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December 16, 2024

Cleo File Transfer Vulnerability: Patch Pitfalls and Darktrace’s Detection of Post-Exploitation Activities

File transfer applications are prime targets for ransomware groups due to their critical role in business operations. Recent vulnerabilities in Cleo's MFT software, namely CVE-2024-50623 and CVE-2024-55956, highlight ongoing risks. Read more about the Darktrace Threat Research team’s investigation into these vulnerabilities.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Maria Geronikolou
Cyber Analyst
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16
Dec 2024

File transfer applications: A target for ransomware

File transfer applications have been a consistent target, particularly for ransomware groups, in recent years because they are key parts of business operations and have trusted access across different parts of an organization that include potentially confidential and personal information about an organization and its employees.

Recent targets of ransomware criminals includes applications like Acellion, Moveit, and GoAnywhere [1]. This seems to have been the case for Cleo’s managed file transfer (MFT) software solutions and the vulnerability CVE-2024-50623.

Threat overview: Understanding Cleo file transfer vulnerability

This vulnerability was believed to have been patched with the release of version 5.8.0.21 in late October 2024. However, open-source intelligence (OSINT) reported that the Clop ransomware group had managed to bypass the initial patch in late November, leading to the successful exploitation of the previously patched CVE.

In the last few days Cleo has published a new vulnerability, CVE-2024-55956, which is not a patch bypass of the CVE-2024-50623 but rather another vulnerability. This is also an unauthenticated file write vulnerability but while CVE-2024-50623 allows for both reading and writing arbitrary files, the CVE-2024-55956 only allows for writing arbitrary files and was addressed in version 5.8.0.24 [2].

Darktrace Threat Research analysts have already started investigating potential signs of devices running the Cleo software with network traffic supporting this initial hypothesis.

Comparison of CVE-2024-50623 and CVE-2024-55956

While CVE-2024-50623 was initially listed as a cross-site scripting issue, it was updated on December 10 to reflect unrestricted file upload and download. This vulnerability could lead to remote code execution (RCE) in versions of Cleo’s Harmony, VLTrader, and LexiCom products prior to 5.8.0.24. Attackers could leverage the fact that files are placed in the "autorun" sub-directory within the installation folder and are immediately read, interpreted, and evaluated by the susceptible software [3].

CVE-2024-55956, refers to an unauthenticated user who can import and execute arbitrary Bash or PowerShell commands on the host system by leveraging the default settings of the Autorun directory [4]. Both CVEs have occurred due to separate issues in the “/Synchronization” endpoint.

Investigating post exploitation patterns of activity on Cleo software

Proof of exploitation

Darktrace’s Threat Research analysts investigated multiple cases where devices identified as likely running Cleo software were detected engaging in unusual behavior. Analysts also attempted to identify any possible association between publicly available indicators of compromise (IoCs) and the exploitation of the vulnerability, using evidence of anomalous network traffic.

One case involved an Internet-facing device likely running Cleo VLTrader software (based on its hostname) reaching out to the 100% rare Lithuanian IP 181.214.147[.]164 · AS 15440 (UAB Baltnetos komunikacijos).

This activity occurred in the early hours of December 8 on the network of a customer in the energy sector. Darktrace detected a Cleo server transferring around over 500 MB of data over multiple SSL connections via port 443 to the Lithuanian IP. External research reported that this IP appears to be a callback IP observed in post-exploitation activity of vulnerable Cleo devices [3].

While this device was regularly observed sending data to external endpoints, this transfer represented a small increase in data sent to public IPs and coupled with the rarity of the destination, triggered a model alert as well as a Cyber AI Analyst Incident summarizing the transfer. Unfortunately, due to the encrypted connection no further analysis of the transmitted data was possible. However, due to the rarity of the activity, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response intervened and prevented any further connections to the IP.

 Model Alert Event Log show repeated connections to the rare IP, filtered with the rarity metric.
Figure 1: Model Alert Event Log show repeated connections to the rare IP, filtered with the rarity metric.
Shows connections to 181.214.147[.]164 and the amount of data transferred.
Figure 2: Shows connections to 181.214.147[.]164 and the amount of data transferred.

On the same day, external connections were observed to the external IP 45.182.189[.]225, along with inbound SSL connections from the same endpoint. OSINT has also linked this IP to the exploitation of Cleo software vulnerabilities [5].

Outgoing connections from a Cleo server to an anomalous endpoint.
Figure 3: Outgoing connections from a Cleo server to an anomalous endpoint.
 Incoming SSL connections from the external IP 45.182.189[.]225.
Figure 4: Incoming SSL connections from the external IP 45.182.189[.]225.

Hours after the last connection to 181.214.147[.]164, the integration detection tool from CrowdStrike, which the customer had integrated with Darktrace, issued an alert. This alert provided additional visibility into host-level processes and highlighted the following command executed on the Cleo server:

“D:\VLTrader\jre\bin\java.exe" -jar cleo.4889

Figure 5: The executed comand “D:\VLTrader\jre\bin\java.exe" -jar cleo.4889 and the Resource Location: \Device\HarddiskVolume3\VLTrader\jre\bin\java.exe.

Three days later, on December 11, another CrowdStrike integration alert was generated, this time following encoded PowerShell command activity on the server. This is consistent with post-exploitation activity where arbitrary PowerShell commands are executed on compromised systems leveraging the default settings of the Autorun directory, as highlighted by Cleo support [6]. According to external researchers , this process initiates connections to an external IP to retrieve JAR files with webshell-like functionality for continued post-exploitation [3]. The IP embedded in both commands observed by Darktrace was 38.180.242[.]122, hosted on ASN 58061(Scalaxy B.V.). There is no OSINT associating this IP with Cleo vulnerability exploitation at the time of writing.

Another device within the same customer network exhibited similar data transfer and command execution activity around the same time, suggesting it had also been compromised through this vulnerability. However, this second device contacted a different external IP, 5.45.74[.]137, hosted on AS 58061 (Scalaxy B.V.).

Like the first device, multiple connections to this IP were detected, with almost 600 MB of data transferred over the SSL protocol.

The Security Integration Detection Model that was triggered  and the PowerShell command observed
Figure 6: The Security Integration Detection Model that was triggered  and the PowerShell command observed
 Incoming connections from the external IP 38.180.242[.]122.
Figure 7: Incoming connections from the external IP 38.180.242[.]122.
Connections to the external IP 5.45.74[.]137.
Figure 8: Connections to the external IP 5.45.74[.]137.
Figure 9: Autonomous Response Actions triggered during the suspicious activities

While investigating potential Cleo servers involved in similar outgoing data activity, Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified two additional instances of likely Cleo vulnerability exploitation used to exfiltrate data outside the network. In those two instances, unusual outgoing data transfers were observed to the IP 176.123.4[.]22 (AS 200019, AlexHost SRL), with around 500 MB of data being exfiltrated over port 443 in one case (the exact volume could not be confirmed in the other instance). This IP was found embedded in encoded PowerShell commands examined by external researchers in the context of Cleo vulnerability exploitation investigations.

Conclusion

Overall, Cleo software represents a critical component of many business operations, being utilized by over 4,000 organizations worldwide. This renders the software an attractive target for threat actors who aim at exploiting internet-facing devices that could be used to compromise the software’s direct users but also other dependent industries resulting in supply chain attacks.

Darktrace / NETWORK was able to capture traffic linked to exploitation of CVE-2024-50623 within models that triggered such as Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint while its Autonomous Response capability successfully blocked the anomalous connections and exfiltration attempts.

Information on new CVEs, how they're being exploited, and whether they've been patched can be fast-changing, sometimes limited and often confusing. Regardless, Darktrace is able to identify and alert to unusual behavior on these systems, indicating exploitation.

Credit to Maria Geronikolou, Alexandra Sentenac, Emma Fougler, Signe Zaharka and the Darktrace Threat Research team

Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

Attackers are adapting, are you ready? This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025.

  • Identity-based attacks: How attackers are bypassing traditional defenses
  • Zero-day exploitation: The rise of previously unknown vulnerabilities
  • AI-driven threats: How adversaries are leveraging AI to outmaneuver security controls

Stay ahead of evolving threats with expert analysis from Darktrace. Download the report here.

Appendices

References

[1] https://blog.httpcs.com/en/file-sharing-and-transfer-software-the-new-target-of-hackers/

[2] https://attackerkb.com/topics/geR0H8dgrE/cve-2024-55956/rapid7-analysis

[3] https://www.huntress.com/blog/threat-advisory-oh-no-cleo-cleo-software-actively-being-exploited-in-the-wild

[4] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55956

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/cleopatras-shadow-a-mass-exploitation-campaign/

[6] https://support.cleo.com/hc/en-us/articles/28408134019735-Cleo-Product-Security-Advisory-CVE-Pending

[7] https://support.cleo.com/hc/en-us/articles/360034260293-Local-HTTP-Users-Configuration

Darktrace Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Security Integration / High Severity Integration Incident

Security Integration / Low Severity Integration Detection

Autonomous Response Model Detections

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Cyber AI Analyst Incidents

Unusual External Data Transfer

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique

INITIAL ACCESS – Exploit Public-Facing Application

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Application Layer Protocol (Web Protocols)

COMMAND AND CONTROL – Encrypted Channel

PERSISTENCE – Web Shell

EXFILTRATION - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

IoC List

IoC       Type    Description + Probability

181.214.147[.]164      IP Address       Likely C2 Infrastructure

176.123.4[.]22            IP Address       Likely C2 Infrastructure

5.45.74[.]137               IP Address           Possible C2 Infrastructure

38.180.242[.]122        IP Address       Possible C2 Infrastructure

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Maria Geronikolou
Cyber Analyst

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June 5, 2025

Unpacking ClickFix: Darktrace’s detection of a prolific social engineering tactic

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What is ClickFix and how does it work?

Amid heightened security awareness, threat actors continue to seek stealthy methods to infiltrate target networks, often finding the human end user to be the most vulnerable and easily exploited entry point.

ClickFix baiting is an exploitation of the end user, making use of social engineering techniques masquerading as error messages or routine verification processes, that can result in malicious code execution.

Since March 2024, the simplicity of this technique has drawn attention from a range of threat actors, from individual cybercriminals to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups such as APT28 and MuddyWater, linked to Russia and Iran respectively, introducing security threats on a broader scale [1]. ClickFix campaigns have been observed affecting organizations in across multiple industries, including healthcare, hospitality, automotive and government [2][3].

Actors carrying out these targeted attacks typically utilize similar techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) to gain initial access. These include spear phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, or exploiting trust in familiar online platforms, such as GitHub, to deliver malicious payloads [2][3]. Often, a hidden link within an email or malvertisements on compromised legitimate websites redirect the end user to a malicious URL [4]. These take the form of ‘Fix It’ or fake CAPTCHA prompts [4].

From there, users are misled into believing they are completing a human verification step, registering a device, or fixing a non-existent issue such as a webpage display error. As a result, they are guided through a three-step process that ultimately enables the execution of malicious PowerShell commands:

  1. Open a Windows Run dialog box [press Windows Key + R]
  2. Automatically or manually copy and paste a malicious PowerShell command into the terminal [press CTRL+V]
  3. And run the prompt [press ‘Enter’] [2]

Once the malicious PowerShell command is executed, threat actors then establish command and control (C2) communication within the targeted environment before moving laterally through the network with the intent of obtaining and stealing sensitive data [4]. Malicious payloads associated with various malware families, such as XWorm, Lumma, and AsyncRAT, are often deployed [2][3].

Attack timeline of ClickFix cyber attack

Based on investigations conducted by Darktrace’s Threat Research team in early 2025, this blog highlights Darktrace’s capability to detect ClickFix baiting activity following initial access.

Darktrace’s coverage of a ClickFix attack chain

Darktrace identified multiple ClickFix attacks across customer environments in both Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and the United States. The following incident details a specific attack on a customer network that occurred on April 9, 2025.

Although the initial access phase of this specific attack occurred outside Darktrace’s visibility, other affected networks showed compromise beginning with phishing emails or fake CAPTCHA prompts that led users to execute malicious PowerShell commands.

Darktrace’s visibility into the compromise began when the threat actor initiated external communication with their C2 infrastructure, with Darktrace / NETWORK detecting the use of a new PowerShell user agent, indicating an attempt at remote code execution.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.
Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.

Download of Malicious Files for Lateral Movement

A few minutes later, the compromised device was observed downloading a numerically named file. Numeric files like this are often intentionally nondescript and associated with malware. In this case, the file name adhered to a specific pattern, matching the regular expression: /174(\d){7}/. Further investigation into the file revealed that it contained additional malicious code designed to further exploit remote services and gather device information.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.
Figure 2: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.

The file contained a script that sent system information to a specified IP address using an HTTP POST request, which also processed the response. This process was verified through packet capture (PCAP) analysis conducted by the Darktrace Threat Research team.

By analyzing the body content of the HTTP GET request, it was observed that the command converts the current time to Unix epoch time format (i.e., 9 April 2025 13:26:40 GMT), resulting in an additional numeric file observed in the URI: /1744205200.

PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.
Figure 3: PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.

Across Darktrace’s investigations into other customers' affected by ClickFix campaigns, both internal information discovery events and further execution of malicious code were observed.

Data Exfiltration

By following the HTTP stream in the same PCAP, the Darktrace Threat Research Team assessed the activity as indicative of data exfiltration involving system and device information to the same command-and-control (C2) endpoint, , 193.36.38[.]237. This endpoint was flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [5].

PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.
Figure 4: PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.

Further analysis of Darktrace’s Advanced Search logs showed that the attacker’s malicious code scanned for internal system information, which was then sent to a C2 server via an HTTP POST request, indicating data exfiltration

Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.
Figure 5: Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.

Actions on objectives

Around ten minutes after the initial C2 communications, the compromised device was observed connecting to an additional rare endpoint, 188.34.195[.]44. Further analysis of this endpoint confirmed its association with ClickFix campaigns, with several OSINT vendors linking it to previously reported attacks [6].

In the final HTTP POST request made by the device, Darktrace detected a file at the URI /init1234 in the connection logs to the malicious endpoint 188.34.195[.]44, likely depicting the successful completion of the attack’s objective, automated data egress to a ClickFix C2 server.

Darktrace / NETWORK grouped together the observed indicators of compromise (IoCs) on the compromised device and triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert, a high-priority detection model designed to identify activity indicative of the early stages of an attack. These models are monitored and triaged 24/7 by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection service, ensuring customers are promptly notified of malicious activity as soon as it emerges.

Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.
Figure 6: Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

In the incident outlined above, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode. As a result, while actions to block specific connections were suggested, they had to be manually implemented by the customer’s security team. Due to the speed of the attack, this need for manual intervention allowed the threat to escalate without interruption.

However, in a different example, Autonomous Response was fully enabled, allowing Darktrace to immediately block connections to the malicious endpoint (138.199.156[.]22) just one second after the initial connection in which a numerically named file was downloaded [7].

Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.
Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.

This customer was also subscribed to our Managed Detection and Response service, Darktrace’s SOC extended a ‘Quarantine Device’ action that had already been autonomously applied in order to buy their security team additional time for remediation.

Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.
Figure 8: Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.

Conclusion

ClickFix baiting is a widely used tactic in which threat actors exploit human error to bypass security defenses. By tricking end point users into performing seemingly harmless, everyday actions, attackers gain initial access to systems where they can access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection identifies early indicators of targeted attacks without relying on prior knowledge or IoCs. By continuously learning each device’s unique pattern of life, Darktrace detects subtle deviations that may signal a compromise. In this case, Darktrace's Autonomous Response, when operating in a fully autonomous mode, was able to swiftly contain the threat before it could progress further along the attack lifecycle.

Credit to Keanna Grelicha (Cyber Analyst) and Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

NETWORK Models

  • Device / New PowerShell User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
  • Device / Suspicious Domain
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
  • Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

Autonomous Response Models

  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·       141.193.213[.]11 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       141.193.213[.]10 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       64.94.84[.]217 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       138.199.156[.]22 – IP address – C2 server

·       94.181.229[.]250 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       216.245.184[.]181 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       212.237.217[.]182 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       168.119.96[.]41 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       193.36.38[.]237 – IP address – C2 server

·       188.34.195[.]44 – IP address – C2 server

·       205.196.186[.]70 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top – Hostname – C2 server

·       shorturl[.]at/UB6E6 – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       tlgrm-redirect[.]icu – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       diagnostics.medgenome[.]com – Hostname – Compromised Website

·       /1741714208 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741718928 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1743871488 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741200416 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741356624 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /ttt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741965536 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1.txt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744205184 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744139920 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744134352 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744125600 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1[.]php?s=527 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       34ff2f72c191434ce5f20ebc1a7e823794ac69bba9df70721829d66e7196b044 – SHA-256 Hash – Possible malicious file

·       10a5eab3eef36e75bd3139fe3a3c760f54be33e3 – SHA-1 Hash – Possible malicious file

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Spearphishing Link - INITIAL ACCESS - T1566.002 - T1566

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

PowerShell - EXECUTION - T1059.001 - T1059

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Automated Exfiltration - EXFILTRATION - T1020 - T1020.001

References

[1] https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/emerging-threats/clickfix-another-deceptive-social-engineering-technique/

[2] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape

[3] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/understanding-the-clickfix-attack/

[4] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/clickfix-the-social-engineering-technique-hackers-use-to-manipulate-victims/

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/193.36.38.237/detection

[6] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.34.195.44/community

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/138.199.156.22/detection

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Keanna Grelicha
Cyber Analyst

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June 4, 2025

Beyond Discovery: Adding Intelligent Vulnerability Validation to Darktrace / Attack Surface Management

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Introducing Exploit Prediction Assessment

Security teams are drowning in vulnerability alerts, but only a fraction of those issues pose a real threat. The new Exploit Prediction Assessment feature in Darktrace / Attack Surface Management helps teams cut through the noise by validating which vulnerabilities on their external attack surface can be actively exploited.

Instead of relying solely on CVSS scores or waiting for patch cycles, Exploit Prediction Assessment uses safe, targeted simulations to test whether exposed systems can be compromised, delivering fast, evidence-based results in under 72 hours.

This capability augments traditional pen testing and complements existing ASM workflows by transforming passive discovery into actionable insight. With EPA, security teams move from reacting to long lists of potential vulnerabilities to making confident, risk-based decisions on what actually matters.

Key highlights of Exploit Prediction Assessment

Simulated attacks to validate real risk

Exploit Prediction Assessment conducts safe, simulated attacks on assets with potential security vulnerabilities that have been identified by Darktrace / Attack Surface Management. This real-time testing validates your systems' susceptibility to compromise by confirming which vulnerabilities are present and exploitable on your attack surface.

Prioritize what matters most

Confirmed security risks can be prioritized for mitigation, ensuring that the most critical threats are promptly addressed. This takes the existing letter ranking system and brings it a step further by drilling down to yet another level. Even in the most overwhelming situations, teams will be able to act on a pragmatic, clear-cut plan.

Fast results, tailored to your environment

Customers set the scope of the Exploit Prediction Assessment within Darktrace / Attack Surface Management and receive the results of the surgical vulnerability testing within 72 hours. Users will see 1 of 2 shields:

1. A green shield with a check mark: Meaning no vulnerabilities were found on scanned CVEs for the asset.

2. A red shield with a red x: Meaning at least one vulnerability was found on scanned CVEs for the asset.

Why it's a game changer

Traditionally, attack surface management tools have focused on identifying exposed assets and vulnerabilities but lacked the context to determine which issues posed the greatest risk. Without context on what’s exploitable, security teams are left triaging long lists of potential risks, operating in isolation from broader business objectives. This misalignment ultimately leads to both weakened risk posture and cross team communication and execution.

This is where Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) becomes essential. Introduced by Gartner, CTEM is a framework that helps organizations continuously assess, validate, and improve their exposure to real-world threats. The goal isn’t just visibility, it’s to understand how an attacker could move through your environment today, and what to fix first to stop them.

Exploit Prediction Assessment brings this philosophy to life within Darktrace / Attack Surface Management. By safely simulating exploit attempts against identified vulnerabilities, it validates which exposures are truly at risk—transforming ASM from a discovery tool into a risk-based decision engine.

This capability directly supports the validation and prioritization phases of CTEM, helping teams focus on exploitable vulnerabilities rather than theoretical ones.  This shift from visibility to action reduces the risk of critical vulnerabilities in the technology stack being overlooked, turning overwhelming vulnerability data into focused, clear actionable insights.

As attack surfaces continue to grow and change, organizations need more than static scans they need continuous, contextual insight. Exploit Prediction Assessment ensures your ASM efforts evolve with the threat landscape, making CTEM a practical reality, not just a strategy.

Exploit Prediction Assessment in action

With Darktrace / Attack Surface Management organizations can get Exploit Prediction Assessment, and the cyber risk team no longer guesses which vulnerabilities matter most. Instead, they identify several externally exposed areas of their attack surface, then use the feature to surgically test for exploitability across these exposed endpoints. Within 72 hours, they receive a report:  

Positive outcome: Based on information in the html or the headers it seems that a vulnerable software version is running on an externally exposed infrastructure. By running a targeted attack on this infrastructure, we can confirm that it cannot be abused.

Negative outcome: Based on information in the html or the headers it seems that a vulnerable software version is running on an externally exposed infrastructure. By running a targeted attack on this infrastructure, we can confirm that it can be exploited, so we can predict it being exploited.

This second outcome changes everything. The team immediately prioritizes the exploitable asset for patching and takes the necessary adjustments to mitigate exposure until the fix is deployed.

Instead of spreading their resources thin across dozens of alerts, they focus on what poses a real threat, saving time, reducing risk, and demonstrating actionable results to stakeholders.

Conclusion

Exploit Predication Assessment bolsters Darktrace’s commitment to proactive cybersecurity. It supports intelligent prioritization of vulnerabilities, keeping organizations ahead of emerging threats. With this new addition to / Attack Surface Management, teams have another tool to empower a more efficient approach to addressing security gaps in real-time.

Stay tuned for more updates and insights on how Darktrace continues to develop a culture of proactive security across the entire ActiveAI Security Platform.

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Kelland Goodin
Product Marketing Specialist
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