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June 21, 2024

Elevating Network Security: Confronting Trust, Ransomware, & Novel Attacks

Ensuring trust, battling ransomware, and detecting novel attacks pose critical challenges in network security. This blog explores these challenges and shows how leveraging AI-driven security solutions helps security teams stay informed and effectively safeguard their network.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response
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21
Jun 2024

Understanding the Network Security Market

Old tools blind to new threats

With the rise of GenAI and novel attacks, organizations can no longer rely solely on traditional network security solutions that depend on historical attack data, such as signatures and detection rules, to identify threats. However, in many cases network security vendors and traditional solutions like IDS/IPS focus on detecting known attacks using historical data. What happens is organizations are left vulnerable to unknown and novel threats, as these approaches only detect known malicious behavior and cannot keep up with unknown threats or zero-day attacks.

Advanced threats

Darktrace's End of Year Threat Report for 2023 highlights significant changes in the cyber threat landscape, particularly due to advancements in technology such as generative AI. The report notes a substantial increase in sophisticated attacks, including those utilizing generative AI, which have made it more challenging for traditional security measures to keep up. The report also details the rise of multi-functional malware, like Black Basta ransomware, which not only encrypts data for ransom but also spreads other types of malware such as the Qbot banking trojan. These complex attacks are increasingly being deployed by advanced cybercriminal groups, underscoring the need for organizations to adopt advanced security measures that can detect and respond to novel threats in real-time.

Defenders need a solution that can level the playing field, especially when they are operating with limited resources and getting overloaded with endless alerts. Most network security tools on the market have a siloed approach and do not integrate with the rest of an organization’s digital estate, but attackers don’t operate in a single domain.

Disparate workforce

With so many organizations continuing to support a remote or hybrid working environment, the need to secure devices that are outside the corporate network or off-VPN is increasingly important. While endpoint protection or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are a fundamental part of any security stack, it’s not possible to install an agent on every device, which can leave blind spots in an organization’s attack surface. Managing trust and access policies is also necessary to protect identities, however this comes with its own set of challenges in terms of implementation and minimizing business disruption.

This blog will dive into these challenges and show examples of how Darktrace has helped mitigate risk and stop novel and never-before-seen threats.

Network Security Challenge 1: Managing trust

What is trust in cybersecurity?

Trust in cybersecurity means that an entity can be relied upon. This can involve a person, organization, or system to be authorized or authenticated by proving their identity is legitimate and can be trusted to have access to the network or sensitive information.

Why is trust important in cybersecurity?

Granting access and privileges to your workforce and select affiliates has profound implications for cybersecurity, brand reputation, regulatory compliance, and financial liability. In a traditional network security model, traffic gets divided into two categories — trusted and untrusted — with some entities and segments of the network deemed more creditable than others.

How do you manage trust in cybersecurity?

Zero trust is too little, but any is too much.

Modern network security challenges point to an urgent need for organizations to review and update their approaches to managing trust. External pressure to adopt zero trust security postures literally suggests trusting no one, but that impedes your freedom
to do business. IT leaders need a proven but practical process for deciding who should be allowed to use your network and how.

Questions to ask in updating Trusted User policies include:

  • What process should you follow to place trust in third
    parties and applications?
  • Do you subject trusted entities to testing and other due
    diligence first?
  • How often do you review this process — and trusted
    relationships themselves — after making initial decisions?
  • How do you tell when trusted users should no longer be
    trusted?

Once trust has been established, security teams need new and better ways to autonomously verify that those transacting within your network are indeed those trusted users that they claim to be, taking only the authorized actions you’ve allowed them to take.

Exploiting trust in the network

Insider threats have a major head start. The opposite of attacks launched by nameless, faceless strangers, insider threats originate through parties once deemed trustworthy. That might mean a current or former member of your workforce or a partner, vendor, investor, or service provider authorized by IT to access corporate systems and data. Threats also arise when a “pawn” gets unwittingly tricked into disclosing credentials or downloading malware.

Common motives for insider attacks include revenge, stealing or leaking sensitive data, taking down IT systems, stealing assets or IP, compromising your organization’s credibility, and simply harassing your workforce. Put simply, rules and signatures based security solutions won’t flag insider threats because an insider does not immediately present themselves as an intruder. Insider threats can only be stopped by an evolving understanding of ‘normal’ for every user that immediately alerts your team when trusted users do something strange.

“By 2026, 10% of large enterprises will have a comprehensive, mature and measurable zero-trust program in place, up from less than 1% today.” [1]

Use Case: Darktrace spots an insider threat

Darktrace / OT detected a subtle deviation from normal behavior when a reprogram command was sent by an engineering workstation to a PLC controlling a pump, an action an insider threat with legitimized access to OT systems would take to alter the physical process without any malware involved. In this instance, AI Analyst, Darktrace’s investigation tool that triages events to reveal the full security incident, detected the event as unusual based on multiple metrics including the source of the command, the destination device, the time of the activity, and the command itself.  

As a result, AI Analyst created a complete security incident, with a natural language summary, the technical details of the activity, and an investigation process explaining how it came to its conclusion. By leveraging Explainable AI, a security team can quickly triage and escalate Darktrace incidents in real time before it becomes disruptive, and even when performed by a trusted insider.

Read more about insider threats here

Network Security Challenge 2: Stopping Ransomware at every stage    

What is Ransomware?

Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts valuable files on a victim’s device, denying the account holder access, and demanding money in exchange for the encryption key. Ransomware has been increasingly difficult to deal with, especially with ransom payments being made in crypto currency which is untraceable. Ransomware can enter a system by clicking a link dangerous or downloading malicious files.

Avoiding ransomware attacks ranks at the top of most CISOs’ and risk managers’ priority lists, and with good reason. Extortion was involved in 25% of all breaches in 2022, with front-page attacks wreaking havoc across healthcare, gas pipelines, food processing plants, and other global supply chains. [2]

What else is new?

The availability of “DIY” toolkits and subscription-based ransom- ware-as-a-service (RaaS) on the dark web equips novice threat actors to launch highly sophisticated attacks at machine speed. For less than $500, virtually anyone can acquire and tweak RaaS offerings such as Philadelphia that come with accessible customer interfaces, reviews, discounts, and feature updates — all the signature features of commercial SaaS offerings.                  

Darktrace Cyber AI breaks the ransomware cycle

The preeminence of ransomware keeps security teams on high alert for indicators of attack but hypervigilance — and too many tools churning out too many alerts — quickly exhausts analysts’ bandwidth. To reverse this trend, AI needs to help prioritize and resolve versus merely detect risk.

Darktrace uses AI to recognize and contextualize possible signs of ransomware attacks as they appear in your network and across multiple domains. Viewing behaviors in the context of your organization’s normal ‘pattern of life’ updates and enhances detection that watches for a repeat of previous techniques.

Darktrace's AI brings the added advantage of continuously analyzing behavior in your environment at machine speed.

Darktrace AI also performs Autonomous Response, shutting down attacks at every stage of the ransomware cycle, including the first telltale signs of exfiltration and encryption of data for extortion purposes.

Use Case: Stopping Hive Ransomware attack

Hive is distributed via a RaaS model where its developers update and maintain the code, in return for a percentage of the eventual ransom payment, while users (or affiliates) are given the tools to carry out attacks using a highly sophisticated and complex malware they would otherwise be unable to use.

In early 2022, Darktrace / NETWORK identified several instances of Hive ransomware on the networks of multiple customers. Using its anomaly-based detection, Darktrace was able to successfully detect the attacks and multiple stages of the kill chain, including command and control (C2) activity, lateral movement, data exfiltration, and ultimately data encryption and the writing of ransom notes.

Darktrace’s AI understands customer networks and learns the expected patterns of behavior across an organization’s digital estate. Using its anomaly-based detection Darktrace is able to identify emerging threats through the detection of unusual or unexpected behavior, without relying on rules and signatures, or known IoCs.

Read the full story here

Network Security Challenge 3: Spotting Novel Attacks

You can’t predict tomorrow’s weather by reading yesterday’s forecast, yet that’s essentially what happens when network security tools only look for known attacks.

What are novel attacks?

“Novel attacks” include unknown or previously unseen exploits such as zero-days, or new variations of known threats that evade existing detection rules.

Depending on how threats get executed, the term “novel” can refer to brand new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), or to subtle new twists on perennial threats like DoS, DDoS, and Domain Name Server (DNS) attacks.

Old tools may be blind to new threats

Stopping novel threats is less about deciding whom to trust than it is about learning to spot something brand new. As we’ve seen with ransomware, the growing “aaS” attack market creates a profound paradigm shift by allowing non-technical perpetrators to tweak, customize, and coin never-before-seen threats that elude traditional network, email, VPN, and cloud security.

Tools based on traditional rules and signatures lack a frame of reference. This is where AI’s ability to spot and analyze abnormalities in the context of normal patterns of life comes into play.                        

Darktrace AI spots what other tools miss                                      

Instead of training in cloud data lakes that pool data from unrelated attacks worldwide, Darktrace AI learns about your unique environment from your environment. By flagging and analyzing everything unusual — instead of only known signs of compromise — Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI keeps security stacks from missing less obvious but potentially more dangerous events.

The real challenge here is achieving faster “time to meaning” and contextualizing behavior that might — or might not — be part of a novel attack. Darktrace/Network does not require a “patient zero” to identify a novel attack, or one exploiting a zero-day vulnerability.

Use Case: Stopping Novel Ransomware Attack

In late May 2023, Darktrace observed multiple instances of Akira ransomware affecting networks across its customer base. Thanks to its anomaly-based approach to threat detection Darktrace successfully identified the novel ransomware attacks and provided full visibility over the cyber kill chain, from the initial compromise to the eventual file encryptions and ransom notes. Darktrace identified Akira ransomware on multiple customer networks, even when threat actors were utilizing seemingly legitimate services (or spoofed versions of them) to carry out malicious activity. While this may have gone unnoticed by traditional security tools, Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection enabled it to recognize malicious activity for what it was. In cases where Darktrace’s autonomous response was enabled these attacks were mitigated in their early stages, thus minimizing any disruption or damage to customer networks.

Read the full story here

References

[1] Gartner, “Gartner Unveils Top Eight Cybersecurity Predictions for 2023-2024,” 28 March 2023.                    

[2] TechTarget, “Ransomware trends, statistics and facts in 2023,” Sean Michael Kerner, 26 January 2023.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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April 30, 2026

Mythos vs Ethos: Defending in an Era of AI‑Accelerated Vulnerability Discovery

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Anthropic’s Mythos and what it means for security teams

Recent attention on systems such as Anthropic Mythos highlights a notable problem for defenders. Namely that disclosure’s role in coordinating defensive action is eroding.

As AI systems gain stronger reasoning and coding capability, their usefulness in analyzing complex software environments and identifying weaknesses naturally increases. What has changed is not attacker motivation, but the conditions under which defenders learn about and organize around risk. Vulnerability discovery and exploitation increasingly unfold in ways that turn disclosure into a retrospective signal rather than a reliable starting point for defense.

Faster discovery was inevitable and is already visible

The acceleration of vulnerability discovery was already observable across the ecosystem. Publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) have grown at double-digit rates for the past two years, including a 32% increase in 2024 according to NIST, driven in part by AI even prior to Anthropic’s Mythos model. Most notably XBOW topped the HackerOne US bug bounty leaderboard, marking the first time an autonomous penetration tester had done so.  

The technical frontier for AI capabilities has been described elsewhere as jagged, and the implication is that Mythos is exceptional but not unique in this capability. While Mythos appears to make significant progress in complex vulnerability analysis, many other models are already able to find and exploit weaknesses to varying degrees.  

What matters here is not which model performs best, but the fact that vulnerability discovery is no longer a scarce or tightly bounded capability.

The consequence of this shift is not simply earlier discovery. It is a change in the defender-attacker race condition. Disclosure once acted as a rough synchronization point. While attackers sometimes had earlier knowledge, disclosure generally marked the moment when risk became visible and defensive action could be broadly coordinated. Increasingly, that coordination will no longer exist. Exploitation may be underway well before a CVE is published, if it is published at all.

Why patch velocity alone is not the answer

The instinctive response to this shift is to focus on patching faster, but treating patch velocity as the primary solution misunderstands the problem. Most organizations are already constrained in how quickly they can remediate vulnerabilities. Asset sprawl, operational risk, testing requirements, uptime commitments, and unclear ownership all limit response speed, even when vulnerabilities are well understood.

If discovery and exploitation now routinely precede disclosure, then patching cannot be the first line of defense. It becomes one necessary control applied within a timeline that has already shifted. This does not imply that organizations should patch less. It means that patching cannot serve as the organizing principle for defense.

Defense needs a more stable anchor

If disclosure no longer defines when defense begins, then defense needs a reference point that does not depend on knowing the vulnerability in advance.  

Every digital environment has a behavioral character. Systems authenticate, communicate, execute processes, and access resources in relatively consistent ways over time. These patterns are not static rules or signatures. They are learned behaviors that reflect how an organization operates.

When exploitation occurs, even via previously unknown vulnerabilities, those behavioral patterns change.

Attackers may use novel techniques, but they still need to gain access, create processes, move laterally, and will ultimately interact with systems in ways that diverge from what is expected. That deviation is observable regardless of whether the underlying weakness has been formally named.

In an environment where disclosure can no longer be relied on for timing or coordination, behavioral understanding is no longer an optional enhancement; it becomes the only consistently available defensive signal.

Detecting risk before disclosure

Darktrace’s threat research has consistently shown that malicious activity often becomes visible before public disclosure.

In multiple cases, including exploitation of Ivanti, SAP NetWeaver, and Trimble Cityworks, Darktrace detected anomalous behavior days or weeks ahead of CVE publication. These detections did not rely on signatures, threat intelligence feeds, or awareness of the vulnerability itself. They emerged because systems began behaving in ways that did not align with their established patterns.

This reflects a defensive approach grounded in ‘Ethos’, in contrast to the unbounded exploration represented by ‘Mythos’. Here, Mythos describes continuous vulnerability discovery at speed and scale. Ethos reflects an understanding of what is normal and expected within a specific environment, grounded in observed behavior.

Revisiting assume breach

These conditions reinforce a principle long embedded in Zero Trust thinking: assume breach.

If exploitation can occur before disclosure, patching vulnerabilities can no longer act as the organizing principle for defense. Instead, effective defense must focus on monitoring for misuse and constraining attacker activity once access is achieved. Behavioral monitoring allows organizations to identify early‑stage compromise and respond while uncertainty remains, rather than waiting for formal verification.

AI plays a critical role here, not by predicting every exploit, but by continuously learning what normal looks like within a specific environment and identifying meaningful deviation at machine speed. Identifying that deviation enables defenders to respond by constraining activity back towards normal patterns of behavior.

Not an arms race, but an asymmetry

AI is often framed as fueling an arms race between attackers and defenders. In practice, the more important dynamic is asymmetry.

Attackers operate broadly, scanning many environments for opportunities. Defenders operate deeply within their own systems, and it’s this business context which is so significant. Behavioral understanding gives defenders a durable advantage. Attackers may automate discovery, but they cannot easily reproduce what belonging looks like inside a particular organization.

A changed defensive model

AI‑accelerated vulnerability discovery does not mean defenders have lost. It does mean that disclosure‑driven, patch‑centric models no longer provide a sufficient foundation for resilience.

As vulnerability volumes grow and exploitation timelines compress, effective defense increasingly depends on continuous behavioral understanding, detection that does not rely on prior disclosure, and rapid containment to limit impact. In this model, CVEs confirm risk rather than define when defense begins.

The industry has already seen this approach work in practice. As AI continues to reshape both offense and defense, behavioral detection will move from being complementary to being essential.

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About the author
Andrew Hollister
Principal Solutions Engineer, Cyber Technician

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April 29, 2026

Darktrace Malware Analysis: Jenkins Honeypot Reveals Emerging Botnet Targeting Online Games

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DDoS Botnet discovery

To observe adversary behavior in real time, Darktrace operates a global honeypot network known as “CloudyPots”, designed to capture malicious activity across a wide range of services, protocols, and cloud platforms. These honeypots provide valuable insights into the techniques, tools, and malware actively targeting internet‑facing infrastructure.

How attackers used a Jenkins honeypot to deploy the botnet

One such software honeypotted by Darktrace is Jenkins, a CI build system that allows developers to build code and run tests automatically. The instance of Jenkins in Darktrace’s honeypot is intentionally configured with a weak password, allowing attackers to obtain remote code execution on the service.

In one instance observed by Darktrace on March 18, 2026, a threat actor seemingly attempted to target Darktrace’s Jenkins honeypot to deploy a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet. Further analysis by Darktrace’s Threat Research team revealed the botnet was intended to specifically target video game servers.

How the Jenkins scriptText endpoint was used for remote code execution

The Jenkins build system features an endpoint named scriptText, which enables users to programmatically send new jobs, in the form of a Groovy script. Groovy is a programming language with similar syntax to Java and runs using the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). An attacker can abuse the scriptText endpoint to run a malicious script, achieving code execution on the victim host.

Request sent to the scriptText endpoint containing the malicious script.
Figure 1: Request sent to the scriptText endpoint containing the malicious script.

The malicious script is sent using the form-data content type, which results in the contents of the script being URL encoded. This encoding can be decoded to recover the original script, as shown in Figure 2, where Darktrace Analysts decoded the script using CyberChef,

The malicious script decoded using CyberChef.
Figure 2: The malicious script decoded using CyberChef.

What happens after Jenkins is compromised

As Jenkins can be deployed on both Microsoft Windows and Linux systems, the script includes separate branches to target each platform.

In the case of Windows, the script performs the following actions:

  • Downloads a payload from 103[.]177.110.202/w.exe and saves it to C:\Windows\Temp\update.dat.
  • Renames the “update.dat” file to “win_sys.exe” (within the same folder)
  • Runs the Unblock-File command is used to remove security restrictions typically applied to files downloaded from the internet.
  • Adds a firewall allow rule is added for TCP port 5444, which the payload uses for command-and-control (C2) communications.

On Linux systems, the script will instead use a Bash one-liner to download the payload from 103[.]177.110.202/bot_x64.exe to /tmp/bot and execute it.

Why this botnet uses a single IP for delivery and command and control

The IP 103[.]177.110.202 belongs to Webico Company Limited, specifically its Tino brand, a Vietnamese company that offers domain registrar services and server hosting. Geolocation data indicates that the IP is located in Ho Chi Minh City. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis revealed multiple malicious associations tied to the IP [1].

Darktrace’s analysis found that the IP 103[.]177.110.202 is used for multiple stages of an attack, including spreading and initial access, delivering payloads, and C2 communication. This is an unusual combination, as many malware families separate their spreading servers from their C2 infrastructure. Typically, malware distribution activity results in a high volume of abuse complaints, which may result in server takedowns or service suspension by internet providers. Separate C2 infrastructure ensures that existing infections remain controllable even if the spreading server is disrupted.

How the malware evades detection and maintains persistence

Analysis of the Linux payload (bot _x64)

The sample begins by setting the environmental variables BUILD_ID and JENKINS_NODE_COOKIE to “dontKillMe”. By default, Jenkins terminates long-running scripts after a defined timeout period; however, setting these variables to “dontKillMe” bypasses this check, allowing the script to continue running uninterrupted.

The script then performs several stealth behaviors to evade detection. First, it deletes the original executable from disk and then renames itself to resemble the legitimate kernel processes “ksoftirqd/0” or “kworker”, which are found on Linux installations by default. It then uses a double fork to daemonize itself, enabling it to run in the background, before redirecting standard input, standard output, and standard error to /dev/null, hiding any logging from the malware. Finally, the script creates a signal handler for signals such as SIGTERM, causing them to be ignored and making it harder to stop the process.

Stealth component of the main function
Figure 3: Stealth component of the main function

How the botnet communicates with command and control (C2)

The sample then connects to the C2 server and sends the detected architecture of the system on which the agent was installed. The malware then enters a loop to handle incoming commands.

The sample features two types of commands, utility commands used to manage the malware, and commands to trigger attacks. Three special commands are defined: “PING” (which replies with PONG as a keep-alive mechanism), “!stop” which causes the malware to exit, and “!update”, which triggers the malware to download a new version from the C2 server and restart itself.

Initial connection to the C2 sever.
Figure 4: Initial connection to the C2 sever.

What DDoS attack techniques this botnet uses

The attack commands consist of the following:

Many of these commands invoke the same function despite appearing to be different attack techniques. For example, specialized attacks such as Cloudflare bypass (cfbypass, uam) use the exact same function as a standard HTTP attack. This may indicate the threat actor is attempting to make the botnet look like it has more capabilities than it actually has, or it could suggest that these commands are placeholders for future attack functionality that has yet to be implemented

All the commands take three arguments: IP, port to attack, and the duration of the attack.

attack_udp and attack_udp_pps

The attack_udp and attack_udp_pps functions both use a basic loop and sendto system call to send UDP packets to the victim’s IP, either targeting a predetermined port or a random port. The attack_udp function sends packets with 1,450 bytes of data, aimed at bandwidth saturation, while the attack_udp_pps function sends smaller 64-byte packets. In both cases, the data body of the packet consists of entirely random data.

Code for the UDP attack method
Figure 5: Code for the UDP attack method

attack_dayz

The attack_dayz function follows a similar structure to the attack_udp function; however, instead of sending random data, it will instead send a TSource Engine Query. This command is specific to Valve Source Engine servers and is designed to return a large volume of data about the targeted server. By repeatedly flooding this request, an attacker can exhaust the resources of a server using a comparatively small amount of data.

The Valve Source Engine server, also called Source Engine Dedicated server, is a server developed by video game company Valve that enables multiplayer gameplay for titles built using the Source game engine, which is also developed by Valve. The Source engine is used in games such as Counterstrike and Team Fortress 2. Curiously, the function attack_dayz, appears to be named after another popular online multiplayer game, DayZ; however, DayZ does not use the Valve Source Engine, making it unclear why this name was chosen.

The code for the “attack_dayz” attack function.
Figure 6: The code for the attack_dayz” attack function.

attack_tcp_push

The attack_tcp_push function establishes a TCP socket with the non-blocking flag set, allowing it to rapidly call functions such as connect() and send() without waiting for their completion. For the duration of the attack, it enters a while loop in which it repeatedly connects to the victim, sends 1,024 bytes of random data, and then closes the connection. This process repeats until the attack duration ends. If the mode flag is set to 1, the function also configures the socket with TCP no-delay enabled, allowing for packets to be sent immediately without buffering, resulting in a higher packet rate and a more effective attack.

The code for the TCP attack function.
Figure 7: The code for the TCP attack function.

attack_http

Similar to attach_tcp_push, attack_http configures a socket with no-delay enabled and non-blocking set. After establishing the connection, it sends 64 HTTP GET requests before closing the socket.

The code for the HTTP attack function.
Figure 8: The code for the HTTP attack function.

attack_special

The attack_special function creates a UDP socket and sets the port and payload based on the value of the mode flag:

  • Mode 0: Port 53 (DNS), sending a 10-byte malformed data packet.
  • Mode 1: Port 27015 (Valve Source Engine), sending the previously observed TSource Engine Query packet.
  • Mode 2: Port 123 (NTP), sending the start of an NTP control request.
The code for the attack_special function.
Figure 9: The code for the attack_special function.

What this botnet reveals about opportunistic attacks on internet-facing systems

Jenkins is one of the less frequently exploited services honeypotted by Darktrace, with only a handful campaigns observed. Nonetheless, the emergence of this new DDoS botnet demonstrates that attackers continue to opportunistically exploit any internet-facing misconfiguration at scale to grow the botnet strength.

While the hosts most commonly affected by these opportunistic attacks are usually “lower-value” systems, this distinction is largely irrelevant for botnets, where numbers alone are more important to overall effectiveness

The presence of game-specific DoS techniques further highlights that the gaming industry continues to be extensively targeted by cyber attackers, with Cloudflare reporting it as the fourth most targeted industry [2]. This botnet has likely already been used against game servers, serving as a reminder for server operators to ensure appropriate mitigations are in place.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

103[.]177.110.202 - Attacker and command-and-control IP

F79d05065a2ba7937b8781e69b5859d78d5f65f01fb291ae27d28277a5e37f9b – bot_x64

References

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/86db2530298e6335d3ecc66c2818cfbd0a6b11fcdfcb75f575b9fcce1faa00f1/detection

[2] - https://blog.cloudflare.com/ddos-threat-report-2025-q4/

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer
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