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QakNote Infections: A Network-Based Exploration of Varied Attack Paths
In an ever-changing threat landscape, security vendors around the world are forced to quickly adapt, react, and respond to known attack vectors and threats. In the face of this, malicious actors are constantly looking for novel ways to gain access to networks. Whether that’s through new exploitations of network vulnerabilities or new delivery methods, attackers and their methods are continually evolving. Although it is valuable for organizations to leverage threat intelligence to keep abreast of known threats to their networks, intelligence alone is not enough to defend against increasingly versatile attackers. Having an autonomous decision maker able to detect and respond to emerging threats, even those employing novel or unknown techniques, is paramount to defend against network compromise.
At the end of January 2023, threat actors began to abuse OneNote attachments to deliver the malware strain, Qakbot, onto users' devices. Widespread adoption of this novel delivery method resulted in a surge in Qakbot infections across Darktrace's customer base between the end of January 2023 and the end of February 2023. Using its Self-Learning AI, Darktrace was able to uncover and respond to these so-called ‘QakNote’ infections as the new trend emerged. Darktrace detected and responded to the threat at multiple stages of the kill chain, preventing damaging and widespread compromise to customer networks.
Qakbot and The Recent Weaponization of OneNote
Qakbot first appeared in 2007 as a banking trojan designed to steal sensitive data such as banking credentials. Since then, Qakbot has evolved into a highly modular, multi-purpose tool, with backdoor, payload delivery, reconnaissance, lateral movement, and data exfiltration capabilities. Although Qakbot's primary delivery method has always been email-based, threat actors have been known to modify their email-based delivery methods of Qakbot in the face of changing circumstances. In the first half of 2022, Microsoft started rolling out versions of Office which block XL4 and VBA macros by default [1]/[2]/[3]. Prior to this change, Qakbot email campaigns typically consisted in the spreading of deceitful emails with Office attachments containing malicious macros. In the face of Microsoft's default blocking of macros, threat actors appeared to cease delivering Qakbot via Office attachments, and shifted to primarily using HTML attachments, through a method known as 'HTML smuggling' [4]/[5]. After the public disclosure [6] of the Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190) in Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) in May 2022, Qakbot actors were seen capitalizing on the vulnerability to facilitate their email-based delivery of Qakbot payloads [7]/[8]/[9].
Given the inclination of Qakbot actors to adapt their email-based delivery methods, it is no surprise that they were quick to capitalize on the novel OneNote-based delivery method which emerged in December 2022. Since December 2022, threat actors have been seen using OneNote attachments to deliver a variety of malware strains, ranging from Formbook [10] to AsynRAT [11] to Emotet [12]. The abuse of OneNote documents to deliver malware is made possible by the fact that OneNote allows for the embedding of executable file types such as HTA files, CMD files, and BAT files. At the end of January 2023, actors started to leverage OneNote attachments to deliver Qakbot [13]/[14]. The adoption of this novel delivery method by Qakbot actors resulted in a surge in Qakbot infections in the wider threat landscape and across the Darktrace customer base.
Observed Activity Chains
Between January 31 and February 24, 2023, Darktrace observed variations of the following pattern of activity across its customer base:
1. User's device contacts OneNote-related endpoint
2. User's device makes an external GET request with an empty Host header, a target URI whose final segment consists in 5 or 6 digits followed by '.dat', and a User-Agent header referencing either cURL or PowerShell. The GET request is responded to with a DLL file
3. User's device makes SSL connections over ports 443 and 2222 to unusual external endpoints, and makes TCP connections over port 65400 to 23.111.114[.]52
4. User's device makes SSL connections over port 443 to an external host named 'bonsars[.]com' (IP: 194.165.16[.]56) and TCP connections over port 443 to 78.31.67[.]7
5. User’s device makes call to Endpoint Mapper service on internal systems and then connects to the Service Control Manager (SCM)
6. User's device uploads files with algorithmically generated names and ‘.dll’ or ‘.dll.cfg’ file extensions to SMB shares on internal systems
7. User's device makes Service Control requests to the systems to which it uploaded ‘.dll’ and ‘.dll.cfg’ files
Further investigation of these chains of activity revealed that they were parts of Qakbot infections initiated via interactions with malicious OneNote attachments.
Delivery Phase
Users' interactions with malicious OneNote attachments, which were evidenced by devices' HTTPS connections to OneNote-related endpoints, such as 'www.onenote[.]com', 'contentsync.onenote[.]com', and 'learningtools.onenote[.]com', resulted in the retrieval of Qakbot DLLs from unusual, external endpoints. In some cases, the user's interaction with the malicious OneNote attachment caused their device to fetch a Qakbot DLL using cURL, whereas, in other cases, it caused their device to download a Qakbot DLL using PowerShell. These different outcomes reflected variations in the contents of the executable files embedded within the weaponized OneNote attachments. In addition to having cURL and PowerShell User-Agent headers, the HTTP requests triggered by interaction with these OneNote attachments had other distinctive features, such as empty host headers and target URIs whose last segment consists in 5 or 6 digits followed by '.dat'.
Command and Control Phase
After fetching Qakbot DLLs, users’ devices were observed making numerous SSL connections over ports 443 and 2222 to highly unusual, external endpoints, as well as large volumes of TCP connections over port 65400 to 23.111.114[.]52. These connections represented Qakbot-infected devices communicating with command and control (C2) infrastructure. Qakbot-infected devices were also seen making intermittent connections to legitimate endpoints, such as 'xfinity[.]com', 'yahoo[.]com', 'verisign[.]com', 'oracle[.]com', and 'broadcom[.]com', likely due to Qakbot making connectivity checks.
Cobalt Strike and VNC Phase
After Qakbot-infected devices established communication with C2 servers, they were observed making SSL connections to the external endpoint, bonsars[.]com, and TCP connections to the external endpoint, 78.31.67[.]7. The SSL connections to bonsars[.]com were C2 connections from Cobalt Strike Beacon, and the TCP connections to 78.31.67[.]7 were C2 connections from Qakbot’s Virtual Network Computing (VNC) module [15]/[16]. The occurrence of these connections indicate that actors leveraged Qakbot infections to drop Cobalt Strike Beacon along with a VNC payload onto infected systems. The deployment of Cobalt Strike and VNC likely provided actors with ‘hands-on-keyboard’ access to the Qakbot-infected systems.
Lateral Movement Phase
After dropping Cobalt Strike Beacon and a VNC module onto Qakbot-infected systems, actors leveraged their strengthened foothold to connect to the Service Control Manager (SCM) on internal systems in preparation for lateral movement. Before connecting to the SCM, infected systems were seen making calls to the Endpoint Mapper service, likely to identify exposed Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (MSRPC) services on internal systems. The MSRPC service, Service Control Manager (SCM), is known to be abused by Cobalt Strike to create and start services on remote systems. Connections to this service were evidenced by OpenSCManager2 (Opnum: 0x40) and OpenSCManagerW (Opnum: 0xf) calls to the svcctl RPC interface.
After connecting to the SCM on internal systems, infected devices were seen using SMB to distribute files with ‘.dll’ and ‘.dll.cfg’ extensions to SMB shares. These uploads were followed by CreateWowService (Opnum: 0x3c) calls to the svcctl interface, likely intended to execute the uploaded payloads. The naming conventions of the uploaded files indicate that they were Qakbot payloads.
Fortunately, none of the observed QakNote infections escalated further than this. If these infections had escalated, it is likely that they would have resulted in the widespread detonation of additional malicious payloads, such as ransomware.
Darktrace Coverage of QakNote Activity
Figure 1 shows the steps involved in the QakNote infections observed across Darktrace’s customer base. How far attackers got along this chain was in part determined by the following three factors:
- Whether the targeted customer had Darktrace/Email
- Whether the targeted customer had Darktrace RESPOND/Network
- Whether the targeted customer acted in response to Darktrace DETECT/Network alerts
The presence of Darktrace/Email typically stopped QakNote infections from moving past the initial infection stage. The presence of RESPOND/Network significantly slowed down observed activity chains, however, infections left unattended and not mitigated by the security teams were able to progress further along the attack chain.
Darktrace observed varying properties in the QakNote emails detected across the customer base. OneNote attachments were typically detected as either ‘application/octet-stream’ files or as ‘application/x-tar’ files. In some cases, the weaponized OneNote attachment embedded a malicious file, whereas in other cases, the OneNote file embedded a malicious link (typically a ‘.png’ or ‘.gif’ link) instead. In all cases Darktrace observed, QakNote emails used subject lines starting with ‘RE’ or ‘FW’ to manipulating their recipients into thinking that such emails were part of an existing email chain/thread. In some cases, emails impersonated users known to their recipients by including the names of such users in their header-from personal names. In many cases, QakNote emails appear to have originated from likely hijacked email accounts. These are highly successful methods of social engineering often employed by threat actors to exploit a user’s trust in known contacts or services, convincing them to open malicious emails and making it harder for security tools to detect.
The fact that observed QakNote emails used the fake-reply method, were sent from unknown email accounts, and contained attachments with unusual MIME types, caused such emails to breach the following Darktrace/Email models:
- Association / Unknown Sender
- Attachment / Unknown File
- Attachment / Unsolicited Attachment
- Attachment / Highly Unusual Mime
- Attachment / Unsolicited Anomalous Mime
- Attachment / Unusual Mime for Organisation
- Unusual / Fake Reply
- Unusual / Unusual Header TLD
- Unusual / Fake Reply + Unknown Sender
- Unusual / Unusual Connection from Unknown
- Unusual / Off Topic
QakNote emails impersonating known users also breached the following DETECT & RESPOND/Email models:
- Unusual / Unrelated Personal Name Address
- Spoof / Basic Known Entity Similarities
- Spoof / Internal User Similarities
- Spoof / External User Similarities
- Spoof / Internal User Similarities + Unrelated Personal Name Address
- Spoof / External User Similarities + Unrelated Personal Name Address
- Spoof / Internal User Similarities + Unknown File
- Spoof / External User Similarities + Fake Reply
- Spoof / Possible User Spoof from New Address - Enhanced Internal Similarities
- Spoof / Whale
The actions taken by Darktrace on the observed emails is ultimately determined by Darktrace/Email models are breached. Those emails which did not breach Spoofing models (due to lack of impersonation indicators) received the ‘Convert Attachment’ action. This action converts suspicious attachments into neutralized PDFs, in this case successfully unweaponizing the malicious OneNote attachments. QakNote emails which did breach Spoofing models (due to the presence of impersonation indicators) received the strongest possible action, ‘Hold Message’. This action prevents suspicious emails from reaching the recipients’ mailbox.
If threat actors managed to get past the first stage of the QakNote kill chain, likely due to the absence of appropriate email security tools, the execution of the subsequent steps resulted in strong intervention from Darktrace/Network.
Interactions with malicious OneNote attachments caused their devices to fetch a Qakbot DLL from a remote server via HTTP GET requests with an empty Host header and either a cURL or PowerShell User-Agent header. These unusual HTTP behaviors caused the following Darktrace/Network models to breach:
- Device / New User Agent
- Device / New PowerShell User Agent
- Device / New User Agent and New IP
- Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
- Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
- Anomalous File / Numeric File Download
- Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
- Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download
For customers with RESPOND/Network active, these breaches resulted in the following autonomous actions:
- Enforce group pattern of life for 30 minutes
- Enforce group pattern of life for 2 hours
- Block connections to relevant external endpoints over relevant ports for 2 hours
- Block all outgoing traffic for 10 minutes
Successful, uninterrupted downloads of Qakbot DLLs resulted in connections to Qakbot C2 servers, and subsequently to Cobalt Strike and VNC C2 connections. These C2 activities resulted in breaches of the following DETECT/Network models:
- Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External
- Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections
- Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
- Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
- Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
- Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
- Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
- Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
- Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
- Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise
For customers with RESPOND/Network active, these breaches caused RESPOND to autonomously perform the following actions:
- Block connections to relevant external endpoints over relevant ports for 1 hour
In cases where C2 connections were allowed to continue, actors attempted to move laterally through usage of SMB and Service Control Manager. This lateral movement activity caused the following DETECT/Network models to breach:
- Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
- Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
For customers with RESPOND/Network enabled, these breaches caused RESPOND to autonomously perform the following actions:
- Block connections to relevant internal endpoints over port 445 for 1 hour
The QakNote infections observed across Darktrace’s customer base involved several steps, each of which elicited alerts and autonomous preventative actions from Darktrace. By autonomously investigating the alerts from DETECT, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to connect the distinct steps of observed QakNote infections into single incidents. It then produced incident logs to present in-depth details of the activity it uncovered, provide full visibility for customer security teams.
Conclusion
Faced with the emerging threat of QakNote infections, Darktrace demonstrated its ability to autonomously detect and respond to arising threats in a constantly evolving threat landscape. The attack chains which Darktrace observed across its customer base involved the delivery of Qakbot via malicious OneNote attachments, the usage of ports 65400 and 2222 for Qakbot C2 communication, the usage of Cobalt Strike Beacon and VNC for ‘hands-on-keyboard’ activity, and the usage of SMB and Service Control Manager for lateral movement.
Despite the novelty of the OneNote-based delivery method, Darktrace was able to identify QakNote infections across its customer base at various stages of the kill chain, using its autonomous anomaly-based detection to identify unusual activity or deviations from expected behavior. When active, Darktrace/Email neutralized malicious QakNote attachments sent to employees. In cases where Darktrace/Email was not active, Darktrace/Network detected and slowed down the unusual network activities which inevitably ensued from Qakbot infections. Ultimately, this intervention from Darktrace’s products prevented infections from leading to further harmful activity, such as data exfiltration and the detonation of ransomware.
Darktrace is able to offer customers an unparalleled level of network security by combining both Darktrace/Network and Darktrace/Email, safeguarding both their email and network environments. With its suite of products, including DETECT and RESPOND, Darktrace can autonomously uncover threats to customer networks and instantaneously intervene to prevent suspicious activity leading to damaging compromises.
Appendices
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Initial Access:
T1566.001 – Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
Execution:
T1204.001 – User Execution: Malicious Link
T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File
T1569.002 – System Services: Service Execution
Lateral Movement:
T1021.002 – Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Command and Control:
T1573.002 – Encrypted Channel : Asymmetric Cryptography
T1571 – Non-Standard Port
T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer
T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1219 – Remote Access Software
List of IOCs
IP Addresses and/or Domain Names:
- 103.214.71[.]45 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 141.164.35[.]94 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 95.179.215[.]225 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 128.254.207[.]55 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 141.164.35[.]94 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 172.96.137[.]149 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 185.231.205[.]246 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 216.128.146[.]67 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 45.155.37[.]170 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 85.239.41[.]55 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 45.67.35[.]108 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 77.83.199[.]12 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 45.77.63[.]210 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 198.44.140[.]78 - Qakbot download infrastructure
- 47.32.78[.]150 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 197.204.13[.]52 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 68.108.122[.]180 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 2.50.48[.]213 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 66.180.227[.]60 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 190.206.75[.]58 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 109.150.179[.]236 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 86.202.48[.]142 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 143.159.167[.]159 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 5.75.205[.]43 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 184.176.35[.]223 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 208.187.122[.]74 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 23.111.114[.]52 - Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- 74.12.134[.]53 – Qakbot C2 infrastructure
- bonsars[.]com • 194.165.16[.]56 - Cobalt Strike C2 infrastructure
- 78.31.67[.]7 - VNC C2 infrastructure
Target URIs of GET Requests for Qakbot DLLs:
- /70802.dat
- /51881.dat
- /12427.dat
- /70136.dat
- /35768.dat
- /41981.dat
- /30622.dat
- /72286.dat
- /46557.dat
- /33006.dat
- /300332.dat
- /703558.dat
- /760433.dat
- /210/184/187737.dat
- /469/387/553748.dat
- /282/535806.dat
User-Agent Headers of GET Requests for Qakbot DLLs:
- curl/7.83.1
- curl/7.55.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.19041.2364
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.3770
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-GB) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.19041.2364
SHA256 Hashes of Downloaded Qakbot DLLs:
- 83e9bdce1276d2701ff23b1b3ac7d61afc97937d6392ed6b648b4929dd4b1452
- ca95a5dcd0194e9189b1451fa444f106cbabef3558424d9935262368dba5f2c6
- fa067ff1116b4c8611eae9ed4d59a19d904a8d3c530b866c680a7efeca83eb3d
- e6853589e42e1ab74548b5445b90a5a21ff0d7f8f4a23730cffe285e2d074d9e
- d864d93b8fd4c5e7fb136224460c7b98f99369fc9418bae57de466d419abeaf6
- c103c24ccb1ff18cd5763a3bb757ea2779a175a045e96acbb8d4c19cc7d84bea
Names of Internally Distributed Qakbot DLLs:
- rpwpmgycyzghm.dll
- rpwpmgycyzghm.dll.cfg
- guapnluunsub.dll
- guapnluunsub.dll.cfg
- rskgvwfaqxzz.dll
- rskgvwfaqxzz.dll.cfg
- hkfjhcwukhsy.dll
- hkfjhcwukhsy.dll.cfg
- uqailliqbplm.dll
- uqailliqbplm.dll.cfg
- ghmaorgvuzfos.dll
- ghmaorgvuzfos.dll.cfg
Links Found Within Neutralized QakNote Email Attachments:
- hxxps://khatriassociates[.]com/MBt/3.gif
- hxxps://spincotech[.]com/8CoBExd/3.gif
- hxxps://minaato[.]com/tWZVw/3.gif
- hxxps://famille2point0[.]com/oghHO/01.png
- hxxps://sahifatinews[.]com/jZbaw/01.png
- hxxp://87.236.146[.]112/62778.dat
- hxxp://87.236.146[.]112/59076.dat
- hxxp://185.231.205[.]246/73342.dat
References
[1] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/excel-blog/excel-4-0-xlm-macros-now-restricted-by-default-for-customer/ba-p/3057905
[2] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805
[3] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/security/internet-macros-blocked
[4] https://www.cyfirma.com/outofband/html-smuggling-a-stealthier-approach-to-deliver-malware/
[5] https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/html-smuggling-the-hidden-threat-in-your-inbox/
[6] https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
[7] https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4616/qakbot-delivered-through-cve-2022-30190-follina
[8] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28728
[9] https://darktrace.com/blog/qakbot-resurgence-evolving-along-with-the-emerging-threat-landscape
[10] https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
[11] https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/threat-insight/onenote-documents-increasingly-used-to-deliver-malware
[12] https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2023/03/emotet-onenote
[13] https://blog.cyble.com/2023/02/01/qakbots-evolution-continues-with-new-strategies/
[14] https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/02/06/qakbot-onenote-attacks/
[15] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/29210
[16] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/feb-wireshark-quiz-answers/
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Protecting Prospects: How Darktrace Detected an Account Hijack Within Days of Deployment
Cloud Migration Expanding the Attack Surface
Cloud migration is here to stay – accelerated by pandemic lockdowns, there has been an ongoing increase in the use of public cloud services, and Gartner has forecasted worldwide public cloud spending to grow around 20%, or by almost USD 600 billion [1], in 2023. With more and more organizations utilizing cloud services and moving their operations to the cloud, there has also been a corresponding shift in malicious activity targeting cloud-based software and services, including Microsoft 365, a prominent and oft-used Software-as-a-Service (SaaS).
With the adoption and implementation of more SaaS products, the overall attack surface of an organization increases – this gives malicious actors additional opportunities to exploit and compromise a network, necessitating proper controls to be in place. This increased attack surface can leave organization’s open to cyber risks like cloud misconfigurations, supply chain attacks and zero-day vulnerabilities [2]. In order to achieve full visibility over cloud activity and prevent SaaS compromise, it is paramount for security teams to deploy sophisticated security measures that are able to learn an organization’s SaaS environment and detect suspicious activity at the earliest stage.
Darktrace Immediately Detects Hijacked Account
In May 2023, Darktrace observed a chain of suspicious SaaS activity on the network of a customer who was about to begin their trial of Darktrace/Cloud™ and Darktrace/Email™. Despite being deployed on the network for less than a week, Darktrace DETECT™ recognized that the legitimate SaaS account, belonging to an executive at the organization, had been hijacked. Darktrace/Email was able to provide full visibility over inbound and outbound mail and identified that the compromised account was subsequently used to launch an internal spear-phishing campaign.
If Darktrace RESPOND™ were enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this compromise, it would have been able to take swift preventative action to disrupt the account compromise and prevent the ensuing phishing attack.
Account Hijack Attack Overview
Unusual External Sources for SaaS Credentials
On May 9, 2023, Darktrace DETECT/Cloud detected the first in a series of anomalous activities performed by a Microsoft 365 user account that was indicative of compromise, namely a failed login from an external IP address located in Virginia.
Just a few minutes later, Darktrace observed the same user credential being used to successfully login from the same unusual IP address, with multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements satisfied.
A few hours after this, the user credential was once again used to login from a different city in the state of Virginia, with MFA requirements successfully met again. Around the time of this activity, the SaaS user account was also observed previewing various business-related files hosted on Microsoft SharePoint, behavior that, taken in isolation, did not appear to be out of the ordinary and could have represented legitimate activity.
The following day, May 10, however, there were additional login attempts observed from two different states within the US, namely Texas and Florida. Darktrace understood that this activity was extremely suspicious, as it was highly improbable that the legitimate user would be able to travel over 2,500 miles in such a short period of time. Both login attempts were successful and passed MFA requirements, suggesting that the malicious actor was employing techniques to bypass MFA. Such MFA bypass techniques could include inserting malicious infrastructure between the user and the application and intercepting user credentials and tokens, or by compromising browser cookies to bypass authentication controls [3]. There have also been high-profile cases in the recent years of legitimate users mistakenly (and perhaps even instinctively) accepting MFA prompts on their token or mobile device, believing it to be a legitimate process despite not having performed the login themselves.
New Email Rule
On the evening of May 10, following the successful logins from multiple US states, Darktrace observed the Microsoft 365 user creating a new inbox rule, named “.’, in Microsoft Outlook from an IP located in Florida. Threat actors are often observed naming new email rules with single characters, likely to evade detection, but also for the sake of expediency so as to not expend any additional time creating meaningful labels.
In this case the newly created email rules included several suspicious properties, including ‘AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob’, ‘StopProcessingRules’ and “MoveToFolder”.
Firstly, ‘AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob’ suppresses or hides warning messages that typically appear if modifications to email rules are made [4]. In this case, it is likely the malicious actor was attempting to implement this property to obfuscate the creation of new email rules.
The ‘StopProcessingRules’ rule meant that any subsequent email rules created by the legitimate user would be overridden by the email rule created by the malicious actor [5]. Finally, the implementation of “MoveToFolder” would allow the malicious actor to automatically move all outgoing emails from the “Sent” folder to the “Deleted Items” folder, for example, further obfuscating their malicious activities [6]. The utilization of these email rule properties is frequently observed during account hijackings as it allows attackers to delete and/or forward key emails, delete evidence of exploitation and launch phishing campaigns [7].
In this incident, the new email rule would likely have enabled the malicious actor to evade the detection of traditional security measures and achieve greater persistence using the Microsoft 365 account.
Account Update
A few hours after the creation of the new email rule, Darktrace observed the threat actor successfully changing the Microsoft 365 user’s account password, this time from a new IP address in Texas. As a result of this action, the attacker would have locked out the legitimate user, effectively gaining full access over the SaaS account.
Phishing Emails
The compromised SaaS account was then observed sending a high volume of suspicious emails to both internal and external email addresses. Darktrace was able to identify that the emails attempting to impersonate the legitimate service DocuSign and contained a malicious link prompting users to click on the text “Review Document”. Upon clicking this link, users would be redirected to a site hosted on Adobe Express, namely hxxps://express.adobe[.]com/page/A9ZKVObdXhN4p/.
Adobe Express is a free service that allows users to create web pages which can be hosted and shared publicly; it is likely that the threat actor here leveraged the service to use in their phishing campaign. When clicked, such links could result in a device unwittingly downloading malware hosted on the site, or direct unsuspecting users to a spoofed login page attempting to harvest user credentials by imitating legitimate companies like Microsoft.
The malicious site hosted on Adobe Express was subsequently taken down by Adobe, possibly in response to user reports of maliciousness. Unfortunately though, platforms like this that offer free webhosting services can easily and repeatedly be abused by malicious actors. Simply by creating new pages hosted on different IP addresses, actors are able to continue to carry out such phishing attacks against unsuspecting users.
In addition to the suspicious SaaS and email activity that took place between May 9 and May 10, Darktrace/Email also detected the compromised account sending and receiving suspicious emails starting on May 4, just two days after Darktrace’s initial deployment on the customer’s environment. It is probable that the SaaS account was compromised around this time, or even prior to Darktrace’s deployment on May 2, likely via a phishing and credential harvesting campaign similar to the one detailed above.
Darktrace Coverage
As the customer was soon to begin their trial period, Darktrace RESPOND was set in “human confirmation” mode, meaning that any preventative RESPOND actions required manual application by the customer’s security team.
If Darktrace RESPOND had been enabled in autonomous response mode during this incident, it would have taken swift mitigative action by logging the suspicious user out of the SaaS account and disabling the account for a defined period of time, in doing so disrupting the attack at the earliest possible stage and giving the customer the necessary time to perform remediation steps. As it was, however, these RESPOND actions were suggested to the customer’s security team for them to manually apply.
Nevertheless, with Darktrace DETECT/Cloud in place, visibility over the anomalous cloud-based activities was significantly increased, enabling the swift identification of the chain of suspicious activities involved in this compromise.
In this case, the prospective customer reached out to Darktrace directly through the Ask the Expert (ATE) service. Darktrace’s expert analyst team then conducted a timely and comprehensive investigation into the suspicious activity surrounding this SaaS compromise, and shared these findings with the customer’s security team.
Conclusion
Ultimately, this example of SaaS account compromise highlights Darktrace’s unique ability to learn an organization’s digital environment and recognize activity that is deemed to be unexpected, within a matter of days.
Due to the lack of obvious or known indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the malicious activity in this incident, this account hijack would likely have gone unnoticed by traditional security tools that rely on a rules and signatures-based approach to threat detection. However, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI enables it to detect the subtle deviations in a device’s behavior that could be indicative of an ongoing compromise.
Despite being newly deployed on a prospective customer’s network, Darktrace DETECT was able to identify unusual login attempts from geographically improbable locations, suspicious email rule updates, password changes, as well as the subsequent mounting of a phishing campaign, all before the customer’s trial of Darktrace had even begun.
When enabled in autonomous response mode, Darktrace RESPOND would be able to take swift preventative action against such activity as soon as it is detected, effectively shutting down the compromise and mitigating any subsequent phishing attacks.
With the full deployment of Darktrace’s suite of products, including Darktrace/Cloud and Darktrace/Email, customers can rest assured their critical data and systems are protected, even in the case of hybrid and multi-cloud environments.
Credit: Samuel Wee, Senior Analyst Consultant & Model Developer
Appendices
References
[2] https://www.upguard.com/blog/saas-security-risks
[4] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/disable-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps
[7] https://blog.knowbe4.com/check-your-email-rules-for-maliciousness
Darktrace Model Detections
Darktrace DETECT/Cloud and RESPOND Models Breached:
SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use
SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual External Sources for SaaS Credential
Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block (RESPOND Model)
SaaS / Compliance / New Email Rule
Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Significant Compliance Activity Block
SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block (RESPOND Model)
SaaS / Compromise / SaaS Anomaly Following Anomalous Login (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Account Update
Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block (RESPOND Model)
IoC – Type – Description & Confidence
hxxps://express.adobe[.]com/page/A9ZKVObdXhN4p/ - Domain – Probable Phishing Page (Now Defunct)
37.19.221[.]142 – IP Address – Unusual Login Source
35.174.4[.]92 – IP Address – Unusual Login Source
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Tactic - Techniques
INITIAL ACCESS, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE
T1078.004 – Cloud Accounts
DISCOVERY
T1538 – Cloud Service Dashboards
CREDENTIAL ACCESS
T1539 – Steal Web Session Cookie
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
T1586 – Compromise Accounts
PERSISTENCE
T1137.005 – Outlook Rules
Blog
Darktrace/Email in Action: Why AI-Driven Email Security is the Best Defense Against Sustained Phishing Campaigns
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Stopping the bad while allowing the good
Since its inception, email has been regarded as one of the most important tools for businesses, revolutionizing communication and allowing global teams to become even more connected. But besides organizations heavily relying on email for their daily operations, threat actors have also recognized that the inbox is one of the easiest ways to establish an initial foothold on the network.
Today, not only are phishing campaigns and social engineering attacks becoming more prevalent, but the level of sophistication of these attacks are also increasing with the help of generative AI tools that allow for the creation of hyper-realistic emails with minimal errors, effectively lowering the barrier to entry for threat actors. These diverse and stealthy types of attacks evade traditional email security tools based on rules and signatures, because they are less likely to contain the low-sophistication markers of a typical phishing attack.
In a situation where the sky is the limit for attackers and security teams are lean, how can teams equip themselves to tackle these threats? How can they accurately detect increasingly realistic malicious emails and neutralize these threats before it is too late? And importantly, how can email security block these threats while allowing legitimate emails to flow freely?
Instead of relying on past attack data, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI detects the slightest deviation from a user’s pattern of life and responds autonomously to contain potential threats, stopping novel attacks in their tracks before damage is caused. It doesn’t define ‘good’ and ‘bad’ like traditional email tools, rather it understands each user and what is normal for them – and what’s not.
This blog outlines how Darktrace/Email™ used its understanding of ‘normal’ to accurately detect and respond to a sustained phishing campaign targeting a real-life company.
Responding to a sustained phishing attack
Over the course of 24 hours, Darktrace detected multiple emails containing different subjects, all from different senders to different recipients in one organization. These emails were sent from different IP addresses, but all came from the same autonomous system number (ASN).
The emails themselves had many suspicious indicators. All senders had no prior association with the recipient, and the emails generated a high general inducement score. This score is generated by structural and non-specific content analysis of the email – a high score indicates that the email is trying to induce the recipient into taking a particular action, which may lead to account compromise.
Additionally, each email contained a visually prominent link to a file storage service, hidden behind a shortened bit.ly link. The similarities across all these emails pointed to a sustained campaign targeting the organization by a single threat actor.
With all these suspicious indicators, many models were breached. This drove up the anomaly score, causing Darktrace/Email to hold all suspicious emails from the recipients’ inboxes, safeguarding the recipients from potential account compromise and disallowing the threats from taking hold in the network.
Imagining a phishing attack without Darktrace/Email
So what could have happened if Darktrace had not withheld these emails, and the recipients had clicked on the links? File storage sites have a wide variety of uses that allow attackers to be creative in their attack strategy. If the user had clicked on the shortened link, the possible consequences are numerous. The link could have led to a login page for unsuspecting victims to input their credentials, or it could have hosted malware that would automatically download if the link was clicked. With the compromised credentials, threat actors could even bypass MFA, change email rules, or gain privileged access to a network. The downloaded malware might also be a keylogger, leading to cryptojacking, or could open a back door for threat actors to return to at a later time.
The limits of traditional email security tools
Secure email gateways (SEGs) and static AI security tools may have found it challenging to detect this phishing campaign as malicious. While Darktrace was able to correlate these emails to determine that a sustained phishing campaign was taking place, the pattern among these emails is far too generic for specific rules as set in traditional security tools. If we take the characteristic of the freemail account sender as an example, setting a rule to block all emails from freemail accounts may lead to more legitimate emails being withheld, since these addresses have a variety of uses.
With these factors in mind, these emails could have easily slipped through traditional security filters and led to a devastating impact on the organization.
Conclusion
As threat actors step up their attacks in sophistication, prioritizing email security is more crucial than ever to preserving a safe digital environment. In response to these challenges, Darktrace/Email offers a set-and-forget solution that continuously learns and adapts to changes in the organization.
Through an evolving understanding of every environment in which it is deployed, its threat response becomes increasingly precise in neutralizing only the bad, while allowing the good – delivering email security that doesn’t come at the expense of business growth.