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January 2, 2023

Analyst's Guide To Cyber AI Loop

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02
Jan 2023
Understand the Cyber AI Loop's functionality in preventing and detecting cyber threats, and how analysts can benefit from Darktrace's AI technology.

On countless occasions, Darktrace has observed cyber-attacks disrupting business operations by using a vulnerable internet-facing asset as a starting point for infection. Finding that one entry point could be all a threat actor needs to compromise an entire organization. With the objective to prevent such vulnerabilities from being exploited, Darktrace’s latest product family includes Attack Surface Management (ASM) to continuously monitor customer attack surfaces for risks, high-impact vulnerabilities and potential external threats. 

An attack surface is the sum of exposed and internet-facing assets and the associated risks a hacker can exploit to carry out a cyber-attack. PREVENT/ASM uses AI to understand what external assets belong to an organization by searching beyond known servers, networks, and IPs across public data sources. 

This blog discusses how Darktrace PREVENT/ASM could combine with DETECT to find potential vulnerabilities and subsequent exploitation within network traffic. In particular, this blog will investigate the assets of a large Australian company which operates in the environmental sciences industry.   

Introducing ASM

In order to understand the link between PREVENT and DETECT, the core features of ASM should first be showcased.

Figure 1: The PREVENT/ASM dashboard.

When facing the landing page, the UI highlights the number of registered assets identified (with zero prior deployment). The tool then organizes the information gathered online in an easily assessable manner. Analysts can see vulnerable assets according to groupings like ‘Misconfiguration’, ‘Social Media Threat’ and ‘Information Leak’ which shows the type of risk posed to said assets.

Figure 2: The Network tab identifies the external facing assets and their hierarchy in a graphical format.

The Network tab helps analysts to filter further to take more rapid action on the most vulnerable assets and interact with them to gather more information. The image below has been filtered by assets with the ‘highest scoring’ risk.

Figure 3: PREVENT/ASM showing a high scoring asset.

Interacting with the showcased asset selected above allows pivoting to the following page, this provides more granular information around risk metrics and the asset itself. This includes a more detailed description of what the vulnerabilities are, as well as general information about the endpoint including its location, URL, web status and technologies used.

  Figure 4: Asset pages for an external web page at risk.

Filtering does not end here. Within the Insights tab, analysts can use the search bar to craft personalized queries and narrow their focus to specific types of risk such as vulnerable software, open ports, or potential cybersquatting attempts from malicious actors impersonating company brands. Likewise, filters can be made for assets that may be running software at risk from a new CVE. 

Figure 5: Insights page with custom queries to search for assets at risk of Log4J exploitation.

For each of the entries that can be read on the left-hand side, a query that could resemble the one on the top right exists. This allows users to locate specific findings beyond those risks that are categorized as critical. These broader searches can range from viewing the inventory as a whole, to seeing exposed APIs, expiring certificates, or potential shadow IT. Queries will return a list with all the assets matching the given criteria, and users can then explore them further by viewing the asset page as seen in Figure 4.

Compromise Scenario

Now that a basic explanation of PREVENT/ASM has been given, this scenario will continue to look at the Australian customer but show how Darktrace can follow a potential compromise of an at-risk ASM asset into the network. 

Having certain ports open could make it particularly easy for an attacker to access an internet-facing asset, particularly those sensitive ones such as 3389 (RDP), 445 (SMB), 135 (RPC Epmapper). Alternatively, a vulnerable program with a well-known exploitation could also aid the task for threat actors.

In this specific case, PREVENT/ASM identified multiple external assets that belonged to the customer with port 3389 open. One of these assets can be labelled as ‘Server A'. Whilst RDP connections can be protected with a password for a given user, if those were weak to bruteforce, it could be an easy task for an attacker to establish an admin session remotely to the victim machine.

Figure 6: Insights tab query filtering for open RDP port 3389.

N or zero-day vulnerabilities associated with the protocol could also be exploited; for example, CVE-2019-0708 exploits an RCE vulnerability in Remote Desktop where an unauthenticated attacker connects to the target system using RDP and sends specially crafted requests. This vulnerability is pre-authentication and requires no user interaction. 

Certain protocols are known to be sensitive according to the control they provide on a destination machine. These are developed for administrative purposes but have the potential to ease an attacker’s job if accessible. Thanks to PREVENT/ASM, security teams can anticipate such activity by having visibility over those assets that could be vulnerable. If this RDP were successfully exploited, DETECT/Network would then highlight the unusual activity performed by the compromised device as the attacker moved through the kill chain.  

There are several models within Darktrace which monitor for risks against internet facing assets. For example, ‘Server A’ which had an open 3389 port on ASM registered the following model breach in the network:

Figure 7: Breach log showing Anomalous Server Activity / New Internet Facing System model for ‘Server A’.

A model like this could highlight a misconfiguration that has caused an internal device to become unexpectedly open to the internet. It could also suggest a compromised device that has now been opened to the internet to allow further exploitation. If the result of a sudden change, such an asset would also be detected by ASM and highlighted within the ‘New Assets’ part of the Insights page. Ultimately this connection was not malicious, however it shows the ability for security teams to track between PREVENT to DETECT and verify an initial compromise.  

A mock scenario can take this further. Using the continued example of an open port 3389 intrusion, new RDP cookies may be registered (perhaps even administrative). This could enable further lateral movement and eventual privilege escalation. Various DETECT models would highlight actions of this nature, two examples are below:

Figure 8: RDP Lateral Movement related model breaches on customer.

Alongside efforts to move laterally, Darktrace may find attempts at reconnaissance or C2 communication from compromised internet facing devices by looking at Darktrace DETECT model breaches including ‘Network Scan’, ‘SMB Scanning’ and ‘Active Directory Reconnaissance’. In this case the network also saw repeated failed internal connections followed by the ‘LDAP Brute-Force Activity model’ around the same time as the RDP activity. Had this been malicious, DETECT would then continue to provide visibility into the C2 and eventual malware deployment stages. 

With the combined visibility of both tools, Darktrace users have support for greater triage across the whole kill chain. For customers also using RESPOND, actions will be taken from the DETECT alerting to subsequently block malicious activity. In doing so, inputs will have fed across the whole Cyber AI Loop by having learnt from PREVENT, DETECT and RESPOND.

This feed from the Cyber AI Loop works both ways. In Figure 9, below, a DETECT model breach shows a customer alert from an internet facing device: 

Figure 9: Model breach on internet-facing server.

This breach took place because an established server suddenly started serving HTTP sessions on a port commonly used for HTTPS (secure) connections. This could be an indicator that a criminal may have gained control of the device and set it to listen on the given port and enable direct connection to the attacker’s machine or command and control server. This device can be viewed by an analyst in its Darktrace PREVENT version, where new metrics can be observed from a perspective outside of the network.

Figure 10: Assets page for server. PREVENT shows few risks for this asset. 

This page reports the associated risks that could be leveraged by malicious actors. In this case, the events are not correlated, but in the event of an attack, this backwards pivoting could help to pinpoint a weak link in the chain and show what allowed the attacker into the network. In doing so this supports the remediation and recovery process. More importantly though, it allows organizations to be proactive and take appropriate security measures required before it could ever be exploited.

Concluding Thoughts

The combination of Darktrace / Attack Surface Management with Darktrace / NETWORK provides wide and in-depth visibility over a company’s infrastructure. Through the Darktrace platform, this coverage is continually learning and updating based on inputs from both. ASM can show companies the potential weaknesses that a cybercriminal could take advantage of. In turn this allows them to prioritize patching, updating, and management of their internet facing assets. At the same time, Darktrace will show the anomalous behavior of any of these internet facing devices, enabling security teams or respond to stop an attack. Use of these tools by an analyst together is effective in gaining informed security data which can be fed back to IT management. Leveraging this allows normal company operations to be performed without the worry of cyber disruption.

Credit to: Emma Foulger, Senior Cyber Analyst at Darktrace

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Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Gabriel Hernandez
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February 11, 2025

NIS2 Compliance: Interpreting 'State-of-the-Art' for Organisations

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NIS2 Background

17 October 2024 marked the deadline for European Union (EU) Member States to implement the NIS2 Directive into national law. The Directive aims to enhance the EU’s cybersecurity posture by establishing a high common level of cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and services. It builds on its predecessor, the 2018 NIS Directive, by expanding the number of sectors in scope, enforcing greater reporting requirements and encouraging Member States to ensure regulated organisations adopt ‘state-of-the-art' security measures to protect their networks, OT and IT systems.  

Timeline of NIS2
Figure 1: Timeline of NIS2

The challenge of NIS2 & 'state-of-the-art'

Preamble (51) - "Member States should encourage the use of any innovative technology, including artificial intelligence, the use of which could improve the detection and prevention of cyberattacks, enabling resources to be diverted towards cyberattacks more effectively."
Article 21 - calls on Member States to ensure that essential and important entities “take appropriate and proportionate” cyber security measures, and that they do so by “taking into account the state-of-the-art and, where applicable, relevant European and international standards, as well as the cost of implementation.”

Regulartory expectations and ambiguity of NIS2

While organisations in scope can rely on technical guidance provided by ENISA1 , the EU’s agency for cybersecurity, or individual guidelines provided by Member States or Public-Private Partnerships where they have been published,2 the mention of ‘state-of-the-art' remains up to interpretation in most Member States. The use of the phrase implies that cybersecurity measures must evolve continuously to keep pace with emerging threats and technological advancements without specifying what ‘state-of-the-art’ actually means for a given context and risk.3  

This ambiguity makes it difficult for organisations to determine what constitutes compliance at any given time and could lead to potential inconsistencies in implementation and enforcement. Moreover, the rapid pace of technological change means that what is considered "state-of-the-art" today will become outdated, further complicating compliance efforts.

However, this is not unique to NIS regulation. As EU scholars have noted, while “state-of-the-art" is widely referred to in legal text relating to technology, there is no standardised legal definition of what it actually constitutes.4

Defining state-of-the-art cybersecurity

In this blog, we outline technical considerations for state-of-the-art cybersecurity. We draw from expertise within our own business and in academia as well as guidelines and security standards set by national agencies, such as Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or Spain’s National Security Framework (ENS), to put forward five criteria to define state-of-the-art cybersecurity.

The five core criteria include:

  • Continuous monitoring
  • Incident correlation
  • Detection of anomalous activity
  • Autonomous response
  • Proactive cyber resilience

These principles build on long-standing security considerations, such as business continuity, vulnerability management and basic security hygiene practices.  

Although these considerations are written in the context of the NIS2 Directive, they are likely to also be relevant for other jurisdictions. We hope these criteria help organisations understand how to best meet their responsibilities under the NIS2 Directive and assist Competent Authorities in defining compliance expectations for the organisations they regulate.  

Ultimately, adopting state-of-the-art cyber defences is crucial for ensuring that organisations are equipped with the best tools to combat new and fast-growing threats. Leading technical authorities, such as the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), recognise that adoption of AI-powered cyber defences will offset the increased volume and impact of AI on cyber threats.5

State of the art cybersecurity in the context of NIS2

1. Continuous monitoring

Continuous monitoring is required to protect an increasingly complex attack surface from attackers.

First, organisations' attack surfaces have expanded following the widespread adoption of hybrid or cloud infrastructures and the increased adoption of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices.6 This exponential growth creates a complex digital environment for organisations, making it difficult for security teams to track all internet-facing assets and identify potential vulnerabilities.

Second, with the significant increase in the speed and sophistication of cyber-attacks, organisations face a greater need to detect security threats and non-compliance issues in real-time.  

Continuous monitoring, defined by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as the ability to maintain “ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk management decisions,”7 has therefore become a cornerstone of an effective cybersecurity strategy. By implementing continuous monitoring, organisations can ensure a real-time understanding of their attack surface and that new external assets are promptly accounted for. For instance, Spain’s technical guidelines for regulation, as set forth by the National Security Framework (Royal Decree 311/2022), highlight the importance of adopting continuous monitoring to detect anomalous activities or behaviours and to ensure timely responses to potential threats (article 10).8  

This can be achieved through the following means:  

All assets that form part of an organisation's estate, both known and unknown, must be identified and continuously monitored for current and emerging risks. Germany’s BSI mandates the continuous monitoring of all protocol and logging data in real-time (requirement #110).9 This should be conducted alongside any regular scans to detect unknown devices or cases of shadow IT, or the use of unauthorised or unmanaged applications and devices within an organisation, which can expose internet-facing assets to unmonitored risks. Continuous monitoring can therefore help identify potential risks and high-impact vulnerabilities within an organisation's digital estate and eliminate potential gaps and blind spots.

Organisations looking to implement more efficient continuous monitoring strategies may turn to automation, but, as the BSI notes, it is important for responsible parties to be immediately warned if an alert is raised (reference 110).10 Following the BSI’s recommendations, the alert must be examined and, if necessary, contained within a short period of time corresponding with the analysis of the risk at hand.

Finally, risk scoring and vulnerability mapping are also essential parts of this process. Looking across the Atlantic, the US’ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines continuous monitoring as “maintaining ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk management decisions”.11 Continuous monitoring helps identify potential risks and significant vulnerabilities within an organisation's digital assets, fostering a dynamic understanding of risk. By doing so, risk scoring and vulnerability mapping allows organisations to prioritise the risks associated with their most critically exposed assets.

2. Correlation of incidents across your entire environment

Viewing and correlating incident alerts when working with different platforms and tools poses significant challenges to SecOps teams. Security professionals often struggle to cross-reference alerts efficiently, which can lead to potential delays in identifying and responding to threats. The complexity of managing multiple sources of information can overwhelm teams, making it difficult to maintain a cohesive understanding of the security landscape.

This fragmentation underscores the need for a centralised approach that provides a "single pane of glass" view of all cybersecurity alerts. These systems streamline the process of monitoring and responding to incidents, enabling security teams to act more swiftly and effectively. By consolidating alerts into a unified interface, organisations can enhance their ability to detect and mitigate threats, ultimately improving their overall security posture.  

To achieve consolidation, organisations should consider the role automation can play when reviewing and correlating incidents. This is reflected in Spain’s technical guidelines for national security regulations regarding the requirements for the “recording of activity” (reinforcement R5).12 Specifically, the guidelines state that:  

"The system shall implement tools to analyses and review system activity and audit information, in search of possible or actual security compromises. An automatic system for collection of records, correlation of events and automatic response to them shall be available”.13  

Similarly, the German guidelines stress that automated central analysis is essential not only for recording all protocol and logging data generated within the system environment but also to ensure that the data is correlated to ensure that security-relevant processes are visible (article 115).14

Correlating disparate incidents and alerts is especially important when considering the increased connectivity between IT and OT environments driven by business and functional requirements. Indeed, organisations that believe they have air-gapped systems are now becoming aware of points of IT/OT convergence within their systems. It is therefore crucial for organisations managing both IT and OT environments to be able to visualise and secure devices across all IT and OT protocols in real-time to identify potential spillovers.  

By consolidating data into a centralised system, organisations can achieve a more resilient posture. This approach exposes and eliminates gaps between people, processes, and technology before they can be exploited by malicious actors. As seen in the German and Spanish guidelines, a unified view of security alerts not only enhances the efficacy of threat detection and response but also ensures comprehensive visibility and control over the organisation's cybersecurity posture.

3. Detection of anomalous activity  

Recent research highlights the emergence of a "new normal" in cybersecurity, marked by an increase in zero-day vulnerabilities. Indeed, for the first time since sharing their annual list, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance reported that in 2023, the majority of the most routinely exploited vulnerabilities were initially exploited as zero-days.15  

To effectively combat these advanced threats, policymakers, industry and academic stakeholders alike recognise the importance of anomaly-based techniques to detect both known and unknown attacks.

As AI-enabled threats become more prevalent,16 traditional cybersecurity methods that depend on lists of "known bads" are proving inadequate against rapidly evolving and sophisticated attacks. These legacy approaches are limited because they can only identify threats that have been previously encountered and cataloged. However, cybercriminals are constantly developing new, never-before-seen threats, such as signatureless ransomware or living off the land techniques, which can easily bypass these outdated defences.

The importance of anomaly detection in cybersecurity can be found in Spain’s technical guidelines, which states that “tools shall be available to automate the prevention and response process by detecting and identifying anomalies17” (reinforcement R4 prevention and automatic response to "incident management”).  

Similarly, the UK NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) highlights how anomaly-based detection systems are capable of detecting threats that “evade standard signature-based security solutions” (Principle C2 - Proactive Security Event Discovery18). The CAF’s C2 principle further outlines:  

“The science of anomaly detection, which goes beyond using pre-defined or prescriptive pattern matching, is a challenging area. Capabilities like machine learning are increasingly being shown to have applicability and potential in the field of intrusion detection.”19

By leveraging machine learning and multi-layered AI techniques, organisations can move away from static rules and signatures, adopting a more behavioural approach to identifying and containing risks. This shift not only enhances the detection of emerging threats but also provides a more robust defence mechanism.

A key component of this strategy is behavioral zero trust, which focuses on identifying unauthorized and out-of-character attempts by users, devices, or systems. Implementing a robust procedure to verify each user and issuing the minimum required access rights based on their role and established patterns of activity is essential. Organisations should therefore be encouraged to follow a robust procedure to verify each user and issue the minimum required access rights based on their role and expected or established patterns of activity. By doing so, organisations can stay ahead of emerging threats and embrace a more dynamic and resilient cybersecurity strategy.  

4. Autonomous response

The speed at which cyber-attacks occur means that defenders must be equipped with tools that match the sophistication and agility of those used by attackers. Autonomous response tools are thus essential for modern cyber defence, as they enable organisations to respond to both known and novel threats in real time.  

These tools leverage a deep contextual and behavioral understanding of the organisation to take precise actions, effectively containing threats without disrupting business operations.

To avoid unnecessary business disruptions and maintain robust security, especially in more sensitive networks such as OT environments, it is crucial for organisations to determine the appropriate response depending on their environment. This can range from taking autonomous and native actions, such as isolating or blocking devices, or integrating their autonomous response tool with firewalls or other security tools to taking customized actions.  

Autonomous response solutions should also use a contextual understanding of the business environment to make informed decisions, allowing them to contain threats swiftly and accurately. This means that even as cyber-attacks evolve and become more sophisticated, organisations can maintain continuous protection without compromising operational efficiency.  

Indeed, research into the adoption of autonomous cyber defences points to the importance of implementing “organisation-specific" and “context-informed” approaches.20  To decide the appropriate level of autonomy for each network action, it is argued, it is essential to use evidence-based risk prioritisation that is customised to the specific operations, assets, and data of individual enterprises.21

By adopting autonomous response solutions, organisations can ensure their defences are as dynamic and effective as the threats they face, significantly enhancing their overall security posture.

5. Proactive cyber resilience  

Adopting a proactive approach to cybersecurity is crucial for organisations aiming to safeguard their operations and reputation. By hardening their defences enough so attackers are unable to target them effectively, organisations can save significant time and money. This proactive stance helps reduce business disruption, reputational damage, and the need for lengthy, resource-intensive incident responses.

Proactive cybersecurity incorporates many of the strategies outlined above. This can be seen in a recent survey of information technology practitioners, which outlines four components of a proactive cybersecurity culture: (1) visibility of corporate assets, (2) leveraging intelligent and modern technology, (3) adopting consistent and comprehensive training methods and (4) implementing risk response procedures.22 To this, we may also add continuous monitoring which allows organisations to understand the most vulnerable and high-value paths across their architectures, allowing them to secure their critical assets more effectively.  

Alongside these components, a proactive cyber strategy should be based on a combined business context and knowledge, ensuring that security measures are aligned with the organisation's specific needs and priorities.  

This proactive approach to cyber resilience is reflected in Spain’s technical guidance (article 8.2): “Prevention measures, which may incorporate components geared towards deterrence or reduction of the exposure surface, should eliminate or reduce the likelihood of threats materializing.”23 It can also be found in the NCSC’s CAF, which outlines how organisations can achieve “proactive attack discovery” (see Principle C2).24 Likewise, Belgium’s NIS2 transposition guidelines mandate the use of preventive measures to ensure the continued availability of services in the event of exceptional network failures (article 30).25  

Ultimately, a proactive approach to cybersecurity not only enhances protection but also lowers regulatory risk and supports the overall resilience and stability of the organisation.

Looking forward

The NIS2 Directive marked a significant regulatory milestone in strengthening cybersecurity across the EU.26 Given the impact of emerging technologies, such as AI, on cybersecurity, it is to see that Member States are encouraged to promote the adoption of ‘state-of-the-art' cybersecurity across regulated entities.  

In this blog, we have sought to translate what state-of-the-art cybersecurity may look like for organisations looking to enhance their cybersecurity posture. To do so, we have built on existing cybersecurity guidance, research and our own experience as an AI-cybersecurity company to outline five criteria: continuous monitoring, incident correlation, detection of anomalous activity, autonomous response, and proactive cyber resilience.

By embracing these principles and evolving cybersecurity practices in line with the state-of-the-art, organisations can comply with the NIS2 Directive while building a resilient cybersecurity posture capable of withstanding evolutions in the cyber threat landscape. Looking forward, it will be interesting to see how other jurisdictions embrace new technologies, such as AI, in solving the cybersecurity problem.

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References

[1] https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/implementation-guidance-on-nis-2-security-measures

[2] https://www.teletrust.de/fileadmin/user_upload/2023-05_TeleTrusT_Guideline_State_of_the_art_in_IT_security_EN.pdf

[3] https://kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2024/04/what-does-nis2-mean-for-energy-businesses.html

[4] https://orbilu.uni.lu/bitstream/10993/50878/1/SCHMITZ_IFIP_workshop_sota_author-pre-print.pdf

[5]https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-of-ai-on-cyber-threat

[6] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949715923000793

[7] https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/information_security_continuous_monitoring

[8] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[10] https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/KRITIS/Konkretisierung_Anforderungen_Massnahmen_KRITIS.html

[11] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-137.pdf

[12] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[13] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[14] https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/KRITIS/Konkretisierung_Anforderungen_Massnahmen_KRITIS.html

[15] https://therecord.media/surge-zero-day-exploits-five-eyes-report

[16] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-of-ai-on-cyber-threat

[17] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[18] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework/caf-objective-c-detecting-cyber-security-events/principle-c2-proactive-security-event-discovery

[19] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework/caf-objective-c-detecting-cyber-security-events/principle-c2-proactive-security-event-discovery

[20] https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/autonomous-cyber-defence-autonomous-agents

[21] https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/autonomous-cyber-defence-autonomous-agents

[22] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376170443_Cultivating_Proactive_Cybersecurity_Culture_among_IT_Professional_to_Combat_Evolving_Threats

[23] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[24] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework/caf-objective-c-detecting-cyber-security-events/principle-c2-proactive-security-event-discovery

[25] https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2024/05/17_1.pdf#page=49

[26] ENISA, NIS Directive 2

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About the author
Livia Fries
Public Policy Manager, EMEA

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February 11, 2025

Defending Against Living-off-the-Land Attacks: Anomaly Detection in Action

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What is living-off-the-land?

Threat actors employ a variety of techniques to compromise target networks, including exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities, abusing misconfigurations, deploying backdoors, and creating custom malware. However, these methods generate a lot of noise and are relatively easy for network and host-based monitoring tools to detect, especially once indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are published by the cybersecurity community.

Living-off-the-Land (LOTL) techniques, however, allow attacks to remain nearly invisible to Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools – leveraging trusted protocols, applications and native systems to carry out malicious activity. While mitigations exist, they are often poorly implemented. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) found that some organizations “lacked security baselines, allowing [Living-off-the-Land binaries (LOLBins)] to execute and leaving analysts unable to identify anomalous activity” and “organizations did not appropriately tune their detection tools to reduce alert noise, leading to an unmanageable level of alerts to sift through and action" [1].

Darktrace / NETWORK addresses this challenge across Information Technology (IT), Operational Technology (OT), and cloud environments by continuously analyzing network traffic and identifying deviations from normal behavior with its multi-layered AI – helping organizations detect and respond to LOTL attacks in real time.

Darktrace’s detection of LOTL attacks

This blog will review two separate attacks detected by Darktrace that leveraged LOTL techniques at several stages of the intrusion.

Case A

Reconnaissance

In September 2024, a malicious actor gained access to a customer network via their Virtual Private Network (VPN) from two desktop devices that had no prior connection history. Over two days, the attacker conducted multiple network scans, targeting ports associated with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and NTLM authentication. Darktrace detected this unusual activity, triggering multiple alerts for scanning and enumeration activity.

Unusual NTLM authentication attempts using default accounts like “Guest” and “Administrator” were detected. Two days after the initial intrusion, suspicious DRSGetNCChanges requests were observed on multiple domain controllers (DCs), targeting the Directory Replication Service RPC interface (i.e., drsuapi) – a technique used to extract account hashes from DCs. This process can be automated using tools like Mimikatz's DcSync and DCShadow

Around the same time, attacker-controlled devices were seen presenting an admin credential and another credential potentially granting access to Cisco Firewall systems, suggesting successful privilege escalation. Due to the severity of this activity, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response was triggered to prevent the device from further deviation from its normal behavior. However, because Autonomous Response was configured in Human Confirmation mode, the response actions had to be manually applied by the customer.

Cyber AI Analyst Critical Incident showing the unusual DRSGetNCChanges requests following unusual scanning activity.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Critical Incident showing the unusual DRSGetNCChanges requests following unusual scanning activity.

Lateral movement

Darktrace also detected anomalous RDP connections to domain controllers, originating from an attacker-controlled device using admin and service credentials. The attacker then successfully pivoted to a likely RDP server, leveraging the RDP protocol – one of the most commonly used for lateral movement in network compromises observed by Darktrace.

Cyber Analyst Incident displaying unusual RDP lateral movement connections
Figure 2: Cyber Analyst Incident displaying unusual RDP lateral movement connections.

Tooling

Following an incoming RDP connection, one of the DCs made a successful GET request to the URI '/download/122.dll' on the 100% rare IP, 146.70.145[.]189. The request returned an executable file, which open-source intelligence (OSINT) suggests is likely a CobaltStrike C2 sever payload [2] [3]. Had Autonomous Response been enabled here, it would have blocked all outgoing traffic from the DC allowing the customer to investigate and remediate.

Additionally, Darktrace detected a suspicious CreateServiceW request to the Service Control (SVCCTL) RPC interface on a server. The request executed commands using ‘cmd.exe’ to perform the following actions

  1. Used ‘tasklist’ to filter processes named ”lsass.exe” (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) to find its specific process ID.
  2. Used “rundll32.exe” to execute the MiniDump function from the “comsvcs.dll” library, creating a memory dump of the “lsass.exe” process.
  3. Saved the output to a PNG file in a temporary folder,

Notably, “cmd.exe” was referenced as “CMd.EXE” within the script, likely an attempt to evade detection by security tools monitoring for specific keywords and patterns.

Model Alert Log showing the unusual SVCCTL create request.
Figure 3: Model Alert Log showing the unusual SVCCTL create request.

Over the course of three days, this activity triggered around 125 Darktrace / NETWORK alerts across 11 internal devices. In addition, Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into the activity, analyzing and connecting 16 separate events spanning multiple stages of the cyber kill chain - from initial reconnaissance to payload retrieval and lateral movement.

Darktrace’s comprehensive detection enabled the customer’s security team to remediate the compromise before any further escalation was observed.

Case B

Between late 2023 and early 2024, Darktrace identified a widespread attack that combined insider and external threats, leveraging multiple LOTL tools for reconnaissance and lateral movement within a customer's network.

Reconnaissance

Initially, Darktrace detected the use of a new administrative credential by a device, which then made unusual RDP connections to multiple internal systems, including a 30-minute connection to a DC. Throughout the attack, multiple unusual RDP connections using the new administrative credential “%admin!!!” were observed, indicating that this protocol was leveraged for lateral movement.

The next day, a Microsoft Defender Security Integration alert was triggered on the device due to suspicious Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) credential dump behavior. Since the LSASS process memory can store operating system and domain admin credentials, obtaining this sensitive information can greatly facilitate lateral movement within a network using legitimate tools such as PsExec or Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) [4]. Security integrations with other security vendors like this one can provide insights into host-based processes, which are typically outside of Darktrace’s coverage. Darktrace’s anomaly detection and network activity monitoring help prioritize the investigation of these alerts.

Three days later, the attacker was observed logging into the DC and querying tickets for the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) service using the default credential “Administrator.” This activity, considered new by Darktrace, triggered an Autonomous Response action that blocked further connections on Kerberos port 88 to the DC. LDAP provides a central location to access and manage data about computers, servers, users, groups, and policies within a network. LDAP enumeration can provide valuable Active Directory (AD) object information to an attacker, which can be used to identify critical attack paths or accounts with high privileges.

Lateral movement

Following the incoming RDP connection, the DC began scanning activities, including RDP and Server Block Message (SMB) services, suggesting the attacker was using remote access for additional reconnaissance. Outgoing RDP connection attempts to over 100 internal devices were observed, with around 5% being successful, highlighting the importance of this protocol for the threat actor’s lateral movement.

Around the same time, the DC made WMI, PsExec, and service control connections to two other DCs, indicating further lateral movement using native administrative protocols and tools. These functions can be leveraged by attackers to query system information, run malicious code, and maintain persistent access to compromised devices while avoiding traditional security tool alarms. In this case, requested services included the IWbemServices (used to access WMI services) and IWbemFetchSmartEnum (used to retrieve a network-optimized enumerator interface) interfaces, with ExecQuery operations detected for the former. This method returns an enumerable collection of IWbemClassObject interface objects based on a query.

Additionally, unusual Windows Remote Management (WinRM) connections to another domain controller were observed. WinRM is a Microsoft protocol that allows systems to exchange and access management information over HTTP(S) across a network, such as running executables or modifying the registry and services.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident showing unusual WMI activity between the two DCs.
Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst Incident showing unusual WMI activity between the two DCs.

The DC was also detected writing the file “PSEXESVC.exe” to the “ADMIN$” share of another internal device over the SMB file transfer network protocol. This activity was flagged as highly unusual by Darktrace, as these two devices had not previously engaged in this type of SMB connectivity.

It is rare for an attacker to immediately find the information or systems they are after, making it likely they will need to move around the network before achieving their objectives. Tools such as PsExec enable attackers to do this while largely remaining under the radar. With PsExec, attackers who gain access to a single system can connect to and execute commands remotely on other internal systems, access sensitive information, and spread their attack further into the environment.

Model Alert Event Log showing the new write of the file “PSEXESVC.exe” by one of the compromised devices over an SMB connection initiated at an unusual time.
Figure 5. Model Alert Event Log showing the new write of the file “PSEXESVC.exe” by one of the compromised devices over an SMB connection initiated at an unusual time.

Darktrace further observed the DC connecting to the SVCCTL endpoint on a remote device and performing the CreateServiceW operation, which was flagged as highly unusual based on previous behavior patterns between the two devices. Additionally, new ChangeServiceConfigW operations were observed from another device.

Aside from IWbemServices requests seen on multiple devices, Darktrace also detected multiple internal devices connecting to the ITaskSchedulerService interface over DCE-RPC and performing new SchRpcRegisterTask operations, which register a task on the destination system. Attackers can exploit the task scheduler to facilitate the initial or recurring execution of malicious code by a trusted system process, often with elevated permissions. The creation of these tasks was considered new or highly unusual and triggered several anomalous ITaskScheduler activity alerts.

Conclusion

As pointed out by CISA, threat actors frequently exploit the lack of implemented controls on their target networks, as demonstrated in the incidents discussed here. In the first case, VPN access was granted to all domain users, providing the attacker with a point of entry. In the second case, there were no restrictions on the use of RDP within the targeted network segment, allowing the attackers to pivot from device to device.

Darktrace assists security teams in monitoring for unusual use of LOTL tools and protocols that can be leveraged by threat actors to achieve a wide range of objectives. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI sifts through the network traffic noise generated by these trusted tools, which are essential to administrators and developers in their daily tasks, and highlights any anomalous and potentially unexpected use.

Credit to Alexandra Sentenac (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/Joint-Guidance-Identifying-and-Mitigating-LOTL_V3508c.pdf

[2] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/146.70.145.189/community

[3] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cc9a670b549d84084618267fdeea13f196e43ae5df0d88e2e18bf5aa91b97318

[4]https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/05/detecting-and-preventing-lsass-credential-dumping-attacks

MITRE Mapping

INITIAL ACCESS - External Remote Services

DISCOVERY - Remote System Discovery

DISCOVERY - Network Service Discovery

DISCOVERY - File and Directory Discovery

CREDENTIAL ACCESS – OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

LATERAL MOVEMENT - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

LATERAL MOVEMENT - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

EXECUTION - System Services: Service Execution

PERSISTENCE - Scheduled Task

COMMAND AND CONTROL - Ingress Tool Transfer

Darktrace Model Detections

Case A

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Device / Network Scan

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / Anomalous NTLM Brute Force

Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Non-Admin)

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous Connection / Possible Share Enumeration Activity

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Connection / Anomalous DRSGetNCChanges Operation

Anomalous Connection / High Priority DRSGetNCChanges

Compliance / Default Credential Usage

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

User / New Admin Credential Ticket Request

Compromise / Unusual SVCCTL Activity

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Numeric File Download

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Compromise / Multiple Kill Chain Indicators

Case B

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

Compliance / Default Credential Usage

Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / RDP Scan

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Device / Anomaly Indicators / New or Uncommon WMI Activity Indicator

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Anomalous Connection / Anomalous DRSGetNCChanges Operation

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Anomalous ITaskScheduler Activity

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

Compliance / Default Credential Usage

IOC - Type - Description/Probability

146.70.145[.]189 - IP Address - Likely C2 Infrastructure

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About the author
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst
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