March 12, 2025

Darktrace's Detection of State-Linked ShadowPad Malware

In 2024, Darktrace identified a cluster of intrusions involving the state-linked malware, ShadowPad. This blog will detail ShadowPad and the associated activities detected by Darktrace.

Written by

Sam Lister

Specialist Security Researcher

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Sam Lister

Specialist Security Researcher

Mar 2025

An integral part of cybersecurity is anomaly detection, which involves identifying unusual patterns or behaviors in network traffic that could indicate malicious activity, such as a cyber-based intrusion. However, attribution remains one of the ever present challenges in cybersecurity. Attribution involves the process of accurately identifying and tracing the source to a specific threat actor(s).

Given the complexity of digital networks and the sophistication of attackers who often use proxies or other methods to disguise their origin, pinpointing the exact source of a cyberattack is an arduous task. Threat actors can use proxy servers, botnets, sophisticated techniques, false flags, etc. Darktrace’s strategy is rooted in the belief that identifying behavioral anomalies is crucial for identifying both known and novel threat actor campaigns.

The ShadowPad cluster

Between July 2024 and November 2024, Darktrace observed a cluster of activity threads sharing notable similarities. The threads began with a malicious actor using compromised user credentials to log in to the target organization's Check Point Remote Access virtual private network (VPN) from an attacker-controlled, remote device named 'DESKTOP-O82ILGG'. In one case, the IP from which the initial login was carried out was observed to be the ExpressVPN IP address, 194.5.83[.]25. After logging in, the actor gained access to service account credentials, likely via exploitation of an information disclosure vulnerability affecting Check Point Security Gateway devices. Recent reporting suggests this could represent exploitation of CVE-2024-24919 [27,28]. The actor then used these compromised service account credentials to move laterally over RDP and SMB, with files related to the modular backdoor, ShadowPad, being delivered to the ‘C:\PerfLogs\’ directory of targeted internal systems. ShadowPad was seen communicating with its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, 158.247.199[.]185 (dscriy.chtq[.]net), via both HTTPS traffic and DNS tunneling, with subdomains of the domain ‘cybaq.chtq[.]net’ being used in the compromised devices’ TXT DNS queries.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s Advanced Search data showing the VPN-connected device initiating RDP connections to a domain controller (DC). The device subsequently distributes likely ShadowPad-related payloads and makes DRSGetNCChanges requests to a second DC.

Figure 2: Event Log data showing a DC making DNS queries for subdomains of ‘cbaq.chtq[.]net’ to 158.247.199[.]185 after receiving SMB and RDP connections from the VPN-connected device, DESKTOP-O82ILGG.

Darktrace observed these ShadowPad activity threads within the networks of European-based customers in the manufacturing and financial sectors. One of these intrusions was followed a few months later by likely state-sponsored espionage activity, as detailed in the investigation of the year in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2024.

[related-resource]

Related ShadowPad activity

Additional cases of ShadowPad were observed across Darktrace’s customer base in 2024. In some cases, common C2 infrastructure with the cluster discussed above was observed, with dscriy.chtq[.]net and cybaq.chtq[.]net both involved; however, no other common features were identified. These ShadowPad infections were observed between April and November 2024, with customers across multiple regions and sectors affected. Darktrace’s observations align with multiple other public reports that fit the timeframe of this campaign.

Darktrace has also observed other cases of ShadowPad without common infrastructure since September 2024, suggesting the use of this tool by additional threat actors. ‍

The data theft thread

One of the Darktrace customers impacted by the ShadowPad cluster highlighted above was a European manufacturer. A distinct thread of activity occurred within this organization’s network several months after the ShadowPad intrusion, in October 2024.

The thread involved the internal distribution of highly masqueraded executable files via Sever Message Block (SMB) and WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation), the targeted collection of sensitive information from an internal server, and the exfiltration of collected information to a web of likely compromised sites. This observed thread of activity, therefore, consisted of three phrases: lateral movement, collection, and exfiltration.

The lateral movement phase began when an internal user device used an administrative credential to distribute files named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ and 'ProgramData\Oracle\duxwfnfo' to the c$ share on another internal system.

*Figure 3: Darktrace model alert highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ to the c$ share on another device.*

Over the next few days, Darktrace detected several other internal systems using administrative credentials to upload files with the following names to the c$ share on internal systems:

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Oracle\Java\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Oracle\Java\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Abletech\Client\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Abletech\Client\client.exe

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\rzrmxrwfvp

ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\3DxWare.exe

ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\webservices.dll

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\updater.exe

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\webservices.dll

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\imtrqjsaqmm

*Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll’ to the c$ share on an internal system.*

The threat actor appears to have abused the Microsoft RPC (MS-RPC) service, WMI, to execute distributed payloads, as evidenced by the ExecMethod requests to the IWbemServices RPC interface which immediately followed devices’ SMB uploads.

*Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst data highlighting a thread of activity starting with an SMB data upload followed by ExecMethod requests.*

Several of the devices involved in these lateral movement activities, both on the source and destination side, were subsequently seen using administrative credentials to download tens of GBs of sensitive data over SMB from a specially selected server. The data gathering stage of the threat sequence indicates that the threat actor had a comprehensive understanding of the organization’s system architecture and had precise objectives for the information they sought to extract.

Immediately after collecting data from the targeted server, devices went on to exfiltrate stolen data to multiple sites. Several other likely compromised sites appear to have been used as general C2 infrastructure for this intrusion activity. The sites used by the threat actor for C2 and data exfiltration purport to be sites for companies offering a variety of service, ranging from consultancy to web design.

Screenshot of one of the likely compromised sites used in the intrusion. — *Figure 6: Screenshot* *of one of the likely compromised sites used in the intrusion.*

At least 16 sites were identified as being likely data exfiltration or C2 sites used by this threat actor in their operation against this organization. The fact that the actor had such a wide web of compromised sites at their disposal suggests that they were well-resourced and highly prepared.

*Figure 7: Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device slowly exfiltrating data to the external endpoint, yasuconsulting[.]com.*

Figure 8: Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device downloading nearly 1 GB of data from an internal system just before uploading a similar volume of data to another suspicious endpoint, www.tunemmuhendislik[.]com

Cyber AI Analyst spotlight

*Figure 9: Cyber AI Analyst identifying and piecing together the various steps of a ShadowPad intrusion.*

*Figure 10: Cyber AI Analyst Incident identifying and piecing together the various steps of the data theft activity.*

As shown in the above figures, Cyber AI Analyst’s ability to thread together the different steps of these attack chains are worth highlighting.

In the ShadowPad attack chains, Cyber AI Analyst was able to identify SMB writes from the VPN subnet to the DC, and the C2 connections from the DC. It was also able to weave together this activity into a single thread representing the attacker’s progression.

Similarly, in the data exfiltration attack chain, Cyber AI Analyst identified and connected multiple types of lateral movement over SMB and WMI and external C2 communication to various external endpoints, linking them in a single, connected incident.

These Cyber AI Analyst actions enabled a quicker understanding of the threat actor sequence of events and, in some cases, faster containment.

Attribution puzzle

Publicly shared research into ShadowPad indicates that it is predominantly used as a backdoor in People’s Republic of China (PRC)-sponsored espionage operations [5][6][7][8][9][10]. Most publicly reported intrusions involving ShadowPad are attributed to the China-based threat actor, APT41 [11][12]. Furthermore, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) recently shared their assessment that ShadowPad usage is restricted to clusters associated with APT41 [13]. Interestingly, however, there have also been public reports of ShadowPad usage in unattributed intrusions [5].

The data theft activity that later occurred in the same Darktrace customer network as one of these ShadowPad compromises appeared to be the targeted collection and exfiltration of sensitive data. Such an objective indicates the activity may have been part of a state-sponsored operation. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), artifacts, and C2 infrastructure observed in the data theft thread appear to resemble activity seen in previous Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)-linked intrusion activities [15] [16] [17] [18] [19].

The distribution of payloads to the following directory locations appears to be a relatively common behavior in DPRK-sponsored intrusions.

Observed examples:

C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\

C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\

C:\ProgramData\Abletech\Client\

C:\ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\

C:\ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\

Additionally, the likely compromised websites observed in the data theft thread, along with some of the target URI patterns seen in the C2 communications to these sites, resemble those seen in previously reported DPRK-linked intrusion activities.

No clear evidence was found to link the ShadowPad compromise to the subsequent data theft activity that was observed on the network of the manufacturing customer. It should be noted, however, that no clear signs of initial access were found for the data theft thread – this could suggest the ShadowPad intrusion itself represents the initial point of entry that ultimately led to data exfiltration.

Motivation-wise, it seems plausible for the data theft thread to have been part of a DPRK-sponsored operation. DPRK is known to pursue targets that could potentially fulfil its national security goals and had been publicly reported as being active in months prior to this intrusion [21]. Furthermore, the timing of the data theft aligns with the ratification of the mutual defense treaty between DPRK and Russia and the subsequent accused activities [20].

Darktrace assesses with medium confidence that a nation-state, likely DPRK, was responsible, based on our investigation, the threat actor applied resources, patience, obfuscation, and evasiveness combined with external reporting, collaboration with the cyber community, assessing the attacker’s motivation and world geopolitical timeline, and undisclosed intelligence.

Conclusion

When state-linked cyber activity occurs within an organization’s environment, previously unseen C2 infrastructure and advanced evasion techniques will likely be used. State-linked cyber actors, through their resources and patience, are able to bypass most detection methods, leaving anomaly-based methods as a last line of defense.

Two threads of activity were observed within Darktrace’s customer base over the last year: The first operation involved the abuse of Check Point VPN credentials to log in remotely to organizations’ networks, followed by the distribution of ShadowPad to an internal domain controller. The second operation involved highly targeted data exfiltration from the network of one of the customers impacted by the previously mentioned ShadowPad activity.

Despite definitive attribution remaining unresolved, both the ShadowPad and data exfiltration activities were detected by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, with Cyber AI Analyst playing a significant role in identifying and piecing together the various steps of the intrusion activities.

Credit to Sam Lister (R&D Detection Analyst), Emma Foulger (Principal Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (VP), and the Darktrace Threat Research team.

Appendices

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Short Period)

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Device / Multiple C2 Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

(Technique name – Tactic ID)

ShadowPad malware threads

Initial Access - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

Initial Access - External Remote Services (T1133)

Privilege Escalation - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001)

Defense Evasion - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002)

Command and Control - Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

Command and Control - Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: DNS (T1071.004)

Data theft thread

Resource Development - Compromise Infrastructure: Domains (T1584.001)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

Execution - Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)

Defense Evasion - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Defense Evasion - Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002)

Collection - Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

Command and Control - Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

Command and Control - Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002)

Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041)

Exfiltration - Data Transfer Size Limits (T1030)

List of indicators of compromise (IoCs)

IP addresses and/or domain names (Mid-high confidence):

ShadowPad thread

- dscriy.chtq[.]net • 158.247.199[.]185 (endpoint of C2 comms)

- cybaq.chtq[.]net (domain name used for DNS tunneling)

Data theft thread

- yasuconsulting[.]com (45.158.12[.]7)

- hobivan[.]net (94.73.151[.]72)

- mediostresbarbas.com[.]ar (75.102.23[.]3)

- mnmathleague[.]org (185.148.129[.]24)

- goldenborek[.]com (94.138.200[.]40)

- tunemmuhendislik[.]com (94.199.206[.]45)

- anvil.org[.]ph (67.209.121[.]137)

- partnerls[.]pl (5.187.53[.]50)

- angoramedikal[.]com (89.19.29[.]128)

- awork-designs[.]dk (78.46.20[.]225)

- digitweco[.]com (38.54.95[.]190)

- duepunti-studio[.]it (89.46.106[.]61)

- scgestor.com[.]br (108.181.92[.]71)

- lacapannadelsilenzio[.]it (86.107.36[.]15)

- lovetamagotchith[.]com (203.170.190[.]137)

- lieta[.]it (78.46.146[.]147)

File names (Mid-high confidence):

ShadowPad thread:

- perflogs\1.txt

- perflogs\AppLaunch.exe

- perflogs\F4A3E8BE.tmp

- perflogs\mscoree.dll

Data theft thread

- ProgramData\Oracle\java.log

- ProgramData\Oracle\duxwfnfo

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Oracle\Java\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Oracle\Java\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Abletech\Client\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Abletech\Client\client.exe

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\rzrmxrwfvp

- ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\3DxWare.exe

- ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\updater.exe

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\imtrqjsaqmm

- temp\HousecallLauncher64.exe

Attacker-controlled device hostname (Mid-high confidence)

- DESKTOP-O82ILGG

References

[1] https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/shadowpad-how-attackers-hide-backdoor-in-software-used-by-hundreds-of-large-companies-around-the-world

[2] https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2017/08/07172148/ShadowPad_technical_description_PDF.pdf

[3] https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities

[4] https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/

[5] https://assets.sentinelone.com/c/Shadowpad?x=P42eqA

[6] https://www.cyfirma.com/research/the-origins-of-apt-41-and-shadowpad-lineage/

[7] https://www.csoonline.com/article/572061/shadowpad-has-become-the-rat-of-choice-for-several-state-sponsored-chinese-apts.html

[8] https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/shadowpad-new-activity-from-the-winnti-group

[9] https://cymulate.com/threats/shadowpad-privately-sold-malware-espionage-tool/

[10] https://www.secureworks.com/research/shadowpad-malware-analysis

[11] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/chinese-hacking-group-apt41-compromised-taiwanese-government-affiliated-research-institute-with-shadowpad-and-cobaltstrike-2/

[12] https://hackerseye.net/all-blog-items/tails-from-the-shadow-apt-41-injecting-shadowpad-with-sideloading/

[13] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scatterbrain-unmasking-poisonplug-obfuscator

[14] https://www.domaintools.com/wp-content/uploads/conceptualizing-a-continuum-of-cyber-threat-attribution.pdf

[15] https://www.nccgroup.com/es/research-blog/north-korea-s-lazarus-their-initial-access-trade-craft-using-social-media-and-social-engineering/

[16] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/01/28/zinc-attacks-against-security-researchers/

[17] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/

[18] https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/

[19] https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2021/01/Lazarus_malware2.html

[20] https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-unlawful-arms-transfer-by-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-russia/

[21] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/25/2003510137/-1/-1/1/Joint-CSA-North-Korea-Cyber-Espionage-Advance-Military-Nuclear-Programs.PDF

[22] https://kyivindependent.com/first-north-korean-troops-deployed-to-front-line-in-kursk-oblast-ukraines-military-intelligence-says/

[23] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/04/frequent-freeloader-part-i-secret-blizzard-compromising-storm-0156-infrastructure-for-espionage/

[24] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/11/frequent-freeloader-part-ii-russian-actor-secret-blizzard-using-tools-of-other-groups-to-attack-ukraine/

[25] https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/chamelgang-attacking-critical-infrastructure-with-ransomware/

[26] https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/state-backed-hackers-using-ransomware.html/

[27] https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/check-point-research-explains-shadow-pad-nailaolocker-and-its-protection/

[28] https://www.orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/cert-news/meet-nailaolocker-a-ransomware-distributed-in-europe-by-shadowpad-and-plugx-backdoors

[related-resource]

AI Cybersecurity: Insights for 2025

We surveyed 1,500+ cybersecurity professionals globally to explore their views, knowledge, and priorities on AI cybersecurity in 2025.

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Written by

Sam Lister

Specialist Security Researcher

Inside the SOC

Written by

Sam Lister

Specialist Security Researcher

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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November 6, 2025

Darktrace Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response

Darktrace: The only Customers’ Choice for NDR in 2025

In a year defined by rapid change across the threat landscape, recognition from those who use and rely on security technology every day means the most.

That’s why we’re proud to share that Darktrace has been named the only Customers’ Choice in the 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response (NDR).

Out of 11 leading NDR vendors evaluated, Darktrace stood alone as the sole Customers’ Choice, a recognition that we feel reflects not just our innovation, but the trust and satisfaction of the customers who secure their networks with Darktrace every day.

What the Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer means

“Voice of the Customer” is a document that synthesizes Gartner Peer Insights reviews into insights for buyers of technology and services. This aggregated peer perspective, along with the individual detailed reviews, is complementary to Gartner expert research and can play a key role in your buying process. Peers are verified reviewers of a technology product or service, who not only rate the offering, but also provide valuable feedback to consider before making a purchase decision. Vendors placed in the upper-right “Customers’ Choice” quadrant of the “Voice of the Customer” have scores that meet or exceed the market average for both axes (User Interest and Adoption, and Overall Experience).It’s not just a rating. We feel it’s a reflection of genuine customer sentiment and success in the field.

In our view, Customers consistently highlight Darktrace’s ability to:

Detect and respond to unknown threats in real time
Deliver unmatched visibility across IT, OT, and cloud environments
Automate investigations and responses through AI-driven insights

We believe this recognition reinforces what our customers already know: that Darktrace helps them see, understand, and stop attacks others miss.

A rare double: recognized by customers and analysts alike

This distinction follows another major recogniton. Darktrace’s placement as a Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response earlier this year.

That makes Darktrace the only vendor to achieve both:

A Leader status in the Gartner Magic Quadrant for NDR, and
A Customers’ Choice in Gartner Peer Insights 2025

It’s a rare double that we feel reflects both industry leadership and customer trust, two perspectives that, together, define what great cybersecurity looks like.

A Customers’ Choice across the network and the inbox

To us, this recognition also builds on Darktrace’s momentum across multiple domains. Earlier this year, Darktrace was also named a Customers’ Choice for Email Security Platforms in the Gartner® Peer Insights™ report.

With more than 1,000 verified reviews across Network Detection and Response, Email Security Platforms, and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), we at Darktrace are proud to be trusted across the full attack surface, from the inbox to the industrial network.

Thank you to our customers

We’re deeply grateful to every customer who shared their experience with Darktrace on Gartner Peer Insights. Your insights drive our innovation and continue to shape how we protect complex, dynamic environments across the world.

Discover why customers choose Darktrace for network and email security.

^{Gartner® Peer Insights™ content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences, and should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.}

^{Gartner, Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response, By Peer Community Contributor, 30 October 2025}

About the author

Mikey Anderson

Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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November 5, 2025

Tracking a Dragon: Investigating a DragonForce-affiliated ransomware attack with Darktrace

What is DragonForce?

DragonForce is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform that emerged in late 2023, offering broad-scale capabilities and infrastructure to threat actors. Recently, DragonForce has been linked to attacks targeting the UK retail sector, resulting in several high-profile cases [1][2]. Moreover, the group launched an affiliate program offering a revenue share of roughly 20%, significantly lower than commissions reported across other RaaS platforms [3].

This Darktrace case study examines a DragonForce-linked RaaS infection within the manufacturing industry. The earliest signs of compromise were observed during working hours in August 2025, where an infected device started performing network scans and attempted to brute-force administrative credentials. After eight days of inactivity, threat actors returned and multiple devices began encrypting files via the SMB protocol using a DragonForce-associated file extension. Ransom notes referencing the group were also dropped, suggesting the threat actor is claiming affiliation with DragonForce, though this has not been confirmed.

Despite Darktrace’s detection of the attack in its early stages, the customer’s deployment did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability configured, allowing the threat to progress to data exfiltration and file encryption.

Darktrace's Observations

While the initial access vector was not clearly defined in this case study, it was likely achieved through common methods previously employed out by DragonForce affiliates. These include phishing emails leveraging social engineering tactics, exploitation of public-facing applications with known vulnerabilities, web shells, and/or the abuse of remote management tools.

Darktrace’s analysis identified internal devices performing internal network scanning, brute-forcing credentials, and executing unusual Windows Registry operations. Notably, Windows Registry events involving "Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks" contain subkeys for individual tasks, storing GUIDs that can be used to locate and analyze scheduled tasks. Additionally, Control\WMI\Security holds security descriptors for WMI providers and Event Tracing loggers that use non-default security settings respectively.

Furthermore, Darktrace identified data exfiltration activity over SSH, including connections to an ASN associated with a malicious hosting service geolocated in Russia.

1. Network Scan & Brute Force

Darktrace identified anomalous behavior in late August to early September 2025, originating from a source device engaging in internal network scanning followed by brute-force attempts targeting administrator credential, including “administrator”, “Admin”, “rdpadmin”, “ftpadmin”.

Upon further analysis, one of the HTTP connections seen in this activity revealed the use of the user agent string “OpenVAS-VT”, suggesting that the device was using the OpenVAS vulnerability scanner. Subsequently, additional devices began exhibiting network scanning behavior. During this phase, a file named “delete.me” was deleted by multiple devices using SMB protocol. This file is commonly associated with network scanning and penetration testing tool NetScan.

2. Windows Registry Key Update

Following the scanning phase, Darktrace observed the initial device then performing suspicious Winreg operations. This included the use of the ”BaseRegOpenKey” function across multiple registry paths.

Additional operations such as “BaseRegOpenKey” and “BaseRegQueryValue” were also seen around this time. These operations are typically used to retrieve specific registry key values and allow write operations to registry keys.

The registry keys observed included “SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security” and “Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks”. These keys can be leveraged by malicious actors to update WMI access controls and schedule malicious tasks, respectively, both of which are common techniques for establishing persistence within a compromised system.

3. New Administrator Credential Usage

Darktrace subsequently detected the device using a highly privileged credential, “administrator”, via a successful Kerberos login for the first time. Shortly after, the same credential was used again for a successful SMB session.

These marked the first instances of authentication using the “administrator” credential across the customer’s environment, suggesting potential malicious use of the credential following the earlier brute-force activity.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in Kerberos login events by an infected device.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in SMB sessions by an infected device.

4. Data Exfiltration

Prior to ransomware deployment, several infected devices were observed exfiltrating data to the malicious IP 45.135.232[.]229 via SSH connections [7][8]. This was followed by the device downloading data from other internal devices and transferring an unusually large volume of data to the same external endpoint.

The IP address was first seen on the network on September 2, 2025 - the same date as the observed data exfiltration activity preceding ransomware deployment and encryption.

Further analysis revealed that the endpoint was geolocated in Russia and registered to the malicious hosting provider Proton66. Multiple external researchers have reported malicious activity involving the same Proton66 ASN (AS198953 Proton66 OOO) as far back as April 2025. These activities notably included vulnerability scanning, exploitation attempts, and phishing campaigns, which ultimately led to malware [4][5][6].

Data Exfiltration Endpoint details.

Endpoint: 45.135.232[.]229
ASN: AS198953 Proton66 OOO
Transport protocol: TCP
Application protocol: SSH
Destination port: 22

Figure 3: Darktrace’s summary of the external IP 45.135.232[.]229, first detected on September 2, 2025. The right-hand side showcases model alerts triggered related to this endpoint including multiple data exfiltration related model alerts.

Further investigation into the endpoint using open-source intelligence (OSINT) revealed that it led to a Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager console webpage. This interface is typically used to configure and manage web servers. However, threat actors have been known to exploit similar setups, using fake certificate warnings to trick users into downloading malware, or deploying malicious IIS modules to steal credentials.

Figure 4: Live screenshot of the destination (45.135.232[.]229), captured via OSINT sources, displaying a Microsoft IIS Manager console webpage.

5. Ransomware Encryption & Ransom Note

Multiple devices were later observed connecting to internal devices via SMB and performing a range of actions indicative of file encryption. This suspicious activity prompted Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst to launch an autonomous investigation, during which it pieced together associated activity and provided concrete timestamps of events for the customer’s visibility.

During this activity, several devices were seen writing a file named “readme.txt” to multiple locations, including network-accessible webroot paths such as inetpub\ and wwwroot\. This “readme.txt” file, later confirmed to be the ransom note, claimed the threat actors were affiliated with DragonForce.

At the same time, devices were seen performing SMB Move, Write and ReadWrite actions involving files with the “.df_win” extension across other internal devices, suggesting that file encryption was actively occurring.

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of SMB events (excluding Read events) where the device was seen moving or writing files with the “.df_win” extension.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of a spike in SMB Write events with the filename “readme.txt” on September 9, indicating the start of file encryption.

Conclusion

The rise of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and increased attacker customization is fragmenting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), making it increasingly difficult for security teams to prepare for and defend against each unique intrusion. RaaS providers like DragonForce further complicate this challenge by enabling a wide range of affiliates, each with varying levels of sophistication [9].

In this instance, Darktrace was able to identify several stages of the attack kill chain, including network scanning, the first-time use of privileged credentials, data exfiltration, and ultimately ransomware encryption. Had the customer enabled Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability, it would have taken timely action to interrupt the attack in its early stages, preventing the eventual data exfiltration and ransomware detonation.

Credit to Justin Torres, Senior Cyber Analyst, Nathaniel Jones, VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO, & Emma Foulger, Global Threat Research Operations Lead.

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

References:

1. https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/dragonforce-goup-ms-coop-harrods/

2. https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/dragonforce-ransomware-attacks-retail-giants

3. https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/dragonforce-ransomware-redefining-hybrid-extortion-in-2025/

4. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-1-mass-scanning-and-exploit-campaigns/

5. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-2-compromised-wordpress-pages-and-malware-campaigns/

6. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/proton66-infrastructure-tied-to-expanding-malware-campaigns-and-c2-operations

7. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.135.232.229

8. https://spur.us/context/45.135.232.229

9. https://www.group-ib.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware/

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

· 45.135.232[.]229 - Endpoint Associated with Data Exfiltration

· .readme.txt – Ransom Note File Extension

· .df_win – File Encryption Extension Observed

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

DragonForce TTPs vs Darktrace Models

Initial Access:

· Anomalous Connection::Callback on Web Facing Device

Command and Control:

· Compromise::SSL or HTTP Beacon

· Compromise::Beacon to Young Endpoint

· Compromise::Beaconing on Uncommon Port

· Compromise::Suspicious SSL Activity

· Anomalous Connection::Devices Beaconing to New Rare IP

· Compromise::Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

· DNS Tunnel with TXT Records

Tooling:

· Anomalous File::EXE from Rare External Location

· Anomalous File::Masqueraded File Transfer

· Anomalous File::Numeric File Download

· Anomalous File::Script from Rare External Location

· Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

· Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

· Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

· Anomalous File::Internet Facing System File Download

Reconnaissance:

· Device::Suspicious SMB Query

· Device::ICMP Address Scan

· Anomalous Connection::SMB Enumeration

· Device::Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

· Anomalous Connection::Possible Share Enumeration Activity

· Device::Possible Active Directory Enumeration

· Anomalous Connection::Large Volume of LDAP Download

· Device::Suspicious LDAP Search Operation

Lateral Movement:

· User::Suspicious Admin SMB Session

· Anomalous Connection::Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

· Anomalous Connection::Unusual Long Remote Desktop Session

· Anomalous Connection::Unusual Admin RDP Session

· User::New Admin Credentials on Client

· User::New Admin Credentials on Server

· Multiple Device Correlations::Spreading New Admin Credentials

· Anomalous Connection::Powershell to Rare External

· Device::New PowerShell User Agent

· Anomalous Active Directory Web Services

· Compromise::Unusual SVCCTL Activity

Evasion:

· Unusual Activity::Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

· Persistence

· Device::Anomalous ITaskScheduler Activity

· Device::AT Service Scheduled Task

· Actions on Objectives

· Compromise::Ransomware::Suspicious SMB Activity (EM)

· Anomalous Connection::Sustained MIME Type Conversion

· Compromise::Ransomware::SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

· Compromise::Ransomware::Possible Ransom Note Write

· Data Sent to Rare Domain

· Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

· Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst Coverage/Investigation Events:

· Web Application Vulnerability Scanning of Multiple Devices

· Port Scanning

· Large Volume of SMB Login Failures

· Unusual RDP Connections

· Widespread Web Application Vulnerability Scanning

· Unusual SSH Connections

· Unusual Repeated Connections

· Possible Application Layer Reconnaissance Activity

· Unusual Administrative Connections

· Suspicious Remote WMI Activity

· Extensive Unusual Administrative Connections

· Suspicious Directory Replication Service Activity

· Scanning of Multiple Devices

· Unusual External Data Transfer

· SMB Write of Suspicious File

· Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

· Access of Probable Unencrypted Password Files

· Internal Download and External Upload

· Possible Encryption of Files over SMB

· SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

_{The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.}

_{Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.}

_{Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.}

_{The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content.}

About the author

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

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