Blog
/
/
April 15, 2021

AI Neutralizes Hafnium Cyber Attack in December 2020

Protect your business from cyber attacks with AI technology. Learn how Darktrace neutralized the Hafnium attack against Exchange servers in December 2020.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
15
Apr 2021

In early December 2020, Darktrace AI autonomously detected and investigated a sophisticated cyber-attack that targeted a customer’s Exchange server. On March 2, 2021, Microsoft disclosed an ongoing campaign by the Hafnium threat actor group leveraging Exchange server zero-days.

Based on similarities in techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) observed, Darktrace has now assessed with high confidence that the attack in December was the work of the Hafnium group. Although it is not possible to determine whether this attack leveraged the same Exchange zero-days as reported by Microsoft, the finding suggests that Hafnium’s campaign was active several months earlier than assumed.

As a result, organizations may want to go back as far as early December 2020 to check security logs and tools for signs of initial intrusion into their Internet-facing Exchange servers.

As Darktrace does not rely on rules or signatures, it doesn’t require a constant cloud connection. Most customers therefore operate our technology themselves, and we don’t centrally monitor their detections.

At the time of detection in December, this was one of many uncategorized, sophisticated intrusions that affected only a single customer, and was not indicative of a broader campaign.

This means that while we protect our customers from individual intrusions, we are not in a position to do global campaign tracking like other companies which focus primarily on threat intelligence and threat actor tracking.

In this blog, we will analyze the attack to aid organizations in their ongoing investigations, and to raise awareness that the Hafnium campaign may have been active for longer than previously disclosed.

Overview of the Exchange attack

The intrusion was detected at an organization in the critical national infrastructure sector in South Asia. One hypothesis is that the Hafnium group was testing out and refining its TTPs, potentially including the Exchange server exploit, before running a broad-scale campaign against Western organizations in early 2021.

The threat actor used many of the same techniques that were observed in the later Hafnium attacks, including the deployment of the low-activity China Chopper web shell, quickly followed by post-exploitation activity – attempting to move laterally and spread to critical devices in the network.

The following analysis demonstrates how Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System detected the malicious activity, how Cyber AI Analyst automatically investigated on the incident and surfaced the alert as a top priority, and how Darktrace RESPOND (formerly known as 'Antigena') would have responded autonomously to shut down the attack, had it been in active mode.

All the activity took place in early December 2020, almost three months before Microsoft released information about the Hafnium campaign.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack from early December 2020

Initial compromise

Unfortunately, the victim organization did not keep any logs or forensic artefacts from their Exchange server in December 2020, which would have allowed Darktrace to ascertain the exploit of the zero-day. However, there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that these Exchange server vulnerabilities were abused.

Darktrace observed no signs of compromise or change in behavior from the Internet-facing Exchange server – no prior internal admin connections, no broad-scale brute-force attempts, no account takeovers, no malware copied to the server via internal channels – until all of a sudden, it began to scan the internal network.

While this is not conclusive evidence that no other avenue of initial intrusion was present, the change in behavior on an administrative level points to a complete takeover of the Exchange server, rather than the compromise of a single Outlook Web Application account.

To conduct a network scan from an Exchange server, a highly privileged, operating SYSTEM-level account is required. The patch level of the Exchange server at the time of compromise appears to have been up-to-date, at least not offering a threat actor the ability to target a known vulnerability to instantly get SYSTEM-level privileges.

For this reason, Darktrace has inferred that the Exchange server zero-days that became public in early March 2021 were possibly being used in this attack observed in early December 2020.

Internal reconnaissance

As soon as the attackers gained access via the web shell, they used the Exchange server to scan all IPs in a single subnet on ports 80, 135, 445, 8080.

This particular Exchange server had never made such a large number of new failed internal connections to that specific subnet on those key ports. As a result, Darktrace instantly alerted on the anomalous behavior, which was indicative of a network scan.

Autonomous Response

Darktrace RESPOND was in passive mode in the environment, so was not able to take action. In active mode, it would have responded by enforcing the previously learned, normal ‘pattern of life’ of the Exchange server – allowing the server to continue normal business operations (sending and receiving emails) but preventing the network scan and any subsequent activity. These actions would have been carried out via various integrations with the customer’s existing security stack, including Firewalls and Network Access Controls.

Specifically, when the network scanning started, the ‘Antigena Network Scan Block’ was triggered. This means that for several hours, Darktrace RESPOND (Antigena) would have blocked any new outgoing connections from the Exchange server to the scanned subnet on port 80, 135, 445, or 8080, preventing the infected Exchange server from conducting network scanning.

As a result, the attackers would not have been able to conclude anything from their reconnaissance — all their scanning would have returned closed ports. At this point, they would need to stop their attack or resort to other means, likely triggering further detections and further Autonomous Response.

The network scan was the first step touching the internal network. This is therefore a clear case of how Darktrace RESPOND can intercept an attack in seconds, acting at the earliest possible evidence of the intrusion.

Lateral movement

Less than an hour after the internal network scan, the compromised Exchange server was observed writing further web shells to other Exchange servers via internal SMB. Darktrace alerted on this as the initially compromised Exchange server had never accessed the other Exchange servers in this fashion over SMB, let alone writing .aspx files to Program Files remotely.

A single click allowed the security team to pivot from the alert into Darktrace’s Advanced Search, revealing further details about the written files. The full file path for the newly deployed web shells was:

Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\themes\errorFS.aspx

The attackers thus used internal SMB to compromise further Exchange servers and deploy more web shells, rather than using the Exchange zero-day exploit again to achieve the same goal. The reason for this is clear: exploits can often be unstable, and an adversary would not want to show their hand unnecessarily if it could be avoided.

While the China Chopper web shell has been deployed with many different names in the past, the file path and file name of the actual .aspx web shell bear very close resemblance to the Hafnium campaign details published by Microsoft and others in March 2021.

As threat actors often reuse naming conventions / TTPs in coherent campaigns, it again indicates that this particular attack was in some way part of the broader campaign observed in early 2021.

Further lateral movement

Minutes later, the attacker conducted further lateral movement by making more SMB drive writes to Domain Controllers. This time the attackers did not upload web shells, but malware, in the form of executables and Windows .bat files.

Darktrace alerted the security team as it was extremely unusual for the Exchange server and its peer group to make SMB drive writes to hidden shares to a Domain Controller, particularly using executables and batch files. The activity was presented to the team in the form of a high-confidence alert such as the anonymized example below.

Figure 2: Example graphic of Darktrace detecting unusual connectivity

The batch file was called ‘a.bat’. At this point, the security team could have created a packet capture for the a.bat file in Darktrace with the click of a button, inspecting the content and details of that script at the time of the intrusion.

Darktrace also listed the credentials involved in the activity, providing context into the compromised accounts. This allows an analyst to pivot rapidly around the data and further understand the scope of the intrusion.

Bird’s-eye perspective

In addition to detecting the malicious activity outlined above, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst autonomously summarized the incident and reported on it, outlining the internal reconnaissance and lateral movement activity in a single, cohesive incident.

The organization has several thousand devices covered by Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System. Nevertheless, over the period of one week, the Hafnium intrusion was in the top five incidents highlighted in Cyber AI Analyst. Even a small or resource-stretched security team, with only a few minutes available per week to review the highest-severity incidents, could have seen and inspected this threat.

Below is a graphic showing a similar Cyber AI Analyst incident created by Darktrace.

Figure 3: A Cyber AI Analyst report showing unusual SMB activity

How to stop a zero-day

Large scale campaigns which target Internet-facing infrastructure and leverage zero-day exploits will continue to occur regularly, and such attacks will always succeed in evading signature-based detection. However, organizations are not helpless against the next high-profile zero-day or supply chain attack.

Detecting the movements of attackers inside a system and responding to contain in-progress threats is possible before IoCs have been provided. The methods of detection outlined above protected the company against this attack in December, and the same techniques will continue to protect the company against unknown threats in the future.

Learn more about how Darktrace AI has stopped Hafnium cyber-attacks and similar threat actors

Darktrace model detections:

  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • Executable Uploaded to DC
  • Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Breach
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block
  • Device / Network Scan - Low Anomaly Score
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual Internal Connections

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Network

/

September 15, 2025

SEO Poisoning and Fake PuTTY sites: Darktrace’s Investigation into the Oyster backdoor

Default blog imageDefault blog image

What is SEO poisoning?

Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is the legitimate marketing technique of improving the visibility of websites in organic search engine results. Businesses, publishers, and organizations use SEO to ensure their content is easily discoverable by users. Techniques may include optimizing keywords, creating backlinks, or even ensuring mobile compatibility.

SEO poisoning occurs when attackers use these same techniques for malicious purposes. Instead of improving the visibility of legitimate content, threat actors use SEO to push harmful or deceptive websites to the top of search results. This method exploits the common assumption that top-ranking results are trustworthy, leading users to click on URLs without carefully inspecting them.

As part of SEO poisoning, the attacker will first register a typo-squatted domain, slightly misspelled or otherwise deceptive versions of real software sites, such as putty[.]run or puttyy[.]org. These sites are optimized for SEO and often even backed by malicious Google ads, increasing the visibility when users search for download links. To achieve that, threat actors may embed pages with strategically chosen, high-value keywords or replicate content from reputable sources to elevate the domain’s perceived authority in search engine algorithms [4]. In more advanced operations, these tactics are reinforced with paid promotion, such as Google ads, enabling malicious domains to appear above organic search results as sponsored links. This placement not only accelerates visibility but also impacts an unwarranted sense of legitimacy to unsuspected users.

Once a user lands on one of these fake pages, they are presented with what looks like a legitimate software download option. Upon clicking the download indicator, the user will be redirected to another separate domain that actually hosts the payload. This hosting domain is usually unrelated to the nominally referenced software. These third-party sites can involve recently registered domains but may also include legitimate websites that have been recently compromised. By hosting malware on a variety of infrastructure, attackers can prolong the availability of distribution methods for these malicious files before they are taken down.

What is the Oyster backdoor?

Oyster, also known as Broomstick or CleanUpLoader, is a C++ based backdoor malware first identified in July 2023. It enables remote access to infected systems, offering features such as command-line interaction and file transfers.

Oyster has been widely adopted by various threat actors, often as an entry point for ransomware attacks. Notable examples include Vanilla Tempest and Rhysida ransomware groups, both of which have been observed leveraging the Oyster backdoor to enhance their attack capabilities. Vanilla Tempest is known for using Oyster’s stealth persistence to maintain long-term access within targeted networks, often aligning their operations with ransomware deployment [5]. Rhysida has taken this further by deploying Oyster as an initial access tool in ransomware campaigns, using it to conduct reconnaissance and move laterally before executing encryption activities [6].

Once installed, the backdoor gathers basic system information before communicating with a command-and-control (C2) server. The malware largely relies on a ‘cmd.exe’ instance to execute commands and launch other files [1].

In previous SEO poisoning cases, the file downloaded from the fake pages is not just PuTTY, but a trojanized version that includes the stealthy Oyster backdoor. PuTTY is a free and open-source terminal emulator for Windows that allows users to connect to remote servers and devices using protocols like SSH and Telnet. In the recent campaign, once a user visits the fake software download site, ranked highly through SEO poisoning, the malicious payload is downloaded through direct user interaction and subsequently installed on the local device, initiating the compromise. The malware then performs two actions simultaneously: it installs a fully functional version of PuTTY to avoid user suspicion, while silently deploying the Oyster backdoor. Given PuTTY’s nature, it is prominently used by IT administrators with highly privileged account as opposed to standard users in a business, possibly narrowing the scope of the targets.

Oyster’s persistence mechanism involves creating a Windows Scheduled Task that runs every few minutes. Notably, the infection uses Dynamic Link Library (DLL) side loading, where a malicious DLL, often named ‘twain_96.dll’, is executed via the legitimate Windows utility ‘rundll32.exe’, which is commonly used to run DLLs [2]. This technique is frequently used by malicious actors to blend their activity with normal system operations.

Darktrace’s Coverage of the Oyster Backdoor

In June 2025, security analysts at Darktrace identified a campaign leveraging search engine manipulation to deliver malware masquerading as the popular SSH client, PuTTY. Darktrace / NETWORK’s anomaly-based detection identified signs of malicious activity, and when properly configured, its Autonomous Response capability swiftly shut down the threar before it could escalate into a more disruptive attack. Subsequent analysis by Darktrace’s Threat Research team revealed that the payload was a variant of the Oyster backdoor.

The first indicators of an emerging Oyster SEO campaign typically appeared when user devices navigated to a typosquatted domain, such as putty[.]run or putty app[.]naymin[.]com, via a TLS/SSL connection.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of a device connecting to the typosquatted domain putty[.]run.

The device would then initiate a connection to a secondary domain that hosts the malicious installer, likely triggered by user interaction with redirect elements on the landing page. This secondary site may not have any immediate connection to PuTTY itself but is instead a hijacked blog, a file-sharing service, or a legitimate-looking content delivery subdomain.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the device making subsequent connections to the payload domain.

Following installation, multiple affected devices were observed attempting outbound connectivity to rare external IP addresses, specifically requesting the ‘/secure’ endpoint as noted within the declared URIs. After the initial callback, the malware continued communicating with additional infrastructure, maintaining its foothold and likely waiting for tasking instructions. Communication patterns included:

·       Endpoints with URIs /api/kcehc and /api/jgfnsfnuefcnegfnehjbfncejfh

·       Endpoints with URI /reg and user agent “WordPressAgent”, “FingerPrint” or “FingerPrintpersistent”

This tactic has been consistently linked to the Oyster backdoor, which has shown similar URI patterns across multiple campaigns [3].

Darktrace analysts also noted the sophisticated use of spoofed user agent strings across multiple investigated customer networks. These headers, which are typically used to identify the application making an HTTP request, are carefully crafted to appear benign or mimic legitimate software. One common example seen in the campaign is the user agent string “WordPressAgent”. While this string references a legitimate web application or plugin, it does not appear to correspond to any known WordPress services or APIs. Its inclusion is most likely designed to mimic background web traffic commonly associated with WordPress-based content management systems.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst investigation linking the HTTP C2 activity.

Case-Specific Observations

While the previous section focused on tactics and techniques common across observed Oyster infections, a closer examination reveals notable variations and unique elements in specific cases. These distinct features offer valuable insights into the diverse operational approaches employed by threat actors. These distinct features, from unusual user agent strings to atypical network behavior, offer valuable insights into the diverse operational approaches employed by the threat actors. Crucially, the divergence in post-exploitation activity reflects a broader trend in the use of widely available malware families like Oyster as flexible entry points, rather than fixed tools with a single purpose. This modular use of the backdoor reflects the growing Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) ecosystem, where a single initial infection can be repurposed depending on the operator’s goals.

From Infection to Data Egress

In one observed incident, Darktrace observed an infected device downloading a ZIP file named ‘host[.]zip’ via curl from the URI path /333/host[.]zip, following the standard payload delivery chain. This file likely contained additional tools or payloads intended to expand the attacker’s capabilities within the compromised environment. Shortly afterwards, the device exhibited indicators of probable data exfiltration, with outbound HTTP POST requests featuring the URI pattern: /upload?dir=NAME_FOLDER/KEY_KEY_KEY/redacted/c/users/public.

This format suggests the malware was actively engaged in local host data staging and attempting to transmit files from the target machine. The affected device, identified as a laptop, aligns with the expected target profile in SEO poisoning scenarios, where unsuspecting end users download and execute trojanized software.

Irregular RDP Activity and Scanning Behavior

Several instances within the campaign revealed anomalous or unexpected Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions occurring shortly after DNS requests to fake PuTTY domains. Unusual RDP connections frequently followed communication with Oyster backdoor C2 servers. Additionally, Darktrace detected patterns of RDP scanning, suggesting the attackers were actively probing for accessible systems within the network. This behavior indicates a move beyond initial compromise toward lateral movement and privilege escalation, common objectives once persistence is established.

The presence of unauthorized and administrative RDP sessions following Oyster infections aligns with the malware’s historical role as a gateway for broader impact. In previous campaigns, Oyster has often been leveraged to enable credential theft, lateral movement, and ultimately ransomware deployment. The observed RDP activity in this case suggests a similar progression, where the backdoor is not the final objective but rather a means to expand access and establish control over the target environment.

Cryptic User Agent Strings?

In multiple investigated cases, the user agent string identified in these connections featured formatting that appeared nonsensical or cryptic. One such string containing seemingly random Chinese-language characters translated into an unusual phrase: “Weihe river is where the water and river flow.” Legitimate software would not typically use such wording, suggesting that the string was intended as a symbolic marker rather than a technical necessity. Whether meant as a calling card or deliberately crafted to frame attribution, its presence highlights how subtle linguistic cues can complicate analysis.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of malicious connections using a user agent with randomized Chinese-language formatting.

Strategic Implications

What makes this campaign particularly noteworthy is not simply the use of Oyster, but its delivery mechanism. SEO poisoning has traditionally been associated with cybercriminal operations focused on opportunistic gains, such as credential theft and fraud. Its strength lies in casting a wide net, luring unsuspecting users searching for popular software and tricking them into downloading malicious binaries. Unlike other campaigns, SEO poisoning is inherently indiscriminate, given that the attacker cannot control exactly who lands on their poisoned search results. However, in this case, the use of PuTTY as the luring mechanism possibly indicates a narrowed scope - targeting IT administrators and accounts with high privileges due to the nature of PuTTY’s functionalities.

This raises important implications when considered alongside Oyster. As a backdoor often linked to ransomware operations and persistent access frameworks, Oyster is far more valuable as an entry point into corporate or government networks than small-scale cybercrime. The presence of this malware in an SEO-driven delivery chain suggests a potential convergence between traditional cybercriminal delivery tactics and objectives often associated with more sophisticated attackers. If actors with state-sponsored or strategic objectives are indeed experimenting with SEO poisoning, it could signal a broadening of their targeting approaches. This trend aligns with the growing prominence of MaaS and the role of initial access brokers in today’s cybercrime ecosystem.

Whether the operators seek financial extortion through ransomware or longer-term espionage campaigns, the use of such techniques blurs the traditional distinctions. What looks like a mass-market infection vector might, in practice, be seeding footholds for high-value strategic intrusions.

Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

·       T1071.001 – Command and Control – Web Protocols

·       T1008 – Command and Control – Fallback Channels

·       T0885 – Command and Control – Commonly Used Port

·       T1571 – Command and Control – Non-Standard Port

·       T1176 – Persistence – Browser Extensions

·       T1189 – Initial Access – Drive-by Compromise

·       T1566.002 – Initial Access – Spearphishing Link

·       T1574.001 – Persistence – DLL

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

·       85.239.52[.]99 – IP address

·       194.213.18[.]89/reg – IP address / URI

·       185.28.119[.]113/secure – IP address / URI

·       185.196.8[.]217 – IP address

·       185.208.158[.]119 – IP address

·       putty[.]run – Endpoint

·       putty-app[.]naymin[.]com – Endpoint

·       /api/jgfnsfnuefcnegfnehjbfncejfh

·       /api/kcehc

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

·       Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity to External Rare

·       Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·       Device / Suspicious Domain

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

References

[1] https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.broomstick

[2] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/malvertising-campaign-delivers-oyster-broomstick-backdoor-via-seo-poisoning-trojanized-tools/

[3] https://hunt.io/blog/oysters-trail-resurgence-infrastructure-ransomware-cybercrime

[4] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/social-engineering/seo-poisoning/

[5] https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/vanilla-tempest-oyster-backdoor-netsupport-unknown-infostealers-soc-incidents-blackpoint-apg/

[6] https://areteir.com/article/rhysida-using-oyster-backdoor-in-attacks/

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.

Continue reading
About the author
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst

Blog

/

Network

/

September 9, 2025

The benefits of bringing together network and email security

Default blog imageDefault blog image

In many organizations, network and email security operate in isolation. Each solution is tasked with defending its respective environment, even though both are facing the same advanced, multi-domain threats.  

This siloed approach overlooks a critical reality: email remains the most common vector for initiating cyber-attacks, while the network is the primary stage on which those attacks progress. Without direct integration between these two domains, organizations risk leaving blind spots that adversaries can exploit.  

A modern security strategy needs to unify email and network defenses, not just in name, but in how they share intelligence, conduct investigations, and coordinate response actions. Let’s take a look at how this joined-up approach delivers measurable technical, operational, and commercial benefits.

Technical advantages

Pre-alert intelligence: Gathering data before the threat strikes

Most security tools start working when something goes wrong – an unusual login, a flagged attachment, a confirmed compromise. But by then, attackers may already be a step ahead.

By unifying network and email security under a single AI platform (like the Darktrace Active AI Security Platform), you can analyze patterns across both environments in real time, even when there are no alerts. This ongoing monitoring builds a behavioral understanding of every user, device, and domain in your ecosystem.

That means when an email arrives from a suspicious domain, the system already knows whether that domain has appeared on your network before – and whether its behavior has been unusual. Likewise, when new network activity involves a domain first spotted in an email, it’s instantly placed in the right context.

This intelligence isn’t built on signatures or after-the-fact compromise indicators – it’s built on live behavioral baselines, giving your defenses the ability to flag threats before damage is done.

Alert-related intelligence: Connecting the dots in real time

Once an alert does fire, speed and context matter. The Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst can automatically investigate across both environments, piecing together network and email evidence into a single, cohesive incident.

Instead of leaving analysts to sift through fragmented logs, the AI links events like a phishing email to suspicious lateral movement on the recipient’s device, keeping the full attack chain intact. Investigations that might take hours – or even days – can be completed in minutes, with far fewer false positives to wade through.

This is more than a time-saver. It ensures defenders maintain visibility after the first sign of compromise, following the attacker as they pivot into network infrastructure, cloud services, or other targets. That cross-environment continuity is impossible to achieve with disconnected point solutions or siloed workflows.

Operational advantages

Streamlining SecOps across teams

In many organizations, email security is managed by IT, while network defense belongs to the SOC. The result? Critical information is scattered between tools and teams, creating blind spots just when you need clarity.

When email and network data flow into a single platform, everyone is working from the same source of truth. SOC analysts gain immediate visibility into email threats without opening another console or sending a request to another department. The IT team benefits from the SOC’s deeper investigative context.

The outcome is more than convenience: it’s faster, more informed decision-making across the board.

Reducing time-to-meaning and enabling faster response

A unified platform removes the need to manually correlate alerts between tools, reducing time-to-meaning for every incident. Built-in AI correlation instantly ties together related events, guiding analysts toward coordinated responses with higher confidence.

Instead of relying on manual SIEM rules or pre-built SOAR playbooks, the platform connects the dots in real time, and can even trigger autonomous response actions across both environments simultaneously. This ensures attacks are stopped before they can escalate, regardless of where they begin.

Commercial advantages

While purchasing “best-of-breed" for all your different tools might sound appealing, it often leads to a patchwork of solutions with overlapping costs and gaps in coverage. However good a “best-in-breed" email security solution might be in the email realm, it won't be truly effective without visibility across domains and an AI analyst piecing intelligence together. That’s why we think “best-in-suite" is the only “best-in-breed" approach that works – choosing a high-quality platform ensures that every new capability strengthens the whole system.  

On top of that, security budgets are under constant pressure. Managing separate vendors for email and network defense means juggling multiple contracts, negotiating different SLAs, and stitching together different support models.

With a single provider for both, procurement and vendor management become far simpler. You deal with one account team, one support channel, and one unified strategy for both environments. If you choose to layer on managed services, you get consistent expertise across your whole security footprint.

Even more importantly, an integrated AI platform sets the stage for growth. Once email and network are under the same roof, adding coverage for other attack surfaces – like cloud or identity – is straightforward. You’re building on the same architecture, not bolting on new point solutions that create more complexity.

Check out the white paper, The Modern Security Stack: Why Your NDR and Email Security Solutions Need to Work Together, to explore these benefits in more depth, with real-world examples and practical steps for unifying your defenses.

[related-resource]

Continue reading
About the author
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI