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July 18, 2024

Investigating the Adaptive Jupyter Information Stealer

Find out how to safeguard your organization from the Jupyter information stealer with strategies revealed by Darktrace's in-depth investigation.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nahisha Nobregas
SOC Analyst
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18
Jul 2024

What is Malware as a Service (MaaS)?

Malware as a Service (MaaS) is a model where cybercriminals develop and sell or lease malware to other attackers.

This approach allows individuals or groups with limited technical skills to launch sophisticated cyberattacks by purchasing or renting malware tools and services. MaaS is often provided through online marketplaces on the dark web, where sellers offer various types of malware, including ransomware, spyware, and trojans, along with support services such as updates and customer support.

The Growing MaaS Marketplace

The Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) marketplace is rapidly expanding, with new strains of malware being regularly introduced and attracting waves of new and previous attackers. The low barrier for entry, combined with the subscription-like accessibility and lucrative business model, has made MaaS a prevalent tool for cybercriminals. As a result, MaaS has become a significant concern for organizations and their security teams, necessitating heightened vigilance and advanced defense strategies.

Examples of Malware as a Service

  • Ransomware as a Service (RaaS): Providers offer ransomware kits that allow users to launch ransomware attacks and share the ransom payments with the service provider.
  • Phishing as a Service: Services that provide phishing kits, including templates and email lists, to facilitate phishing campaigns.
  • Botnet as a Service: Renting out botnets to perform distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or other malicious activities.
  • Information Stealer: Information stealers are a type of malware specifically designed to collect sensitive data from infected systems, such as login credentials, credit card numbers, personal identification information, and other valuable data.

How does information stealer malware work?

Information stealers are an often-discussed type MaaS tool used to harvest personal and proprietary information such as administrative credentials, banking information, and cryptocurrency wallet details. This information is then exfiltrated from target networks via command-and-control (C2) communication, allowing threat actors to monetize the data. Information stealers have also increasingly been used as an initial access vector for high impact breaches including ransomware attacks, employing both double and triple extortion tactics.

After investigating several prominent information stealers in recent years, the Darktrace Threat Research team launched an investigation into indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with another variant in late 2023, namely the Jupyter information stealer.

What is Jupyter information stealer and how does it work?

The Jupyter information stealer (also known as Yellow Cockatoo, SolarMarker, and Polazert) was first observed in the wild in late 2020. Multiple variants have since become part of the wider threat landscape, however, towards the end of 2023 a new variant was observed. This latest variant achieved greater stealth and updated its delivery method, targeting browser extensions such as Edge, Firefox, and Chrome via search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning and malvertising. This then redirects users to download malicious files that typically impersonate legitimate software, and finally initiates the infection and the attack chain for Jupyter [3][4]. In recently noted cases, users download malicious executables for Jupyter via installer packages created using InnoSetup – an open-source compiler used to create installation packages in the Windows OS.

The latest release of Jupyter reportedly takes advantage of signed digital certificates to add credibility to downloaded executables, further supplementing its already existing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for detection evasion and sophistication [4]. Jupyter does this while still maintaining features observed in other iterations, such as dropping files into the %TEMP% folder of a system and using PowerShell to decrypt and load content into memory [4]. Another reported feature includes backdoor functionality such as:

  • C2 infrastructure
  • Ability to download and execute malware
  • Execution of PowerShell scripts and commands
  • Injecting shellcode into legitimate windows applications

Darktrace Coverage of Jupyter information stealer

In September 2023, Darktrace’s Threat Research team first investigated Jupyter and discovered multiple IoCs and TTPs associated with the info-stealer across the customer base. Across most investigated networks during this time, Darktrace observed the following activity:

  • HTTP POST requests over destination port 80 to rare external IP addresses (some of these connections were also made via port 8089 and 8090 with no prior hostname lookup).
  • HTTP POST requests specifically to the root directory of a rare external endpoint.
  • Data streams being sent to unusual external endpoints
  • Anomalous PowerShell execution was observed on numerous affected networks.

Taking a further look at the activity patterns detected, Darktrace identified a series of HTTP POST requests within one customer’s environment on December 7, 2023. The HTTP POST requests were made to the root directory of an external IP address, namely 146.70.71[.]135, which had never previously been observed on the network. This IP address was later reported to be malicious and associated with Jupyter (SolarMarker) by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [5].

Device Event Log indicating several connections from the source device to the rare external IP address 146.70.71[.]135 over port 80.
Figure 1: Device Event Log indicating several connections from the source device to the rare external IP address 146.70.71[.]135 over port 80.

This activity triggered the Darktrace / NETWORK model, ‘Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname’. This model alerts for devices that have been seen posting data out of the network to rare external endpoints without a hostname. Further investigation into the offending device revealed a significant increase in external data transfers around the time Darktrace alerted the activity.

This External Data Transfer graph demonstrates a spike in external data transfer from the internal device indicated at the top of the graph on December 7, 2023, with a time lapse shown of one week prior.
Figure 2: This External Data Transfer graph demonstrates a spike in external data transfer from the internal device indicated at the top of the graph on December 7, 2023, with a time lapse shown of one week prior.

Packet capture (PCAP) analysis of this activity also demonstrates possible external data transfer, with the device observed making a POST request to the root directory of the malicious endpoint, 146.70.71[.]135.

PCAP of a HTTP POST request showing streams of data being sent to the endpoint, 146.70.71[.]135.
Figure 3: PCAP of a HTTP POST request showing streams of data being sent to the endpoint, 146.70.71[.]135.

In other cases investigated by the Darktrace Threat Research team, connections to the rare external endpoint 67.43.235[.]218 were detected on port 8089 and 8090. This endpoint was also linked to Jupyter information stealer by OSINT sources [6].

Darktrace recognized that such suspicious connections represented unusual activity and raised several model alerts on multiple customer environments, including ‘Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections’ and ‘Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port’.

In one instance, a device that was observed performing many suspicious connections to 67.43.235[.]218 was later observed making suspicious HTTP POST connections to other malicious IP addresses. This included 2.58.14[.]246, 91.206.178[.]109, and 78.135.73[.]176, all of which had been linked to Jupyter information stealer by OSINT sources [7] [8] [9].

Darktrace further observed activity likely indicative of data streams being exfiltrated to Jupyter information stealer C2 endpoints.

Graph displaying the significant increase in the number of HTTP POST requests with No Get made by an affected device, likely indicative of Jupyter information stealer C2 activity.
Figure 4: Graph displaying the significant increase in the number of HTTP POST requests with No Get made by an affected device, likely indicative of Jupyter information stealer C2 activity.

In several cases, Darktrace was able to leverage customer integrations with other security vendors to add additional context to its own model alerts. For example, numerous customers who had integrated Darktrace with Microsoft Defender received security integration alerts that enriched Darktrace’s model alerts with additional intelligence, linking suspicious activity to Jupyter information stealer actors.

The security integration model alerts ‘Security Integration / Low Severity Integration Detection’ and (right image) ‘Security Integration / High Severity Integration Detection’, linking suspicious activity observed by Darktrace with Jupyter information stealer (SolarMarker).
Figure 5: The security integration model alerts ‘Security Integration / Low Severity Integration Detection’ and (right image) ‘Security Integration / High Severity Integration Detection’, linking suspicious activity observed by Darktrace with Jupyter information stealer (SolarMarker).

Conclusion

The MaaS ecosystems continue to dominate the current threat landscape and the increasing sophistication of MaaS variants, featuring advanced defense evasion techniques, poses significant risks once deployed on target networks.

Leveraging anomaly-based detections is crucial for staying ahead of evolving MaaS threats like Jupyter information stealer. By adopting AI-driven security tools like Darktrace / NETWORK, organizations can more quickly identify and effectively detect and respond to potential threats as soon as they emerge. This is especially crucial given the rise of stealthy information stealing malware strains like Jupyter which cannot only harvest and steal sensitive data, but also serve as a gateway to potentially disruptive ransomware attacks.

Credit to Nahisha Nobregas (Senior Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Cyber Analyst)

References

1.     https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-multi-extortion-ransomware

2.     https://flashpoint.io/blog/evolution-stealer-malware/

3.     https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/11/jupyter-rising-an-update-on-jupyter-infostealer.html

4.     https://www.morphisec.com/hubfs/eBooks_and_Whitepapers/Jupyter%20Infostealer%20WEB.pdf

5.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/146.70.71.135

6.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/67.43.235.218/community

7.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/2.58.14.246/community

8.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/91.206.178.109/community

9.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/78.135.73.176/community

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoints
  • Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Excessive Posts to Root
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Security Integration / High Severity Integration Detection
  • Security Integration / Low Severity Integration Detection
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

AI Analyst Incidents:

  • Unusual Repeated Connections
  • Possible HTTP Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints
  • Possible HTTP Command and Control

List of IoCs

Indicators – Type – Description

146.70.71[.]135

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

91.206.178[.]109

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

146.70.92[.]153

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

2.58.14[.]246

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

78.135.73[.]176

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

217.138.215[.]105

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

185.243.115[.]88

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

146.70.80[.]66

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

23.29.115[.]186

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

67.43.235[.]218

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

217.138.215[.]85

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

193.29.104[.]25

IP Address

Jupyter info-stealer C2 Endpoint

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nahisha Nobregas
SOC Analyst

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July 6, 2026

NIST Just Proved It: AI Security Can’t Be Solved With Rules

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Static AI guardrails are inherently limited

As organizations adopt generative AI, many still assume that the right set of guardrails will be enough. The problem is you can’t anticipate every way these systems might be misused, abused or attacked. What NIST has done is put a mathematical foundation under that intuition.

In recent research building on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, which showed that any system built on a fixed set of rules will always have gaps, NIST demonstrates that there is no finite set of guardrails that can be universally robust against adversarial prompts. In plain terms, if your defense is based on a fixed set of rules, there will always be inputs that bypass them. Not because the rules are badly written, but because the problem space is bigger than static rules can ever cover.

This is not new in cybersecurity - detection rules have always had to live with this trade-off. What is different with GenAI is the scale and shape of that problem. These systems are built on human language, and human language is not bounded. It is fluid, contextual and deliberately ambiguous. The number of ways intent can be hidden is effectively limitless. You are not defending against a defined protocol or a fixed exploit chain. You are defending against the entire expressive capacity of people.

So attempting to create a complete set of rules is the wrong starting point. It assumes the problem can be deterministically described. NIST’s work shows that it cannot. Organizations still need a way to manage AI risk, but the traditional approach of defining allowed and disallowed patterns is always going to lag behind what is actually happening. The same input can be benign in one context and risky in another, and static rules struggle to capture that distinction.

The question then is what fills that gap?

AI security must shift from rules to behavior

What's required is a shift in what you are trying to understand. Rules try to describe what should and shouldn't happen. Behavior shows you what is happening. Or to put it another way, if inputs are unbounded and adversaries adapt, the only stable signal is behavior.

In a GenAI context, that means analyzing how an AI model is being used, how prompts evolve over time, how outputs are shaped, and where AI agent interactions start to drift from what is expected. It means moving from static definitions of bad to a more dynamic understanding of intent.

Instead of trying to predict every bad prompt, you focus on identifying when behavior starts to move outside expected norms. Instead of asking whether a single input matches a rule, you ask whether the overall pattern of activity makes sense for the system and how it’s being used.

Guardrails remain important but they are only one layer

This does not eliminate the need for guardrails. They still play a role. But they will never address the entire problem space and are simply one part of your defense in depth approach.

NIST’s proof is useful because it makes this explicit. It removes the assumption that with enough effort, a complete rule set is achievable. It isn’t.

Once you accept that, the shift becomes unavoidable. This is no longer a problem of writing better rules, but of understanding behavior in a space where the possible inputs are effectively unbounded.

For security leaders, that changes the nature of the problem. It is less about defining what should be allowed, and more about recognizing when something is no longer consistent with expected behavior.

That does not remove the need for guardrails, but it does change their role. They set boundaries, but they do not define understanding. The gap between the two is where risk now sits.

In the end, this is what “can’t be solved with rules” really means. Rules will always leave gaps, and those gaps are not theoretical. They show up in how systems actually behave Not what we expect them to do, or what we intended them to do, but what they are doing in practice. That is where the signal is, and increasingly, that is where the security problem sits.

References:

https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/06/nist-mathematical-proof-supports-transition-continuous-monitor-and-update

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11475847

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Andrew Hollister
Principal Solutions Engineer, Cyber Technician

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July 1, 2026

5 Ways AI is changing traditional security models according to modern CISOs

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The Reality of Securing AI in Motion

Traditional security tools were built for environments defined by fixed rules and predictable workflows. But AI behavior is non-deterministic. The same prompt can produce different outcomes, and risk often emerges gradually as AI behavior adapts, and permissions drift over time. This creates a constantly shifting environment where security teams are working to define control in a system that resists stability. “In AI security, yesterday's priorities can become tomorrow's blind spots. The landscape shifts that fast,” warned the SVP and Head of Technology and Cybersecurity of a real estate investment trust. Conventional approaches, which rely on establishing and maintaining a steady baseline, struggle to keep up with that level of change.

At the same time, AI adoption is accelerating across organizations, often faster than security teams can implement the controls needed to manage it. “The car is being built while it’s already on the road,” explained the CISO of a global private fund administrator. “The threats we're securing against today won't be the threats we're facing tomorrow. What kept us up three months ago looks nothing like what we're dealing with today.”

As businesses move quickly to unlock value from AI, security teams are left closing gaps in real time, while also facing adversaries who are using AI to make their attacks more scalable, adaptive, and difficult to detect. In this recent roundtable discussion of CISOs and security leaders, five themes emerged around AI cyber risk.  

1. AI agents with human access but no human judgment

In Darktrace’s 2026 State of AI Cybersecurity report, 96% of the surveyed security professionals agree that AI significantly improves the speed and efficiency with which they work. Yet, 92% admitted that they’re concerned with the security implications of the use of AI agents across their workforce.

AI agents now operate with human-level permissions across systems, acting at machine speed, orchestrating actions across platforms, and making decisions without the judgment or caution a person would apply. Unlike human users, they cannot be expected to pause and question whether a given action is appropriate.

Their identities are also difficult to inventory, govern, and audit. As agents become easier to deploy than legacy IT systems ever were, organizations are quickly losing track of what is running, what it has access to, and what it is doing. This creates a growing class of highly privileged, autonomous actors operating without the visibility or oversight that traditional identity and access controls were designed to provide.“While AI adoption is critical to running a modern business, AI alone can’t solve all our cybersecurity challenges,” said a global financial sector CISO. “We still need think critically and use human judgement. Those are two things AI can’t do.”

This lack of human judgment becomes especially risky as new architectures, such as Model Context Protocol (MCP), can expand how agents connect to data, tools, and external systems. By design, MCP enables agents to dynamically discover and interact with new resources, increasing flexibility but also introducing new pathways for unintended access, data exposure, or abuse if not properly governed.

The CISO of a fund administrator highlighted one emerging vector as an example: rogue MCP servers. “Our developers want to move quickly and bring value to the business, but technologies like these can unintentionally expose sensitive data in ways that would never have happened before.”

2. Increased digital complexity and expanded attack surface

AI activity rarely stays contained. A single prompt can trigger a chain of actions across networks, email, cloud infrastructure, SaaS platforms, endpoints, identity systems, and development environments, spanning systems that were never designed to be secured as a single, connected flow. This expands both the scale and complexity of what security teams need to monitor and defend.

Yet no single control has visibility across that entire chain. “You can’t defend effectively what you can’t see,” cautioned the private fund administrator CISO. As AI-driven activity moves fluidly across environments, gaps in coverage become inevitable, creating blind spots that attackers can exploit.

Threat actors are already capitalizing on this lack of visibility. “Threat actors have advanced their use of generative AI to launch more convincing phishing campaigns, automate social engineering, and scale attacks with greater precision down to the individual level,” said the SVP of Technology and Cybersecurity for the real estate investment trust. What was once manual and targeted can now be automated and personalized at scale, making attacks harder to detect and easier to execute.

At the same time, the pace of exploitation is accelerating. As a global CISO operating across 40+ countries described it: “Zero-day vulnerabilities are no longer zero day; it’s minus one day. By the time you get to it and address it, it’s already a problem.” By the time risk is identified, it has often already been realized.

The result is a rapidly expanding and increasingly interconnected attack surface that challenges security teams to maintain visibility, context, and control across AI-driven activity.

3. Shadow AI is already everywhere

76% of organizations now cite shadow AI as a problem, one that is spreading through organizations in ways that are hard to track and even harder to control.

Employees are experimenting with publicly available Gen AI tools. Teams are spinning up low-code automations on their own. SaaS providers are quietly embedding AI into existing products. Developers are plugging AI services directly into workflows, often without pausing to consider what that exposure means.

The result is a lack of visibility into:

  • What AI tools are being used
  • What data those tools can access
  • Where prompts and outputs are going
  • Which AI agents are interacting with enterprise systems

The SVP of Cybersecurity at a real estate investment trust described the shift: “Before, I was worried about someone sending data erroneously to their personal email. Now we have all these agents online that people are utilizing, and we’re looking at those vectors as well.” For security teams, this means operating without a complete view of how AI is being used, what it can access, and where risk may already be emerging.

4. Built-in guardrails are not enough

Organizations often assume that native AI guardrails or provider-level controls are sufficient to manage AI risk. But securing AI requires ongoing visibility, oversight, and governance, not just controls configured at deployment. "It’s a misconception that adopting AI is going to solve all your problems,” warns a global financial services CISO.

Security leaders are increasingly recognizing the limitations of these controls as:

  • Fragmented and difficult to enforce consistently across multiple AI systems, workflows, and environments
  • Ambiguous in terms of accountability due to shared responsibility for AI governance between IT, security, developers, business teams, and third-party providers
  • Limited in end-to-end oversight, leaving gaps that stretch from the initial prompt all the way through to the downstream impact of an agent's actions

Securing AI demands more than simple prompt filtering or static policy enforcement. It requires understanding intent, behavior, and context across both human and AI activity.

The next phase of cybersecurity: securing AI

To safely and responsibly adopt AI at scale, organizations need a new operational model for cybersecurity that’s capable of:

• Understanding AI behavior

• Identifying risk in real time

• Maintaining governance without slowing innovation

The CSO of a $10 billion municipal utility organization described the challenge with precision: “We have to move at the speed of innovation and risk, because both are accelerating faster than ever.”

Embrace AI with confidence with Darktrace / SECURE AI

Darktrace has introduced Darktrace / SECURE AI™, a new product within the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™  ,designed to provide enterprise-wide security for AI by applying industry leading behavioral analysis to how prompts, agents, and AI systems are used.

Darktrace / SECURE AITM delivers real-time visibility and control across Enterprise and SaaS GenAI prompts, AI agent identities, development and production environments, and Shadow AI - detecting even subtle misuse, misconfiguration, and drift that traditional, rule-based controls simply do not understand. By interpreting context and intent across humans and machines, Darktrace enables organizations to adopt AI at scale without introducing unmanaged risk

What makes this possible is Darktrace’s decade-long maturity and expertise in behavioral understanding and AI-native cybersecurity. Achieved with Self-Learning AI that has been proven across more than 10,000 organizations, Darktrace understands what “normal” looks like for a business, across its users, systems, and now AI, so that meaningful deviations can be detected and acted on before they become incidents.

With one CISO describing Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI as “a leap forward compared to other tools” and another as a “force multiplier,” the technology can interpret ambiguous interactions, understand how access accumulates over time, and recognize when behavior, human or machine, begins to drift.

“Strategically, we’re looking to gain more visibility into how AI is operating across the environment and achieve greater control over what AI should be allowed to access and do,” shared the CISO at a private fund administrator.  

“What I’ve seen from Darktrace / SECURE AI is extremely promising. I have tremendous confidence in Darktrace’s vision for where this is headed and its ability to execute on this new solution.”

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