Blog
/
Identity
/
March 20, 2023

Multi-Factor Authentication: Not the Silver Bullet

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is a widely used security measure, but it's not bulletproof. See how threat actors can exploit MFA to access your information.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tegbir Singh
Cyber Analyst
Written by
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
20
Mar 2023

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is a long-established component of the identity and access management (IAM) framework that requires users to provide multiple verification factors to access Software as a Service (SaaS) and application environments, rather than simply relying on account credentials. MFA has been widely, although not universally, adopted as a security measure against common account takeover methods, such as brute-force attacks and exploiting passwords found in data leaks. Despite the adoption of MFA, account takeover methods are still prevalent across the threat landscape. However, the industry is seeing more and more examples of MFA compromise wherein threat actors exploit the security tool itself to gain account access.

Although having a security measure like MFA is a crucial first step in safeguarding a network, relying on a single method will always lead to gaps. MFA is a generic term for a broad range of products and services with varying degrees of efficacy; however, it is often used in the same way as Zero Trust, as a tick box or one size fits all solution. Knowing the gaps in security that are still present, even when utilizing effective MFA tools, is essential to mitigating the evolving threats of account compromise.

Figure 1: The standard flow process of MFA for any individual application. 

Bypassing MFA & Attack Details

Instances of threat actors’ bypassing MFA typically involve an element of social engineering, such as spamming authentication requests to the victim’s email or phone. This takes advantage of the victim’s fatigue of receiving numerous notifications, leading them to validate the request to silence the notifications. Microsoft research data published in September 2022 shows a clear trend of MFA fatigue attacks becoming increasingly popular last year [1]. Notably, the Uber hack occurred after attackers exploited this method [2]. This trend seems likely to continue as MFA progresses towards universal adoption and attackers continue to focus on social engineering as a means to bypass it. The following example details how Darktrace not only identifies and warns customers about unusual MFA activity for hijacked accounts, but also how its suite of products can take appropriate actions to prevent further compromise.

On January 5, 2023, a SaaS account belonging to a customer based in Australia was observed successfully logging in from a rare external endpoint, following two previous failed attempts. Darktrace identified that the login IP address was in the United States, which it recognized as unusual compared to the user’s expected login location, and the successful login followed multiple failed MFA authentication requests.

Figure 2: A screenshot of the SaaS console, showcasing the login activity of the SaaS user with the reason for the failed logins highlighted. 

No further suspicious activity was detected on the device, likely a tactic employed by the threat actor to remain undetected by security tools. However, a Darktrace model breach was triggered two days later following another usual login location, this time in Germany. Once again, a successful authentication request was observed, suggesting the attacker was able to consistently bypass the MFA security and access the account. 

Following this login, multiple unusual activities were observed including the access of multiple sensitive internal files and initiating updates to email folders, namely \Sent Items, \Deleted Items, and \WIISE. This type of activity is indicative of a victim’s mailbox being modified to enable attackers to send malicious spam to contacts in the organization, allowing them to escalate their privileges and move laterally throughout the network.

Figure 3: A screenshot of the SaaS console showing some of the suspicious files that were previewed by the user. 

Darktrace continued to report suspicious activity from this user with similar activity occurring again on January 8, when the user was observed logging in from another highly anomalous location and accessing similar files. The activity escalated on January 13 when, alongside an unusual login and further email updates, the user created a new email rule suspiciously named “.”.

Figure 4: A screenshot showcasing the details of the email rule that was created by the malicious actor. 

The rule appears to have targeted emails received from a specific internal user, marking them as read and moving them to a different folder; it was likely that the attacker intended to use these emails to help socially engineer third-parties and compromise the organization’s network further. Additional suspicious activity was observed from the user, including an update to an email containing a potentially sensitive attachment.

Figure 5: A screenshot showing details of the attachment observed.

Due to the combination of an unusual login and new email rule, Darktrace RESPOND/Network™ took swift autonomous action, forcing the user in question to log out and disabling the account, preventing further compromise. With the implementation of these actions the malicious actor was unable to engage in any further activity on the compromised account.

Figure 6: The above screenshot of the SaaS UI shows some of the actions initiated by Darktrace RESPOND/Network.

Conclusion

Having MFA in place is an important first step towards hardening an organization’s SaaS environment and safeguarding against less sophisticated methods of attack, however defense in depth is key to ensuring a network is truly secure. Any one security measure will always have weaknesses, and only with multiple layers of varying protection can gaps in security be effectively closed. 

Using Self-Learning AI™, Darktrace DETECT™ can quickly identify unexpected behavior on a device, even if it occurs with legitimate credentials and successfully passes MFA, to bring it to the attention of the security team. Darktrace RESPOND™ is then able to take immediate action, implementing precise actions to prevent more serious compromise. 

Pairing the two products together provides customers with an around-the-clock AI decision maker capable of detecting emerging threats, even those that would evade other traditional security measures, and interrupting attacks at machine speed with surgical precision.

Resources

[1] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-azure-ad-blog/defend-your-users-from-mfa-fatigue-attacks/ba-p/2365677 

[2] https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2022/09/18/has-uber-been-hacked-company-investigates-cybersecurity-incident-as-law-enforcement-alerted/?sh=4d3495796056 

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tegbir Singh
Cyber Analyst
Written by
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Email

/

April 24, 2026

Email-Borne Cyber Risk: A Core Challenge for the CISO in the Age of Volume and Sophistication

Default blog imageDefault blog image

The challenge for CISOs

Despite continuous advances in security technologies, humans continue to be exploited by attackers. Credential abuse and social actions like phishing are major factors, accounting for around 60% of all breaches. These attacks rely less on technical vulnerabilities and more on exploiting human behavior and organizational processes. 

From my perspective as a former CISO, protecting humans concentrates three of today’s most pressing challenges: the sheer volume of email-based threats, their increasing sophistication, and the limitations of traditional employee awareness programs in moving the needle on risk. 

My personal experience of security awareness training as a CISO

With over 20 years’ experience as an ICT and Cybersecurity leader across various international organizations, I’ve seen security awareness training (SAT) in many guises. And while the cyber landscape is evolving in every direction, the effectiveness of SAT is reaching a plateau.  

Most programs I’ve seen follow a familiar pattern. Training is delivered through a combination of eLearning modules and internal sessions designed to reinforce IT policies. Employees are typically required to complete a slide deck or video, followed by a multiple-choice quiz. Occasional phishing simulations are distributed throughout the year.

The content is often static and unpersonalized, based on known threats that may already be outdated. Every employee regardless of role or risk exposure receives the same training and the same simulated phishing templates, from front-desk staff to the CEO.

The problem with traditional SAT programs

The issue with the approach to SAT outlined above is that the distribution of power is imbalanced. Humans will always be fallible, particularly when faced with increasingly sophisticated attacks. Providing generic, low-context training risks creating false confidence rather than genuine resilience. Let’s look at some of the problems in detail.

Timing and delivery

Employees today operate under constant cognitive load, making lots of rapid decisions every day to reduce their email volumes. Yet if employees are completing training annually, or on an ad hoc basis, it becomes a standalone occurrence rather than a continuous habit.  

As a result, retention is low. Employees often forget the lessons within weeks, a phenomenon known as the ‘Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve.’

The graph illustrates that when you first learn something, the information disappears at an exponential rate without retention. In fact, according to the curve, you forget 50% of all new information within a day, and 90% of all new information within a week.  

Simultaneously, most training is conducted within a separate interface. Because it takes place away from the actual moment of decision-making, the "teachable moment" is lost. There is a cognitive disconnect between the action (clicking a link in Outlook) and the education (watching a video in a browser). 

People

In the context of professional risk management, the risks faced by different users are different. Static learning such as everyone receiving the same ‘Password Reset’ email doesn’t help users prepare for the specific threats they are likely to face. It also contributes to user fatigue, driven by repetitive training. And if users receive tests at the same time, news spreads among colleagues, hurting the efficacy of the test.  

Staff turnover introduces further risk. In many organizations, new employees gain access to systems before receiving meaningful training, reducing onboarding to little more than policy acknowledgment.

Measuring success

In my experience, solutions are standalone, without any correlation to other tools in the security stack. In some cases, the programs are delivered by HR rather than the security team, creating a complete silo.  

As a result, SAT is often perceived as a compliance exercise rather than a capability building function. The result is that poor-quality training does little to reduce the likelihood of compromise, regardless of completion rates or quiz performance.

What a modern SAT solution should look like

For today’s CISO, email represents the convergence point of high-volume, high-impact, and human-centric threats. Despite significant security investments, it remains one of the most difficult channels to secure effectively. Given these constraints, CISOs must evolve their approach to SAT.

Success lies in a balanced strategy one that combines advanced technology, attack surface reduction, and pragmatic user enablement, without over-relying on human vigilance as the final line of defense.

This means moving beyond traditional SAT toward continuous, contextual awareness, realistic simulations, and tight integration with security outcomes.

Three requirements for a modern SAT solution

  • Invisible protection: The optimum security solution is one that assists users without impeding their experience. The objective is to enhance human capabilities, rather than simply delivering a lecture. 
  • Real-time feedback: Rather than a monthly quiz, the ideal system would provide a prompt or warning when a user is about to engage with something suspicious. 
  • Positive culture: Shifting the focus away from a "gotcha" culture, which is a contributing factor to a resentment, and instead empowers employees to serve as "sensors" for the company. 

Discover how personalized security coaching can strengthen your human layer and make your email defenses more resilient. Explore Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense.

Continue reading
About the author
Karim Benslimane
VP, Field CISO

Blog

/

Network

/

April 21, 2026

How a Compromised eScan Update Enabled Multi‑Stage Malware and Blockchain C2

multi-stage malwareDefault blog imageDefault blog image

The rise of supply chain attacks

In recent years, the abuse of trusted software has become increasingly common, with supply chain compromises emerging as one of the fastest growing vectors for cyber intrusions. As highlighted in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026, attackers and state-actors continue to find significant value in gaining access to networks through compromised trusted links, third-party tools, or legitimate software. In January 2026, a supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product was reported, with malicious updates distributed to customers through the legitimate update infrastructure. This, in turn, resulted in a multi‑stage loader malware being deployed on compromised devices [1][2].

An overview of eScan exploitation

According to eScan’s official threat advisory, unauthorized access to a regional update server resulted in an “incorrect file placed in the update distribution path” [3]. Customers associated with the affected update servers who downloaded the update during a two-hour window on January 20 were impacted, with affected Windows devices subsequently have experiencing various errors related to update functions and notifications [3].

While eScan did not specify which regional update servers were affected by the malicious update, all impacted Darktrace customer environments were located in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region.

External research reported that a malicious 32-bit executable file , “Reload.exe”, was first installed on affected devices, which then dropped the 64-bit downloader, “CONSCTLX.exe”. This downloader establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks such as “CorelDefrag”, which are responsible for executing PowerShell scripts. Subsequently, it evades detection by tampering with the Windows HOSTS file and eScan registry to prevent future remote updates intended for remediation. Additional payloads are then downloaded from its command-and-control (C2) server [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of eScan exploitation

Initial Access and Blockchain as multi-distributed C2 Infrastructure

On January 20, the same day as the aforementioned two‑hour exploit window, Darktrace observed multiple devices across affected networks downloading .dlz package files from eScan update servers, followed by connections to an anomalous endpoint, vhs.delrosal[.]net, which belongs to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The endpoint contained a self‑signed SSL certificate with the string “O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, ST=SomeState, C=AU”, a default placeholder commonly used in SSL/TLS certificates for testing and development environments, as well as in malicious C2 infrastructure [4].

Utilizing a multi‑distributed C2 infrastructure, the attackers also leveraged domains linked with the Solana open‑source blockchain for C2 purposes, namely “.sol”. These domains were human‑readable names that act as aliases for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. As browsers do not natively resolve .sol domains, the Solana Naming System (formerly known as Bonfida, an independent contributor within the Solana ecosystem) provides a proxy service, through endpoints such as sol-domain[.]org, to enable browser access.

Darktrace observed devices connecting to blackice.sol-domain[.]org, indicating that attackers were likely using this proxy to reach a .sol domain for C2 activity. Given this behavior, it is likely that the attackers leveraged .sol domains as a dead drop resolver, a C2 technique in which threat actors host information on a public and legitimate service, such as a blockchain. Additional proxy resolver endpoints, such as sns-resolver.bonfida.workers[.]dev, were also observed.

Solana transactions are transparent, allowing all activity to be viewed publicly. When Darktrace analysts examined the transactions associated with blackice[.]sol, they observed that the earliest records dated November 7, 2025, which coincides with the creation date of the known C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net as shown in WHOIS Lookup information [4][5].

WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
Figure 1: WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
 Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.
Figure 2: Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.

Subsequent instructions found within the transactions contained strings such as “CNAME= vhs[.]delrosal[.]net”, indicating attempts to direct the device toward the malicious endpoint. A more recent transaction recorded on January 28 included strings such as “hxxps://96.9.125[.]243/i;code=302”, suggesting an effort to change C2 endpoints. Darktrace observed multiple alerts triggered for these endpoints across affected devices.

Similar blockchain‑related endpoints, such as “tumama.hns[.]to”, were also observed in C2 activities. The hns[.]to service allows web browsers to access websites registered on Handshake, a decentralized blockchain‑based framework designed to replace centralized authorities and domain registries for top‑level domains. This shift toward decentralized, blockchain‑based infrastructure likely reflects increased efforts by attackers to evade detection.

In outgoing connections to these malicious endpoints across affected networks, Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the activity was 100% rare and anomalous for both the devices and the wider networks, likely indicative of malicious beaconing, regardless of the underlying trusted infrastructure. In addition to generating multiple model alerts to capture this malicious activity across affected networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to compile these separate events into broader incidents that summarized the entire attack chain, allowing customers’ security teams to investigate and remediate more efficiently. Moreover, in customer environments where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled, Darktrace took swift action to contain the attack by blocking beaconing connections to the malicious endpoints, even when those endpoints were associated with seemingly trustworthy services.

Conclusion

Attacks targeting trusted relationships continue to be a popular strategy among threat actors. Activities linked to trusted or widely deployed software are often unintentionally whitelisted by existing security solutions and gateways. Darktrace observed multiple devices becoming impacted within a very short period, likely because tools such as antivirus software are typically mass‑deployed across numerous endpoints. As a result, a single compromised delivery mechanism can greatly expand the attack surface.

Attackers are also becoming increasingly creative in developing resilient C2 infrastructure and exploiting legitimate services to evade detection. Defenders are therefore encouraged to closely monitor anomalous connections and file downloads. Darktrace’s ability to detect unusual activity amidst ever‑changing tactics and indicators of compromise (IoCs) helps organizations maintain a proactive and resilient defense posture against emerging threats.

Credit to Joanna Ng (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Min Kim (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Researcher Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • vhs[.]delrosal[.]net – C2 server
  • tumama[.]hns[.]to – C2 server
  • blackice.sol-domain[.]org – C2 server
  • 96.9.125[.]243 – C2 Server

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.001 - Command and Control: Web Protocols
  • T1588.001 - Resource Development
  • T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
  • T1195 – Supple Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.morphisec.com/blog/critical-escan-threat-bulletin/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

[3] hxxps://download1.mwti.net/documents/Advisory/eScan_Security_Advisory_2026[.]pdf

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/delrosal.net

[5] hxxps://explorer.solana[.]com/address/2wFAbYHNw4ewBHBJzmDgDhCXYoFjJnpbdmeWjZvevaVv

Continue reading
About the author
Joanna Ng
Associate Principal Analyst
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI