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October 3, 2024

From Call to Compromise: Darktrace’s Response to a Vishing-Induced Network Attack

When a remote user fell victim to a vishing attack, allowing a malicious actor to gain access to a customer network, Darktrace swiftly detected the intrusion and responded effectively. This prompt action prevented any data loss and reinforced trust in Darktrace’s robust security measures.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Rushanth Ramanathan
Cyber Analyst
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03
Oct 2024

What is vishing?

Vishing, or voice phishing, is a type of cyber-attack that utilizes telephone devices to deceive targets. Threat actors typically use social engineering tactics to convince targets that they can be trusted, for example, by masquerading as a family member, their bank, or trusted a government entity. One method frequently used by vishing actors is to intimidate their targets, convincing them that they may face monetary fines or jail time if they do not provide sensitive information.

What makes vishing attacks dangerous to organizations?

Vishing attacks utilize social engineering tactics that exploit human psychology and emotion. Threat actors often impersonate trusted entities and can make it appear as though a call is coming from a reputable or known source.  These actors often target organizations, specifically their employees, and pressure them to obtain sensitive corporate data, such as privileged credentials, by creating a sense of urgency, intimidation or fear. Corporate credentials can then be used to gain unauthorized access to an organization’s network, often bypassing traditional security measures and human security teams.

Darktrace’s coverage of vishing attack

On August 12, 2024, Darktrace / NETWORK identified malicious activity on the network of a customer in the hospitality sector. The customer later confirmed that a threat actor had gained unauthorized access through a vishing attack. The attacker successfully spoofed the IT support phone number and called a remote employee, eventually leading to the compromise.

Figure 1: Timeline of events in the kill chain of this attack.

Establishing a Foothold

During the call, the remote employee was requested to authenticate via multi-factor authentication (MFA). Believing the caller to be a member of their internal IT support, using the legitimate caller ID, the remote user followed the instructions and confirmed the MFA prompt, providing access to the customer’s network.

This authentication allowed the threat actor to login into the customer’s environment by proxying through their Virtual Private Network (VPN) and gain a foothold in the network. As remote users are assigned the same static IP address when connecting to the corporate environment, the malicious actor appeared on the network using the correct username and IP address. While this stealthy activity might have evaded traditional security tools and human security teams, Darktrace’s anomaly-based threat detection identified an unusual login from a different hostname by analyzing NTLM requests from the static IP address, which it determined to be anomalous.

Observed Activity

  • On 2024-08-12 the static IP was observed using a credential belonging to the remote user to initiate an SMB session with an internal domain controller, where the authentication method NTLM was used
  • A different hostname from the usual hostname associated with this remote user was identified in the NTLM authentication request sent from a device with the static IP address to the domain controller
  • This device does not appear to have been seen on the network prior to this event.

Darktrace, therefore, recognized that this login was likely made by a malicious actor.

Internal Reconnaissance

Darktrace subsequently observed the malicious actor performing a series of reconnaissance activities, including LDAP reconnaissance, device hostname reconnaissance, and port scanning:

  • The affected device made a 53-second-long LDAP connection to another internal domain controller. During this connection, the device obtained data about internal Active Directory (AD) accounts, including the AD account of the remote user
  • The device made HTTP GET requests (e.g., HTTP GET requests with the Target URI ‘/nice ports,/Trinity.txt.bak’), indicative of Nmap usage
  • The device started making reverse DNS lookups for internal IP addresses.
Figure 2: Model alert showing the IP address from which the malicious actor connected and performed network scanning activities via port 9401.
Figure 3: Model Alert Event Log showing the affected device connecting to multiple internal locations via port 9401.

Lateral Movement

The threat actor was also seen making numerous failed NTLM authentication requests using a generic default Windows credential, indicating an attempt to brute force and laterally move through the network. During this activity, Darktrace identified that the device was using a different hostname than the one typically used by the remote employee.

Cyber AI Analyst

In addition to the detection by Darktrace / NETWORK, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into the ongoing activity. The investigation was able to correlate the seemingly separate events together into a broader incident, continuously adding new suspicious linked activities as they occurred.

Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst investigation showing the activity timeline, and the activities associated with the incident.

Upon completing the investigation, Cyber AI Analyst provided the customer with a comprehensive summary of the various attack phases detected by Darktrace and the associated incidents. This clear presentation enabled the customer to gain full visibility into the compromise and understand the activities that constituted the attack.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst displaying the observed attack phases and associated model alerts.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Despite the sophisticated techniques and social engineering tactics used by the attacker to bypass the customer’s human security team and existing security stack, Darktrace’s AI-driven approach prevented the malicious actor from continuing their activities and causing more harm.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology is able to enforce a pattern of life based on what is ‘normal’ and learned for the environment. If activity is detected that represents a deviation from expected activity from, a model alert is triggered. When Darktrace’s Autonomous Response functionality is configured in autonomous response mode, as was the case with the customer, it swiftly applies response actions to devices and users without the need for a system administrator or security analyst to perform any actions.

In this instance, Darktrace applied a number of mitigative actions on the remote user, containing most of the activity as soon as it was detected:

  • Block all outgoing traffic
  • Enforce pattern of life
  • Block all connections to port 445 (SMB)
  • Block all connections to port 9401
Figure 6: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response actions showing the actions taken in response to the observed activity, including blocking all outgoing traffic or enforcing the pattern of life.

The growing threat of vishing in a remote workforce

This vishing attack underscores the significant risks remote employees face and the critical need for companies to address vishing threats to prevent network compromises. The remote employee in this instance was deceived by a malicious actor who spoofed the phone number of internal IT Support and convinced the employee to perform approve an MFA request. This sophisticated social engineering tactic allowed the attacker to proxy through the customer’s VPN, making the malicious activity appear legitimate due to the use of static IP addresses.

Despite the stealthy attempts to perform malicious activities on the network, Darktrace’s focus on anomaly detection enabled it to swiftly identify and analyze the suspicious behavior. This led to the prompt determination of the activity as malicious and the subsequent blocking of the malicious actor to prevent further escalation.

While the exact motivation of the threat actor in this case remains unclear, the 2023 cyber-attack on MGM Resorts serves as a stark illustration of the potential consequences of such threats. MGM Resorts experienced significant disruptions and data breaches following a similar vishing attack, resulting in financial and reputational damage [1]. If the attack on the customer had not been detected, they too could have faced sensitive data loss and major business disruptions. This incident underscores the critical importance of robust security measures and vigilant monitoring to protect against sophisticated cyber threats.

Insights from Darktrace’s First 6: Half-year threat report for 2024

First 6: half year threat report darktrace screenshot

Darktrace’s First 6: Half-Year Threat Report 2024 highlights the latest attack trends and key threats observed by the Darktrace Threat Research team in the first six months of 2024.

  • Focuses on anomaly detection and behavioral analysis to identify threats
  • Maps mitigated cases to known, publicly attributed threats for deeper context
  • Offers guidance on improving security posture to defend against persistent threats

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Appendices

Credit to Rajendra Rushanth (Cyber Security Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead)

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Device / Unusual LDAP Bind and Search Activity
  • Device / Attack and Recon Tools
  • Device / Network Range Scan
  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / UDP Enumeration
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches (Enhanced Monitoring)
  • Device / Reverse DNS Sweep
  • Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type – Description

/nice ports,/Trinity.txt.bak - URI – Unusual Nmap Usage

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – ID – Technique

INITIAL ACCESS – T1200 – Hardware Additions

DISCOVERY – T1046 – Network Service Scanning

DISCOVERY – T1482 – Domain Trust Discovery

RECONNAISSANCE – T1590 – IP Addresses

T1590.002 – DNS

T1590.005 – IP Addresses

RECONNAISSANCE – T1592 – Client Configurations

T1592.004 – Client Configurations

RECONNAISSANCE – T1595 – Scanning IP Blocks

T1595.001 – Scanning IP Blocks

T1595.002 – Vulnerability Scanning

References

[1] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/securing-helpdesks-from-hackers-what-we-can-learn-from-the-mgm-breach/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Rushanth Ramanathan
Cyber Analyst

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October 21, 2026

Beyond the Fridge: Exposed Industrial Control Systems

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Introduction

In October 2026, hundreds of supermarkets across France were reportedly affected by a cyberattack targeting their refrigeration systems. According to public reports, the attackers gained access to internet-connected controllers and modified their settings, forcing refrigeration units into high and extremely low temperatures and causing significant disruption. Total losses have been reported to reach several million euros.

The incident drew attention to the security of industrial refrigeration systems, particularly older devices with exposed management interfaces and known vulnerabilities.

The exact details of how the attackers gained access have not been confirmed, however it is speculated that the public-facing web server could be accessed with the username “admin” and password being the current date. Researchers from Claroty’s Team82 identified a vulnerability in Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series in 2025, “CVE-2025-41450", allowing for administrative access using a time-based “code-of-the-day" for authentication [1].

Default credentials, outdated firmware and publicly accessible administrative interfaces have been an issue for years. And yet these systems continue to appear in internet scans and require little sophistication to gain admin access. A simple search of internet-connected devices shows a range of exposed devices from Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and remote gateways, to, yes, more fridges.

Darktrace malware researchers identified hundreds of IoT and OT devices publicly exposed on the internet, many of which are configured with no authentication, weak credentials, or default credentials. As shown in Figure 1, an exposed Copeland XWEB web interface, used to manage Dixell equipment, including refrigerators, can provide the ability to remotely control connected devices.

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Figure 1: Copeland XWEB interface used to control systems including refrigerators and air conditioning.

However, it’s not only fridges; web management interfaces for industrial controls are also publicly accessible, often protected only by weak credentials. Figure 2 shows an example of a publicly exposed WAGO interface. The WAGO management interface is a configuration and administration panel for controllers. Through it, a logged-in user can view device details and diagnostics, manage user accounts and passwords, update firmware, back up or restore the full configuration, set the clock, and manage SD card storage. While it typically doesn’t manage switch outputs or read live process values, someone with access could still disrupt operation by changing network or Modbus settings, loading bad firmware or configurations, or by resetting passwords and enabling insecure services.

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Figure 2: WAGO Management interface.

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The issue extends beyond management interfaces. During our research, we identified publicly accessible web interfaces belonging to PLCs, including Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley devices. In each case, the risk arises from how the devices have been deployed and configured, not from a flaw in the vendors’ products.

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Figure 3: Web interface for Allen-Bradley CompactLogix controller.

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Figure 3 shows the web interface of an Allen-Bradley CompactLogix controller. Unlike the previous examples, this interface provides a view into the controller's operation, including running tasks, network connections, memory usage and diagnostic information. Rockwell Automation's CompactLogix controllers are commonly used to automate industrial processes, from manufacturing and packaging lines to water treatment and material handling systems. Depending on their configuration, these controllers can operate motors, pumps, valves and other physical equipment.

Although in this example the interface shown does not provide direct control over the PLC's logic, it exposes information about the model, firmware, network layout, and connections, which is useful reconnaissance for a bigger attack.

The concern is not necessarily that every exposed interface allows an attacker to immediately manipulate industrial processes. However, these devices are accessible from the public internet in the first place, providing information about systems that may be responsible for controlling physical equipment.

The attacks on refrigeration systems in France highlight the consequences of poorly secured industrial devices. As demonstrated throughout this research, publicly accessible management interfaces are not limited to refrigeration controllers but extend to PLCs and other systems used to manage industrial equipment.

Finding these devices requires little effort. Internet scanners make it possible to identify publicly exposed interfaces quickly, and in some cases these interfaces rely on publicly documented default credentials or have no authentication at all. As attackers increasingly use AI tools, such attacks may be identified and carried out faster and at a greater scale.

The consequences of this access depend on the device and the functionality exposed. While some interfaces provide little more than diagnostic information, others allow users to modify configurations, disrupt communications, or change settings that affect physical equipment. In industrial environments, this can result in operational downtime, damaged equipment and financial losses.

Weak passwords, default credentials and exposed administrative interfaces are not new security issues. Yet their continued presence on internet-connected industrial systems demonstrates how easily preventable weaknesses can leave physical operations vulnerable to attack.

Exposed devices often come from third-party suppliers and contractors, who frequently install refrigeration controllers, gateways and PLCs without the organization ever being aware they are connected to the internet. Asset visibility remains an important foundation, but organizations should assume that some unknown assets and services will exist. Effective security therefore also depends on continuous monitoring, anomaly detection, network segmentation and rapid response, so that risky exposure and unusual activity can be identified and addressed before it becomes disruptive.

Darktrace helps security teams gain visibility across IT and OT and respond to risks: https://www.darktrace.com/products/operational-technology.

Copeland, Dixell, WAGO, Rockwell Automation, Allen-Bradley and CompactLogix are trademarks of their respective owners. Their use here is for identification only and does not imply any affiliation with or endorsement by those owners.

References

1.        https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-defrost-the-food-uncovering-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead

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October 20, 2026

Why Kubernetes Security Needs A Behavioral Approach

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Kubernetes has become a foundational technology for modern cloud-native infrastructure. It can orchestrate everything from customer-facing applications to data pipelines and, increasingly, AI workloads. This is due to the highly scalable nature of Kubernetes, making it cost efficient and reliable.

Gartner projects that by 2028, 95% of new AI deployments will run on Kubernetes, up from less than 30% today1. However, the same qualities that make Kubernetes powerful also make it uniquely challenging to secure, leaving many organizations with limited visibility into their clusters. This lack of visibility increases risk - it’s difficult to secure what you can’t see.

However, this risk is often looked at as purely a posture management challenge. While Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) solutions can tell you how a cluster should be configured, they don’t tell you what it is doing in real time. This requires runtime behavioral monitoring of clusters to detect active threats.

Yet existing approaches to securing Kubernetes by most Cloud Detection and Response (CDR) and Network Detection and Response (NDR) vendors often have limited coverage or require a third-party integration to forward traffic and metadata. This means that capabilities can be limited and detections can lack the context of the wider environment, which slows down triage, investigation and response.

Why Kubernetes is hard to secure

Traditional security tooling was built for persistent, long-term infrastructure such as servers and virtual machines with fixed identities that last months or years. Some elements of Kubernetes environments can have a much shorter lifespan, breaking many assumptions those tools rely on:

  1. Increased complexity
    1. Kubernetes environments can be complex in comparison to traditional infrastructure, with many different elements to consider such as nodes, clusters, containers, pods and the workloads themselves.
  2. Ephemeral by design
    1. Kubernetes pods can spin up and terminate in seconds. A container that was compromised may no longer exist by the time a deeper investigation is required, leaving no artifact to analyze. This poses a unique challenge for security operations.
  3. Weaker workload boundaries
    1. Kubernetes containers use lightweight, shared-kernel isolation rather than separate virtual machines, improving efficiency but reducing separation between workloads and the host. As a result, a compromised container may have a greater potential impact on the node and neighboring workloads than a compromised virtual machine (VM).2
    2. Recent vulnerabilities have shown that threat actors can escape a container and gain access to the underlying host.3, 4
  4. Everything is API-driven
    1. Dozens or hundreds of microservices communicate over internal APIs, and the Kubernetes control plane itself is an API. This creates a large and dynamic attack surface, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate activity from malicious behavior.
    2. Without identity-aware runtime visibility, threat actors can move laterally between pods and exploit misconfigured role-based access controls (RBAC) with little chance of detection.

Rising to the challenge of securing Kubernetes

With the release of Darktrace 7.2, Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK can extend behavioral security into Kubernetes, delivering visibility, detection and response capabilities across runtime activity. Darktrace addresses the challenges of securing Kubernetes environments in several ways.

Behavioral detection, not static rules

Many Kubernetes runtime tools rely on predefined rules and signatures - a fixed list of “bad” behaviors to match against. That approach struggles with novel attacks and generates noise at scale. Darktrace takes a different approach: our Adaptive AI builds a Unique Behavioral Profile for each organization from the ground up, learning the normal behavior of every workload, node and identity in your cluster. It then uses this understanding to detect meaningful deviations from expected behavior, which serves as the basis for surfacing suspicious and malicious activity.  

A pod reaching out to an unfamiliar destination, an unexpected executable launching inside a workload, or an identity performing an action it has never performed, all surface as anomalies without anyone having to write a rule in advance.

Darktrace surfaces unexpected Kubernetes activity that does not align with an organization’s Unique Behavioral Profile

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Visibility across the network, the process, and the control plane

Darktrace monitors Kubernetes at three levels that together provide comprehensive runtime visibility:

  1. Network-layer
    1. Traffic between pods, across nodes and out to the internet. This helps to detect lateral movement and unusual connectivity, whether internal or external.
  2. Process-layer
    1. What is executing inside your containers. If a process reads a sensitive credential file or spawns an unexpected shell inside a production pod, Darktrace can identify that activity and use it as context for further detections.
  3. Control plane
    1. Activity against the Kubernetes API itself: someone executes a command in a running pod, RBAC changes, or unusual administrative actions. Many high-impact security events involve the control plane, an area that is often less visible to solutions that only analyze or scan network-layer telemetry.

Misconfiguration and vulnerability awareness

Runtime detection is strongest when combined with posture and exposure management. Darktrace surfaces risky pod configurations, such as privileged containers, host networking, and over-permissive service accounts as workloads are deployed, and links CVEs from images to the workloads running them. Security teams can go beyond simply knowing that a vulnerability exists and see exactly where it is in the cluster. When combined with behavior-based detections, this provides invaluable context that can help prioritize incidents and proactively identify areas that need further attention. For example, anomalous workload behavior on its own might not be very interesting to a security team at first, but if that same workload is known to host sensitive data, is known to have critical vulnerabilities associated with it, or is publicly accessible, then this narrative becomes much more suspicious and demanding of their attention.

Darktrace highlights Kubernetes misconfigurations such as privileged containers, host networking, and missing security controls, helping teams prioritize runtime alerts with valuable exposure and risk context

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Response, tailored to Kubernetes

Detection is most effective when paired with response. Darktrace can take precise actions on Kubernetes workloads, including blocking a malicious connection at the pod level, helping to safely contain threats while security teams investigate. Response actions can be taken fully autonomously or via a human-in-the-loop process, which is completely configurable depending on the desired level of autonomy and scope. Darktrace is expanding the number of Kubernetes-native response actions to give customers even more flexibility when containing threats.

Forensics that survive the workload

Because containers are so short-lived, evidence disappears fast and this can make it very difficult to answer questions related to the initial detections. Darktrace solves this with Forensic Acquisition & Investigation capabilities that extend to Kubernetes containers, allowing investigations to be triggered manually by an analyst, or automatically from an alert, preserving evidence before the workload is gone.

For incident responders, this addresses a key challenge in container security: being able to answer “what actually happened?” after an ephemeral workload has vanished.

One platform, not another silo

Kubernetes doesn't exist in isolation, and neither should its security. Darktrace correlates cluster activity with the surrounding cloud environment, including AWS, Azure and GCP identities, network activity and cloud assets, allowing analysts to pivot between a Kubernetes workload and its wider context. A single anomalous action can be traced from the control plane to the pod, and from the pod to the cloud identity behind it, all within a single investigation workflow. This can also include alerts from other areas of hybrid infrastructure or third-party sources where relevant, adding more context to investigations and speeding up workflows for human analysts.

Built to deploy easily

Operational complexity can be a barrier to security adoption. Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK for Kubernetes installs with a single command, and for teams that manage their infrastructure as code, it supports raw manifests so the deployment can live in a Git repository and be managed through existing GitOps workflows. The same deployment approach works across Kubernetes environments in AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and on-premises infrastructure. Early adopters of Darktrace’s Kubernetes capabilities have highlighted the simplicity of deployment and time to value.

Darktrace can deploy across your Kubernetes environment and wider hybrid infrastructure, while also providing visibility into Kubernetes deployment structure and status

Next steps

Kubernetes environments are dynamic, ephemeral and API-driven in ways that challenge traditional security tooling. With Kubernetes usage increasing due to widespread AI adoption, it is essential to secure Kubernetes environments as part of securing what AI can do. Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK addresses these challenges by learning normal behavior in Kubernetes environments across network, process and control-plane layers, identifying meaningful threats and enabling targeted response. Combined with the context of wider hybrid infrastructure and forensic investigation capabilities, Darktrace provides visibility into both emerging threats and active incidents.

To see how Darktrace can help secure your Kubernetes environment and your wider hybrid infrastructure, get in touch to arrange your free trial. Existing customers can contact their Darktrace Account Team for more information about deployment options and licensing.

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Sources

[1] Gartner, Container Management research, 2025: "By 2028, 95% of new AI deployments will use Kubernetes, up from less than 30% today."  https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/7913109. (quote reproduced under Gartner reprint at https://www.kubermatic.com/magic-quadrant-and-critical-capabilities-for-container-management/)

[2] Palo Alto Networks (Unit 42) – Container Breakouts: Escape Techniques in Cloud Environments. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/container-escape-techniques/

[3] runC container-escape vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-31133, CVE-2025-52565, CVE-2025-52881), disclosed by a SUSE researcher on November 5, 2025. https://www.securityweek.com/runc-vulnerabilities-can-be-exploited-to-escape-containers/

[4] NVIDIAScape (CVE-2025-23266), CVSS 9.0. https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5659

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About the author
Elise Longhurst
Senior Product Executive
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