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March 20, 2023

Multi-Factor Authentication: Not the Silver Bullet

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is a widely used security measure, but it's not bulletproof. See how threat actors can exploit MFA to access your information.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tegbir Singh
Cyber Analyst
Written by
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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20
Mar 2023

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is a long-established component of the identity and access management (IAM) framework that requires users to provide multiple verification factors to access Software as a Service (SaaS) and application environments, rather than simply relying on account credentials. MFA has been widely, although not universally, adopted as a security measure against common account takeover methods, such as brute-force attacks and exploiting passwords found in data leaks. Despite the adoption of MFA, account takeover methods are still prevalent across the threat landscape. However, the industry is seeing more and more examples of MFA compromise wherein threat actors exploit the security tool itself to gain account access.

Although having a security measure like MFA is a crucial first step in safeguarding a network, relying on a single method will always lead to gaps. MFA is a generic term for a broad range of products and services with varying degrees of efficacy; however, it is often used in the same way as Zero Trust, as a tick box or one size fits all solution. Knowing the gaps in security that are still present, even when utilizing effective MFA tools, is essential to mitigating the evolving threats of account compromise.

Figure 1: The standard flow process of MFA for any individual application. 

Bypassing MFA & Attack Details

Instances of threat actors’ bypassing MFA typically involve an element of social engineering, such as spamming authentication requests to the victim’s email or phone. This takes advantage of the victim’s fatigue of receiving numerous notifications, leading them to validate the request to silence the notifications. Microsoft research data published in September 2022 shows a clear trend of MFA fatigue attacks becoming increasingly popular last year [1]. Notably, the Uber hack occurred after attackers exploited this method [2]. This trend seems likely to continue as MFA progresses towards universal adoption and attackers continue to focus on social engineering as a means to bypass it. The following example details how Darktrace not only identifies and warns customers about unusual MFA activity for hijacked accounts, but also how its suite of products can take appropriate actions to prevent further compromise.

On January 5, 2023, a SaaS account belonging to a customer based in Australia was observed successfully logging in from a rare external endpoint, following two previous failed attempts. Darktrace identified that the login IP address was in the United States, which it recognized as unusual compared to the user’s expected login location, and the successful login followed multiple failed MFA authentication requests.

Figure 2: A screenshot of the SaaS console, showcasing the login activity of the SaaS user with the reason for the failed logins highlighted. 

No further suspicious activity was detected on the device, likely a tactic employed by the threat actor to remain undetected by security tools. However, a Darktrace model breach was triggered two days later following another usual login location, this time in Germany. Once again, a successful authentication request was observed, suggesting the attacker was able to consistently bypass the MFA security and access the account. 

Following this login, multiple unusual activities were observed including the access of multiple sensitive internal files and initiating updates to email folders, namely \Sent Items, \Deleted Items, and \WIISE. This type of activity is indicative of a victim’s mailbox being modified to enable attackers to send malicious spam to contacts in the organization, allowing them to escalate their privileges and move laterally throughout the network.

Figure 3: A screenshot of the SaaS console showing some of the suspicious files that were previewed by the user. 

Darktrace continued to report suspicious activity from this user with similar activity occurring again on January 8, when the user was observed logging in from another highly anomalous location and accessing similar files. The activity escalated on January 13 when, alongside an unusual login and further email updates, the user created a new email rule suspiciously named “.”.

Figure 4: A screenshot showcasing the details of the email rule that was created by the malicious actor. 

The rule appears to have targeted emails received from a specific internal user, marking them as read and moving them to a different folder; it was likely that the attacker intended to use these emails to help socially engineer third-parties and compromise the organization’s network further. Additional suspicious activity was observed from the user, including an update to an email containing a potentially sensitive attachment.

Figure 5: A screenshot showing details of the attachment observed.

Due to the combination of an unusual login and new email rule, Darktrace RESPOND/Network™ took swift autonomous action, forcing the user in question to log out and disabling the account, preventing further compromise. With the implementation of these actions the malicious actor was unable to engage in any further activity on the compromised account.

Figure 6: The above screenshot of the SaaS UI shows some of the actions initiated by Darktrace RESPOND/Network.

Conclusion

Having MFA in place is an important first step towards hardening an organization’s SaaS environment and safeguarding against less sophisticated methods of attack, however defense in depth is key to ensuring a network is truly secure. Any one security measure will always have weaknesses, and only with multiple layers of varying protection can gaps in security be effectively closed. 

Using Self-Learning AI™, Darktrace DETECT™ can quickly identify unexpected behavior on a device, even if it occurs with legitimate credentials and successfully passes MFA, to bring it to the attention of the security team. Darktrace RESPOND™ is then able to take immediate action, implementing precise actions to prevent more serious compromise. 

Pairing the two products together provides customers with an around-the-clock AI decision maker capable of detecting emerging threats, even those that would evade other traditional security measures, and interrupting attacks at machine speed with surgical precision.

Resources

[1] https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-azure-ad-blog/defend-your-users-from-mfa-fatigue-attacks/ba-p/2365677 

[2] https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2022/09/18/has-uber-been-hacked-company-investigates-cybersecurity-incident-as-law-enforcement-alerted/?sh=4d3495796056 

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tegbir Singh
Cyber Analyst
Written by
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

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January 30, 2026

ClearFake: From Fake CAPTCHAs to Blockchain-Driven Payload Retrieval

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What is ClearFake?

As threat actors evolve their techniques to exploit victims and breach target networks, the ClearFake campaign has emerged as a significant illustration of this continued adaptation. ClearFake is a campaign observed using a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites, impacting sectors such as e‑commerce, travel, and automotive. First identified in mid‑2023, ClearFake is frequently leveraged to socially engineer victims into installing fake web browser updates.

In ClearFake compromises, victims are steered toward compromised WordPress sites, often positioned by attackers through search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. Once on the site, users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA. This counterfeit challenge is designed to appear legitimate while enabling the execution of malicious code. When a victim interacts with the CAPTCHA, a PowerShell command containing a download string is retrieved and executed.

Attackers commonly abuse the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA) in these operations. Recent campaigns have also incorporated Smart Chain endpoints, such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org,” to obtain configuration code. The primary payload delivered through ClearFake is typically an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer, enabling credential theft, data exfiltration, and persistent access [1].

Darktrace’s Coverage of ClearFake

Darktrace / ENDPOINT first detected activity likely associated with ClearFake on a single device on over the course of one day on November 18, 2025. The system observed the execution of “mshta.exe,” the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host utility. It also noted a repeated process command referencing “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru”, indicating suspicious external activity. Subsequent analysis of this endpoint using open‑source intelligence (OSINT) indicated that it was a malicious, domain generation algorithm (DGA) endpoint [2].

Figure 1: The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.

This activity indicates that mshta.exe was used to contact a remote server, “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru/rpxacc64mshta,” and execute the associated HTA file to initiate the next stage of the attack. OSINT sources have since heavily flagged this server as potentially malicious [3].

The first argument in this process uses the MSHTA utility to execute the HTA file hosted on the remote server. If successful, MSHTA would then run JavaScript or VBScript to launch PowerShell commands used to retrieve malicious payloads, a technique observed in previous ClearFake campaigns. Darktrace also detected unusual activity involving additional Microsoft executables, including “winlogon.exe,” “userinit.exe,” and “explorer.exe.” Although these binaries are legitimate components of the Windows operating system, threat actors can abuse their normal behavior within the Windows login sequence to gain control over user sessions, similar to the misuse of mshta.exe.

EtherHiding cover

Darktrace also identified additional ClearFake‑related activity, specifically a connection to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org, a legitimate BNB Smart Chain endpoint. This activity was triggered by injected JavaScript on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com, where the script initiated an eth_call POST request to the Smart Chain endpoint.

Figure 2: Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.

EtherHiding is a technique in which threat actors leverage blockchain technology, specifically smart contracts, as part of their malicious infrastructure. Because blockchain is anonymous, decentralized, and highly persistent, it provides threat actors with advantages in evading defensive measures and traditional tracking [4].

In this case, when a user visits a compromised WordPress site, injected base64‑encoded JavaScript retrieved an ABI string, which was then used to load and execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain.

Figure 3: JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.

Conducting malware analysis on this instance, the Base64 decoded into a JavaScript loader. A POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org was then used to retrieve a hex‑encoded ABI string that loads and executes the contract. The JavaScript also contained hex and Base64‑encoded functions that decoded into additional JavaScript, which attempted to retrieve a payload hosted on GitHub at “github[.]com/PrivateC0de/obf/main/payload.txt.” However, this payload was unavailable at the time of analysis.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the executable file and the malicious hostname.

Autonomous Response

As Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled on this customer’s network, Darktrace was able to take swift mitigative action to contain the ClearFake‑related activity early, before it could lead to potential payload delivery. The affected device was blocked from making external connections to a number of suspicious endpoints, including 188.114.96[.]6, *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, and neighb0rrol1[.]ru, ensuring that no further malicious connections could be made and no payloads could be retrieved.

Autonomous Response also acted to prevent the executable mshta.exe from initiating HTA file execution over HTTPS from this endpoint by blocking the attempted connections. Had these files executed successfully, the attack would likely have resulted in the retrieval of an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer.

Figure 6: Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.

Conclusion

ClearFake continues to be observed across multiple sectors, but Darktrace remains well‑positioned to counter such threats. Because ClearFake’s end goal is often to deliver malware such as information stealers and malware loaders, early disruption is critical to preventing compromise. Users should remain aware of this activity and vigilant regarding fake CAPTCHA pop‑ups. They should also monitor unusual usage of MSHTA and outbound connections to domains that mimic formats such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org” [1].

In this case, Darktrace was able to contain the attack before it could successfully escalate and execute. The attempted execution of HTA files was detected early, allowing Autonomous Response to intervene, stopping the activity from progressing. As soon as the device began communicating with weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, an Autonomous Response inhibitor triggered and interrupted the connections.

As ClearFake continues to rise, users should stay alert to social engineering techniques, including ClickFix, that rely on deceptive security prompts.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)


Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Process / New Executable Launched

Endpoint / Anomalous Use of Scripting Process

Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched

Endpoint / Process Connection::Unusual Connection from New Process

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL - Malicious Domain
  • 188.114.96[.]6 – IP – Suspicious Domain
  • *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL – Malicious Domain

MITRE Tactics

Initial Access, Drive-by Compromise, T1189

User Execution, Execution, T1204

Software Deployment Tools, Execution and Lateral Movement, T1072

Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059

System Binary Proxy Execution: MSHTA, T1218.005

References

1.        https://www.kroll.com/en/publications/cyber/rapid-evolution-of-clearfake-delivery

2.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/weiss.neighb0rrol1.ru

3.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1f1aabe87e5e93a8fff769bf3614dd559c51c80fc045e11868f3843d9a004d1e/community

4.        https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/etherhiding-a-new-tactic-for-hiding-malware-on-the-blockchain/

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Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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January 30, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

6. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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