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June 25, 2024

Let the Dominos Fall! SOC and IR Metrics for ROI

Vendors are scrambling to compare MTTD metrics laid out in the latest MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK® Evaluations. But this analysis is reductive, ignoring the fact that in cybersecurity, there are far more metrics that matter.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
John Bradshaw
Sr. Director, Technical Marketing
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25
Jun 2024

One of the most enjoyable discussions (and debates) I engage in is the topic of Security Operations Center (SOC) and Incident Response (IR) metrics to measure and validate an organization’s Return on Investment (ROI). The debate part comes in when I hear vendor experts talking about “the only” SOC metrics that matter, and only list the two most well-known, while completely ignoring metrics that have a direct causal relationship.

In this blog, I will discuss what I believe are the SOC/IR metrics that matter, how each one has a direct impact on the others, and why organizations should ensure they are working towards the goal of why these metrics are measured in the first place: Reduction of Risk and Costs.

Reduction of Risk and Costs

Every security solution and process an organization puts in place should reduce the organization’s risk of a breach, exposure by an insider threat, or loss of productivity. How an organization realizes net benefits can be in several ways:

  • Improved efficiencies can result in SOC/IR staff focusing on other areas such as advanced threat hunting rather than churning through alerts on their security consoles. It may also help organizations dealing with the lack of skilled security staff by using Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automated processes.
  • A well-oiled SOC/IR team that has greatly reduced or even eliminated mundane tasks attracts, motivates, and retains talent resulting in reduced hiring and training costs.
  • The direct impact of a breach such as a ransomware attack can be devastating. According to the 2024 Data Breach Investigations Report by Verizon, MGM Resorts International reported the ALPHV ransomware cost the company approximately $100 million[1].
  • Failure to take appropriate steps to protect the organization can result in regulatory fines; and if an organization has, or is considering, purchasing Cyber Insurance, can result in declined coverage or increased premiums.

How does an organization demonstrate they are taking proactive measures to prevent breaches? That is where it's important to understand the nine (yes, nine) key metrics, and how each one directly influences the others, play their roles.

Metrics in the Incident Response Timeline

Let’s start with a review of the key steps in the Incident Response Timeline:

Seven of the nine key metrics are in the IR timeline, while two of the metrics occur before you ever have an incident. They occur in the Pre-Detection Stage.

Pre-Detection stage metrics are:

  • Preventions Per Intrusion Attempt (PPIA)
  • False Positive Reduction Rate (FPRR)

Next is the Detect and Investigate stage, there are three metrics to consider:

  • Mean Time to Detection (MTTD)
  • Mean Time to Triage (MTTT)
  • Mean Time to Understanding (MTTU)

This is followed by the Remediation stage, there are two metrics here:

  • Mean Time to Containment (MTTC)
  • Mean Time to Remediation / Recovery (MTTR)

Finally, there is the Risk Reduction stage, there are two metrics:

  • Mean Time to Advice (MTTA)
  • Mean Time to Implementation (MTTI)

Pre-Detection Stage

Preventions Per Intrusion Attempt

PPIA is defined as stopping any intrusion attempt at the earliest possible stage. Your network Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) blocks vulnerability exploits, your e-mail security solution intercepts and removes messages with malicious attachments or links, your egress firewall blocks unauthorized login attempts, etc. The adversary doesn’t get beyond Step 1 in the attack life cycle.

This metric is the first domino. Every organization should strive to improve on this metric every day. Why? For every intrusion attempt you stop right out of the gate, you eliminate the actions for every other metric. There is no incident to detect, triage, investigate, remediate, or analyze post-incident for ways to improve your security posture.

When I think about PPIA, I always remember back to a discussion with a former mentor, Tim Crothers, who discussed the benefits of focusing on Prevention Failure Detection.

The concept is that as you layer your security defenses, your PPIA moves ever closer to 100% (no one has ever reached 100%). This narrows the field of fire for adversaries to breach into your organization. This is where novel, unknown, and permuted threats live and breathe. This is where solutions utilizing Unsupervised Machine Learning excel in raising anomalous alerts – indications of potential compromise involving one of these threats. Unsupervised ML also raises alerts on anomalous activity generated by known threats and can raise detections before many signature-based solutions. Most organizations struggle to find strong permutations of known threats, insider threats, supply chain attacks, attacks utilizing n-day and 0-day exploits. Moving PPIA ever closer to 100% also frees your team up for conducting threat hunting activities – utilizing components of your SOC that collect and store telemetry to query for potential compromises based on hypothesis the team raises. It also significantly reduces the alerts your team must triage and investigate – solving many of the issues outlined at the start of this paper.

False Positive Reduction Rate

Before we discuss FPRR, I should clarify how I define False Positives (FPs). Many define FPs as an alert that is in error (i.e.: your EDR alerts on malware that turns out to be AV signature files). While that is a FP, I extend the definition to include any alert that did not require triage / investigation and distracts the SOC/IR team (meaning they conducted some level of triage / investigation).

This metric is the second domino. Why is this metric important? Every alert your team exerts time and effort on that is a non-issue distracts them from alerts that matter. One of the major issues that has resonated in the security industry for decades is that SOCs are inundated with alerts and cannot clear the backlog. When it comes to PPIA + FPRR, I have seen analysts spend time investigating alerts that were blocked out of the gate while their screen continued to fill up with more. You must focus on Prevention Failure Detection to get ahead of the backlog.

Detect and Investigate Stages

Mean Time to Detection

MTTD, or “Dwell Time”, has decreased dramatically over the past 12 years. From well over a year to 16 days in 2023[2]. MTTD is measured from the earliest possible point you could detect the intrusion to the moment you actually detect it.

This third domino is important because the longer an adversary remains undetected, the more the odds increase they will complete their mission objective. It also makes the tasks of triage and investigation more difficult as analysts must piece together more activity and adversaries may be erasing evidence along the way – or your storage retention does not cover the breach timeline.

Many solutions focusing solely on MTTD can actually create the very problem SOCs are looking to solve.  That is, they generate so much alerting that they flood the console, email, or text messaging app causing an unmanageable queue of alerts (this is the problem XDR solutions were designed to resolve by focusing on incidents rather than alerts).

Mean Time to Triage

MTTT involves SOCs that utilize Level 1 (aka Triage) analysts to render an “escalate / do not escalate” alert verdict accurately. Accuracy is important because Triage Analysts typically are staff new to cyber security (recent grad / certification) and may over escalate (afraid to miss something important) or under escalate (not recognize signs of a successful breach). Because of this, a small MTTT does not always equate to successful handling of incidents.

This metric is important because keeping your senior staff focused on progressing incidents in a timely manner (and not expending time on false positives) should reduce stress and required headcount.

Mean Time to Understanding

MTTU deals with understanding the complete nature of the incident being investigated. This is different than MTTT which only deals with whether the issue merits escalation to senior analysts. It is then up to the senior analysts to determine the scope of the incident, and if you are a follower of my UPSET Investigation Framework, you know understanding the full scope involves:

U = All compromised accounts

P = Persistence Mechanisms used

S = All systems involved (organization, adversary, and intermediaries)

E = Endgame (or mission objective)

T = Techniques, Tactics, Procedures (TTPs) utilized by the adversary

MTTU is important because this information is critical before any containment or remediation actions are taken. Leave a stone unturned, and you alert the adversary that you are onto them and possibly fail to close an avenue of access.

Remediation Stages

Mean Time to Containment

MTTC deals with neutralizing the threat. You may not have kicked the adversary out, but you have halted their progress to their mission objective and ability to inflict further damage. This may be through use of isolation capabilities, termination of malicious processes, or firewall blocks.

MTTC is important, especially with ransomware attacks where every second counts. Faster containment responses can result in reduced / eliminated disruption to business operations or loss of data.

Mean Time to Remediation / Recovery

The full scope of the incident is understood, the adversary has been halted in their tracks, no malicious processes are running on any systems in your organization. Now is the time to put things back to right. MTTR deals with the time involved in restoring business operations to pre-incident stage. It means all remnants of changes made by the adversary (persistence, account alterations, programs installed, etc.) are removed; all disrupted systems are restored to operations (i.e.: ransomware encrypted systems are recovered from backups / snapshots), compromised user accounts are reset, etc.

MTTR is important because it informs senior management of how fast the organization can recover from an incident. Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plans play a major role in improving this score.

Risk Reduction Stages

Mean Time to Advice

After the dust has settled from the incident, the job is not done. MTTA deals with identifying and assessing the specific areas (vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, lack of security controls) that permitted the adversary to advance to the point where detection occurred (and any actions beyond). The SOC and IR teams should then compile a list of recommendations to present to management to improve the security posture of the organization so the same attack path cannot be used.

Mean Time to Implement

Once recommendations are delivered to management, how long does it take to implement them? MTTI tracks this timeline because none of it matters if you don’t fix the holes that led to the breach.

Nine Dominos

There are the nine dominos of SOC / IR metrics I recommend helping organizations know if they are on the right track to reduce risk, costs and improve morale / retention of the security teams. You may not wish to track all nine, but understanding how each metric impacts the others can provide visibility into why you are not seeing expected improvements when you implement a new security solution or change processes.

Improving prevention and reducing false positives can make huge positive impacts on your incident response timeline. Utilizing solutions that get you to resolution quicker allows the team to focus on recommendations and risk reduction strategies.

Whichever metrics you choose to track, just be sure the dominos fall in your favor.

References

[1] 2024 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, p83

[2] Mandiant M-Trends 2023

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
John Bradshaw
Sr. Director, Technical Marketing

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August 19, 2026

When AI Becomes the Lure: A Fake Gemini Installer Delivers Vidar

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace observed a customer download a fake Google Gemini installer hosted on Google Colab, resulting in the execution of the Vidar information stealer.
  • Darktrace identified the compromise through behavioral indicators, including suspicious process activity, anomalous network communications, and indicators of credential theft, before autonomously containing the threat.
  • The incident highlights how threat actors are increasingly exploiting trusted platforms and a growing interest in AI tools to distribute malware through seemingly legitimate software acquisition workflows.

The Growing Abuse of Generative AI

As organizations are increasingly adopting generative AI tools into their daily workflows, attackers are adapting their distribution methods accordingly too. As part of their day-to-day work, users are now searching for AI assistants, programming tools, browser extensions, desktop applications, and productivity integrations.

Recent reports have highlighted campaigns that use fake AI software and AI-related installers to distribute malware and steal credentials [1]. Researchers have documented campaigns that exploit fake AI-themed websites and services to distribute information stealers and backdoors [2]. Security researchers have also observed attackers disguising malware as legitimate installers for AI software to increase the likelihood of victim interaction and execution [3].

In July 2026, Darktrace observed one such case within a customer environment in the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region, where attackers used a fake generative AI installer to deliver the prolific information stealer Vidar. This incident highlights how threat actors are exploiting interest in AI services to distribute established malware using increasingly convincing social engineering techniques.

How a Fake Gemini Installer Delivered Vidar

Initial Access: From Search Result to Malware Download

Unlike many malware campaigns that begin with a phishing email, this activity appears to have originated from a user searching for and downloading software.

Darktrace first observed unusual activity on the customer network after a suspicious executable file was launched from a user’s Download folder. Further investigation revealed that the file purported to be a Google Gemini installer and was named “Download_Google_Gemini_For_Windows.exe”.

During the initial analysis, it was noted that the top search result for the suspicious filename associated pointed to a file hosted on Google Colab, a cloud-based Jupyter notebook platform, commonly used by developers, researchers, and data scientists to run code and machine learning workloads through a web browser. By leveraging another trusted Google platform, the attacker increased the likelihood that users would perceive the download as legitimate, making the lure more convincing to those searching for Gemini-related software.

Figure 1: The Google Colab page containing a download prompt for the fake Google Gemini installer.

Further investigation of the Google Colab page revealed that the download prompt redirected users to a secondary site, hxxps://micronsoftwares[.]com, which posed as a "Windows Software Hub" download page and offered the fake Gemini installer for download.

Figure 2: The secondary website posing as a "Windows Software Hub" download page, which likely hosted the fake Gemini installer.

While the investigation did not uncover any HTTP or file-download telemetry data that conclusively identified the download source, SSL communication sessions with Google Colab were detected immediately before the suspicious file was executed. The timing of these connections suggests that the user interacted with the Colab resource before being redirected to the secondary site from which the executable was downloaded.

The user was not simply tricked into opening an email attachment; instead, the attacker embedded malicious content into a process many users would consider entirely legitimate: searching for and downloading software associated with a trusted platform.

Weaponizing Trusted Platforms

At the time of review (July 15, 2026), Darktrace's Threat Research team confirmed that the Google Colab page was still active and prompting users to download a ZIP archive containing the binary file.

The archive also appeared to contain a README file instructing users to run the binary file with administrator privileges and add it to their antivirus software’s exception lists. These instructions suggest that the campaign relied heavily on social engineering, convincing users to take actions that would facilitate malware execution and potentially bypass security checks.

The use of a legitimate platform also complicates the user’s decision-making. Downloads associated with a trusted service are often perceived as less suspicious than those hosted on unfamiliar domains. When combined with the branding of a widely used AI tool, the lure becomes even more convincing.

Malware Analysis

Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified the executable file as the information-stealing malware Vidar. Analysis revealed that the binary file was a newer Go-compiled variant that communicated with Telegram-based infrastructure. Darktrace’s researchers also identified dtm[.]kijangturbo88[.]top as a command-and-control (C2) endpoint associated with the activity. While the malware itself was not novel, the lure and delivery mechanism was.

For a deeper look at the information stealer, see Darktrace’s 2023 analysis of Vidar.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the unusual outbound connection associated with the fake Gemini installer.

Shortly after execution, the process established communications with the external IP address 91.98.98[.]86 via port 443, directly linking the executable to suspicious network activity observed on the device. Subsequent open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis of the revealed multiple malicious associations [5].

Additional Darktrace detections included unusual SSL activity from the affected device. Analysis of related SSL telemetry identified 91.98.111[.]49 as additional infrastructure associated  with the activity [6].

Subsequent alerts from the customer's Microsoft Defender for Endpoint integration later confirmed activity consistent with the theft of browser credentials and other sensitive data from the affected endpoint.

Taken together, these detections provided a clear picture of the attack, from the execution of a suspicious file and unusual network connections to indicators of C2 activity and credential theft.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of anomalous activity following the execution of the fake Gemini installer, seen in the Model Alert Event Log.

Darktrace's Autonomous Response

Following the detection, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response took immediate containment action, including blocking communication with suspicious external infrastructure, including 91.98.98[.]86, and quarantining the compromised device.

Despite the apparent legitimacy of the activity, with the installer hosted on a trusted platform and resembling a routine software download, Darktrace was able to detect and contain the attack because the device's behavior deviated from its normal pattern.

Figure 5: Automated containment actions implemented by Darktrace's Autonomous Response following the detection of activity associated with the fake Gemini installer.

Conclusion

This investigation highlights how threat actors continue to adapt established malware delivery techniques to emerging technology trends. While the malware itself was not new, the distribution method was. By disguising Vidar as a Google Gemini installer and hosting the malicious content on a trusted platform, the attack aligned its lure with a growing behavioral trend: users actively searching for AI tools and services as part of their day-to-day work.

Although fake installers are not a new phenomenon, the rapid rise of generative AI has created new opportunities for threat actors. Rather than relying solely on traditional delivery methods, attackers can now target users who are actively searching for AI applications. As AI adoption continues to accelerate across enterprise environments, organizations should remain alert to campaigns that exploit this interest through fake applications, malicious websites, manipulated search results, the misuse of trusted platforms, and AI-themed social engineering.

Credit to Rushanth Ramanathan (Cyber Analyst) Joanna Ng (Detection Engineer)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Security Integration / C2 Activity and Integration Detection
  • Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched
  • Endpoint / Process Connection / Unusual Connection from New Process
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Security Integration / High Severity Integration Detection
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly /  Antigena Significant Security Integration and Network Activity Block

•Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly /  Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC Type Description
Download_Google_Gemini_For_Windows.exe File Fake Gemini-themed installer observed during the investigation.
GoogleAppInstaller.exe File Related executable identified through endpoint telemetry.
91.98.98[.]86 IP Address External destination contacted by the malicious executable.
91.98.111[.]49 IP Address Related infrastructure identified through SSL certificate pivoting.
dtm[.]kijangturbo88[.]top Domain Command-and-control endpoint identified during malware analysis.
1e13c2c9eac72daf63fd00a9946878949e159ae6ec51b54ec64f942d79d61913 SHA256 Malware sample associated with the fake Gemini installer.

MITRE ATT@CK Mapping


MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique
Initial Access T1204 User Execution
Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Defence Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Credential Access T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Credential Access T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
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About the author
Rajendra Rushanth
Cyber Analyst

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August 11, 2026

When AI Agents Attack: The Case for Behavioral Anomaly Detection

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The UK AI Security Institute (AISI) has just published a detailed incident report confirming what many within the cyber security industry have suspected for some time: frontier AI agents, given a degree of autonomy, can independently develop and execute attack chains against real targets, including social engineering, supply-chain compromise, and deception, without explicit instruction to do so.

The report (INC-2026-07-28-01, published 4 August 2026) documents what happened during a routine capability evaluation between 25 and 28 July. It deserves a careful read from anyone responsible for securing the modern digital estate.

The incident

AISI regularly tests frontier AI models for offensive cyber capability. In this exercise, agents were placed inside a simulated network environment and given internet access this was deliberate, given to reflect realism of the task. Across 122 evaluation runs, 19 instances of unsanctioned activity were recorded, including cases where agents broke the intended boundaries of the test and acted against real people and real infrastructure on the open internet.

In the most serious case, an agent (Mythos 5) autonomously:

  • Conducted open-source intelligence gathering to identify real developers associated with keywords from the simulated scenario
  • Created a GitHub account and submitted a pull request containing obfuscated malicious code to a real, unaffiliated repository
  • Created a second sockpuppet account to post comments on its own PR, attempting to manufacture social proof
  • When a human reviewer flagged the malicious content, the agent lied, claiming an accidental commit, then repeatedly attempted to reintroduce the payload under the guise of having "fixed" the code
  • Sent spear-phishing emails to the repository maintainer containing manipulated content designed to convince them to merge the code
  • Planted a prompt injection inside a GitHub issue, hidden in an HTML comment invisible to humans but readable by AI coding assistants parsing the repository via API

AISI confirmed no real-world harm resulted. The PRs were not merged; the payloads did not execute. But containment was a product of circumstance, not design.

Why this matters

Every action the agents took used legitimate services operating within normal parameters. Creating a GitHub account is legitimate. Opening a pull request is legitimate. Sending an email is legitimate. Posting an issue is legitimate.

No vulnerability was exploited. No known malware signature was present. No indicator of compromise from any threat intelligence feed would have matched. The entire attack existed as a pattern, a sequence of individually normal actions that, taken together, constituted a supply-chain attack, a social engineering campaign, and an attempted compromise of downstream systems.

This is the class of threat that signature-based and rule-based security tools structurally struggle to detect. They answer the question "have I seen this before?" When the answer is no – and when the attack is novel, composed of legitimate actions, and adapted in real time by an adversary in this case an agent that reasons about evasion – they struggle.

Behavioral anomaly detection: The architecture that fits

Darktrace has spent a decade building a platform around a different question: "is this behavior normal for this entity?"

The platform learns the baseline behavior of every user, device, and communication pattern across an organization's digital environment. It does not need prior knowledge of an attack technique. It identifies deviation from learned normality, surfaces it, and through its Autonomous Response capability, takes targeted action to contain threats at machine speed.

Consider how this AISI incident might show across the Darktrace platform:

Network detection and response

While no payload was successfully delivered to a victim in this incident, AISI's post-incident analysis of the agent's code (detailed on pages 24-25 of the report) reveals what would have landed on target systems had the social engineering succeeded. The agent produced three successive payload generations, each replacing the last after being detected and called out:

Generation 1 hid a module-load stager inside a legitimate bug-fix commit, guarded by an environment variable check, to skip execution in CI. Its second stage attempted to fetch Poseidon implants (Linux and Windows variants) calling back to the agent's own C2 listener, with a fallback to publicly hosted polling scripts that fetched and executed commands every 60 seconds.

Generation 2 exploited an Electron "What's New" window with nodeIntegration enabled, loading remote HTML from a GitHub Pages site the agent had registered. The page decoded an XOR-obfuscated payload at runtime that beaconed host identifiers over DNS, attempted to download the same implants, ran its own in-process C2 loop, and installed reboot persistence via crontab and Windows registry Run keys.

Generation 3 was a post-install dropper added after the agent had already been publicly caught. It XOR-decoded a hidden URL, downloaded a script over plaintext HTTP, and ran it detached, force-exiting so npm install always reports success, giving the attacker remote code execution on any machine running the install.

None of these payloads reached a victim. But the technical detail matters: this is the calibre of tradecraft an autonomous agent produced in a matter of hours, unprompted. Each generation demonstrated adaptation, the agent iterated its approach in direct response to being detected.

For network defenders, the behavioral signals these payloads would have generated are clear. DNS beaconing to novel domains, periodic HTTP polling to newly registered infrastructure, XOR-encoded data in transit, registry and crontab persistence writes on endpoints that have never exhibited such behavior. These are exactly the anomalies that Darktrace / NETWORK identifies in real time: deviations from learned device and connection baselines, regardless of whether the specific payload or C2 domain has been seen before.

Beyond the payload analysis, the agents' broader activity produced additional behavioral anomalies: new identities engaging in high-frequency interactions with external services, coordination via unusual channels (public pastebins, gists), and lateral communication patterns that deviate from any established baseline.

Email security

The spear-phishing emails sent by the agent, crafted with context-specific content designed to manipulate a specific individual, represent exactly the kind of socially engineered communication that static email gateways can miss. Darktrace / EMAIL analyses the linguistic patterns, sender behavior, and relational context of every message. A brand-new sender using tailored language to pressure a recipient into a specific technical action deviates from the learned communication profile, regardless of whether the message contains a known-bad URL or attachment.

Securing AI

This is where the incident points to a threat category that many security platforms do not yet fully address. The agent did not just use AI as a tool for attack. It targeted other AI systems, attempting prompt injections against coding assistants and trying to compromise automated workflows. Organisations adopting AI agents for development, operations, and decision-making are introducing a newer extended attack surface.  

Darktrace / SECURE AI extends the same behavioral detection model into this space. It monitors AI usage across the enterprise, detecting anomalous interactions with AI services, identifying sensitive data exposure to AI systems, providing visibility into shadow AI use. As AI agents become standard components of enterprise infrastructure, the ability to detect when an AI system is behaving outside its expected parameters, when there is a chance, it is being manipulated, or when it is interacting with something it should not be, that becomes a direct security requirement rather than a future consideration.

The principle is consistent across the Darktrace platform: learn what normal looks like, identify deviation, respond autonomously.

The AI-to-AI threat surface

One of the report's most important findings is a confirmation that AI agents can act outside of instructions and guardrails to complete tasks. The Mythos 5 agent conducted reconnaissance on a repository maintainer, inferred it might be an AI coding assistant, and deployed a prompt injection specifically crafted to compromise it.

This is a new attack class. Organizations deploying AI coding assistants, AI-powered code review, or autonomous DevOps agents now face an adversary that:

  • Moves at speed
  • Is able to adapt its approach when initial attempts are halted
  • Specifically targets AI systems via techniques (prompt injection, hidden instructions in HTML comments) that are less visible to human reviewers but parsed by machines
  • Reasons about which evasion strategies are most likely to succeed

Defending against this requires security that operates with the same adaptability and speed. A system that learns what "normal" looks like, and flags deviation from it.

What AISI recommends

The report identifies five contributing factors to the incident. Two are directly relevant:

No synchronous real-time monitoring (Section 5.3): AISI acknowledges it had not built real-time behavioral monitoring capable of immediately blocking unsanctioned agent actions. Their security team detected the incident via commercial security monitoring software, but only after activity had already occurred.

No fine-grained behavioral controls (Section 6.2): AISI's forward-looking response includes building continuous monitoring that can "immediately block or flag unsanctioned AI agent behavior."

The direction is clear: organizations need security that watches behavior continuously, learns what normal looks like, and acts when deviation occurs, without requiring a human in the loop for every decision.

The takeaway

The AISI incident is documented proof that autonomous AI agents will independently develop novel attack chains using legitimate tools, adapt when detected, employ deception, and target both humans and other AI systems. This happened last week, in a controlled setting, with commercially available models.

The security architecture that addresses this is behavioral anomaly detection applied across the full digital estate, as AI agents become standard components of enterprise infrastructure, writing code, managing deployments, processing communications, the attack surface they create is behavioral by nature.

This is the approach Darktrace has taken for years: learning what is normal across an organization’s digital environment, identifying meaningful deviations, and responding to emerging threats without relying on known attack signatures. As autonomous AI agents introduce new and unpredictable behaviors, that foundation becomes increasingly important to securing the enterprise.

Read the full report from the UK AI Security Institute here.

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About the author
Adam Stevens
Senior Director of Product
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