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May 1, 2025

SocGholish: From loader and C2 activity to RansomHub deployment

In early 2025, Darktrace uncovered SocGholish-to-RansomHub intrusion chains, including loader and C2 activity, alongside credential harvesting via WebDAV and SCF abuse. Learn more about SocGholish and its kill chain here!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst
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01
May 2025

Over the past year, a clear pattern has emerged across the threat landscape: ransomware operations are increasingly relying on compartmentalized affiliate models. In these models, initial access brokers (IABs) [6], malware loaders, and post-exploitation operators work together.

Due to those specialization roles, a new generation of loader campaigns has risen. Threat actors increasingly employ loader operators to quietly establish footholds on the target network. These entities then hand off access to ransomware affiliates. One loader that continues to feature prominently in such campaigns is SocGholish.

What is SocGholish?

SocGholish is a loader malware that has been utilized since at least 2017 [7].  It has long been associated with fake browser updates and JavaScript-based delivery methods on infected websites.

Threat actors often target outdated or poorly secured CMS-based websites like WordPress. Through unpatched plugins, or even remote code execution flaws, they inject malicious JavaScript into the site’s HTML, templates or external JS resources [8].  Historically, SocGholish has functioned as a first-stage malware loader, ultimately leading to deployment of Cobalt Strike beacons [9], and further facilitating access persistence to corporate environments. More recently, multiple security vendors have reported that infections involving SocGholish frequently lead to the deployment of RansomHub ransomware [3] [5].

This blog explores multiple instances within Darktrace's customer base where SocGholish deployment led to subsequent network compromises. Investigations revealed indicators of compromise (IoCs) similar to those identified by external security researchers, along with variations in attacker behavior post-deployment. Key innovations in post-compromise activities include credential access tactics targeting authentication mechanisms, particularly through the abuse of legacy protocols like WebDAV and SCF file interactions over SMB.

Initial access and execution

Since January 2025, Darktrace’s Threat Research team observed multiple cases in which threat actors leveraged the SocGholish loader for initial access. Malicious actors commonly deliver SocGholish by compromising legitimate websites by injecting malicious scripts into the HTML of the affected site. When the visitor lands on an infected site, they are typically redirected to a fake browser update page, tricking them into downloading a ZIP file containing a JavaScript-based loader [1] [2]. In one case, a targeted user appears to have visited the compromised website garagebevents[.]com (IP: 35.203.175[.]30), from which around 10 MB of data was downloaded.

Device Event Log showing connections to the compromised website, following by connections to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.
Figure 1: Device Event Log showing connections to the compromised website, following by connections to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.

Within milliseconds of the connection establishment, the user’s device initiated several HTTPS sessions over the destination port 443 to the external endpoint 176.53.147[.]97, linked to the following Keitaro TDS domains:

  • packedbrick[.]com
  • rednosehorse[.]com
  • blackshelter[.]org
  • blacksaltys[.]com

To evade detection, SocGholish uses highly obfuscated code and relies on traffic distribution systems (TDS) [3].  TDS is a tool used in digital and affiliate marketing to manage and distribute incoming web traffic based on predefined rules. More specifically, Keitaro is a premium self-hosted TDS frequently utilized by attackers as a payload repository for malicious scripts following redirects from compromised sites. In the previously noted example, it appears that the device connected to the compromised website, which then retrieved JavaScript code from the aforementioned Keitaro TDS domains. The script served by those instances led to connections to the endpoint virtual.urban-orthodontics[.]com (IP: 185.76.79[.]50), successfully completing SocGholish’s distribution.

Advanced Search showing connections to the compromised website, following by those to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.
Figure 2: Advanced Search showing connections to the compromised website, following by those to the identified Keitaro TDS instances.

Persistence

During some investigations, Darktrace researchers observed compromised devices initiating HTTPS connections to the endpoint files.pythonhosted[.]org (IP: 151.101.1[.]223), suggesting Python package downloads. External researchers have previously noted how attackers use Python-based backdoors to maintain access on compromised endpoints following initial access via SocGholish [5].

Credential access and lateral movement

Credential access – external

Darktrace researchers identified observed some variation in kill chain activities following initial access and foothold establishment. For example, Darktrace detected interesting variations in credential access techniques. In one such case, an affected device attempted to contact the rare external endpoint 161.35.56[.]33 using the Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) protocol. WebDAV is an extension of the HTTP protocol that allows users to collaboratively edit and manage files on remote web servers. WebDAV enables remote shares to be mounted over HTTP or HTTPS, similar to how SMB operates, but using web-based protocols. Windows supports WebDAV natively, which means a UNC path pointing to an HTTP or HTTPS resource can trigger system-level behavior such as authentication.

In this specific case, the system initiated outbound connections using the ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’ user-agent, targeting the URI path of /s on the external endpoint 161.35.56[.]33. During these requests, the host attempted to initiate NTML authentication and even SMB sessions over the web, both of which failed. Despite the session failures, these attempts also indicate a form of forced authentication. Forced authentication exploits a default behavior in Windows where, upon encountering a UNC path, the system will automatically try to authenticate to the resource using NTML – often without any user interaction. Although no files were directly retrieved, the WebDAV server was still likely able to retrieve the user’s NTLM hash during the session establishment requests, which can later be used by the adversary to crack the password offline.

Credential access – internal

In another investigated incident, Darktrace observed a related technique utilized for credential access and lateral movement. This time, the infected host uploaded a file named ‘Thumbs.scf’ to multiple internal SMB network shares. Shell Command File ( SCF) is a legacy Windows file format used primarily for Windows Explorer shortcuts. These files contain instructions for rendering icons or triggering shell commands, and they can be executed implicitly when a user simply opens a folder containing the file – no clicks required.

The ‘Thumbs.scf’ file dropped by the attacker was crafted to exploit this behavior. Its contents included a [Shell] section with the Command=2 directive and an IconFile path pointing to a remote UNC resource on the same external endpoint, 161.35.56[.]33, seen in the previously described case – specifically, ‘\\161.35.56[.]33\share\icon.ico’. When a user on the internal network navigates to the folder containing the SCF file, their system will automatically attempt to load the icon. In doing so, the system issues a request to the specified UNC path, which again prompts Windows to initiate NTML authentication.

This pattern of activity implies that the attacker leveraged passive internal exposure; users who simply browsed a compromised share would unknowingly send their NTML hashes to an external attacker-controlled host. Unlike the WebDAV approach, which required initiating outbound communication from the infected host, this SCF method relies on internal users to interact with poisoned folders.

Figure 3: Contents of the file 'Thumbs.scf' showing the UNC resource hosted on the external endpoint.
Figure 3: Contents of the file 'Thumbs.scf' showing the UNC resource hosted on the external endpoint.

Command-and-control

Following initial compromise, affected devices would then attempt outbound connections using the TLS/SSL protocol over port 443 to different sets of command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with SocGholish. The malware frequently uses obfuscated JavaScript loaders to initiate its infection chain, and once dropped, the malware communicates back to its infrastructure over standard web protocols, typically using HTTPS over port 443. However, this set of connections would precede a second set of outbound connections, this time to infrastructure linked to RansomHub affiliates, possibly facilitating the deployed Python-based backdoor.

Connectivity to RansomHub infrastructure relied on defense evasion tactics, such as port-hopping. The idea behind port-hopping is to disguise C2 traffic by avoiding consistent patterns that might be caught by firewalls, and intrusion detection systems. By cycling through ephemeral ports, the malware increases its chances of slipping past basic egress filtering or network monitoring rules that only scrutinize common web traffic ports like 443 or 80. Darktrace analysts identified systems connecting to destination ports such as 2308, 2311, 2313 and more – all on the same destination IP address associated with the RansomHub C2 environment.

Figure 4: Advanced Search connection logs showing connections over destination ports that change rapidly.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of 2025, Darktrace analysts identified a campaign whereby ransomware affiliates leveraged SocGholish to establish network access in victim environments. This activity enabled multiple sets of different post exploitation activity. Credential access played a key role, with affiliates abusing WebDAV and NTML over SMB to trigger authentication attempts. The attackers were also able to plant SCF files internally to expose NTML hashes from users browsing shared folders. These techniques evidently point to deliberate efforts at early lateral movement and foothold expansion before deploying ransomware. As ransomware groups continue to refine their playbooks and work more closely with sophisticated loaders, it becomes critical to track not just who is involved, but how access is being established, expanded, and weaponized.

Credit to Chrisina Kreza (Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

·       Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Compliance / External Windows Communication

·       Compliance / SMB Drive Write

·       Compromise / Large DNS Volume for Suspicious Domain

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·       Device / Anonymous NTML Logins

·       Device / External Network Scan

·       Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

·       Device / SMB Lateral Movement

·       Device / Suspicious SMB Activity

·       Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·       User / Kerberos Username Brute Force

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

·       Credential Access – T1187 Forced Authentication

·       Credential Access – T1110 Brute Force

·       Command and Control – T1071.001 Web Protocols

·       Command and Control – T1571 Non-Standard Port

·       Discovery – T1083 File and Directory Discovery

·       Discovery – T1018 Remote System Discovery

·       Discovery – T1046 Network Service Discovery

·       Discovery – T1135 Network Share Discovery

·       Execution – T1059.007 JavaScript

·       Lateral Movement – T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares

·       Resource Deployment – T1608.004 Drive-By Target

List of indicators of compromise (IoCs)

·       garagebevents[.]com – 35.203.175[.]30 – Possibly compromised website

·       packedbrick[.]com – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       rednosehorse[.]com – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       blackshelter[.]org – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       blacksaltys[.]com – 176.53.147[.]97 – Keitaro TDS Domains used for SocGholish Delivery

·       virtual.urban-orthodontics[.]com – 185.76.79[.]50

·       msbdz.crm.bestintownpro[.]com – 166.88.182[.]126 – SocGholish C2

·       185.174.101[.]240 – RansomHub Python C2

·       185.174.101[.]69 – RansomHub Python C2

·       108.181.182[.]143 – RansomHub Python C2

References

[1] https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/socgholish-malware/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/threat-hunting-case-study-socgholish

[3] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html

[4] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/update-fake-updates-two-new-actors-and-new-mac-malware

[5] https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/ransomhub-affiliate-leverage-python-based-backdoor/

[6] https://www.cybereason.com/blog/how-do-initial-access-brokers-enable-ransomware-attacks

[7] https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124/

[8] https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-spotting-socgholish-wordpress-injection/

[9] https://www.esentire.com/blog/socgholish-to-cobalt-strike-in-10-minutes

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst

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May 27, 2025

From Rockstar2FA to FlowerStorm: Investigating a Blooming Phishing-as-a-Service Platform

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What is FlowerStorm?

FlowerStorm is a Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform believed to have gained traction following the decline of the former PhaaS platform Rockstar2FA. It employs Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) attacks to target Microsoft 365 credentials. After Rockstar2FA appeared to go dormant, similar PhaaS portals began to emerge under the name FlowerStorm. This naming is likely linked to the plant-themed terminology found in the HTML titles of its phishing pages, such as 'Sprout' and 'Blossom'. Given the abrupt disappearance of Rockstar2FA and the near-immediate rise of FlowerStorm, it is possible that the operators rebranded to reduce exposure [1].

External researchers identified several similarities between Rockstar2FA and FlowerStorm, suggesting a shared operational overlap. Both use fake login pages, typically spoofing Microsoft, to steal credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) tokens, with backend infrastructure hosted on .ru and .com domains. Their phishing kits use very similar HTML structures, including randomized comments, Cloudflare turnstile elements, and fake security prompts. Despite Rockstar2FA typically being known for using automotive themes in their HTML titles, while FlowerStorm shifted to a more botanical theme, the overall design remained consistent [1].

Despite these stylistic differences, both platforms use similar credential capture methods and support MFA bypass. Their domain registration patterns and synchronized activity spikes through late 2024 suggest shared tooling or coordination [1].

FlowerStorm, like Rockstar2FA, also uses their phishing portal to mimic legitimate login pages such as Microsoft 365 for the purpose of stealing credentials and MFA tokens while the portals are relying heavily on backend servers using top-level domains (TLDs) such as .ru, .moscow, and .com. Starting in June 2024, some of the phishing pages began utilizing Cloudflare services with domains such as pages[.]dev. Additionally, usage of the file “next.php” is used to communicate with their backend servers for exfiltration and data communication. FlowerStorm’s platform focuses on credential harvesting using fields such as email, pass, and session tracking tokens in addition to supporting email validation and MFA authentications via their backend systems [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of FlowerStorm Microsoft phishing

While multiple suspected instances of the FlowerStorm PhaaS platform were identified during Darktrace’s investigation, this blog will focus on a specific case from March 2025. Darktrace’s Threat Research team analyzed the affected customer environment and discovered that threat actors were accessing a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) account from several rare external IP addresses and ASNs.

Around a week before the first indicators of FlowerStorm were observed, Darktrace detected anomalous logins via Microsoft Office 365 products, including Office365 Shell WCSS-Client and Microsoft PowerApps.  Although not confirmed in this instance, Microsoft PowerApps could potentially be leveraged by attackers to create phishing applications or exploit vulnerabilities in data connections [2].

Darktrace’s detection of the unusual SaaS credential use.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the unusual SaaS credential use.

Following this initial login, Darktrace observed subsequent login activity from the rare source IP, 69.49.230[.]198. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources have since associated this IP with the FlowerStorm PhaaS operation [3][4].  Darktrace then observed the SaaS user resetting the password on the Core Directory of the Azure Active Directory using the user agent, O365AdminPortal.

Given FlowerStorm’s known use of AitM attacks targeting Microsoft 365 credentials, it seems highly likely that this activity represents an attacker who previously harvested credentials and is now attempting to escalate their privileges within the target network.

Darktrace / IDENTITY’s detection of privilege escalation on a compromised SaaS account, highlighting unusual login activity and a password reset event.
Figure 2: Darktrace / IDENTITY’s detection of privilege escalation on a compromised SaaS account, highlighting unusual login activity and a password reset event.

Notably, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst also detected anomalies during a number of these login attempts, which is significant given FlowerStorm’s known capability to bypass MFA and steal session tokens.

Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of new login behavior for the SaaS user, including abnormal MFA usage.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of new login behavior for the SaaS user, including abnormal MFA usage.
Multiple login and failed login events were observed from the anomalous source IP over the month prior, as seen in Darktrace’s Advanced Search.
Figure 4: Multiple login and failed login events were observed from the anomalous source IP over the month prior, as seen in Darktrace’s Advanced Search.

In response to the suspicious SaaS activity, Darktrace recommended several Autonomous Response actions to contain the threat. These included blocking the user from making further connections to the unusual IP address 69.49.230[.]198 and disabling the user account to prevent any additional malicious activity. In this instance, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response was configured in Human Confirmation mode, requiring manual approval from the customer’s security team before any mitigative actions could be applied. Had the system been configured for full autonomous response, it would have immediately blocked the suspicious connections and disabled any users deviating from their expected behavior—significantly reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.

Figure 5: Autonomous Response Actions recommended on this account behavior; This would result in disabling the user and blocking further sign-in activity from the source IP.

Conclusion

The FlowerStorm platform, along with its predecessor, RockStar2FA is a PhaaS platform known to leverage AitM attacks to steal user credentials and bypass MFA, with threat actors adopting increasingly sophisticated toolkits and techniques to carry out their attacks.

In this incident observed within a Darktrace customer's SaaS environment, Darktrace detected suspicious login activity involving abnormal VPN usage from a previously unseen IP address, which was subsequently linked to the FlowerStorm PhaaS platform. The subsequent activity, specifically a password reset, was deemed highly suspicious and likely indicative of an attacker having obtained SaaS credentials through a prior credential harvesting attack.

Darktrace’s prompt detection of these SaaS anomalies and timely notifications from its Security Operations Centre (SOC) enabled the customer to mitigate and remediate the threat before attackers could escalate privileges and advance the attack, effectively shutting it down in its early stages.

Credit to Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Alert Detections

·      SaaS / Access / M365 High Risk Level Login

·      SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

·      SaaS / Compromise / Login from Rare High-Risk Endpoint

·      SaaS / Compromise / SaaS Anomaly Following Anomalous Login

·      SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Account Update

·      SaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual MFA Auth and SaaS Activity

Cyber AI Analyst Coverage

·      Suspicious Access of Azure Active Directory  

·      Suspicious Access of Azure Active Directory  

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

69.49.230[.]198 – Source IP – Malicious IP Associated with FlowerStorm, Observed in Login Activity

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Cloud Accounts - DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - T1078.004 - T1078

Cloud Service Dashboard - DISCOVERY - T1538

Compromise Accounts - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1586

Steal Web Session Cookie - CREDENTIAL ACCESS - T1539

References:

[1] https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/12/19/phishing-platform-rockstar-2fa-trips-and-flowerstorm-picks-up-the-pieces/

[2] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/operations/incident-response-playbook-compromised-malicious-app

[3] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/69.49.230.198/community

[4] https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/69.49.230.198

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Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst

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May 23, 2025

Defending the Frontlines: Proactive Cybersecurity in Local Government

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Serving a population of over 165,000 citizens, this county government delivers essential services that enhance the quality of life for all of its residents in Florida, United States. From public safety and works to law enforcement, economic development, health, and community services, the county’s cybersecurity strategy plays a foundational role in protecting its citizens.

From flying blind to seeing the bigger picture

Safeguarding data from multiple systems, service providers, and citizens is a key aspect of the County’s Systems Management remit. Protecting sensitive information while enabling smooth engagement with multiple external partners poses a unique challenge; the types of data and potential threats are continuously evolving, but resources – both human and financial – remain consistently tight.

When the Chief Information Officer took on his role in 2024, building out a responsive defense-in-depth strategy was central to achieving these goals. However, with limited resources and complex needs, his small security team was struggling with high alert volumes, inefficient tools, and time-consuming investigations that frequently led nowhere.

Meanwhile, issues like insider threats, Denial of Service (DoS), and phishing attacks were growing; the inefficiencies were creating serious security vulnerabilities. As the CIO put it, he was flying blind. With so much data coming in, security analysts were in danger of missing the bigger picture.

“We would just see a single portion of data that could send us down a rabbit hole, thinking something’s going on – only to find out after spending days, weeks, or even months that it was nothing. If you’re only seeing one piece of the issue, it’s really difficult to identify whether something is a legitimate threat or a false positive.”

Local government’s unique cybersecurity challenges

According to the CIO, even with a bigger team, aligning and comparing all the data into a comprehensive, bigger picture would be a major challenge. “The thing about local government specifically is that it’s a complex security environment. We bring together a lot of different individuals and organizations, from construction workers to people who bring projects into our community to better the County. What we work with varies from day to day.”

The challenge wasn’t just about identifying threats, but also about doing so quickly enough to respond before damage was done. The CIO said this was particularly concerning when dealing with sophisticated threats: “We’re dealing with nation-state attackers nowadays, as opposed to ‘script kiddies.’ There’s no time to lose. We’ve got to have cybersecurity that can respond as quickly as they can attack.”

To achieve this, among the most critical challenges the CIO and his team needed to address were:

  • Contextual awareness and visibility across the network: The County team lacked the granular visibility needed to identify potentially harmful behaviors. The IT team needed a tool that uncovered hidden activities and provided actionable insights, with minimal manual intervention.
  • Augmenting human expertise and improving response times: Hiring additional analysts to monitor the environment is prohibitively expensive for many local governments. The IT team needed a cybersecurity solution that could augment existing skills while automating day-to-day tasks. More effective resource allocation would drive improved response times.
  • Preventing email-based threats: Phishing and malicious email links present a persistent threat. The County team needed a way to flag, identify, and hold suspicious messages automatically and efficiently. Given the team’s public service remit, contextual awareness is crucial to ensuring that no legitimate communications are accidentally blocked. Accuracy is extremely important.
  • Securing access and managing insider threats: Having already managed insider threats posed by former staff members, the IT team wanted to adopt a more proactive, deterrent-based approach towards employee IT resource use, preventing incidents before they could occur.

Proactive cybersecurity

Recognizing these challenges, the CIO and County sought AI-driven solutions capable of acting autonomously to support a lean IT team and give the big picture view needed, without getting lost in false positive alerts.

Ease of deployment was another key requirement: the CIO wanted to quickly establish a security baseline for County that would not require extensive pre-planning or disrupt existing systems. Having worked with Darktrace in previous roles, he knew the solution had the capacity to make the critical connections he was looking for, while delivering fast response times and reducing the burden on security teams.

When every second counts, we want to be as close to the same resources as our attackers are utilizing. We have got to have something that can respond as quickly as they can attack. For the County, that’s Darktrace.” – CIO, County Systems Management Department.

Closing network visibility gaps with Darktrace / NETWORK

The County chose Darktrace / NETWORK for unparalleled visibility into the County’s network. With the solution in place, the CIO and his team were able to identify and address previously hidden activities, uncovering insider threats in unexpected places. For example, one team member had installed an unauthorized anonymizer plug-in on their browser, posing a potentially serious security risk via traffic being sent out to the internet. “Darktrace immediately alerted on it,” said CIO. “We were able to deal with the threat proactively and quickly.”

Darktrace / NETWORK continuously monitored and updated its understanding of the County environment, intelligently establishing the different behaviors and network activity. The end result was a level of context awareness that enabled the team to focus on the alerts that mattered most, saving time and effort.

“Darktrace brings all the data we need together, into one picture. We’re able to see what’s going on at a glance, as opposed to spending time trying to identify real threats from false positives,” said the CIO. The ability to automate actions freed the team up to focus on more complex tasks, with 66% of network response actions being applied autonomously, taking the right action at the right time to stop the earliest signs of threatening activity. This reduced pressure on the County’s team members, while buying valuable containment time to perform deeper investigations.

The agentless deployment advantage

For the CIO, one of the major benefits of Darktrace / NETWORK is that it’s agentless. “Agents alert attackers to the presence of security in your environment, it helps them to understand that there’s something else they need to bring down your defenses,” he said. Using Darktrace to mirror network traffic, the County can maintain full visibility across all network entities without alerting attackers and respond to threatening activity at machine speed. “It allows me to sleep better at night, knowing that this tool can effectively unplug the network cable from that device and bring it offline,” said CIO.

Streamlining investigations with Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst

For lean security teams, contextual awareness is crucial in reducing the burden of alert fatigue. Using Cyber AI Analyst, the County team is able to take the pressure off, automatically investigating every relevant event, and reducing thousands of individual alerts to only a small number of incidents that require manual review.

For the County team, the benefits are clear: 520 investigation hours saved in one month, with an average of just 11 minutes investigation time per incident. For the CIO, Darktrace goes beyond reducing workloads, it actually drives security: “It identifies threats almost instantly, bringing together logs and behaviors into a single, clear view.”

The efficiency gain has been so significant that the CIO believes Darktrace augments capabilities beyond the size of a team of analysts. “You could have three analysts working around the clock, but it’s hard to bring all those logs and behaviors together in one place and communicate everything in a coordinated way. Nothing does that as quickly as Darktrace can.”

Catching the threats from within: Defense in depth with Darktrace / IDENTITY

One of the key benefits of Darktrace for the County was its breadth of capability and responsiveness. “We’re looking at everything from multi-factor authentication, insider threats, distributed denial of service attacks,” said the CIO. “I’ve worked with other products in the past, but I’ve never found a tool as good as Darktrace.”

Further insider threats uncovered by Darktrace / IDENTITY included insecure access practices. Some users had logins and passwords on shared network resources or in plain-text files. Darktrace alerted the security team and the threats were mitigated before serious damage was done.

Darktrace / IDENTITY gives organizations advanced visibility of application user behavior from unusual authentication, password sprays, account takeover, resource theft, and admin abuse. Security teams can take targeted actions including the forced log-off of a user or temporary disabling of an account to give the team time to verify legitimacy.

First line of defense against the number one attack vector: Enhancing email security with Darktrace / EMAIL

Email-based threats, such as phishing, are among the most common attack vectors in modern cybersecurity, and a key vector for ransomware attacks. Post implementation performance was so strong that the organization now plans to retire other tools, cutting costs without compromising on security.

Darktrace / EMAIL was one of the first tools that I implemented when I started here,” said CIO. “I really recognize the value of it in our environment.” In addition to detecting and flagging potentially malicious email, the CIO said an unexpected benefit has been the reinforcement of more security-aware behaviors among end users. “People are checking their junk folders now, alerting us and checking to see if something is legitimate or not.”

The CIO said that, unlike traditional email security tools that basically perform only one function, Darktrace has multiple additional capabilities that deliver extra layers of protection compared to one-dimensional alternatives. For example, AI-employee feedback loops leverage insights gained from individual users to not only improve detection rates, but also provide end users with contextual security awareness training, to enhance greater understanding of the risks.

Straightforward integration, ease of use

The County wanted a powerful, responsive solution – without demanding pre-installation or integration needs, and with maximum ease of use. “The integration is relatively painless,” said the CIO. “That’s another real benefit, you can bring Darktrace into your environment and have it up and running faster than you could ever hire additional analysts to look at the same data.”

The team found that, compared to competing products, where there was extensive setup, overhead, and resources, “Darktrace is almost plug-and-play.” According to the CIO, the solution started ingesting information and providing notifications immediately: “You can turn on defense or response mechanisms at a granular level, for email or network – or both at the same time.”

The County sees Darktrace as an integral part of its cybersecurity strategy into the future. “Having worked with Darktrace in the past, it was an easy decision for me to agree to a multi-year partnership,” said the CIO “As we continue to build out our defense-in-depth strategy, the ability to use Darktrace to manage other data sources and identify new, additional behavior will be crucial to our proactive, risk-based approach.”

Darktrace has the capacity to meet the organization’s need for exceptional responsiveness, without burning out teams. “If you’re not overburdening the teams that you do have with significant workloads, they have a lot more agility to deal with things on the fly,” said the CIO.

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