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The Risks of Remote Access Tools

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03
Aug 2022
03
Aug 2022
Discover how remote access tools in exploitations across OT/ICS and corporate environments benefit from Darktrace's product suite.

In 2022, remote access tools continue to provide versatile support to organizations. By controlling devices remotely from across the globe, IT teams save on response costs, travel times, and can receive remote support from external parties like contractors [1 & 2]. This is particularly relevant in cases involving specialty machines such as OT/ICS systems where physical access is sometimes limited. These tools, however, come with their own risks. The following blog will discuss these risks and how they can be addressed (particularly in OT environments) by looking at two exploit examples from the popular sphere and within the Darktrace customer base. 

One of the most popular remote tools is TeamViewer, a comprehensive videoconferencing and remote management tool which can be used on both desktop and handheld devices[3]. Like other sophisticated tools, when it works as intended, it can seem like magic. However, remote access tools can be exploited and may grant privileged network access to potential threat actors. Although TeamViewer needs to be installed on both perpetrator and victim devices, if an attacker has access to a misconfigured TeamViewer device, it becomes trivial to establish a foothold and deploy malware. 

In early 2021, remote access tooling was seen on a new scale against the City of Oldsmar’s water treatment plant [4] (Figure 1). Oldsmar manages chemical concentration levels in the water for a 15,000-person city. The water treatment plant had been using TeamViewer to allow employees to share screens and work through IT issues. However, in February an employee noticed he had lost control of his mouse cursor.  Initially he was unconcerned; the employee assumed that the cursor was being controlled by his boss, who regularly connected to the computer to monitor the facility’s systems. A few hours later though, the employee again saw his cursor moving out of his control and this time noticed that it was attempting to change levels of sodium hydroxide in the water supply (which is extremely dangerous for human consumption). Thankfully, the employee was able to quickly spot the changes and return them to their normal level. When looking back at the event, the key question posed by officials was where exactly the vulnerability was located in their security stack. [5]. The answer was unclear.

Figure 1: Photograph of compromised water plant in Florida 

When attackers get initial network access, the primary challenge for any enterprise is identifying a) that a device compromise has happened and b) how it happened. These were the same challenges seen in the Oldsmar attack. When the first physical signs of compromise occurred (cursor movement), the impacted user was still unsure whether the activity was malicious. A detailed investigation from Dragos revealed the how: evidence of a watering hole, reconnaissance activity a month prior, a targeted variant of the Tofsee botnet, and the potential presence of two separate threat actors [6 & 7]. The answer to both questions pointed to a complex attack. However, with Darktrace these questions become less important. 

Darktrace DETECT does not rely on signatures but instead has AI-based models for live detection of these tools and anomalies within the wider network. Regardless of the security ‘hole’, live detection gives security teams the potential to respond in near-live time.

According to Darktrace’s Chief Product Officer, Max Heinemeyer, the Oldsmar attack was possible because it “Abused off-the-shelf tools that were already used by the client, specifically TeamViewer. This tactic, which targeted the domain controller as the initial vector, made the malware deployment easy and effective.” [8]. 

Darktrace has multiple DETECT models to provide visibility over anomalous TeamViewer or remote access tool usage:

·      Compliance / Incoming Remote Access Tool

·      Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Client

·      Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

·      Device / Activity Identifier / Teamviewer 

General incoming privileged connections:

·      Compliance / Incoming Remote Desktop

·      Compliance / Incoming SSH

Industrial DETECT can also highlight any new or unusual changes in ICS/OT systems:

·      ICS / Incoming ICS Command

·      ICS / Incoming RDP And ICS Commands

·      ICS / Uncommon ICS Error

Darktrace gives security teams the opportunity for a proactive response, and it is up to those teams to utilize that opportunity. In recent months our SOC Team have also seen remote access controls being abused for high-profile threats. In one example, Darktrace detected a ransomware attack supported by the installation of AnyDesk. 

In May a company’s mail server was detected making multiple external requests for an unusual file ‘106.exe’ using a PowerShell agent (6b79549200af33bf0322164f8a4d56a0fa08a5a62ab6a5c93a6eeef2065430ce). Although some requests were directed to sinkholes, many were otherwise successful. Subsequently a DDL file with hash f126ce9014ee87de92e734c509e1b5ab71ffb2d5a8b27171da111f96f3ba0e75 (marked by VirusTotal as malicious) was downloaded. This was followed by the installation of AnyDesk: a remote access tool likely deployed for backdoor purposes during further compromises. It is clear the threat actor then moved on to reconnaissance, with new Mimikatz use and a large volume of ICMP and SMBv.1 scanning sessions using a default credential. DCE-RPC calls were also made to the Netlogon service, suggesting a possible attempt to exploit 2020’s Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) [9]. When the customer then discovered a ransom note pertaining to LV (repurposed REvil), Darktrace analysts helped them to re-configure Darktrace RESPOND and turn it to active rather than human confirmation mode (Figure 2). 

Figure 2: Capture of LV ransom note provided by customer


Whilst in this instance the tool was not used for initial access, it was still an important contingency tool to ensure the threat actor’s persistency as the customer tried to respond to the ongoing breach. Yet it was the visibility provided by Darktrace model detection and changes to RESPOND configuration which ensured the customer kept up with this actor and reduced the impact of the attack. 

Looking back at Oldsmar, it is clear that being aware of remote access tools is only half the battle. More importantly, most organizations are asking if their use in attacks can be prevented in the first place. As an off-the-shelf tool, restricting TeamViewer use seems like an easy solution but such tools are often essential for maintenance and support operations. Even if limited to privileged users, these accounts are also subject to potential compromise. Instead, companies can take a large-scale view and consider the environment in which the Oldsmar attack occurred. 

In this context, the separation of OT and IT systems is a potential solution - if attackers cannot access at-risk systems, then they also cannot attack those systems. However, with recent discourse around the IT-OT convergence and increased use of IOT devices, this separation is increasingly challenging to implement [10]. Complex networking designs, stringent patching requirements and ever-changing business/operational needs are all big considerations when establishing industrial security. In fact, Tenable’s CEO Amit Yoran encouraged less separation following Oldsmar: “There’s business reasons and efficiency reasons that you might want to connect those to be able to predict when parts are going to fail or when outages are going to occur [sic].” [11]. 

When neither addressing remote access use or industrial set-up provides a quick solution, then security teams need to look to third-party support to stop similar attacks. In addition to Darktrace DETECT, our Darktrace PREVENT range with PREVENT/Attack Surface Management (ASM) can also alert security teams to internet-facing devices at risk of remote access exploitation. ASM actively queries the Shodan API for open ports on company websites and exposed servers. This highlights those assets which might be vulnerable to this type of remote access.   

In conclusion, TeamViewer and other remote access tools offer a lot of convenience for security teams but also for attackers. Attackers can remotely access important systems including those in the industrial network and install malware using remote access tools as leverage. Security teams need to know both their normal authorized activities and how to enforce them. With Darktrace DETECT, the tools are given transparency, with Darktrace RESPOND they can be blocked, and now Darktrace PREVENT/ASM helps to mitigate the risk of attack before it happens. As the professional world continues to embrace hybrid working, it becomes increasingly crucial to embrace these types of products and ensure protection against the dangers of unwanted remote access. 

Thanks to Connor Mooney for his contributions to this blog.

Appendices

References 

[1] https://goabacus.com/advantages-and-disadvantages-of-remote-access-service/ 

[2] https://blog.ericom.com/advantages-of-remote-access/ 

[3] https://www.teamviewer.com/en/documents/ 

[4] https://www.wired.com/story/oldsmar-florida-water-utility-hack/ 

[5 & 11] https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/ot-it-integration-raises-risk-for-water-providers-experts-say-a-18841 

[6] https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/ 

[7] https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/recommendations-following-the-oldsmar-water-treatment-facility-cyber-attack/

[8] https://customerportal.darktrace.com/darktrace-blogs/get-blog/53  

[9] https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cve-2020-1472-zerologon-security-advisory/

[10] https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/converge-it-and-ot-to-turbocharge-business-operations-scaling-power

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Dylan Hinz
Cyber Analyst
Gabriel Few-Wiegratz
Head of Threat Intelligence Hub
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Safeguarding Distribution Centers in the Digital Age

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12
Jun 2024

Challenges securing distribution centers

For large retail providers, e-commerce organizations, logistics & supply chain organizations, and other companies who rely on the distribution of goods to consumers cybersecurity efforts are often focused on an immense IT infrastructure. However, there's a critical, often overlooked segment of infrastructure that demands vigilant monitoring and robust protection: distribution centers.

Distribution centers play a critical role in the business operations of supply chains, logistics, and the retail industry. They serve as comprehensive logistics hubs, with many organizations operating multiple centers worldwide to meet consumer needs. Depending on their size and hours of operation, even just one hour of downtime at these centers can result in significant financial losses, ranging from tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars per hour.

Due to the time-sensitive nature and business criticality of distribution centers, there has been a rise in applying modern technologies now including AI applications to enhance efficiency within these facilities. Today’s distribution centers are increasingly connected to Enterprise IT networks, the cloud and the internet to manage every stage of the supply chain. Additionally, it is common for organizations to allow 3rd party access to the distribution center networks and data for reasons including allowing them to scale their operations effectively.

However, this influx of new technologies and interconnected systems across IT, OT and cloud introduces new risks on the cybersecurity front. Distribution center networks include industrial operational technologies ICS/OT, IoT technologies, enterprise network technology, and cloud systems working in coordination. The convergence of these technologies creates a greater chance that blind spots exist for security practitioners and this increasing presence of networked technology increases the attack surface and potential for vulnerability. Thus, having cybersecurity measures that cover IT, OT or Cloud alone is not enough to secure a complex and dynamic distribution center network infrastructure.  

The OT network encompasses various systems, devices, hardware, and software, such as:

  • Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
  • Warehouse Execution System (WES)
  • Warehouse Control System (WCS)
  • Warehouse Management System (WMS)
  • Energy Management Systems (EMS)
  • Building Management Systems (BMS)
  • Distribution Control Systems (DCS)
  • Enterprise IT devices
  • OT and IoT: Engineering workstations, ICS application and management servers, PLCs, HMI, access control, cameras, and printers
  • Cloud applications

Distribution centers: An expanding attack surface

As these distribution centers have become increasingly automated, connected, and technologically advanced, their attack surfaces have inherently increased. Distribution centers now have a vastly different potential for cyber risk which includes:  

  • More networked devices present
  • Increased routable connectivity within industrial systems
  • Externally exposed industrial control systems
  • Increased remote access
  • IT/OT enterprise to industrial convergence
  • Cloud connectivity
  • Contractors, vendors, and consultants on site or remoting in  

Given the variety of connected systems, distribution centers are more exposed to external threats than ever before. Simultaneously, distribution center’s business criticality has positioned them as interesting targets to cyber adversaries seeking to cause disruption with significant financial impact.

Increased connectivity requires a unified security approach

When assessing the unique distribution center attack surface, the variety of interconnected systems and devices requires a cybersecurity approach that can cover the diverse technology environment.  

From a monitoring and visibility perspective, siloed IT, OT or cloud security solutions cannot provide the comprehensive asset management, threat detection, risk management, and response and remediation capabilities across interconnected digital infrastructure that a solution natively covering IT, cloud, OT, and IoT can provide.  

The problem with using siloed cybersecurity solutions to cover a distribution center is the visibility gaps that are inherently created when using multiple solutions to try and cover the totality of the diverse infrastructure. What this means is that for cross domain and multi-stage attacks, depending on the initial access point and where the adversary plans on actioning their objectives, multiple stages of the attack may not be detected or correlated if they security solutions lack visibility into OT, IT, IoT and cloud.

Comprehensive security under one solution

Darktrace leverages Self-Learning AI, which takes a new approach to cybersecurity. Instead of relying on rules and signatures, this AI trains on the specific business to learn a ‘pattern of life’ that models normal activity for every device, user, and connection. It can be applied anywhere an organization has data, and so can natively cover IT, OT, IoT, and cloud.  

With these models, Darktrace /OT provides improved visibility, threat detection and response, and risk management for proactive hardening recommendations.  

Visibility: Darktrace is the only OT security solution that natively covers IT, IoT and OT in unison. AI augmented workflows ensure OT cybersecurity analysts and operation engineers can manage IT and OT environments, leveraging a live asset inventory and tailored dashboards to optimize security workflows and minimize operator workload.

Threat detection, investigation, and response: The AI facilitates anomaly detection capable of detecting known, unknown, and insider threats and precise response for OT environments that contains threats at their earliest stages before they can jeopardize control systems. Darktrace immediately understands, identifies, and investigates all anomalous activity in OT networks, whether human or machine driven and uses Explainable AI to generate investigation reports via Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst.

Proactive risk identification: Risk management capabilities like attack path modeling can prioritize remediation and mitigation that will most effectively reduce derived risk scores. Rather than relying on knowledge of past attacks and CVE lists and scores, Darktrace AI learns what is ‘normal’ for its environment, discovering previously unknown threats and risks by detecting subtle shifts in behavior and connectivity. Through the application of Darktrace AI for OT environments, security teams can investigate novel attacks, discover blind spots, get live-time visibility across all their physical and digital assets, and reduce the time to detect, respond to, and triage security events.

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Daniel Simonds
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Inside the SOC

Medusa Ransomware: Looking Cyber Threats in the Eye with Darktrace

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10
Jun 2024

What is Living off the Land attack?

In the face of increasingly vigilant security teams and adept defense tools, attackers are continually looking for new ways to circumvent network security and gain access to their target environments. One common tactic is the leveraging of readily available utilities and services within a target organization’s environment in order to move through the kill chain; a popular method known as living off the land (LotL). Rather than having to leverage known malicious tools or write their own malware, attackers are able to easily exploit the existing infrastructure of their targets.

The Medusa ransomware group in particular are known to extensively employ LotL tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in their attacks, as one Darktrace customer in the US discovered in early 2024.

What is Medusa Ransomware?

Medusa ransomware (not to be confused with MedusaLocker) was first observed in the wild towards the end of 2022 and has been a popular ransomware strain amongst threat actors since 2023 [1]. Medusa functions as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform, providing would-be attackers, also know as affiliates, with malicious software and infrastructure required to carry out disruptive ransomware attacks. The ransomware is known to target organizations across many different industries and countries around the world, including healthcare, education, manufacturing and retail, with a particular focus on the US [2].

How does medusa ransomware work?

Medusa affiliates are known to employ a number of TTPs to propagate their malware, most prodominantly gaining initial access by exploiting vulnerable internet-facing assets and targeting valid local and domain accounts that are used for system administration.

The ransomware is typically delivered via phishing and spear phishing campaigns containing malicious attachments [3] [4], but it has also been observed using initial access brokers to access target networks [5]. In terms of the LotL strategies employed in Medusa compromises, affiliates are often observed leveraging legitimate services like the ConnectWise remote monitoring and management (RMM) software and PDQ Deploy, in order to evade the detection of security teams who may be unable to distinguish the activity from normal or expected network traffic [2].

According to researchers, Medusa has a public Telegram channel that is used by threat actors to post any data that may have been stolen, likely in an attempt to extort organizations and demand payment [2].  

Darktrace’s Coverage of Medusa Ransomware

Established Foothold and C2 activity

In March 2024, Darktrace /NETWORK identified over 80 devices, including an internet facing domain controller, on a customer network performing an unusual number of activities that were indicative of an emerging ransomware attack. The suspicious behavior started when devices were observed making HTTP connections to the two unusual endpoints, “wizarr.manate[.]ch” and “go-sw6-02.adventos[.]de”, with the PowerShell and JWrapperDownloader user agents.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ launched an autonomous investigation into the connections and was able to connect the seemingly separate events into one wider incident spanning multiple different devices. This allowed the customer to visualize the activity in chronological order and gain a better understanding of the scope of the attack.

At this point, given the nature and rarity of the observed activity, Darktrace /NETWORK's autonomous response would have been expected to take autonomous action against affected devices, blocking them from making external connections to suspicious locations. However, autonomous response was not configured to take autonomous action at the time of the attack, meaning any mitigative actions had to be manually approved by the customer’s security team.

Internal Reconnaissance

Following these extensive HTTP connections, between March 1 and 7, Darktrace detected two devices making internal connection attempts to other devices, suggesting network scanning activity. Furthermore, Darktrace identified one of the devices making a connection with the URI “/nice ports, /Trinity.txt.bak”, indicating the use of the Nmap vulnerability scanning tool. While Nmap is primarily used legitimately by security teams to perform security audits and discover vulnerabilities that require addressing, it can also be leveraged by attackers who seek to exploit this information.

Darktrace / NETWORK model alert showing the URI “/nice ports, /Trinity.txt.bak”, indicating the use of Nmap.
Figure 1: Darktrace /NETWORK model alert showing the URI “/nice ports, /Trinity.txt.bak”, indicating the use of Nmap.

Darktrace observed actors using multiple credentials, including “svc-ndscans”, which was also seen alongside DCE-RPC activity that took place on March 1. Affected devices were also observed making ExecQuery and ExecMethod requests for IWbemServices. ExecQuery is commonly utilized to execute WMI Query Language (WQL) queries that allow the retrieval of information from WI, including system information or hardware details, while ExecMethod can be used by attackers to gather detailed information about a targeted system and its running processes, as well as a tool for lateral movement.

Lateral Movement

A few hours after the first observed scanning activity on March 1, Darktrace identified a chain of administrative connections between multiple devices, including the aforementioned internet-facing server.

Cyber AI Analyst was able to connect these administrative connections and separate them into three distinct ‘hops’, i.e. the number of administrative connections made from device A to device B, including any devices leveraged in between. The AI Analyst investigation was also able to link the previously detailed scanning activity to these administrative connections, identifying that the same device was involved in both cases.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the chain of lateral movement activity.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the chain of lateral movement activity.

On March 7, the internet exposed server was observed transferring suspicious files over SMB to multiple internal devices. This activity was identified as unusual by Darktrace compared to the device's normal SMB activity, with an unusual number of executable (.exe) and srvsvc files transferred targeting the ADMIN$ and IPC$ shares.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious SMB write activity.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious SMB write activity.
Graph highlighting the number of successful SMB writes and the associated model alerts.
Figure 4: Graph highlighting the number of successful SMB writes and the associated model alerts.

The threat actor was also seen writing SQLite3*.dll files over SMB using a another credential this time. These files likely contained the malicious payload that resulted in the customer’s files being encrypted with the extension “.s3db”.

Darktrace’s visibility over an affected device performing successful SMB writes.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s visibility over an affected device performing successful SMB writes.

Encryption of Files

Finally, Darktrace observed the malicious actor beginning to encrypt and delete files on the customer’s environment. More specifically, the actor was observed using credentials previously seen on the network to encrypt files with the aforementioned “.s3db” extension.

Darktrace’s visibility over the encrypted files.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s visibility over the encrypted files.


After that, Darktrace observed the attacker encrypting  files and appending them with the extension “.MEDUSA” while also dropping a ransom note with the file name “!!!Read_me_Medusa!!!.txt”

Darktrace’s detection of threat actors deleting files with the extension “.MEDUSA”.
Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of threat actors deleting files with the extension “.MEDUSA”.
Darktrace’s detection of the Medusa ransom note.
Figure 8: Darktrace’s detection of the Medusa ransom note.

At the same time as these events, Darktrace observed the attacker utilizing a number of LotL techniques including SSL connections to “services.pdq[.]tools”, “teamviewer[.]com” and “anydesk[.]com”. While the use of these legitimate services may have bypassed traditional security tools, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enabled it to detect the activity and distinguish it from ‘normal’’ network activity. It is highly likely that these SSL connections represented the attacker attempting to exfiltrate sensitive data from the customer’s network, with a view to using it to extort the customer.

Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of “services.pdq[.]tools” usage.
Figure 9: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of “services.pdq[.]tools” usage.

If this customer had been subscribed to Darktrace's Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service at the time of the attack, they would have been promptly notified of these suspicious activities by the Darktrace Security Operation Center (SOC). In this way they could have been aware of the suspicious activities taking place in their infrastructure before the escalation of the compromise. Despite this, they were able to receive assistance through the Ask the Expert service (ATE) whereby Darktrace’s expert analyst team was on hand to assist the customer by triaging and investigating the incident further, ensuring the customer was well equipped to remediate.  

As Darktrace /NETWORK's autonomous response was not enabled in autonomous response mode, this ransomware attack was able to progress to the point of encryption and data exfiltration. Had autonomous response been properly configured to take autonomous action, Darktrace would have blocked all connections by affected devices to both internal and external endpoints, as well as enforcing a previously established “pattern of life” on the device to stop it from deviating from its expected behavior.

Conclusion

The threat actors in this Medusa ransomware attack attempted to utilize LotL techniques in order to bypass human security teams and traditional security tools. By exploiting trusted systems and tools, like Nmap and PDQ Deploy, attackers are able to carry out malicious activity under the guise of legitimate network traffic.

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, however, allows it to recognize the subtle deviations in a device’s behavior that tend to be indicative of compromise, regardless of whether it appears legitimate or benign on the surface.

Further to the detection of the individual events that made up this ransomware attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate the activity and collate it under one wider incident. This allowed the customer to track the compromise and its attack phases from start to finish, ensuring they could obtain a holistic view of their digital environment and remediate effectively.

Credit to Maria Geronikolou, Cyber Analyst, Ryan Traill, Threat Content Lead

Appendices

Darktrace DETECT Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Share

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Device / Network Scan

Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Possible HTTP Command and Control

Extensive Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints

Suspicious Remote WMI Activity

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Possible Ransom Note Accessed over SMB

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC – Type – Description + Confidence

207.188.6[.]17      -     IP address   -      C2 Endpoint

172.64.154[.]227 - IP address -        C2 Endpoint

wizarr.manate[.]ch  - Hostname -       C2 Endpoint

go-sw6-02.adventos[.]de.  Hostname  - C2 Endpoint

.MEDUSA             -        File extension     - Extension to encrypted files

.s3db               -             File extension    -  Created file extension

SQLite3-64.dll    -        File           -               Used tool

!!!Read_me_Medusa!!!.txt - File -   Ransom note

Svc-ndscans         -         Credential     -     Possible compromised credential

Svc-NinjaRMM      -       Credential      -     Possible compromised credential

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Discovery  - File and Directory Discovery - T1083

Reconnaissance    -  Scanning IP            -          T1595.001

Reconnaissance -  Vulnerability Scanning -  T1595.002

Lateral Movement -Exploitation of Remote Service -  T1210

Lateral Movement - Exploitation of Remote Service -   T1210

Lateral Movement  -  SMB/Windows Admin Shares     -    T1021.002

Lateral Movement   -  Taint Shared Content          -            T1080

Execution   - PowerShell     - T1059.001

Execution  -   Service Execution   -    T1059.002

Impact   -    Data Encrypted for Impact  -  T1486

References

[1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/medusa-ransomware-escalation-new-leak-site/

[2] https://thehackernews.com/2024/01/medusa-ransomware-on-rise-from-data.html

[3] https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/trustwave-blog/unveiling-the-latest-ransomware-threats-targeting-the-casino-and-entertainment-industry/

[4] https://www.sangfor.com/farsight-labs-threat-intelligence/cybersecurity/security-advisory-for-medusa-ransomware

[5] https://thehackernews.com/2024/01/medusa-ransomware-on-rise-from-data.html

[6]https://any.run/report/8be3304fec9d41d44012213ddbb28980d2570edeef3523b909af2f97768a8d85/e4c54c9d-12fd-477f-8cbb-a20f8fb98912

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About the author
Maria Geronikolou
Cyber Analyst
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