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November 3, 2021

Defending Against Living Off the Land Cyber Attacks

Find out how hackers utilize living off the land techniques to navigate environments without detection and how to safeguard against these threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
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03
Nov 2021

What is Living off the Land attack?

While the term was first coined in 2013, Living off the Land tools, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have boomed in popularity in recent years. In part, this is because the traditional approach of defensive security — blocklisting file hashes, domains, and other traces of threats encountered in previous attacks — is ill-equipped to identify these attacks. So these stealthy, often fileless attacks, have pushed their way into the mainstream.

Definition and overview

Living off the Land is a strategy which involves threat actors leveraging the utilities readily available within the target organization’s digital environment to move through the cyber kill chain. This is a popular method because It is often cheaper, easier, and more effective to make use of an organization’s own infrastructure in an attempt to attack rather than writing bespoke malware for every heist.

How does Living off the Land attack work?

Living off the Land attacks have a particular history in highly organized, targeted hacking. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups have long favored Living off the Land TTPs, since evasion is a top priority. And trends show that ransomware groups are opting for human-operated ransomware that relies heavily on Living off the Land techniques, instead of commodity malware.

Among some of the most commonly used tools exploited for nefarious purposes are Powershell, Windows Management Interface (WMI), and PsExec. These tools are regularly used by network administrators as part of their daily routines, and traditional security tools reliant on static rules and signatures often have a hard time distinguishing between legitimate and malicious use.

Living off the Land attack techniques

Before a threat actor turns your infrastructure against you in a Living off the Land attack, they must be able to execute commands on a targeted system. Therefore, Living off the Land attacks are a post-infection framework for network reconnaissance, lateral movement, and persistence.

Once a device is infected, there are hundreds of system tools at the attacker’s disposal – these may be pre-installed on the system or downloaded via Microsoft-signed binaries. And, in the wrong hands, other trusted third-party administration tools on the network can also turn from friend to foe.

As Living off the Land techniques evolve, a single typical attack is hard to determine. However, we can group these TTPs in broader categories.

Microsoft-signed Living off the Land TTPs

Microsoft is ubiquitous in the business world and across industries. The Living off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) project aims to document all Microsoft-signed binaries and scripts that include functionality for APT groups in Living off the Land attacks. To date, there are 135 system tools on this list that are vulnerable to misuse, each aiding a different objective. These could be the creation of new user accounts, data compression and exfiltration, system information gathering, launching processes on a target destination or even the disablement of security services. Both Microsoft’s documentation of vulnerable pre-installed tools and the LOLBAS project are growing, non-exhaustive lists.

Command line exploitation

When it comes to delivering a malicious payload to the target, WMI (WMIC.exe), the command line tool (cmd.exe), and PowerShell (powershell.exe) were used most frequently by attackers, according to a recent study. These commonly exploited command line utilities are used during the configuration of security settings and system properties, provide sensitive network or device status updates, and facilitate the transfer and execution of files between devices.

Specifically, the command line group shares three key traits:

  1. They are readily available on Windows systems.
  2. They are frequently used by most administrators or internal processes to perform everyday tasks.
  3. They can perform their core functionalities without writing data to a disk.

Mimikatz

Mimikatz differs from other tools in that it is not pre-installed on most systems. It is an open-source utility used for the dumping of passwords, hashes, PINs and Kerberos tickets. While some network administrators may use Mimikatz to perform internal vulnerability assessments, it is not readily available on Windows systems.

Traditional security approaches used to detect the download, installation, and use of Mimikatz are often insufficient. There exists a wide range of verified and well documented techniques for obfuscating tooling like Mimikatz, meaning even an unsophisticated attacker can subvert basic string or hash-based detections.

Tips for stopping Living off the Land attacks

Living off the Land techniques have proven incredibly effective at enabling attackers to blend into organizations’ digital environments. It is normal for millions of credentials, network tools, and processes to be logged each day across a single digital ecosystem. So how can defenders spot malicious use of legitimate tools amidst this digital noise?

Network hygiene: As with most threats, basic network hygiene is the first step. This includes implementing the principle of least privilege, de-activating all unnecessary programs, setting up software whitelisting, and performing asset and application inventory checks. However, while these measures are a step in the right direction, with enough time a sophisticated attacker will always manage to work their way around them.

Self-Learning AI technology: This technology, exclusive to Darktrace, has become fundamental in shining a light on attackers using an organization’s own infrastructure against them. It learns any given unique digital environment from the ground up, understanding the ‘pattern of life’ for every device and user. Living off the Land attacks are therefore identified in real time from a series of subtle deviations. This might include a new credential or unusual SMB / DCE-RPC usage.

Its deep understanding of the business enables it to spot attacks that fly under the radar of other tools. With a Living off the Land attack, the AI will recognize that although usage of particular tool might be normal for an organization, the way in which that tool is used allows the AI to reveal seemingly benign behavior as unmistakably malicious.

Example of Self-Learning AI

Self-Learning AI might observe the frequent usage of Powershell user-agents across multiple devices, but will only report an incident if the user agent is observed on a device at an unusual time.

Similarly, Darktrace might observe WMI commands being sent between thousands of combinations of devices each day, but will only alert on such activity if the commands are uncommon for both the source and the destination.

And even the subtle indicators of Mimikatz exploitation, like new credential usage or uncommon SMB traffic, will not be buried among the normal operations of the infrastructure.

Final thoughts on Living off the Land techniques

Living off the Land techniques aren’t going away any time soon. Recognizing this, security teams are beginning to move away from ‘legacy’-based defenses that rely on historical attack data to catch the next attack, and towards AI that uses a bespoke and evolving understanding of its surroundings to detect subtle deviations indicative of a threat – even if that threat makes use of legitimate tools.

Thanks to Darktrace analysts Isabel Finn and Paul Jennings for their insights on the above threat find and supporting MITRE ATT&CK mapping.

Learn more about Self-Learning AI

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product

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March 2, 2026

What the Darktrace Annual Threat Report 2026 Means for Security Leaders

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The challenge for today’s CISOs

At the broadest level, the defining characteristic of cybersecurity in 2026 is the sheer pace of change shaping the environments we protect. Organizations are operating in ecosystems that are larger, more interconnected, and more automated than ever before – spanning cloud platforms, distributed identities, AI-driven systems, and continuous digital workflows.  

The velocity of this expansion has outstripped the slower, predictable patterns security teams once relied on. What used to be a stable backdrop is now a living, shifting landscape where technology, risk, and business operations evolve simultaneously. From this vantage point, the central challenge for security leaders isn’t reacting to individual threats, but maintaining strategic control and clarity as the entire environment accelerates around them.

Strategic takeaways from the Annual Threat Report

The Darktrace Annual Threat Report 2026 reinforces a reality every CISO feels: the center of gravity isn’t the perimeter, vulnerability management, or malware, but trust abused via identity. For example, our analysis found that nearly 70% of incidents in the Americas region begin with stolen or misused accounts, reflecting the global shift toward identity‑led intrusions.

Mass adoption of AI agents, cloud-native applications, and machine decision-making means CISOs now oversee systems that act on their own. This creates an entirely new responsibility: ensuring those systems remain safe, predictable, and aligned to business intent, even under adversarial pressure.

Attackers increasingly exploit trust boundaries, not firewalls – leveraging cloud entitlements, SaaS identity transitions, supply-chain connectivity, and automation frameworks. The rise of non-human identities intensifies this: credentials, tokens, and agent permissions now form the backbone of operational risk.

Boards are now evaluating CISOs on business continuity, operational recovery, and whether AI systems and cloud workloads can fail safely without cascading or causing catastrophic impact.

In this environment, detection accuracy, autonomous response, and blast radius minimization matter far more than traditional control coverage or policy checklists.

Every organization will face setbacks; resilience is measured by how quickly security teams can rise, respond, and resume momentum. In 2026, success will belong to those that adapt fastest.

Managing business security in the age of AI

CISO accountability in 2026 has expanded far beyond controls and tooling. Whether we asked for it or not, we now own outcomes tied to business resilience, AI trust, cloud assurance, and continuous availability. The role is less about certainty and more about recovering control in an environment that keeps accelerating.

Every major 2026 initiative – AI agents, third-party risk, cloud, or comms protection – connects to a single board-level question: Are we still in control as complexity and automation scale faster than humans?

Attackers are not just getting more sophisticated; they are becoming more automated. AI changes the economics of attack, lowering cost and increasing speed. That asymmetry is what CISOs are being measured against.

CISOs are no longer evaluated on tool coverage, but on the ability to assure outcomes – trust in AI adoption, resilience across cloud and identity, and being able to respond to unknown and unforeseen threats.

Boards are now explicitly asking whether we can defend against AI-driven threats. No one can predict every new behavior – survival depends on detecting malicious deviations from normal fast and responding autonomously.  

Agents introduce decision-making at machine speed. Governance, CI/CD scanning, posture management, red teaming, and runtime detection are no longer differentiators but the baseline.

Cloud security is no longer architectural, it is operational. Identity, control planes, and SaaS exposure now sit firmly with the CISO.

AI-speed threats already reshaping security in 2026

We’re already seeing clear examples of how quickly the threat landscape has shifted in 2026. Darktrace’s work on React2Shell exposed just how unforgiving the new tempo is: a honeypot stood up with an exposed React was hit in under two minutes. There was no recon phase, no gradual probing – just immediate, automated exploitation the moment the code appeared publicly. Exposure now equals compromise unless defenses can detect, interpret, and act at machine speed. Traditional operational rhythms simply don’t map to this reality.

We’re also facing the first wave of AI-authored malware, where LLMs generate code that mutates on demand. This removes the historic friction from the attacker side: no skill barrier, no time cost, no limit on iteration. Malware families can regenerate themselves, shift structure, and evade static controls without a human operator behind the keyboard. This forces CISOs to treat adversarial automation as a core operational risk and ensure that autonomous systems inside the business remain predictable under pressure.

The CVE-2026-1731 BeyondTrust exploitation wave reinforced the same pattern. The gap between disclosure and active, global exploitation compressed into hours. Automated scanning, automated payload deployment, coordinated exploitation campaigns, all spinning up faster than most organizations can push an emergency patch through change control. The vulnerability-to-exploit window has effectively collapsed, making runtime visibility, anomaly detection, and autonomous containment far more consequential than patching speed alone.

These cases aren’t edge scenarios; they represent the emerging norm. Complexity and automation have outpaced human-scale processes, and attackers are weaponizing that asymmetry.  

The real differentiator for CISOs in 2026 is less about knowing everything and more about knowing immediately when something shifts – and having systems that can respond at the same speed.

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About the author
Mike Beck
Global CISO

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March 2, 2026

CVE-2026-1731: How Darktrace Sees the BeyondTrust Exploitation Wave Unfolding

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Note: Darktrace's Threat Research team is publishing now to help defenders. We will continue updating this blog as our investigations unfold.

Background

On February 6, 2026, the Identity & Access Management solution BeyondTrust announced patches for a vulnerability, CVE-2026-1731, which enables unauthenticated remote code execution using specially crafted requests.  This vulnerability affects BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and particular older versions of Privileged Remote Access (PRA) [1].

A Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit for this vulnerability was released publicly on February 10, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) reported exploitation attempts within 24 hours [2].

Previous intrusions against Beyond Trust technology have been cited as being affiliated with nation-state attacks, including a 2024 breach targeting the U.S. Treasury Department. This incident led to subsequent emergency directives from  the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and later showed attackers had chained previously unknown vulnerabilities to achieve their goals [3].

Additionally, there appears to be infrastructure overlap with React2Shell mass exploitation previously observed by Darktrace, with command-and-control (C2) domain  avg.domaininfo[.]top seen in potential post-exploitation activity for BeyondTrust, as well as in a React2Shell exploitation case involving possible EtherRAT deployment.

Darktrace Detections

Darktrace’s Threat Research team has identified highly anomalous activity across several customers that may relate to exploitation of BeyondTrust since February 10, 2026. Observed activities include:

Outbound connections and DNS requests for endpoints associated with Out-of-Band Application Security Testing; these services are commonly abused by threat actors for exploit validation.  Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Suspicious executable file downloads. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Outbound beaconing to rare domains. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

Unusual cryptocurrency mining activity. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

And model alerts for:

  • Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP

IT Defenders: As part of best practices, we highly recommend employing an automated containment solution in your environment. For Darktrace customers, please ensure that Autonomous Response is configured correctly. More guidance regarding this activity and suggested actions can be found in the Darktrace Customer Portal.  

Appendices

Potential indicators of post-exploitation behavior:

·      217.76.57[.]78 – IP address - Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://217.76.57[.]78:8009/index.js - URL -  Likely payload

·      b6a15e1f2f3e1f651a5ad4a18ce39d411d385ac7  - SHA1 - Likely payload

·      195.154.119[.]194 – IP address – Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://195.154.119[.]194/index.js - URL – Likely payload

·      avg.domaininfo[.]top – Hostname – Likely C2 server

·      104.234.174[.]5 – IP address - Possible C2 server

·      35da45aeca4701764eb49185b11ef23432f7162a – SHA1 – Possible payload

·      hXXp://134.122.13[.]34:8979/c - URL – Possible payload

·      134.122.13[.]34 – IP address – Possible C2 server

·      28df16894a6732919c650cc5a3de94e434a81d80 - SHA1 - Possible payload

References:

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1731

2.        https://www.securityweek.com/beyondtrust-vulnerability-targeted-by-hackers-within-24-hours-of-poc-release/

3.        https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-1731-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-rce-beyondtrust-remote-support-rs-privileged-remote-access-pra/

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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