The evolution of supply chain attacks
Supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated. As network defenses improve, threat actors continuously adapt and refine their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to achieve their goals. In recent years, this has led to a rise in the exploitation of trusted services and software, including legitimate browser extensions. Exploitation of these extensions can provide adversaries with a stealthy means to infiltrate target networks and access high-value accounts undetected.
A notable example of this trend was the compromise of the Cyberhaven Chrome extension at the end of 2024. This incident appeared to be part of a broader campaign targeting multiple Chrome browser extensions, highlighting the evolving nature of supply chain attacks [1].
What is Cyberhaven?
Cyberhaven, a US-based data security organization, experienced a security breach on December 24, 2024, when a phishing attack reportedly compromised one of their employee's credentials [2]. This allowed attackers to publish a malicious version of the Cyberhaven Chrome extension, which exfiltrated cookies and authenticated sessions from targeted websites. The malicious extension was active from December 25 to December 26 – a time when most businesses and employees were out of office and enjoying the festive period, a fact not lost on threat actors. The attackers, likely a well-organized and financially motivated group, compromised more than 30 additional Chrome extensions, affecting more than 2.6 million users [3]. They used sophisticated phishing techniques to authorize malicious OAuth applications, bypassing traditional security measures and exploiting vulnerabilities in OAuth authorizations. The primary motive appeared to be financial gain, targeting high-value platforms like social media advertising and AI services [4].
In late December 2024, multiple Darktrace customers were compromised via the Cyberhaven Chrome extension; this blog will primarily focus on Darktrace / NETWORK detections from one affected customer.
Darktrace’s coverage of Cyberhaven compromises
On December 26, 2024, Darktrace identified a series of suspicious activities across multiple customer environments, uncovering a structured attack sequence that progressed from initial intrusion to privilege escalation and data exfiltration. The attack was distributed through a malicious update to the Cyberhaven Chrome extension [2]. The malicious update established a foothold in customer environments almost immediately, leading to further anomalies.
As with other Chrome browser extensions, Cyberhaven Chrome extensions were updated automatically with no user interaction required. However, in this instance, the automatic update included a malicious version which was deployed to customer environments. This almost immediately introduced unauthorized activity, allowing attackers to establish a foothold in customer networks. The update allowed attackers to execute their objectives in the background, undetected by traditional security tools that rely on known indicators of compromise (IoCS) rather than identifying anomalies.
While multiple customer devices were seen connecting to cyberhaven[.]io, a legitimate Cyberhaven domain, Darktrace detected persistent beaconing behavior to cyberhavenext[.]pro, which appeared to be attempting to masquerade as another legitimate Cyberhaven domain. Darktrace recognized this activity as unusual, triggering several model alerts in Darktrace / NETWORK to highlight the persistent outbound connections to the suspicious domain.
Further analysis of external connectivity patterns indicated an increase in anomalous HTTP requests alongside this beaconing activity. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources also suggest that the cyberhavenext[.]pro endpoint is associated with malicious activities [5].
![Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of beaconing activity to cyberhavenext[.]pro](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/67dc7499269bcc358b9aad33_Screenshot%202025-03-20%20at%201.03.14%E2%80%AFPM.png)
Analysis using Darktrace’s Advanced Search revealed that some of these connections were directed to the suspicious external IP address 149.28.124[.]84. Further investigation confirmed that the IP correlated with two SSL hostnames, including the malicious cyberhavenext[.]pro, further reinforcing its connection to the attack infrastructure.
![Darktrace Advanced Search analysis showing the IP address 149.28.124[.]84 correlating to two SSL hostnames, one of which is cyberhavenext[.]pro.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/67dc74e07eb5ef51eee6c6dd_Screenshot%202025-03-20%20at%201.04.30%E2%80%AFPM.png)
Between December 23 and December 27, Darktrace observed sustained beaconing-like activity from affected devices on the customer’s network.
![Darktrace’s detection of beaconing activities from a customer device to the endpoint 149.28.124[.]84 between December 23 and December 27.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/67dc7518caefb6d1f494c515_Screenshot%202025-03-20%20at%201.05.30%E2%80%AFPM.png)
Darktrace observed 27 unique devices connecting to the malicious command-and-control (C2) infrastructure as far back as December 3. While most connections were brief, they represented an entry point for malicious activity. Over a two-day period, two devices transmitted 5.57 GiB of incoming data and 859.37 MiB of outgoing data, generating over 3 million log events across SSL, HTTP, and connection data.
Subsequent analysis identified a significant increase in unauthorized data transfers to the aforementioned 149.28.124[.]84 IP on another customer network, highlighting the potential broader impact of this compromise. The volume and frequency of these transfers suggested that attackers were leveraging automated data collection techniques, further underscoring the sophistication of the attack.
![Darktrace’s detection of the likely exfiltration of 859.37 MiB to the endpoint 149.28.124[.]84.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/67dc756dafea47eab5474512_Screenshot%202025-03-20%20at%201.06.47%E2%80%AFPM.png)
External research suggested that once active, the Cyberhaven extension would begin silently collecting session cookies and authentication tokens, specifically targeting high-value accounts such as Facebook Ads accounts [4]. Darktrace’s analysis of another affected customer noted many HTTP POST connections directed to a specific URI ("ai-cyberhaven"), while GET requests contained varying URIs prefixed with "/php/urlblock?args=AAAh....--redirect." This activity indicated an exfiltration mechanism, consistent with techniques observed in other compromised Chrome extensions. By compromising session cookies, attackers could potentially gain administrative access to connected accounts, further escalating their privileges [4].
Conclusion
This incident highlights the importance of monitoring not just endpoint security, but also cloud and browser-based security solutions, as attackers increasingly target these trusted and oft overlooked vectors.
Ultimately, by focusing on anomaly detection and behavioral analysis rather than static signatures and lists of ‘known bads’, Darktrace was able to successfully detect devices affected by the Cyberhaven Chrome browser extension compromise, by identifying activity that would likely have been considered legitimate and benign by traditional security solutions.
This compromise also serves as a reminder that supply chain attacks are not limited to traditional software vendors. Browser extensions, cloud-based applications, and SaaS services are equally vulnerable, as evidenced by Darktrace's detection of Balada Injector malware exploiting WordPress vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized network access [6]. Therefore, increased targeting of browser-based security tools, and a greater exploitation of OAuth and session hijacking techniques are to be expected. Attackers will undoubtedly refine their methods to infiltrate legitimate vendors and distribute malicious updates through trusted channels. By staying informed, vigilant, and proactive, organizations can mitigate exposure to evolving supply chain threats and safeguard their critical assets from emerging browser-based attack techniques.
Credit to Rajendra Rushanth (Cyber Analyst) Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)
Appendices
Darktrace Model Detections
· Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare (AP: C2 Comms)
· Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days (AP: C2 Comms)
· Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination (AP: C2 Comms)
· Device / Suspicious Domain (AP: C2 Comms, AP: Tooling)
· Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint (AP: C2 Comms)
· Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server (AP: C2 Comms)
· Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint (AP: C2 Comms)
· Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device (AP: C2 Comms)
· Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare (AP: C2 Comms)
· Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days (AP: C2 Comms)
· Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname (AP: C2 Comms)
· Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server (AP: C2 Comms)
· Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score (AP: C2 Comms)
· Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections (AP: C2 Comms)
· Email Nexus / Connection to Hijacked Correspondent Link
· Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External (AP: C2 Comms)
· Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing (AP: C2 Comms)
List of IoCs
IoC - Type - Description + Confidence
cyberhavenext[.]pro - Hostname - Used for C2 communications and data exfiltration (cookies and session tokens)
149.28.124[.]84 - IP - Associated with malicious infrastructure
45.76.225[.]148 - IP - Associated with malicious infrastructure
136.244.115[.]219 - IP - Associated with malicious infrastructure
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique
INITIAL ACCESS - T1176 - Browser Extensions
EXECUTION - T1204.002 - Malicious Browser Extensions
PERSISTENCE - T1176 - Browser Extensions
COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - Web Protocols
COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001 - Data Obfuscation
CREDENTIAL ACCESS - T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie
DISCOVERY - T1518.001 - Security Software Discovery
LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1557.003 - Man-in-the-Browser
EXFILTRATION - T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 - Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
IMPACT - T1583.006 - Session Hijacking
References
[1] https://thehackernews.com/2024/12/16-chrome-extensions-hacked-exposing.html
[3] https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/chrome-browser-extensions-hijacked/
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