May 13, 2025

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace Neutralized AsyncRAT

Darktrace's AI-driven tools identified and disrupted AsyncRAT activity, detecting suspicious connections and blocking them autonomously. This proactive response prevented the compromise from escalating and safeguarded sensitive data from exfiltration.

Written by

Isabel Evans

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Isabel Evans

Cyber Analyst

May 2025

What is a RAT?

As the proliferation of new and more advanced cyber threats continues, the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) remains a classic tool in a threat actor's arsenal. RATs, whether standardized or custom-built, enable attackers to remotely control compromised devices, facilitating a range of malicious activities.

What is AsyncRAT?

Since its first appearance in 2019, AsyncRAT has become increasingly popular among a wide range of threat actors, including cybercriminals and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

Originally available on GitHub as a legitimate tool, its open-source nature has led to widespread exploitation. AsyncRAT has been used in numerous campaigns, including prolonged attacks on essential US infrastructure, and has even reportedly penetrated the Chinese cybercriminal underground market [1] [2].

How does AsyncRAT work?

Original source code analysis of AsyncRAT demonstrates that once installed, it establishes persistence via techniques such as creating scheduled tasks or registry keys and uses SeDebugPrivilege to gain elevated privileges [3].

Its key features include:

Keylogging
File search
Remote audio and camera access
Exfiltration techniques
Staging for final payload delivery

These are generally typical functions found in traditional RATs. However, it also boasts interesting anti-detection capabilities. Due to the popularity of Virtual Machines (VM) and sandboxes for dynamic analysis, this RAT checks for the manufacturer via the WMI query 'Select * from Win32_ComputerSystem' and looks for strings containing 'VMware' and 'VirtualBox' [4].

Darktrace’s coverage of AsyncRAT

In late 2024 and early 2025, Darktrace observed a spike in AsyncRAT activity across various customer environments. Multiple indicators of post-compromise were detected, including devices attempting or successfully connecting to endpoints associated with AsyncRAT.

On several occasions, Darktrace identified a clear association with AsyncRAT through the digital certificates of the highlighted SSL endpoints. Darktrace’s Real-time Detection effectively identified and alerted on suspicious activities related to AsyncRAT. In one notable incident, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response promptly took action to contain the emerging threat posed by AsyncRAT.

AsyncRAT attack overview

On December 20, 2024, Darktrace first identified the use of AsyncRAT, noting a device successfully establishing SSL connections to the uncommon external IP 185.49.126[.]50 (AS199654 Oxide Group Limited) via port 6606. The IP address appears to be associated with AsyncRAT as flagged by open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources [5]. This activity triggered the device to alert the ‘Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed' model.

Figure 1: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.

Following these initial connections, the device was observed making a significantly higher number of connections to the same endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 via port 6606 over an extended period. This pattern suggested beaconing activity and triggered the 'Compromise/Beaconing Activity to External Rare' model alert.

Further analysis of the original source code, available publicly, outlines the default ports used by AsyncRAT clients for command-and-control (C2) communications [6]. It reveals that port 6606 is the default port for creating a new AsyncRAT client. Darktrace identified both the Certificate Issuer and the Certificate Subject as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". This SSL certificate encrypts the packets between the compromised system and the server. These indicators of compromise (IoCs) detected by Darktrace further suggest that the device was successfully connecting to a server associated with AsyncRAT.

Figure 2: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.

Figure 4: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.

A few days later, the same device was detected making numerous connections to a different IP address, 195.26.255[.]81 (AS40021 NL-811-40021), via various ports including 2106, 6606, 7707, and 8808. Notably, ports 7707 and 8808 are also default ports specified in the original AsyncRAT source code [6].

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.

Similar to the activity observed with the first endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50, the Certificate Issuer for the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 was identified as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". Further OSINT investigation confirmed associations between the IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and AsyncRAT [7].

Figure 6: Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server.

Once again, Darktrace's Autonomous Response acted swiftly, blocking the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 throughout the observed AsyncRAT activity.

Figure 7: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions were applied against the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81.

A day later, Darktrace again alerted to further suspicious activity from the device. This time, connections to the suspicious endpoint 'kashuub[.]com' and IP address 191.96.207[.]246 via port 8041 were observed. Further analysis of port 8041 suggests it is commonly associated with ScreenConnect or Xcorpeon ASIC Carrier Ethernet Transport [8]. ScreenConnect has been observed in recent campaign’s where AsyncRAT has been utilized [9]. Additionally, one of the ASN’s observed, namely ‘ASN Oxide Group Limited’, was seen in both connections to kashuub[.]com and 185.49.126[.]50.

This could suggest a parallel between the two endpoints, indicating they might be hosting AsyncRAT C2 servers, as inferred from our previous analysis of the endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 and its association with AsyncRAT [5]. OSINT reporting suggests that the “kashuub[.]com” endpoint may be associated with ScreenConnect scam domains, further supporting the assumption that the endpoint could be a C2 server.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology was once again able to support the customer here, blocking connections to “kashuub[.]com”. Ultimately, this intervention halted the compromise and prevented the attack from escalating or any sensitive data from being exfiltrated from the customer’s network into the hands of the threat actors.

Figure 8: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.

Due to the popularity of this RAT, it is difficult to determine the motive behind the attack; however, from existing knowledge of what the RAT does, we can assume accessing and exfiltrating sensitive customer data may have been a factor.

Conclusion

While some cybercriminals seek stability and simplicity, openly available RATs like AsyncRAT provide the infrastructure and open the door for even the most amateur threat actors to compromise sensitive networks. As the cyber landscape continually shifts, RATs are now being used in all types of attacks.

Darktrace’s suite of AI-driven tools provides organizations with the infrastructure to achieve complete visibility and control over emerging threats within their network environment. Although AsyncRAT’s lack of concealment allowed Darktrace to quickly detect the developing threat and alert on unusual behaviors, it was ultimately Darktrace Autonomous Response's consistent blocking of suspicious connections that prevented a more disruptive attack.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

‍

Appendices

Real-time Detection Models
- Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
- Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
- Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
- Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
- Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
- Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
- Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour
- Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Autonomous Response Models
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

List of IoCs

· 185.49.126[.]50 - IP – AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

· 195.26.255[.]81 – IP - AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

· 191.96.207[.]246 – IP – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

· CN=AsyncRAT Server - SSL certificate - AsyncRATC2 Infrastructure

· Kashuub[.]com– Hostname – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

‍

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:

Tactic –Technique – Sub-Technique

Execution– T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

DefenceEvasion – T1497 - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

Discovery– T1057 – Process Discovery

Discovery– T1082 – System Information Discovery

LateralMovement - T1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Collection/ Credential Access – T1056 – Input Capture: Keylogging

Collection– T1125 – Video Capture

Commandand Control – T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

Commandand Control – T1219 - Remote Access Software

Exfiltration– T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/operation-layover-how-we-tracked-attack/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/china-cybercrime-undergrond-deepmix-tea-horse-road-great-firewall

[3] https://www.attackiq.com/2024/08/01/emulate-asyncrat/

[4] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/spear-phishing-campaign-with-new-techniques-aimed-at-aviation-companies

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/185.49.126[.]50/community

[6] https://dfir.ch/posts/asyncrat_quasarrat/

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/195.26.255[.]81

[8] https://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=8041

[9] https://www.esentire.com/blog/exploring-the-infection-chain-screenconnects-link-to-asyncrat-deployment

[10] https://scammer.info/t/taking-out-connectwise-sites/153479/518?page=26

Written by

Isabel Evans

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Written by

Isabel Evans

Cyber Analyst

•

June 11, 2025

Nicole Wong

Cyber Security Analyst

Compliance

•

June 5, 2025

The Darktrace Community

Watch the NIS2 Webinar

Blog

OT

June 11, 2025

Proactive OT security: Lessons on supply chain risk management from a rogue Raspberry Pi

Understanding supply chain risk in manufacturing

For industries running Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as manufacturing and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), complex supply chains mean that disruption to one weak node can have serious impacts to the entire ecosystem. However, supply chain risk does not always originate from outside an organization’s ICS network.

The implicit trust placed on software or shared services for maintenance within an ICS can be considered a type of insider threat [1], where defenders also need to look ‘from within’ to protect against supply chain risk. Attackers have frequently mobilised this form of insider threat:

Many ICS and SCADA systems were compromised during the 2014 Havex Watering Hole attack, where via operators’ implicit trust in the trojanized versions of legitimate applications, on legitimate but compromised websites [2]. ‍
In 2018, the world’s largest manufacturer of semiconductors and processers shut down production for three days after a supplier installed tainted software that spread to over 10,000 machines in the manufacturer’s network [3].
During the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack, attackers compromised a version of Orion software that was deployed from SolarWinds’ own servers during a software update to thousands of customers, including tech manufacturing companies such as Intel and Nvidia [4].

Traditional approaches to ICS security have focused on defending against everything from outside the castle walls, or outside of the ICS network. As ICS attacks become more sophisticated, defenders must not solely rely on static perimeter defenses and prevention.

A critical part of active defense is understanding the ICS environment and how it operates, including all possible attack paths to the ICS including network connections, remote access points, the movement of data across zones and conduits and access from mobile devices. For instance, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and vendors often install remote access software or third-party equipment in ICS networks to facilitate legitimate maintenance and support activities, which can unintentionally expand the ICS’ attack surface.

This blog describes an example of the convergence between supply chain risk and insider risk, when a vendor left a Raspberry Pi device in a manufacturing customer’s ICS network without the customer’s knowledge.

Case study: Using unsupervised machine learning to detect pre-existing security issues

Raspberry Pi devices are commonly used in SCADA environments as low-cost, remotely accessible data collectors [5][6][7]. They are often paired with Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) for monitoring and tracking [8]. However, these devices also represent a security risk because their small physical size and time-consuming nature of physical inspection makes them easy to overlook. This poses a security risk, as these devices have previously been used to carry out USB-based attacks or to emulate Ethernet-over-USB connections to exfiltrate sensitive data [8][9].

In this incident, a Darktrace customer was unaware that their supplier had installed a Raspberry Pi device on their ICS network. Crucially, the installation occurred prior to Darktrace’s deployment on the customer’s network.

For other anomaly detection tools, this order of events meant that this third-party device would likely have been treated as part of the customer’s existing infrastructure. However, after Darktrace was deployed, it analyzed the metadata from the encrypted HTTPS and DNS connections that the Raspberry Pi made to ‘call home’ to the supplier and determined that these connections were unusual compared to the rest of the devices in the network, even in the absence of any malicious indicators of compromise (IoCs).

Darktrace triggered the following alerts for this unusual activity that consequently notified the customer to the pre-existing threat of an unmanaged device already present in their network:

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
Compromise / Agent Beacon (Short Period)
Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
Tags / New Raspberry Pi Device
Device / DNS Requests to Unusual Server
Device / Anomaly Indicators / Spike in Connections to Rare Endpoint Indicator

‍*Figure 1: Darktrace’s External Sites Summary showing the rarity of the external endpoint that the Raspberry Pi device ‘called home’ to and the model alerts triggered.*

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into the activity, correlating related events into a broader incident and generating a report outlining the potential threat along with supporting technical details.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection meant that the Raspberry Pi device did not need to be observed performing clearly malicious behavior to alert the customer to the security risk, and neither can defenders afford to wait for such escalation.

Why is this significant?

In 2021 a similar attack took place. Aiming to poison a Florida water treatment facility, attackers leveraged a TeamViewer instance that had been dormant on the system for six months, effectively allowing the attacker to ‘live off the land’ [10].

The Raspberry Pi device in this incident also remained outside the purview of the customer’s security team at first. It could have been leveraged by a persistent attacker to pivot within the internal network and communicate externally.

A proactive approach to active defense that seeks to minimize and continuously monitor the attack surface and network is crucial.

The growing interest in manufacturing from attackers and policymakers

Significant motivations for targeting the manufacturing sector and increasing regulatory demands make the convergence of supply chain risk, insider risk, and the prevalence of stealthy living-off-the-land techniques particularly relevant to this sector.

Manufacturing is consistently targeted by cybercriminals [11], and the sector’s ‘just-in-time’ model grants attackers the opportunity for high levels of disruption. Furthermore, under NIS 2, manufacturing and some food and beverage processing entities are now designated as ‘important’ entities. This means stricter incident reporting requirements within 24 hours of detection, and enhanced security requirements such as the implementation of zero trust and network segmentation policies, as well as measures to improve supply chain resilience [12][13][14].

How can Darktrace help?

Ultimately, Darktrace successfully assisted a manufacturing organization in detecting a potentially disruptive 'near-miss' within their OT environment, even in the absence of traditional IoCs. Through passive asset identification techniques and continuous network monitoring, the customer improved their understanding of their network and supply chain risk.

While the swift detection of the rogue device allowed the threat to be identified before it could escalate, the customer could have reduced their time to respond by using Darktrace’s built-in response capabilities, had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability been enabled. Darktrace’s Autonomous Response can be configured to target specific connections on a rogue device either automatically upon detection or following manual approval from the security team, to stop it communicating with other devices in the network while allowing other approved devices to continue operating. Furthermore, the exportable report generated by Cyber AI Analyst helps security teams to meet NIS 2’s enhanced reporting requirements.

Sophisticated ICS attacks often leverage insider access to perform in-depth reconnaissance for the development of tailored malware capabilities. This case study and high-profile ICS attacks highlight the importance of mitigating supply chain risk in a similar way to insider risk. As ICS networks adapt to the introduction of IIoT, remote working and the increased convergence between IT and OT, it is important to ensure the approach to secure against these threats is compatible with the dynamic nature of the network.

Credit to Nicole Wong (Principal Cyber Analyst), Matthew Redrup (Senior Analyst and ANZ Team Lead)

[related-resource]

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Infrastructure / New Raspberry Pi Device - INITIAL ACCESS - T1200 Hardware Additions
Device / DNS Requests to Unusual Server - CREDENTIAL ACCESS, COLLECTION - T1557 Man-in-the-Middle
Compromise / Agent Beacon - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 Web Protocols

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation/defining-insider-threats

[2] https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/gb/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/139/havex-targets-industrial-control-systems

[3]https://thehackernews.com/2018/08/tsmc-wannacry-ransomware-attack.html

[4] https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/21/22194183/intel-nvidia-cisco-government-infected-solarwinds-hack

[5] https://www.centreon.com/monitoring-ot-with-raspberry-pi-and-centreon/

[6] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9107689

[7] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/webicc-scada-integration-industrial-raspberry-pi-devices-mryff

[8] https://www.rowse.co.uk/blog/post/how-is-the-raspberry-pi-used-in-the-iiot

[9] https://sepiocyber.com/resources/whitepapers/raspberry-pi-a-friend-or-foe/#:~:text=Initially%20designed%20for%20ethical%20purposes,as%20cyberattacks%20and%20unauthorized%20access

[10] https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/10/us/florida-water-poison-cyber/index.html

[11] https://www.mxdusa.org/2025/02/13/top-cyber-threats-in-manufacturing/

[12] https://www.shoosmiths.com/insights/articles/nis2-what-manufacturers-and-distributors-need-to-know-about-europes-new-cybersecurity-regime

[13] https://www.goodaccess.com/blog/nis2-require-zero-trust-essential-security-measure#zero-trust-nis2-compliance

[14] https://logisticsviewpoints.com/2024/11/06/the-impact-of-nis-2-regulations-on-manufacturing-supply-chains/

About the author

Nicole Wong

Cyber Security Analyst

Blog

Compliance

June 9, 2025

Modernising UK Cyber Regulation: Implications of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill

Two individuals sitting at a desk working on a document

The need for security and continued cyber resilience

The UK government has made national security a key priority, and the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (CSRB) is a direct reflection of that focus. In introducing the Bill, Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, Peter Kyle, recognised that the UK is “desperately exposed” to cyber threats—from criminal groups to hostile nation-states that are increasingly targeting the UK's digital systems and critical infrastructure^[1].

Context and timeline for the new legislation

First announced during the King’s Speech of July 2024, and elaborated in a Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) policy statement published in April 2025, the CSRB is expected to be introduced in Parliament during the 2025-26 legislative session.

For now, organisations in the UK remain subject to the 2018 Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations – an EU-derived law which was drafted before today’s increasing digitisation of critical services, rise in cloud adoption and emergence of AI-powered threats.

Why modernisation is critical

Without modernisation, the Government believes UK’s infrastructure and economy risks falling behind international peers. The EU, which revised its cybersecurity regulation under the NIS2 Directive, already imposes stricter requirements on a broader set of sectors.

The urgency of the Bill is also underscored by recent high-impact incidents, including the Synnovis attack which targeted the National Health Service (NHS) suppliers and disrupted thousands of patient appointments and procedures^[2]. The Government has argued that such events highlight a systemic failure to keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat landscape^[3].

What the Bill aims to achieve

This Bill represents a decisive shift. According to the Government, it will modernise and future‑proof the UK’s cyber laws, extending oversight to areas where risk has grown but regulation has not kept pace^[4]. While the legislation builds on previous consultations and draws lessons from international frameworks like the EU’s NIS2 directive, it also aims to tailor solutions to the UK’s unique threat environment.

Importantly, the Government is framing cybersecurity not as a barrier to growth, but as a foundation for it. The policy statement emphasises that strong digital resilience will create the stability businesses need to thrive, innovate, and invest^[5]. Therefore, the goals of the Bill will not only be to enhance security but also act as an enabler to innovation and economic growth.

Recognition that AI changes cyber threats

The CSRB policy statement recognises that AI is fundamentally reshaping the threat landscape, with adversaries now leveraging AI and commercial cyber tools to exploit vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and supply chains. Indeed, the NCSC has recently assessed that AI will almost certainly lead to “an increase in the frequency and intensity of cyber threats”^[6]. Accordingly, the policy statement insists that the UK’s regulatory framework “must keep pace and provide flexibility to respond to future threats as and when they emerge”^[7].

To address the threat, the Bill signals new obligations for MSPs and data centres, timely incident reporting and dynamic guidance that can be refreshed without fresh primary legislation, making it essential for firms to follow best practices.

What might change in day-to-day practice?

New organisations in scope of regulation

Under the existing Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations^[8], the UK already supervises operators in five critical sectors—energy, transport, drinking water, health (Operators of Essential Services, OES) and digital infrastructure (Relevant Digital Service Providers, RDSPs).

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill retains this foundation and adds Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and data centres to the scope of regulation to “better recognise the increasing reliance on digital services and the vulnerabilities posed by supply chains”^[9]. It also grants the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology the power to add new sectors or sub‑sectors via secondary legislation, following consultation with Parliament and industry.

Managed service providers (MSPs)

MSPs occupy a central position within the UK’s enterprise information‑technology infrastructure. Because they remotely run or monitor clients’ systems, networks and data, they hold privileged, often continuous access to multiple environments. This foothold makes them an attractive target for malicious actors.

The Bill aims to bring MSPs in scope of regulation by making them subject to the same duties as those placed on firms that provide digital services under the 2018 NIS Regulations. By doing so, the Bill seeks to raise baseline security across thousands of customer environments and to provide regulators with better visibility of supply‑chain risk.

The proposed definition for MSPs is a service which:

Is provided to another organisation
Relies on the use of network and information systems to deliver the service
Relates to ongoing management support, active administration and/or monitoring of AI systems, IT infrastructure, applications, and/or IT networks, including for the purpose of activities relating to cyber security.
Involves a network connection and/or access to the customer’s network and information systems.

Data centres

Building on the September 2024 designation of data centres as critical national infrastructure, the CSRB will fold data infrastructure into the NIS-style regime by naming it an “relevant sector" and data centres as “essential service”^[10].

About 182 colocation facilities run by 64 operators will therefore come under statutory duties to notify the regulator, maintain proportionate CAF-aligned controls and report significant incidents, regardless of who owns them or what workloads they host.

New requirements for regulated organisations

Incident reporting processes

There could be stricter timelines or broader definitions of what counts as a reportable incident. This might nudge organisations to formalise detection, triage, and escalation procedures.

The Government is proposing to introduce a new two-stage incident reporting process. This would include an initial notification which would be submitted within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, followed by a full incident report which should be submitted within 72 hours of the same.

Supply chain assurance requirements

Supply chains for the UK's most critical services are becoming increasingly complex and present new and serious vulnerabilities for cyber-attacks. The recent Synnovis ransomware attacks on the NHS^[11] exemplify the danger posed by attacks against the supply chains of important services and organisations. This is concerning when reflecting on the latest Cyber Security Breaches survey conducted by DSIT, which highlights that fewer than 25% of large businesses review their supply chain risks^[12].

Despite these risks, the UK’s legacy cybersecurity regulatory regime does not explicitly cover supply chain risk management. The UK instead relies on supporting and non-statutory guidance to close this gap, such as the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)^[13].

The CSRB policy statement acts on this regulatory shortcoming and recognises that “a single supplier’s disruption can have far-reaching impacts on the delivery of essential or digital services”^[14].

To address this, the Bill would make in-scope organisations (OES and RDPS) directly accountable for the cybersecurity of their supply chains. Secondary legislation would spell out these duties in detail, ensuring that OES and RDSPs systematically assess and mitigate third-party cyber risks.

Updated and strengthened security requirements

By placing the CAF into a firmer footing and backing it with a statutory Code of Practice, the Government is setting clearer expectations about government expectations on technical standards and methods organisations will need to follow to prove their resilience.

How Darktrace can help support affected organizations

Demonstrate resilience

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI^TM continuously monitors your digital estate across cloud, network, OT, email, and endpoint to detect, investigate, and autonomously respond to emerging threats in real time. This persistent visibility and defense posture helps organizations demonstrate cyber resilience to regulators with confidence.

Streamline incident reporting and compliance

Darktrace surfaces clear alerts and automated investigation reports, complete with timeline views and root cause analysis. These insights reduce the time and complexity of regulatory incident reporting and support internal compliance workflows with auditable, AI-generated evidence.

Improve supply chain visibility

With full visibility across connected systems and third-party activity, Darktrace detects early indicators of lateral movement, account compromise, and unusual behavior stemming from vendor or partner access, reducing the risk of supply chain-originated cyber-attacks.

Ensure MSPs can meet new standards

For managed service providers, Darktrace offers native multi-tenant support and autonomous threat response that can be embedded directly into customer environments. This ensures consistent, scalable security standards across clients—helping MSPs address increasing regulatory obligations.

[related-resource]