deployment.

  • Another incident on a gaming organization involved a SaaS account hijack in which a compromised account authenticated from unusual IP addresses, created a new privileged account and subsequently sent a high volume of suspected malicious email. An administrative account later authenticated from rare endpoints.

GTA VI gives criminals an audience

Grand Theft Auto VI arrives on November 19 with the kind of attention few entertainment releases command [1]. Before launch, that interest is already being exploited by sites offering supposed demos and downloads.

During September and October 2026, Darktrace detected devices across multiple customer environments connecting to GTA VI-themed sites associated with suspicious activity. The organizations involved were spread across EMEA and the Americas and included Manufacturing, Finance, and Public administration and defense sectors.

Darktrace has also investigated multiple incidents affecting gaming organizations including ransomware and a SaaS account hijack. Those investigations show a separate side of the threat: attackers operating inside corporate infrastructure and accounts, sometimes well before the eventual impact becomes apparent.

Following a fake GTA VI download

On October 7, 2026, Darktrace detected a device making suspicious DNS requests for gta6-play[.]ru, an unofficial Russian-language GTA VI site that had also been flagged as likely malicious in open-source intelligence (OSINT).

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Figure 1: A screenshot of the suspicious endpoint gta6-play[.]ru .

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Figure 2: A screenshot of a “Download Studio” endpoint led to on gta6-play[.]ru.

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The site advertised a GTA VI download. The site led to a separate “Download Studio” page offering a Windows executable. Analysis found the file was packaged using InstallMate, a commercial installation framework, with an embedded .tsuarch section containing a compressed tiz3 archive.


Further examination identified functionality designed to inspect the environment in which the installer was running. This included checking registry entries for installed software and disk devices, enumerating network adapters, inspecting MAC addresses, and searching for running processes and window titles.


The installer also searched for processes associated with virtualization, debugging, and network analysis, including VMware and VirtualBox components, alongside debugging and monitoring utilities such as OllyDbg, WinDbg, Process Hacker, Process Monitor, Wireshark and Fiddler.

The presence of those checks did not prove that the executable was malicious. The installer contained functionality capable of extracting embedded files, but the investigation did not establish that it was being used to deploy a malicious payload. No definitive malicious payload or command-and-control infrastructure was identified. The software appeared to be InstallRex, which is classified by several security vendors as a potentially unwanted program.

That is still a useful finding; A user looking for GTA VI content could move from an unofficial gaming site to an executable that inspected the local environment, including checking for software commonly used by security researchers.

A second GTA VI lure appeared across twelve organizations

During September 2026, Darktrace alerted on HTTP connections to gta6demo[.]asia across twelve customer environments. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.

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Figure 3: An example model alert generated due to a suspicious connection to gta6demo[.]asia.

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In a case affecting a UK-based customer, Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst further investigated connections to gta6demo[.]asia and generated an incident due to the highly suspicious nature of the behavior.

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Figure 4: A Real-Time AI Analyst incident highlighting the suspicious activity for further investigation

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Public threat research has associated gta6demo[.]asia with a campaign advertising a fake GTA VI demo. Users clicking "Play Now" were reportedly directed towards an executable containing the Vidar infostealer [2].

There is a practical difference between this activity and an attack against a games company. The users encountering GTA VI-themed infrastructure can work anywhere. Darktrace saw the activity across several sectors outside Gaming, including Finance, Manufacturing, and Public administration and defense.

A major game release can therefore create security exposure well beyond its publisher. A search for a demo or unofficial download on a corporate device is enough to bring gaming-themed infrastructure into an enterprise environment.

Ransomware operators inside the gaming industry

The attacks Darktrace observed against Gaming companies themselves show different patterns.

In August 2026, Darktrace threat research identified possible malicious activity at a European game developer. Ransomware was ultimately deployed and data was exfiltrated, with the DireWolf ransomware group claiming responsibility.

Darktrace observed suspicious file downloads and beaconing from several devices to rare endpoints alongside Monero cryptocurrency mining, Active Directory and network reconnaissance, unusual administrative RDP connections, activity associated with data staging and HTTP-based exfiltration.

Much of the intrusion was therefore visible before ransomware appeared; the environment was already showing evidence of ingress tooling, external command-and-control communications (C2), reconnaissance, unusual administrative access and data movement.

A separate investigation in December 2025 provides a closer view of this pre-ransomware activity. A European games company was targeted by Qilin ransomware with Darktrace observing scanning and LDAP searches involving userAccountControl, which can expose information useful for identifying accounts and Service Principal Names within Active Directory.

New administrative credentials then appeared on a Domain Controller and the Domain Controller also generated scanning, anomalous RPC, SMB, and SSH activity, and NetShareEnum activity through srvsvc. Elsewhere in the environment, long Remote Desktop sessions and SMB enumeration appeared consistent with lateral movement.

Several devices also transferred data to cloud storage services including WebDrive and Amazon Web Services (AWS). In some cases, large downloads preceded subsequent uploads. Darktrace observed the transfer pattern, although the available telemetry does not establish that every transfer represented attacker-controlled exfiltration.

The activity preceding the Qilin deployment included Active Directory reconnaissance, privileged credential use, network and share enumeration, unusual remote access and significant data movement. Each appeared before ransomware became the defining feature of the incident.

SaaS hijacking shifts the attacker evidence

A separate investigation in May 2026 involved the hijacking of a SaaS account at a Gaming organization.

The compromised account authenticated from several IP addresses that were unusual for the organization. It then performed suspicious SaaS group administration, including creating a new privileged account. The account subsequently sent a high volume of emails assessed as likely malicious spam and potentially intended to compromise additional users.

The following day, an administrative SaaS account authenticated from rare endpoints, raising the possibility that further privileged access had been obtained.

The activity presented a different detection problem from the ransomware cases. Authentication from rare infrastructure, administrative changes, creation of a privileged account and subsequent email activity provided the strongest indications that a legitimate identity had been compromised.

For a Gaming company using hosted platforms for development, communication and business operations, a compromised account with the right permissions can provide considerable access without requiring the attacker to reproduce a conventional network intrusion.

Detecting the intrusion before impact

The ransomware investigations show why encryption should not be the first point at which an incident comes into focus. Darktrace observed LDAP and Active Directory-related reconnaissance, new privileged credentials, unusual Domain Controller activity, remote sessions, network enumeration and abnormal data movement before ransomware deployment.

The SaaS case produced different evidence: authentication from rare infrastructure, unexpected administrative changes and activity performed through a compromised account. GTA VI-themed activity required another approach again, following users through unofficial sites and redirects and examining the software offered for download.

GTA VI has put gaming back into the headlines ahead of its November release. The security activity around it is already visible beyond the games industry, while ransomware and account-compromise investigations show attackers operating inside gaming companies through very different routes.

For defenders, those routes leave evidence before the incident reaches its most damaging stage. The practical work is in recognizing those changes early enough to investigate them.

Credit to Gemma Stubberfield (Cyber Analyst), Ahmed Gardezi (Senior Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead), Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence)

References:

1.        https://www.rockstargames.com/VI

2.     https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/08/fake-gta-6-extended-look-and-demo-sites-deliver-an-infostealer

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Gemma Stubberfield
Cyber Analyst

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November 17, 2026

How Microsoft and Darktrace Secure the AI-Powered Enterprise

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When legitimate activity creates business risk

AI is making information more accessible and enabling autonomous agents to act across enterprise systems. But legitimate access can still result in sensitive-data exposure, unintended actions, or activity that deviates from business expectations.

Microsoft's evolving security strategy recognizes this shift, emphasizing continuous risk assessment, stronger identity protection, and security that adapts as AI systems operate. For enterprises, the challenge is increasingly about recognizing when trusted activity introduces risk, even when existing controls are functioning as intended.

Where global intelligence meets deep business context

Microsoft brings global threat intelligence and comprehensive security capabilities, helping organizations protect identities, data, applications, and infrastructure. Its integrated approach connects security signals, governance, detection, and response across increasingly complex environments.

Darktrace complements these strengths with deep, organization-specific behavioral understanding. Powered by Adaptive AI, Darktrace continuously learns the patterns and relationships unique to each business, developing a Unique Behavioral Profile for each organization that helps distinguish meaningful threats from legitimate activity. By connecting identity, activity, context, and intent, it adds another dimension to security intelligence.

Together, Microsoft and Darktrace combine global intelligence with deeper knowledge of how each customer operates. Through supported integrations, this behavioral context enriches existing Microsoft security workflows, enabling more informed investigations and precise response.

This complementary approach extends across three interconnected areas of enterprise security- AI, People and Infrastructure. From understanding how AI and agents operate to protecting trusted communications and the infrastructure businesses depend on, Darktrace strengthens Microsoft's security capabilities with behavioral insight specific to each organization.

Understanding AI beyond permissions and policies

As AI moves into business-critical operations, security teams need to understand more than which applications and agents are approved. They need visibility into how AI is used, what information it accesses, and whether its actions remain aligned with business intent.

Microsoft provides extensive AI development, governance, and security capabilities. Darktrace / SECURE AI complements these with behavioral analysis across Shadow AI, prompts, agent identities and actions, and development risk. Policy Manager helps evaluate activity against organizational AI policies, while the announced integration with Microsoft Agent 365 is designed to enrich agent risk assessments with organization-specific behavioral signals. Together, these capabilities help organizations scale AI adoption with greater confidence.

Recognizing risk within trusted relationships

Sophisticated threats increasingly exploit established business relationships, familiar communications, and legitimate accounts. A message from a trusted supplier or an action taken through an authorized identity may appear routine until considered against the organization's normal behavior.

Darktrace / EMAIL complements Microsoft's native email, identity, and data protection capabilities by understanding how people and organizations communicate. This enables more precise detection of targeted phishing, business email compromise, account takeover, and data loss, supported by proportionate response. Integrations such as Unified Quarantine within Microsoft Defender for Office 365 bring this additional protection into existing security workflows.

Seeing the bigger picture behind an attack across domains

Threats rarely unfold within a single security domain. Suspicious identity activity, unexpected cloud connections, and unusual network behavior may appear unrelated until the relationships between them reveal a developing attack.

Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK complements Microsoft's security capabilities with organization-specific behavioral detection across network, cloud, identity, and operational technology. Real-Time AI Analyst, including Cyber AI Analyst, connects related activity into investigated incidents that can be delivered into Microsoft Sentinel, helping security teams accelerate investigations and support targeted containment across the hybrid enterprise.

Turning security intelligence into business confidence

As AI becomes more deeply integrated into business operations, organizations need security that understands not only what technology can access, but how it behaves within their unique environment.

Microsoft and Darktrace bring complementary strengths to that challenge. By connecting global threat intelligence and integrated security capabilities with deep behavioral understanding, the partnership helps organizations recognize emerging risks, respond with greater precision, and strengthen their existing security investments.

The opportunity is to turn security intelligence into meaningful business context, enabling organizations to innovate and operate AI with confidence.

Darktrace named a 2026 Microsoft Partner of the Year Finalist for ISV Innovation

Darktrace has been named a finalist for the 2026 Microsoft Partner of the Year Award in the ISV Innovation category.  

This recognition reflects our collaboration with Microsoft to bring business context to enterprise security. By connecting Microsoft's global threat intelligence and integrated security capabilities with Darktrace's deep behavioral understanding, we help organizations recognize emerging risks and respond with greater precision across AI, People and Infrastructure.

Thank you to Microsoft, our customers, and our teams for their continued collaboration.

Meet Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite and the Microsoft Frontier Tour

Explore how Darktrace and Microsoft are bringing behavioral security to AI, people, and infrastructure.

Join Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite in San Francisco, November 17–19, or connect with our experts as we join the Microsoft Frontier Tour across 21 cities worldwide.

Meet Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite

Connect with Darktrace at the Microsoft Frontier Tour

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About the author
Pallavi Singh
Senior Product Marketing Manager
Your data. Our AI.
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