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December 16, 2024

Breaking Down Nation State Attacks on Supply Chains

Explore how nation-state supply chain attacks like 3CX, NotPetya, and SolarWinds exploited trusted providers to cause global disruption, highlighting the urgent need for robust security measures.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Benjamin Druttman
Cyber Security AI Technical Instructor
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16
Dec 2024

Introduction: Nation state attacks on supply chains

In recent years, supply chain attacks have surged in both frequency and sophistication, evolving into one of the most severe threats to organizations across almost every industry. By exploiting third-party vendors and service providers, these attacks can inflict widespread disruption with a single breach. They have become a go-to choice for nation state actors and show no signs of slowing down. According to Gartner, the costs from these attacks will skyrocket “from $46 billion in 2023 to $138 billion by 2031” [1].  

But why are supply chains specifically such an irresistible target for threat actors? Dwight D. Eisenhower, the General of the US Army in World War II and former US President, once said, “you won’t find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

The same is true in cyberspace and cyberwarfare. We live in an increasingly interconnected world. The provision of almost every service integral to our daily lives relies on a complex web of interdependent third parties.  

Naturally, threat actors gravitate towards these service providers. By compromising just one of them, they can spread through supply chains downstream to other organizations and raise the odds of winning their battle, campaign, or war.  

software supply chain sequence
Figure 1: Software supply chain attack cycle

A house built on open-source sand

Software developers face immense pressure to produce functional code quickly, often under tight deadlines. Adding to this challenge is the need to comply with stringent security requirements set by their DevSecOps counterparts, who aim to ensure that code is safe from vulnerabilities.  

Open-source repositories alleviate some of this pressure by providing pre-built packages of code and fully functioning tools that developers can freely access and integrate. These highly accessible resources enhance productivity and boost innovation. As a result, they have a huge, diverse user base spanning industries and geographies. However, given their extensive adoption, any security lapse can result in widespread compromise across businesses.

Cautionary tales for open-source dependencies

This is exactly what happened in December 2021 when a remote code execution vulnerability was discovered in Log4J’s software. In simple terms, it exposed an alarmingly straightforward way for attackers to take control of any system using Log4J.  

The scope for potential attack was unprecedented. Some estimates say up to 3 billion devices were affected worldwide, in what was quickly labelled the “single biggest, most critical vulnerability of the last decade” [2].

What ensued was a race between opportunistic nefarious actors and panicked security professionals. The astronomical number of vulnerable devices laid expansive groundwork for attackers, who quickly began probing potentially exploitable systems. 48% of corporate networks globally were scanned for the vulnerability, while security teams scrambled to apply the remediating patch [3].

The vulnerability attracted nation states like a moth to a flame, who, unsurprisingly, beat many security teams to it. According to the FBI and the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), Iranian government-sponsored threat groups were found using the Log4J vulnerability to install cryptomining software, credential stealers and Ngrok reverse proxies onto no less than US Federal networks [4].  

Research from Microsoft and Mandiant revealed nation state groups from China, North Korea and Turkey also taking advantage of the Log4J vulnerability to deploy malware on target systems [5].  

If Log4j taught us anything, it’s that vulnerabilities in open-source technologies can be highly attractive target for nation states. When these technologies are universally adopted, geopolitical adversaries have a much wider net of opportunity to successfully weaponize them.  

It therefore comes as no surprise that nation states have ramped up their operations targeting the open-source link of the supply chain in recent years.  

Since 2020, there has been a 1300% increase in malicious threats circulating on open-source repositories. PyPI is the official open-source code repository for programming done in the Python language and used by over 800,000 developers worldwide. In the first 9 months of 2023 alone, 7,000 malicious packages were found on PyPI, some of which were linked to the North Korea state-sponsored threat group, Lazarus [6].  

Most of them were found using a technique called typosquatting, in which the malicious payloads are disguised with names that very closely resemble those of legitimate packages, ready for download by an unwitting software developer. This trickery of the eye is an example of social engineering in the supply chain.  

A hop, skip, and a jump into the most sensitive networks on earth

One of the most high-profile supply chain attacks in recent history occurred in 2023, targeting 3CX’s Desktop App – a widely used video communications by over 600,000 customers in various sectors such as aerospace, healthcare and hospitality.

The incident gained notoriety as a double supply chain attack. The initial breach originated from financial trading software called X_Trader, which had been infected with a backdoor.  A 3CX employee unknowingly downloaded the compromised X_Trader software onto a corporate device. This allowed attackers to steal the employee’s credentials and use them to gain access to 3CX’s network, spread laterally and compromising Windows and Mac systems.  

The attack moved along another link of the supply chain to several of 3CX’s customers, impacting critical national infrastructure like energy sector in US and Europe.  

For the average software provider, this attack shed more light on how a compromise of their technology could cause chaos for their customers.  

But nation states already knew this. The 3CX attack was attributed, yet again, to Lazarus, the same North Korean nation state blamed for implanting malicious packages in the Python repository.  

It’s also worth mentioning the astounding piece of evidence in a separate social engineering campaign which linked the 3CX hack to North Korea. It was an attack worthy of a Hollywood cyber block buster. The threat group, Lazarus, lured hopeful job candidates on LinkedIn into clicking on malicious ZIP file disguised as an attractive PDF offer for a position as a Developer at HSBC. The malware’s command and control infrastructure, journalide[.]org, was the same one discovered in the 3CX campaign.  

Though not strictly a supply chain attack, the LinkedIn campaign illustrates how nation states employ a diverse array of methods that span beyond the supply chain to achieve their goals. These sophisticated and well-resourced adversaries are adaptable and capable of repurposing their command-and-control infrastructure to orchestrate a range of attacks. This attack, along with the typosquatting attacks found in PyPI, serve as a critical reminder for security teams: supply chain attacks are often coupled with another powerful tactic – social engineering of human teams.

When the cure is worse than the disease

Updates to the software are a core pillar of cybersecurity, designed to patch vulnerabilities like Log4J and ensure it is safe. However, they have also proven to serve as alarmingly efficient delivery vessels for nation states to propagate their cyberattacks.  

Two of the most prolific supply chain breaches in recent history have been deployed through malicious updates, illustrating how they can be a double-edged sword when it comes to cyber defense.  

NotPetya (2017) and Solarwinds (2020)

The 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack exemplified the mass spread of ransomware via a single software update. A Russian military group injected malware on accounting software used by Ukrainian businesses for tax reporting. Via an automatic update, the ransomware was pushed out to thousands of customers within hours, crippled Ukrainian infrastructure including airports, financial institutions and government agencies.  

Some of the hardest hit victims were suppliers themselves. Maersk, the global shipping giant responsible for shipping one fifth of the world’s goods, had their entire global operations brought to a halt and their 76 ports temporarily shut down. The interruptions to global trade were then compounded when a FedEx subsidiary was hit by the same ransomware. Meanwhile, Merck, a pharmaceutical company, was unable to supply vaccines to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention due to the attack.  

In 2020, another devastating supply chain attack unfolded in a similar way. Threat actors tied to Russian intelligence embedded malicious code into Solarwinds’ Orion IT software, which was then distributed as an update to 18,000 organizations. Victims included at least eight U.S. government agencies, as well as several major tech companies.  

These two attacks highlighted two key lessons. First, in a hyperconnected digital world, nation states will exploit the trust organizations place in software updates to cause a ripple effect of devastation downstream. Secondly, the economies of scale for the threat actor themselves are staggering: a single malicious update provided the heavy lifting work of dissemination to the attacker. A colossal number of originations were infected, and they obtained the keys to the world’s most sensitive networks.

The conclusion is obvious, albeit challenging to implement; organizations must rigorously scrutinize the authenticity and security of updates to prevent far-reaching consequences.  

Some of the biggest supply chain attacks in recent history and the nation state actor they are attributed to
Figure 2: Some of the biggest supply chain attacks in recent history and the nation state actor they are attributed to

Geopolitics and nation States in 2024: Beyond the software supply chain

The threat to our increasingly complex web of global supply is real. But organizations must look beyond their software to successfully mitigate supply chain disruption. Securing hardware and logistics is crucial, as these supply chain links are also in the crosshairs of nation states.  

In July 2024, suspicious packages caused a warehouse fire at a depot belonging to courier giant DHL in Birmingham, UK. British counter-terrorism authorities investigated Russian involvement in this fire, which was linked to a very similar incident that same month at a DHL facility in Germany.  

In September 2024, camouflaged explosives were hidden in walkie talkies and pagers in Lebanon and Syria – a supply chain attack widely believed to be carried out by Israel.

While these attacks targeted hardware and logistics rather than software, the underlying rule of thumb remained the same: the compromise of a single distributor can provide the attackers with considerable economies of scale.

These attacks sparked growing concerns of coordinated efforts to sabotage the supply chain. This sentiment was reflected in a global survey carried out by HP in August 2024, in which many organisations reported “nation-state threat actors targeting physical supply chains and tampering with device hardware and firmware integrity” [7].

More recently, in November 2024, the Russian military unit 29155 vowed to “turn the lights out for millions” by threatening to launch cyberattacks on the blood supply of NATO countries, critical national infrastructure (CNI). Today, CNI encompasses more than the electric grid and water supply; it includes ICT services and IT infrastructure – the digital systems that underpin the foundations of modern society.    

This is nothing new. The supply and logistics-focused tactic has been central to warfare throughout history. What’s changed is that cyberspace has merely expanded the scale and efficiency of these tactics, turning single software compromises into attack multipliers. The supply chain threat is now more multi-faceted than ever before.  

Learnings from the supply chain threat landscape

Consider some of the most disastrous nation-state supply chain attacks in recent history – 3CX, NotPetya and Solarwinds. They share a remarkable commonality: the attackers only needed to compromise a single piece of software to cause rampant disruption. By targeting a technology provider whose products were deeply embedded across industries, threat actors leveraged the trust inherent in the supply chain to infiltrate networks at scale.

From a nation-state’s perspective, targeting a specific technology, device or service used by vast swathes of society amplifies operational efficiency. For software, hardware and critical service suppliers, these examples serve as an urgent wake-up call. Without rigorous security measures, they risk becoming conduits for global disruption. Sanity-checking code, implementing robust validation processes, and fostering a culture of security throughout the supply chain are no longer optional—they are essential.  

The stakes are clear: in the interconnected digital age, the safety of countless systems, industries and society at large depends on their vigilance.  

Screenshot of supply chain security whitepaper

Gain a deeper understanding of the evolving risks in supply chain security and explore actionable strategies to protect your organization against emerging threats. Download the white paper to empower your decision-making with expert insights tailored for CISOs

Download: Securing the Supply Chain White Paper

References

  1. https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/5524495
  1. CISA Insights “Remediate Vulnerabilities for Internet-Accessible Systems.”
  1. https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/the-numbers-behind-a-cyber-pandemic-detailed-dive/
  1. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-320a  
  1. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/  
  1. https://content.reversinglabs.com/state-of-sscs-report/the-state-of-sscs-report-24  
  1. https://www.hp.com/us-en/newsroom/press-releases/2024/hp-wolf-security-study-supply-chains.html
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Benjamin Druttman
Cyber Security AI Technical Instructor

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May 19, 2026

State of AI Cybersecurity 2026: 77% of security stacks include AI, but trust is lagging

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Findings in this blog are taken from Darktrace’s annual State of AI Cybersecurity Report 2026.

AI is a contributing member of nearly every modern cybersecurity team. As we discussed earlier in this blog series, rapid AI adoption is expanding the attack surface in ways that security professionals have never before experienced while also empowering attackers to operate at unprecedented speed and scale. It’s only logical that defenders are harnessing the power of AI to fight back.

After all, AI can help cybersecurity teams spot the subtle signs of novel threats before humans can, investigate events more quickly and thoroughly, and automate response. But although AI has been widely adopted, this technology is also frequently misunderstood, and occasionally viewed with suspicion.

For CISOs, the cybersecurity marketplace can be noisy. Making sense of competing vendors’ claims to distinguish the solutions that truly deliver on AI’s full potential from those that do not isn’t always easy. Without a nuanced understanding of the different types of AI used across the cybersecurity stack, it is difficult to make informed decisions about which vendors to work with or how to gain the most value from their solutions. Many security leaders are turning to Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) for guidance and support.

The right kinds of AI in the right places?

Back in 2024, when we first conducted this annual survey, more than a quarter of respondents were only vaguely familiar with generative AI or hadn’t heard of it at all. Today, GenAI plays a role in 77% of security stacks. This percentage marks a rapid increase in both awareness and adoption over a relatively short period of time.

According to security professionals, different types of AI are widely integrated into cybersecurity tooling:

  • 67% report that their organization’s security stack uses supervised machine learning
  • 67% report that theirs uses agentic AI
  • 58% report that theirs uses natural language processing (NLP)
  • 35% report that theirs uses unsupervised machine learning

But their responses suggest that organizations aren’t always using the most valuable types of AI for the most relevant use cases.

Despite all the recent attention AI has gotten, supervised machine learning isn’t new. Cybersecurity vendors have been experimenting with models trained on hand-labeled datasets for over a decade. These systems are fed large numbers of examples of malicious activity – for instance, strains of ransomware – and use these examples to generalize common indicators of maliciousness – such as the TTPs of multiple known ransomware strains – so that the models can identify similar attacks in the future. This approach is more effective than signature-based detection, since it isn’t tied to an individual byte sequence or file hash. However, supervised machine learning models can miss patterns or features outside the training data set. When adversarial behavior shifts, these systems can’t easily pivot.

Unsupervised machine learning, by contrast, can identify key patterns and trends in unlabeled data without human input. This enables it to classify information independently and detect anomalies without needing to be taught about past threats. Unsupervised learning can continuously learn about an environment and adapt in real time.

One key distinction between supervised and unsupervised machine learning is that supervised learning algorithms require periodic updating and re-training, whereas unsupervised machine learning trains itself while it works.

The question of trust

Even as AI moves into the mainstream, security professionals are eyeing it with a mix of enthusiasm and caution. Although 89% say they have good visibility into the reasoning behind AI-generated outputs, 74% are limiting AI’s ability to take autonomous action in their SOC until explainability improves. 86% do not allow AI to take even small remediation actions without human oversight.

This model, commonly known as “human in the loop,” is currently the norm across the industry. It seems like a best-of-both-worlds approach that allows teams to experience the benefits of AI-accelerated response without relinquishing control – or needing to trust an AI system.

Keeping humans somewhat in the loop is essential for getting the best out of AI. Analysts will always need to review alerts, make judgement calls, and set guardrails for AI's behavior. Their input helps AI models better understand what “normal” looks like, improving their accuracy over time.

However, relying on human confirmation has real costs – it delays response, increases the cognitive burden analysts must bear, and creates potential coverage gaps when security teams are overwhelmed or unavailable. The traditional model, in which humans monitor and act on every alert, is no longer workable at scale.

If organizations depend too heavily on in-the-loop humans, they risk recreating the very problem AI is meant to solve: backlogs of alerts waiting for analyst review. Removing the human from the loop can buy back valuable time, which analysts can then invest in building a proactive security posture. They can also focus more closely on the most critical incidents, where human attention is truly needed.

Allowing AI to operate autonomously requires trust in its decision-making. This trust can be built gradually over time, with autonomous operations expanding as trust grows. But it also requires knowledge and understanding of AI — what it is, how it works, and how best to deploy it at enterprise scale.

Looking for help in all the right places

To gain access to these capabilities in a way that’s efficient and scalable, growing numbers of security leaders are looking for outsourced support. In fact, 85% of security professionals prefer to obtain new SOC capabilities in the form of a managed service.

This makes sense: Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) can deliver deep, continuously available expertise without the cost and complexity of building an in-house team. Outsourcing also allows organizations to scale security coverage up or down as needs change, stay current with evolving threats and regulatory requirements, and leverage AI-native detection and response without needing to manage the AI tools themselves.

Preferences for MSSP-delivered security operations are particularly strong in the education, energy (87%), and healthcare sectors. This makes sense: all are high-value targets for threat actors, and all tend to have limited cybersecurity budgets, so the need for a partner who can deliver affordable access to expertise at scale is strong. Retailers also voiced a strong preference for MSSP-delivered services. These companies are tasked with managing large volumes of consumer personal and financial data, and with transforming an industry traditionally thought of as a late adopter to a vanguard of cyber defense. Technology companies, too, have a marked preference for SOC capabilities delivered by MSSPs. This may simply be because they understand the complexity of the threat landscape – and the advantages of specialized expertise — so well.

In order to help as many organizations as possible – from major enterprises to small and midmarket companies – benefit from enterprise-grade, AI-native security, Darktrace is making it easier for MSSPs to deliver its technology. The ActiveAI Security Portal introduces an alert dashboard designed to increase the speed and efficiency of alert triage, while a new AI-powered managed email security solution is giving MSSPs an edge in the never-ending fight against advanced phishing attacks – helping partners as well as organizations succeed on the frontlines of cyber defense.

Explore the full State of AI Cybersecurity 2026 report for deeper insights into how security leaders are responding to AI-driven risks.

Learn more about securing AI in your enterprise.

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May 19, 2026

When Open Source Is Weaponized: Analysis of a Trojanized 7 Zip Installer

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Background of the malicious 7-Zip installer, and assessing its Impact

Early in 2026, external researchers disclosed a malicious distribution campaign leveraging a trojanized installer masquerading itself as a legitimate 7‑Zip utility. Evidence suggests the campaign was active as of January 2026, during which victims were served a fake installer from 7zip[.]com, a highly convincing typo-squatted domain impersonating the official 7‑Zip distribution site (7-zip[.]org).

Initial access is typically achieved through social engineering and search‑engine abuse, including YouTube tutorial content that explicitly referenced the impersonated domain as the download source. Notably, several reports observed the installer delivered a modified but functional build of 7‑Zip (7zfm.exe) to reduce suspicion and preserve expected user behavior.

However, the installer also dropped additional payloads, such as Uphero.exe, hero.exe, and hero.dll, which are not part of the legitimate 7‑Zip software package. Once installed and executed, these payloads allow the attacker to establish persistence and configure the infected host as a proxy node under their control. This facilitates malicious activities such as traffic relaying, anonymizing infrastructure, and the delivery of secondary payloads [1] [2].

Overall, this attack illustrates a proxyware-style attack that abuses implicit trust in widely deployed third‑party tools while exploiting unconventional delivery vectors such as instructional media. By closely imitating legitimate software behavior and branding, the threat actors significantly reduced user suspicion and increased the likelihood of widespread, undetected compromise.

Threat overview

Darktrace observed multiple customers affected by the malicious 7‑Zip installer between January 12 and January 22, impacting organizations across the Americas (AMS), Asia‑Pacific & Japan (APJ), and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) regions. The activity targeted customers across various sectors, including Human health and social work activities, Manufacturing, Education, and Information and communication.

The following use case highlights a device on one customer network making external connections associated with malicious 7-Zip update activity observed between  January 7 and January 18, 2026.  This behavior included connectivity to the malicious domain 7zip[.]com, followed by command-and control (C2) activity involving "smshero"-themed domains, as well as outbound proxy connections over ports 1000 and 1002.  

Initial Connectivity to 'update[.]7zip[.]com':

Initial Beaconing to Young Endpoint alert behavior, involving the known tunnel/proxy endpoint ‘79.127.221[.]47’.
Figure 1: Initial Beaconing to Young Endpoint alert behavior, involving the known tunnel/proxy endpoint ‘79.127.221[.]47’.

Starting on January 7, Darktrace / NETWORK detected the device making repeated beaconing connections to the endpoint 79.127.221[.]47 over the destination port 1000. The use of this port aligns with open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting that hero[.]exe establishes outbound proxy connections via non-standard ports such as 1000 and 1002 [1].

Darktrace observed TLS beaconing alerts to the known trojanized installer, update[.]7zip[.]com · 98.96.229[.]19, over port 443 on January 7th.
Figure 2: Darktrace observed TLS beaconing alerts to the known trojanized installer, update[.]7zip[.]com · 98.96.229[.]19, over port 443 on January 7th.

Later the same day, the device initiated TLS beaconing to the endpoint update.7zip[.]com. This is more than likely a common source of compromise, where victims unknowingly installed a modified build of the tool alongside additional malicious components. The campaign then progressed into the next attack phase, marked by established connectivity to various C2 domains.

Beaconing Activity to "smshero"-themed domains

Darktrace subsequently observed the same infected device connecting to various C2 domains used to retrieve configuration data. As such, these external hostnames were themed around the string “smshero”, for example ‘smshero[.]co’.

On January 8th, Darktrace observed SSL beaconing to a rare destination which was attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, nova[.]smshero[.]ai.
Figure 3: On January 8th, Darktrace observed SSL beaconing to a rare destination which was attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, nova[.]smshero[.]ai.

The following day, on January 8, the device exhibited its first connectivity to a "smshero"-themed endpoint, which has since been identified as being associated with rotating C2 servers [1] [3]. Similar beaconing activity continued over the following days, with Darktrace identifying C2 connectivity to update[.]7zip[.]com over port 443, alongside additional connections to “smshero”‑themed endpoints such as zest.hero-sms[.]ai, flux.smshero[.]cc, and glide.smshero[.]cc between January 9 and January 15.

Darktrace later observed continued beaconing alerts over a 4-day interval to additional rare destinations attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, zest[.]hero-sms[.]ai & glide[.]smshero[.]cc.
Figure 4: Darktrace later observed continued beaconing alerts over a 4-day interval to additional rare destinations attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, zest[.]hero-sms[.]ai & glide[.]smshero[.]cc.

Proxied connectivity over destination ports

The primary objective of this campaign is believed to be proxyware, whereby third-party traffic is routed through victim devices to potentially obfuscate malicious activity. Devices were also observed communicating with rare external IPs hosted on Cloudflare and DataCamp Limited ASNs, establishing outbound proxy connections over the non-standard ports 1000 and 1002 [1].

OSINT sources also indicate that connections over these ports leveraged an XOR-encoded protocol (key 0x70) designed to obscure control messages. While the end goal of the campaign remains unclear, residential proxy networks can be abused to evade security rules and facilitate further unauthorized activities, including phishing and malware distribution [1][3].

Specifically, on January 8, Darktrace observed the device engaging in low-and-slow data exfiltration to the IP 79.127.221[.]47, which had first been observed the previous day, over port 1000. Proxyware typically installs an agent that routes third‑party traffic through an end-user’s device, effectively  turning it into a residential proxy exit node. This activity likely represents the system actively communicating outbound data to an entity that controls its behavior.

Figure 5: Darktrace later observed a ‘Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP’ alert, involving the known tunnel/proxy endpoint ‘79.127.221[.]47’.

Similar activity continued between January 10 and January 18, with Darktrace detecting threat actors attempting to exfiltrate significant volumes of data to 79.127.221[.]47 over destination port 1000.

Throughout the course of this incident, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched several autonomous investigations, analyzing each anomalous event and ultimately painting a detailed picture of the attack timeline. These investigations correlated multiple incidents based on Darktrace detections observed between January 7 and January 19. Cyber AI Analyst identified anomalous variables such as repeated connections to unusual endpoints involving data uploads and downloads, with particular emphasis on HTTP and SSL connectivity.

Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing multiple incident events that occurred on January 7th & 8th, highlighting associated malicious 7-zip behaviors.
Figure 6: Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing multiple incident events that occurred on January 7th & 8th, highlighting associated malicious 7-zip behaviors.
Darktrace AI Analyst Endpoint Details from the given ‘Unusual Repeated Connections’ Incident Event, including the known tunnel/proxy endpoint.
Figure 7: Darktrace AI Analyst Endpoint Details from the given ‘Unusual Repeated Connections’ Incident Event, including the known tunnel/proxy endpoint.
 Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing additional incident events that occurred on January 12th through 18th, highlighting malicious 7-zip behaviors and SSL connectivity.
Figure 8: Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing additional incident events that occurred on January 12th through 18th, highlighting malicious 7-zip behaviors and SSL connectivity.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

At several stages throughout the attack, Darktrace implemented Autonomous Response actions to help contain the suspicious activity as soon as it was identified, providing the customer’s security team with additional time to investigate and remediate. Between January 7 and January 18, Darktrace blocked a wide range of malicious activity, including beaconing connections to unusual endpoints, small data exfiltration attempts, and larger egress efforts, ultimately preventing the attacker from progressing through multiple stages of the attack or achieving their objectives.

Darktrace Autonomous Response Action Coverage showcasing connection block connection events including various endpoints that occurred on January 7th.
Figure 9: Darktrace Autonomous Response Action Coverage showcasing connection block connection events including various endpoints that occurred on January 7th.
Darktrace Antigena (Autonomous Response) Model Alert Coverage, showcasing a Antigena Suspicious Activity Block alert occurred on January 10th as a result of the Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP model alert.
Figure 10: Darktrace Antigena (Autonomous Response) Model Alert Coverage, showcasing a Antigena Suspicious Activity Block alert occurred on January 10th as a result of the Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP model alert.
Figure 11: Additional Darktrace Antigena (Autonomous Response) Model Alert Coverage, showcasing a Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block alert occurred on January 18th as a result of the Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound model alert.

Conclusion

The malicious 7‑Zip installer underscores how attackers continue to weaponize trust in widely used, legitimate software to gain initial access while evading user suspicion. By exploiting familiar and commonly installed services, this type of attack demonstrates that even routine actions, such as installing compression software, can become high‑risk events when defenses or user awareness are insufficient.

This campaign further emphasizes the urgent need for strict software validation and continuous network monitoring. Modern threats no longer rely solely on obscure tools or overtly malicious behavior. Instead, they increasingly blend seamlessly into everyday operations, making detection more challenging.

In this case, Darktrace / NETWORK was able to identify the anomalous activity and Autonomous Response actions in a timely manner, enabling the customer to be quickly notified and providing crucial additional time to investigate further.

In summary, the abuse of a trojanized 7‑Zip installer highlights a concerning shift in modern threat tactics, where trusted and widely deployed tools can serve as primary delivery mechanisms for system compromise. This reality reinforces that proactive detection, continuous monitoring, and strong security awareness are not optional but essential.

Credit to Justin Torres, Senior Cyber Analyst, David Moreira da Silva, Cyber Analyst, Emma Foulger, Global Threat Research Operations Lead.

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

1. https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/02/fake-7-zip-downloads-are-turning-home-pcs-into-proxy-nodes

2. https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/unofficial-7-zip-com-website-served-up-malware-for-10-days-files-turned-pcs-into-a-proxy-botnet

3. https://blog.lukeacha.com/2026/01/beware-of-fake-7zip-installer-upstage.html

4. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malicious-7-zip-site-distributes-installer-laced-with-proxy-tool/

5. https://customerportal.darktrace.com/guides/antigena-network-model-actions

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

·      Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

·      Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days

·      Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days

·      Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·      Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

Cyber AI Analyst Coverage

·      Unusual Repeated Connections

·      Unusual Repeated Connections to Multiple Endpoints

·      Possible HTTP Command and Control

·      Possible HTTP Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints

·      Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

·      Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints

Indicators of Compromise

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·      7zip[.]com – Hostname – C2 Endpoint

·      flux[.]smshero[.]co - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      neo[.]herosms[.]co - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      nova[.]smshero[.]ai - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      zest[.]hero-sms[.]ai -  Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      soc[.]hero-sms[.]co - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      pulse[.]herosms[.]cc - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      glide[.]smshero[.]cc - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      prime[.]herosms[.]vip - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      172.96.115[.]226 - IP Address - C2 Endpoint

·      79.127.221[.]47:1002 – IP Address/Port - Proxy Endpoint

·      84.17.37[.]1:1002 - IP Address/Port - Proxy Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique Name - Tactic - ID - Sub-Technique of

·      Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - EXFILTRATION - T1041

·      Scheduled Transfer - EXFILTRATION - T1029

·      Automated Exfiltration - EXFILTRATION - T1020

·      Data Transfer Size Limits - EXFILTRATION - T1030

·      External Proxy - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1090.002 - T1090

·      Non-Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1095

·      Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

·      Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 - T1567

·      Exploit Public-Facing Application - INITIAL ACCESS - T1190

·      Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

·      Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

·      Man in the Browser - COLLECTION - T1185

·      Browser Extensions - PERSISTENCE - T1176

·      Encrypted Channel - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1573

·      Fallback Channels - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1008

·      Multi-Stage Channels - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1104

·      Supply Chain Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS ICS - T0862

·      Commonly Used Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL ICS - T0885

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About the author
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst
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