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March 12, 2025

Darktrace's Detection of State-Linked ShadowPad Malware

In 2024, Darktrace identified a cluster of intrusions involving the state-linked malware, ShadowPad. This blog will detail ShadowPad and the associated activities detected by Darktrace.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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12
Mar 2025


An integral part of cybersecurity is anomaly detection, which involves identifying unusual patterns or behaviors in network traffic that could indicate malicious activity, such as a cyber-based intrusion. However, attribution remains one of the ever present challenges in cybersecurity. Attribution involves the process of accurately identifying and tracing the source to a specific threat actor(s).

Given the complexity of digital networks and the sophistication of attackers who often use proxies or other methods to disguise their origin, pinpointing the exact source of a cyberattack is an arduous task. Threat actors can use proxy servers, botnets, sophisticated techniques, false flags, etc. Darktrace’s strategy is rooted in the belief that identifying behavioral anomalies is crucial for identifying both known and novel threat actor campaigns.

The ShadowPad cluster

Between July 2024 and November 2024, Darktrace observed a cluster of activity threads sharing notable similarities. The threads began with a malicious actor using compromised user credentials to log in to the target organization's Check Point Remote Access virtual private network (VPN) from an attacker-controlled, remote device named 'DESKTOP-O82ILGG'.  In one case, the IP from which the initial login was carried out was observed to be the ExpressVPN IP address, 194.5.83[.]25. After logging in, the actor gained access to service account credentials, likely via exploitation of an information disclosure vulnerability affecting Check Point Security Gateway devices. Recent reporting suggests this could represent exploitation of CVE-2024-24919 [27,28]. The actor then used these compromised service account credentials to move laterally over RDP and SMB, with files related to the modular backdoor, ShadowPad, being delivered to the  ‘C:\PerfLogs\’ directory of targeted internal systems. ShadowPad was seen communicating with its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, 158.247.199[.]185 (dscriy.chtq[.]net), via both HTTPS traffic and DNS tunneling, with subdomains of the domain ‘cybaq.chtq[.]net’ being used in the compromised devices’ TXT DNS queries.

Darktrace’s Advanced Search data showing the VPN-connected device initiating RDP connections to a domain controller (DC). The device subsequently distributes likely ShadowPad-related payloads and makes DRSGetNCChanges requests to a second DC.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s Advanced Search data showing the VPN-connected device initiating RDP connections to a domain controller (DC). The device subsequently distributes likely ShadowPad-related payloads and makes DRSGetNCChanges requests to a second DC.
Event Log data showing a DC making DNS queries for subdomains of ‘cbaq.chtq[.]net’ to 158.247.199[.]185 after receiving SMB and RDP connections from the VPN-connected device, DESKTOP-O82ILGG.
Figure 2: Event Log data showing a DC making DNS queries for subdomains of ‘cbaq.chtq[.]net’ to 158.247.199[.]185 after receiving SMB and RDP connections from the VPN-connected device, DESKTOP-O82ILGG.

Darktrace observed these ShadowPad activity threads within the networks of European-based customers in the manufacturing and financial sectors.  One of these intrusions was followed a few months later by likely state-sponsored espionage activity, as detailed in the investigation of the year in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2024.

[related-resource]

Related ShadowPad activity

Additional cases of ShadowPad were observed across Darktrace’s customer base in 2024. In some cases, common C2 infrastructure with the cluster discussed above was observed, with dscriy.chtq[.]net and cybaq.chtq[.]net both involved; however, no other common features were identified. These ShadowPad infections were observed between April and November 2024, with customers across multiple regions and sectors affected.  Darktrace’s observations align with multiple other public reports that fit the timeframe of this campaign.

Darktrace has also observed other cases of ShadowPad without common infrastructure since September 2024, suggesting the use of this tool by additional threat actors. ‍

The data theft thread

One of the Darktrace customers impacted by the ShadowPad cluster highlighted above was a European manufacturer. A distinct thread of activity occurred within this organization’s network several months after the ShadowPad intrusion, in October 2024.

The thread involved the internal distribution of highly masqueraded executable files via Sever Message Block (SMB) and WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation), the targeted collection of sensitive information from an internal server, and the exfiltration of collected information to a web of likely compromised sites. This observed thread of activity, therefore, consisted of three phrases: lateral movement, collection, and exfiltration.

The lateral movement phase began when an internal user device used an administrative credential to distribute files named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ and 'ProgramData\Oracle\duxwfnfo' to the c$ share on another internal system.  

Darktrace model alert highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ to the c$ share on another device.
Figure 3: Darktrace model alert highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ to the c$ share on another device.

Over the next few days, Darktrace detected several other internal systems using administrative credentials to upload files with the following names to the c$ share on internal systems:

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Oracle\Java\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Oracle\Java\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Abletech\Client\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Abletech\Client\client.exe

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\rzrmxrwfvp

ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\3DxWare.exe

ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\webservices.dll

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\updater.exe

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\webservices.dll

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\imtrqjsaqmm

Cyber AI Analyst highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll’ to the c$ share on an internal system.
Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll’ to the c$ share on an internal system.

The threat actor appears to have abused the Microsoft RPC (MS-RPC) service, WMI, to execute distributed payloads, as evidenced by the ExecMethod requests to the IWbemServices RPC interface which immediately followed devices’ SMB uploads.  

Cyber AI Analyst data highlighting a thread of activity starting with an SMB data upload followed by ExecMethod requests.
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst data highlighting a thread of activity starting with an SMB data upload followed by ExecMethod requests.

Several of the devices involved in these lateral movement activities, both on the source and destination side, were subsequently seen using administrative credentials to download tens of GBs of sensitive data over SMB from a specially selected server.  The data gathering stage of the threat sequence indicates that the threat actor had a comprehensive understanding of the organization’s system architecture and had precise objectives for the information they sought to extract.

Immediately after collecting data from the targeted server, devices went on to exfiltrate stolen data to multiple sites. Several other likely compromised sites appear to have been used as general C2 infrastructure for this intrusion activity. The sites used by the threat actor for C2 and data exfiltration purport to be sites for companies offering a variety of service, ranging from consultancy to web design.

Screenshot of one of the likely compromised sites used in the intrusion. 
Figure 6: Screenshot of one of the likely compromised sites used in the intrusion.

At least 16 sites were identified as being likely data exfiltration or C2 sites used by this threat actor in their operation against this organization. The fact that the actor had such a wide web of compromised sites at their disposal suggests that they were well-resourced and highly prepared.  

Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device slowly exfiltrating data to the external endpoint, yasuconsulting[.]com.
Figure 7: Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device slowly exfiltrating data to the external endpoint, yasuconsulting[.]com.
Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device downloading nearly 1 GB of data from an internal system just before uploading a similar volume of data to another suspicious endpoint, www.tunemmuhendislik[.]com    
Figure 8: Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device downloading nearly 1 GB of data from an internal system just before uploading a similar volume of data to another suspicious endpoint, www.tunemmuhendislik[.]com  

Cyber AI Analyst spotlight

Cyber AI Analyst identifying and piecing together the various steps of a ShadowPad intrusion.
Figure 9: Cyber AI Analyst identifying and piecing together the various steps of a ShadowPad intrusion.  
Cyber AI Analyst Incident identifying and piecing together the various steps of the data theft activity.
Figure 10: Cyber AI Analyst Incident identifying and piecing together the various steps of the data theft activity.

As shown in the above figures, Cyber AI Analyst’s ability to thread together the different steps of these attack chains are worth highlighting.

In the ShadowPad attack chains, Cyber AI Analyst was able to identify SMB writes from the VPN subnet to the DC, and the C2 connections from the DC. It was also able to weave together this activity into a single thread representing the attacker’s progression.

Similarly, in the data exfiltration attack chain, Cyber AI Analyst identified and connected multiple types of lateral movement over SMB and WMI and external C2 communication to various external endpoints, linking them in a single, connected incident.

These Cyber AI Analyst actions enabled a quicker understanding of the threat actor sequence of events and, in some cases, faster containment.

Attribution puzzle

Publicly shared research into ShadowPad indicates that it is predominantly used as a backdoor in People’s Republic of China (PRC)-sponsored espionage operations [5][6][7][8][9][10]. Most publicly reported intrusions involving ShadowPad  are attributed to the China-based threat actor, APT41 [11][12]. Furthermore, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) recently shared their assessment that ShadowPad usage is restricted to clusters associated with APT41 [13]. Interestingly, however, there have also been public reports of ShadowPad usage in unattributed intrusions [5].

The data theft activity that later occurred in the same Darktrace customer network as one of these ShadowPad compromises appeared to be the targeted collection and exfiltration of sensitive data. Such an objective indicates the activity may have been part of a state-sponsored operation. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), artifacts, and C2 infrastructure observed in the data theft thread appear to resemble activity seen in previous Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)-linked intrusion activities [15] [16] [17] [18] [19].

The distribution of payloads to the following directory locations appears to be a relatively common behavior in DPRK-sponsored intrusions.

Observed examples:

C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\  

C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\  

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\  

C:\ProgramData\Abletech\Client\  

C:\ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\  

C:\ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\

Additionally, the likely compromised websites observed in the data theft thread, along with some of the target URI patterns seen in the C2 communications to these sites, resemble those seen in previously reported DPRK-linked intrusion activities.

No clear evidence was found to link the ShadowPad compromise to the subsequent data theft activity that was observed on the network of the manufacturing customer. It should be noted, however, that no clear signs of initial access were found for the data theft thread – this could suggest the ShadowPad intrusion itself represents the initial point of entry that ultimately led to data exfiltration.

Motivation-wise, it seems plausible for the data theft thread to have been part of a DPRK-sponsored operation. DPRK is known to pursue targets that could potentially fulfil its national security goals and had been publicly reported as being active in months prior to this intrusion [21]. Furthermore, the timing of the data theft aligns with the ratification of the mutual defense treaty between DPRK and Russia and the subsequent accused activities [20].

Darktrace assesses with medium confidence that a nation-state, likely DPRK, was responsible, based on our investigation, the threat actor applied resources, patience, obfuscation, and evasiveness combined with external reporting, collaboration with the cyber community, assessing the attacker’s motivation and world geopolitical timeline, and undisclosed intelligence.


Conclusion

When state-linked cyber activity occurs within an organization’s environment, previously unseen C2 infrastructure and advanced evasion techniques will likely be used. State-linked cyber actors, through their resources and patience, are able to bypass most detection methods, leaving anomaly-based methods as a last line of defense.

Two threads of activity were observed within Darktrace’s customer base over the last year: The first operation involved the abuse of Check Point VPN credentials to log in remotely to organizations’ networks, followed by the distribution of ShadowPad to an internal domain controller. The second operation involved highly targeted data exfiltration from the network of one of the customers impacted by the previously mentioned ShadowPad activity.

Despite definitive attribution remaining unresolved, both the ShadowPad and data exfiltration activities were detected by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, with Cyber AI Analyst playing a significant role in identifying and piecing together the various steps of the intrusion activities.  

Credit to Sam Lister (R&D Detection Analyst), Emma Foulger (Principal Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (VP), and the Darktrace Threat Research team.

Appendices

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Compliance / SMB Drive Write  

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

User / New Admin Credentials on Client  

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Short Period)

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Device / Multiple C2 Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound  

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

(Technique name – Tactic ID)

ShadowPad malware threads

Initial Access - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

Initial Access - External Remote Services (T1133)

Privilege Escalation - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001)

Defense Evasion - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002)

Command and Control - Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

Command and Control - Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: DNS (T1071.004)

Data theft thread

Resource Development - Compromise Infrastructure: Domains (T1584.001)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

Execution - Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)

Defense Evasion - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Defense Evasion - Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002)

Collection - Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

Command and Control - Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

Command and Control - Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002)

Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041)

Exfiltration - Data Transfer Size Limits (T1030)

List of indicators of compromise (IoCs)

IP addresses and/or domain names (Mid-high confidence):

ShadowPad thread

- dscriy.chtq[.]net • 158.247.199[.]185 (endpoint of C2 comms)

- cybaq.chtq[.]net (domain name used for DNS tunneling)  

Data theft thread

- yasuconsulting[.]com (45.158.12[.]7)

- hobivan[.]net (94.73.151[.]72)

- mediostresbarbas.com[.]ar (75.102.23[.]3)

- mnmathleague[.]org (185.148.129[.]24)

- goldenborek[.]com (94.138.200[.]40)

- tunemmuhendislik[.]com (94.199.206[.]45)

- anvil.org[.]ph (67.209.121[.]137)

- partnerls[.]pl (5.187.53[.]50)

- angoramedikal[.]com (89.19.29[.]128)

- awork-designs[.]dk (78.46.20[.]225)

- digitweco[.]com (38.54.95[.]190)

- duepunti-studio[.]it (89.46.106[.]61)

- scgestor.com[.]br (108.181.92[.]71)

- lacapannadelsilenzio[.]it (86.107.36[.]15)

- lovetamagotchith[.]com (203.170.190[.]137)

- lieta[.]it (78.46.146[.]147)

File names (Mid-high confidence):

ShadowPad thread:

- perflogs\1.txt

- perflogs\AppLaunch.exe

- perflogs\F4A3E8BE.tmp

- perflogs\mscoree.dll

Data theft thread

- ProgramData\Oracle\java.log

- ProgramData\Oracle\duxwfnfo

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Oracle\Java\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Oracle\Java\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Abletech\Client\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Abletech\Client\client.exe

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\rzrmxrwfvp

- ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\3DxWare.exe

- ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\updater.exe

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\imtrqjsaqmm

- temp\HousecallLauncher64.exe

Attacker-controlled device hostname (Mid-high confidence)

- DESKTOP-O82ILGG

References  

[1] https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/shadowpad-how-attackers-hide-backdoor-in-software-used-by-hundreds-of-large-companies-around-the-world  

[2] https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2017/08/07172148/ShadowPad_technical_description_PDF.pdf

[3] https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities

[4] https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/

[5] https://assets.sentinelone.com/c/Shadowpad?x=P42eqA

[6] https://www.cyfirma.com/research/the-origins-of-apt-41-and-shadowpad-lineage/

[7] https://www.csoonline.com/article/572061/shadowpad-has-become-the-rat-of-choice-for-several-state-sponsored-chinese-apts.html

[8] https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/shadowpad-new-activity-from-the-winnti-group

[9] https://cymulate.com/threats/shadowpad-privately-sold-malware-espionage-tool/

[10] https://www.secureworks.com/research/shadowpad-malware-analysis

[11] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/chinese-hacking-group-apt41-compromised-taiwanese-government-affiliated-research-institute-with-shadowpad-and-cobaltstrike-2/

[12] https://hackerseye.net/all-blog-items/tails-from-the-shadow-apt-41-injecting-shadowpad-with-sideloading/

[13] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scatterbrain-unmasking-poisonplug-obfuscator

[14] https://www.domaintools.com/wp-content/uploads/conceptualizing-a-continuum-of-cyber-threat-attribution.pdf

[15] https://www.nccgroup.com/es/research-blog/north-korea-s-lazarus-their-initial-access-trade-craft-using-social-media-and-social-engineering/  

[16] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/01/28/zinc-attacks-against-security-researchers/

[17] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/  

[18] https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/  

[19] https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2021/01/Lazarus_malware2.html  

[20] https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-unlawful-arms-transfer-by-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-russia/

[21] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/25/2003510137/-1/-1/1/Joint-CSA-North-Korea-Cyber-Espionage-Advance-Military-Nuclear-Programs.PDF  

[22] https://kyivindependent.com/first-north-korean-troops-deployed-to-front-line-in-kursk-oblast-ukraines-military-intelligence-says/

[23] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/04/frequent-freeloader-part-i-secret-blizzard-compromising-storm-0156-infrastructure-for-espionage/  

[24] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/11/frequent-freeloader-part-ii-russian-actor-secret-blizzard-using-tools-of-other-groups-to-attack-ukraine/  

[25] https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/chamelgang-attacking-critical-infrastructure-with-ransomware/    

[26] https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/state-backed-hackers-using-ransomware.html/  

[27] https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/check-point-research-explains-shadow-pad-nailaolocker-and-its-protection/

[28] https://www.orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/cert-news/meet-nailaolocker-a-ransomware-distributed-in-europe-by-shadowpad-and-plugx-backdoors

[related-resource]

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Specialist Security Researcher
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Specialist Security Researcher

NetSupport RAT: How Legitimate Tools Can Be as Damaging as Malware

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NetSupport RAT is the malicious abuse of the legitimate NetSupport Manager remote administration tool. Originally designed for IT support, threat actors exploit it to gain unauthorized system access, exfiltrate data, and deploy malware or info‑stealers, turning trusted functionality into a dangerous attack vector.
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NetSupport RAT: How Legitimate Tools Can Be as Damaging as Malware

NetSupport RAT: How Legitimate Tools Can Be as Damaging as MalwareDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is NetSupport Manager?

NetSupport Manager is a legitimate IT tool used by system administrators for remote support, monitoring, and management. In use since 1989, NetSupport Manager enables users to remotely access and navigate systems across different platforms and operating systems [1].

What is NetSupport RAT?

Although NetSupport Manager is a legitimate tool that can be used by IT and security professionals, there has been a rising number of cases in which it is abused to gain unauthorized access to victim systems. This misuse has become so prevalent that, in recent years, security researchers have begun referring to NetSupport as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), a term typically used for malware that enables a threat actor to remotely access or control an infected device [2][3][4].

NetSupport RAT activity summary

The initial stages of NetSupport RAT infection may vary depending on the source of the initial compromise. Using tactics such as the social engineering tactic ClickFix, threat actors attempt to trick users into inadvertently executing malicious PowerShell commands under the guise of resolving a non-existent issue or completing a fake CAPTCHA verification [5]. Other attack vectors such as phishing emails, fake browser updates, malicious websites, search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning, malvertising and drive-by downloads are also employed to direct users to fraudulent pages and fake reCAPTCHA verification checks, ultimately inducing them to execute malicious PowerShell commands [5][6][7]. This leads to the successful installation of NetSupport Manager on the compromised device, which is often placed in non-standard directories such as AppData, ProgramData, or Downloads [3][8].

Once installed, the adversary is able to gain remote access to the affected machine, monitor user activity, exfiltrate data, communicate with the command-and-control (C2) server, and maintain persistence [5]. External research has also highlighted that post-exploitation of NetSupport RAT has involved the additional download of malicious payloads [2][5].

Attack flow diagram highlighting key events across each phase of the attack phase
Figure 1: Attack flow diagram highlighting key events across each phase of the attack phase [2][5].

Darktrace coverage

In November of 2025, suspicious behavior indicative of the malicious abuse of NetSupport Manager was observed on multiple customers across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and the Americas (AMS).

While open-source intelligence (OSINT) has reported that, in a recent campaign, a threat actor impersonated government entities to trick users in organizations in the Information Technology, Government and Financial Services sectors in Central Asia into downloading NetSupport Manager [8], approximately a third of Darktrace’s affected customers in November were based in the US while the rest were based in EMEA. This contrast underscores how widely NetSupport Manager is leveraged by threat actors and highlights its accessibility as an initial access tool.  

The Darktrace customers affected were in sectors including Information and Communication, Manufacturing and Arts, entertainment and recreation.

The ClickFix social engineering tactic typically used to distribute the NetSupport RAT is known to target multiple industries, including Technology, Manufacturing and Energy sectors [9]. It also reflects activity observed in the campaign targeting Central Asia, where the Information Technology sector was among those affected [8].

The prevalence of affected Education customers highlights NetSupport’s marketing focus on the Education sector [10]. This suggests that threat actors are also aware of this marketing strategy and have exploited the trust it creates to deploy NetSupport Manager and gain access to their targets’ systems. While the execution of the PowerShell commands that led to the installation of NetSupport Manager falls outside of Darktrace's purview in cases identified, Darktrace was still able to identify a pattern of devices making connections to multiple rare external domains and IP addresses associated with the NetSupport RAT, using a wide range of ports over the HTTP protocol. A full list of associated domains and IP addresses is provided in the Appendices of this blog.

Although OSINT identifies multiple malicious domains and IP addresses as used as C2 servers, signature-based detections of NetSupport RAT indicators of compromise (IoCs) may miss broader activity, as new malicious websites linked to the RAT continue to appear.

Darktrace’s anomaly‑based approach allows it to establish a normal ‘pattern of life’ for each device on a network and identify when behavior deviates from this baseline, enabling the detection of unusual activity even when it does not match known IoCs or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

In one customer environment in late 2025, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device initiating new connections to the rare external endpoint, thetavaluemetrics[.]com (74.91.125[.]57), along with the use of a previously unseen user agent, which it recognized as highly unusual for the network.

Darktrace’s detection of HTTP POST requests to a suspicious URI and new user agent usage.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of HTTP POST requests to a suspicious URI and new user agent usage.

Darktrace identified that user agent present in connections to this endpoint was the ‘NetSupport Manager/1.3’, initially suggesting legitimate NetSupport Manager activity. Subsequent investigation, however, revealed that the endpoint was in fact a malicious NetSupportRAT C2 endpoint [12]. Shortly after, Darktrace detected the same device performing HTTP POST requests to the URI fakeurl[.]htm. This pattern of activity is consistent with OSINT reporting that details communication between compromised devices and NetSupport Connectivity Gateways functioning as C2 servers [11].

Conclusion

As seen not only with NetSupport Manager but with any legitimate or open‑source software used by IT and security professionals, the legitimacy of a tool does not prevent it from being abused by threat actors. Open‑source software, especially tools with free or trial versions such as NetSupport Manager, remains readily accessible for malicious use, including network compromise. In an age where remote work is still prevalent, validating any anomalous use of software and remote management tools is essential to reducing opportunities for unauthorized access.

Darktrace’s anomaly‑based detection enables security teams to identify malicious use of legitimate tools, even when clear signatures or indicators of compromise are absent, helping to prevent further impact on a network.


Credit to George Kim (Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS), Anna Gilbertson (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Alerts

·       Compromise / Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

·       Compromise / New User Agent and POST

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·       Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

·       Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing

·       Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

·       Compromise / POST and Beacon to Rare External

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator           Type     Description

/fakeurl.htm URI            NetSupportRAT C2 URI

thetavaluemetrics[.]com        Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

westford-systems[.]icu            Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

holonisz[.]com                Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

heaveydutyl[.]com      Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

nsgatetest1[.]digital   Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

finalnovel[.]com            Connection hostname              NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

217.91.235[.]17              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

45.94.47[.]224                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

74.91.125[.]57                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

88.214.27[.]48                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

104.21.40[.]75                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

38.146.28[.]242              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

185.39.19[.]233              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

45.88.79[.]237                 IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

141.98.11[.]224              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

88.214.27[.]166              IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

107.158.128[.]84          IP             NetSupportRAT C2 Endpoint

87.120.93[.]98                 IP             Rhadamanthys C2 Endpoint

References‍

  1. ‍https://mspalliance.com/netsupport-debuts-netsupport-24-7/
  2. https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2023/11/netsupport-rat-the-rat-king-returns.html‍
  3. https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/netsupport-manager/ ‍
  4. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.19/netsupport-manager-execution-from-an-unusual-path.html‍
  5. https://rewterz.com/threat-advisory/netsupport-rat-delivered-through-spoofed-verification-pages-active-iocs ‍
  6. https://thehackernews.com/2025/11/new-evalusion-clickfix-campaign.html‍
  7. https://corelight.com/blog/detecting-netsupport-manager-abuse ‍
  8. https://thehackernews.com/2025/11/bloody-wolf-expands-java-based.html‍‍
  9. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/preventing-clickfix-attack-vector
  10. ‍https://www.netsupportsoftware.com/education-solutions
  11. ‍https://www.esentire.com/blog/unpacking-netsupport-rat-loaders-delivered-via-clickfix‍
  12. https://threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/malware/win.netsupportmanager_rat/
  13. ‍https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/5fe6936a69c786c9ded9f31ed1242c601cd64e1d90cecd8a7bb03182c47906c2

‍

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About the author
George Kim
Analyst Consulting Lead – AMS

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March 5, 2026

Inside Cloud Compromise: Investigating Attacker Activity with Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Forensic Acquisition and investigationDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Investigating cloud attacks with Darktrace/ Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation™ is the industry’s first truly automated forensic solution purpose-built for the cloud. This blog will demonstrate how an investigation can be carried out against a compromised cloud server in minutes, rather than hours or days.

The compromised server investigated in this case originates from Darktrace’s Cloudypots system, a global honeypot network designed to observe adversary activity in real time across a wide range of cloud services. Whenever an attacker successfully compromises one of these honeypots, a forensic copy of the virtual server's disk is preserved for later analysis. Using Forensic Acquisition & Investigation, analysts can then investigate further and obtain detailed insights into the compromise including complete attacker timelines and root cause analysis.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation supports importing artifacts from a variety of sources, including EC2 instances, ECS, S3 buckets, and more. The Cloudypots system produces a raw disk image whenever an attack is detected and stores it in an S3 bucket. This allows the image to be directly imported into Forensic Acquisition & Investigation using the S3 bucket import option.

As Forensic Acquisition & Investigation runs cloud-natively, no additional configuration is required to add a specific S3 bucket. Analysts can browse and acquire forensic assets from any bucket that the configured IAM role is permitted to access. Operators can also add additional IAM credentials, including those from other cloud providers, to extend access across multiple cloud accounts and environments.

Figure 1: Forensic Acquisition & Investigation import screen.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation then retrieves a copy of the file and automatically begins running the analysis pipeline on the artifact. This pipeline performs a full forensic analysis of the disk and builds a timeline of the activity that took place on the compromised asset. By leveraging Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s cloud-native analysis system, this process condenses hour of manual work into just minutes.

Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.
Figure 2: Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.

Once processing is complete, the preserved artifact is visible in the Evidence tab, along with a summary of key information obtained during analysis, such as the compromised asset’s hostname, operating system, cloud provider, and key event count.

The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.
Figure 3: The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.

Clicking on the “Key events” field in the listing opens the timeline view, automatically filtered to show system- generated alarms.

The timeline provides a chronological record of every event that occurred on the system, derived from multiple sources, including:

  • Parsed log files such as the systemd journal, audit logs, application specific logs, and others.
  • Parsed history files such as .bash_history, allowing executed commands to be shown on the timeline.
  • File-specific events, such as files being created, accessed, modified, or executables being run, etc.

This approach allows timestamped information and events from multiple sources to be aggregated and parsed into a single, concise view, greatly simplifying the data review process.

Alarms are created for specific timeline events that match either a built-in system rule, curated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team or an operator-defined rule  created at the project level. These alarms help quickly filter out noise and highlight on events of interest, such as the creation of a file containing known malware, access to sensitive files like Amazon Web Service (AWS) credentials, suspicious arguments or commands, and more.

The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.
Figure 4: The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.

In this case, several alarms were generated for suspicious Base64 arguments being passed to Selenium. Examining the event data, it appears the attacker spawned a Selenium Grid session with the following payload:

"request.payload": "[Capabilities {browserName: chrome, goog:chromeOptions: {args: [-cimport base64;exec(base64...], binary: /usr/bin/python3, extensions: []}, pageLoadStrategy: normal}]"

This is a common attack vector for Selenium Grid. The chromeOptions object is intended to specify arguments for how Google Chrome should be launched; however, in this case the attacker has abused the binary field to execute the Python3 binary instead of Chrome. Combined with the option to specify command-line arguments, the attacker can use Python3’s -c option to execute arbitrary Python code, in this instance, decoding and executing a Base64 payload.

Selenium’s logs truncate the Arguments field automatically, so an alternate method is required to retrieve the full payload. To do this, the search bar can be used to find all events that occurred around the same time as this flagged event.

Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].
Figure 5: Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].

Scrolling through the search results, an entry from Java’s systemd journal can be identified. This log contains the full, unaltered payload. GCHQ’s CyberChef can then be used to decode the Base64 data into the attacker’s script, which will ultimately be executed.

Decoding the attacker’s payload in CyberChef.
Figure 6: Decoding the attacker’s payload in CyberChef.

In this instance, the malware was identified as a variant of a campaign that has been previously documented in depth by Darktrace.

Investigating Perfctl Malware

This campaign deploys a malware sample known as ‘perfctl to the compromised host. The script executed by the attacker downloads a Go binary named “promocioni.php” from 200[.]4.115.1. Its functionality is consistent with previously documented perfctl samples, with only minor changes such as updated filenames and a new command-and-control (C2) domain.

Perfctl is a stealthy malware that has several systems designed  to evade detection. The main binary is packed with UPX, with the header intentionally tampered with to prevent unpacking using regular tools. The binary also avoids executing any malicious code if it detects debugging or tracing activity, or if artifacts left by earlier stages are missing.

To further aid its evasive capabilities, perfctl features a usermode rootkit using an LD preload. This causes dynamically linked executables to load perfctl’s rootkit payload before other system modules, allowing it to override functions, such as intercepting calls to list files and hiding output from the returned list. Perfctl uses this to hide its own files, as well as other files like the ld.so.preload file, preventing users from identifying that a rootkit is present in the first place.

This also makes it difficult to dynamically analyze, as even analysts aware of the rootkit will struggle to get around it due to its aggressiveness in hiding its components. A useful trick is to use the busybox-static utilities, which are statically linked and therefore immune to LD preloading.

Perfctl will attempt to use sudo to escalate its permissions to root if the user it was executed as has the required privileges. Failing this, it will attempt to exploit the vulnerability CVE-2021-4034.

Ultimately, perfctl will attempt to establish a C2 link via Tor and spawn an XMRig miner to mine the Monero cryptocurrency. The traffic to the mining pool is encapsulated within Tor to limit network detection of the mining traffic.

Darktrace’s Cloudypots system has observed 1,959 infections of the perfctl campaign across its honeypot network in the past year, making it one of the most aggressive campaigns seen by Darktrace.

Key takeaways

This blog has shown how Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation equips defenders in the face of a real-world attacker campaign. By using this solution, organizations can acquire forensic evidence and investigate intrusions across multiple cloud resources and providers, enabling defenders to see the full picture of an intrusion on day one. Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s patented data-processing system takes advantage of the cloud’s scale to rapidly process large amounts of data, allowing triage to take minutes, not hours.

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation is available as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) but can also be deployed on-premises as a virtual application or natively in the cloud, providing flexibility between convenience and data sovereignty to suit any use case.

Support for acquiring traditional compute instances like EC2, as well as more exotic and newly targeted platforms such as ECS and Lambda, ensures that attacks taking advantage of Living-off-the-Cloud (LOTC) strategies can be triaged quickly and easily as part of incident response. As attackers continue to develop new techniques, the ability to investigate how they use cloud services to persist and pivot throughout an environment is just as important to triage as a single compromised EC2 instance.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer
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