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July 4, 2024

A Busy Agenda: Darktrace's Detection of Qilin Ransomware as a Service Operator

This blog breaks down how Darktrace detected and analyzed Qilin, a Ransomware-as-a-Service group behind recent high-impact attacks. You’ll see how Qilin affiliates customize attacks with flexible encryption, process termination, and double-extortion techniques, as well as why its cross-platform builds in Rust and Golang make it especially evasive. Darktrace highlights three real-world cases where its AI identified likely Qilin activity across customer environments, offering insights into how behavioral detection can spot novel ransomware before disruption occurs. Readers will gain a clear view of Qilin’s toolkit, tactics, and how self-learning defense adapts to these evolving threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst
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04
Jul 2024

What is Qilin Ransomware and what's its impact?

Qilin ransomware has recently dominated discussions across the cyber security landscape following its deployment in an attack on Synnovis, a UK-based medical laboratory company. The ransomware attack ultimately affected patient services at multiple National Health Service (NHS) hospitals that rely on Synnovis diagnostic and pathology services. Qilin’s origins, however, date back further to October 2022 when the group was observed seemingly posting leaked data from its first known victim on its Dedicated Leak Site (DLS) under the name Agenda[1].

The Darktrace Threat Research team investigated network artifacts related to Qilin and identified three probable cases of the ransomware across the Darktrace customer base between June 2022 and May 2024.

How Qilin Ransowmare Operates as RaaS

Qilin operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that employs double extortion tactics, whereby harvested data is exfiltrated and threatened of publication on the group's DLS, which is hosted on Tor. Qilin ransomware has samples written in both the Golang and Rust programming languages, making it compilable with various operating systems, and is highly customizable.

Techniques Qilin Ransomware uses to avoid detection

When building Qilin ransomware variants to be used on their target(s), affiliates can configure settings such as:

  • Encryption modes (skip-step, percent, or speed)
  • File extensions, directories, or processes to exclude
  • Unique company IDs used as extensions on encrypted files
  • Services or processes to terminate during execution [1] [2].
  • Trend Micro analysts, who were the first to discover Qilin samples in August 2022, when the name "Agenda" was still used in ransom notes, found that each analyzed sample was customized for the intended victims and that "unique company IDs were used as extensions of encrypted files" [3]. This information is configurable from within the Qilin's affiliate panel's 'Targets' section, shown below.

    Qilin's affiliate panel and branding

    The panel's background image features the eponym Chinese legendary chimerical creature Qilin (pronounced “Ke Lin”). Despite this Chinese mythology reference, Russian language was observed being used by a Qilin operator in an underground forum post aimed at hiring affiliates and advertising their RaaS operation[2].

    Figure 1: Qilin ransomware’s affiliate panel.

    Qilin’s affiliate payment model

    Qilin's RaaS program purportedly has an attractive affiliates' payment structure,

    • Affiliates earn 80% of ransom payments under USD 3 million
    • Affiliates earn 85% of ransom payments above USD 3 million [2]

    Publication of stolen data and ransom payment negotiations are purportedly handled by Qilin operators. Qilin affiliates have been known to target companies located around the world and within a variety of industries, including critical sectors such as healthcare and energy.

    Qilin target industries and victims

    As Qilin is a RaaS operation, the choice of targets does not necessarily reflect Qilin operators' intentions, but rather that of its affiliates.  

    Similarly, the tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IoC) identified by Darktrace are associated with the given affiliate deploying Qilin ransomware for their own purpose, rather than TTPs and IoCs of the Qilin group. Likewise, initial vectors of infection may vary from affiliate to affiliate.

    Previous studies show that initial access to networks were gained via spear phishing emails or by leveraging exposed applications and interfaces.

    Differences have been observed in terms of data exfiltration and potential C2 external endpoints, suggesting the below investigations are not all related to the same group or actor(s).

    [related-resource]

    Darktrace’s threat research investigation

    Qlin ransomware attack breakdown

    June 2022: Qilin ransomware attack exploiting VPN and SCCM servers

    Key findings:

    • Initial access: VPN and compromised admin account
    • Lateral movement: SCCM and VMware ESXi hosts
    • Malware observed: SystemBC, Tofsee
    • Ransom notes: Linked to Qilin naming conventions
    • Darktrace visibility: Analysts worked with customer via Ask the Expert (ATE) to expand coverage, revealing unusual scanning, rare external connections, and malware indicators tied to Qilin

    Full story:

    Darktrace first detected an instance of Qilin ransomware back in June 2022, when an attacker was observed successfully accessing a customer’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) and compromising an administrative account, before using RDP to gain access to the customer’s Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) server.

    From there, an attack against the customer's VMware ESXi hosts was launched. Fortunately, a reboot of their virtual machines (VM) caught the attention of the security team who further uncovered that custom profiles had been created and remote scripts executed to change root passwords on their VM hosts. Three accounts were found to have been compromised and three systems encrypted by ransomware.  

    Unfortunately, Darktrace was not configured to monitor the affected subnets at the time of the attack. Despite this, the customer was able to work directly with Darktrace analysts via the Ask the Expert (ATE) service to add the subnets in question to Darktrace’s visibility, allowing it to monitor for any further unusual behavior.

    Once visibility over the compromised SCCM server was established, Darktrace observed:

    • A series of unusual network scanning activities  
    • The use of Kali (a Linux distribution designed for digital forensics and penetration testing).
    • Connections to multiple rare external hosts. Many of which were using the “[.]ru” Top Level Domain (TLD).

    One of the external destinations the server was attempting to connect was found to be related to SystemBC, a malware that turns infected hosts into SOCKS5 proxy bots and provides command-and-control (C2) functionality.

    Additionally, the server was observed making external connections over ports 993 and 143 (typically associated with the use of the Interactive Message Access Protocol (IMAP) to multiple rare external endpoints. This was likely due to the presence of Tofsee malware on the device.

    After the compromise had been contained, Darktrace identified several ransom notes following the naming convention “README-RECOVER-<extension/company_id>.txt”” on the network. This naming convention, as well as the similar “<company_id>-RECOVER-README.txt” have been referenced by open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers as associated with Qilin ransom notes[5] [6] [7].

    April 2023: Manufacturing sector breach with large-scale exfiltration

    Key findings:

    • Initial access & movement: Extensive scanning and lateral movement via SMB, RDP, and WMI
    • Credential abuse: Use of default credentials (admin, administrator)
    • Malware/Indicators: Evidence of Cobalt Strike; suspicious WebDAV user agent and JA3 fingerprint
    • Data exfiltration: ~30 GB stolen via SSL to MEGA cloud storage
    • Darktrace analysis: Detected anomalous SMB and DCE-RPC traffic from domain controller, high-volume RDP activity, and rare external connectivity to IPs tied to command-and-control (C2). Confirmed ransom notes followed Qilin naming conventions.

    Full story:

    The next case of Qilin ransomware observed by Darktrace took place in April 2023 on the network of a customer in the manufacturing sector in APAC. Unfortunately for the customer in this instance, Darktrace's Autonomous Response was not active on their environment and no autonomous actions were taken to contain the compromise.

    Over the course of two days, Darktrace identified a wide range of malicious activity ranging from extensive initial scanning and lateral movement attempts to the writing of ransom notes that followed the aforementioned naming convention (i.e., “README-RECOVER-<extension/company_id>.txt”).

    Darktrace observed two affected devices attempting to move laterally through the SMB, DCE-RPC and RDP network protocols. Default credentials (e.g., UserName, admin, administrator) were also observed in the large volumes of SMB sessions initiated by these devices. One of the target devices of these SMB connections was a domain controller, which was subsequently seen making suspicious WMI requests to multiple devices over DCE-RPC and enumerating SMB shares by binding to the ‘server service’ (srvsvc) named pipe to a high number of internal devices within a short time frame. The domain controller was further detected establishing an anomalously high number of connections to several internal devices, notably using the RDP administrative protocol via a default admin cookie.  

    Repeated connections over the HTTP and SSL protocol to multiple newly observed IPs located in the 184.168.123.0/24 range were observed, indicating C2 connectivity.  WebDAV user agent and a JA3 fingerprint potentially associated with Cobalt Strike were notably observed in these connections. A few hours later, Darktrace detected additional suspicious external connections, this time to IPs associated with the MEGA cloud storage solution. Storage solutions such as MEGA are often abused by attackers to host stolen data post exfiltration. In this case, the endpoints were all rare for the network, suggesting this solution was not commonly used by legitimate users. Around 30 GB of data was exfiltrated over the SSL protocol.

    Darktrace did not observe any encryption-related activity on this customer’s network, suggesting that encryption may have taken place locally or within network segments not monitored by Darktrace.

    May 2024: US enterprise compromise

    Key findings:

    • Initial access & movement: Abuse of administrative and default credentials; lateral movement via DCE-RPC and RDP
    • Malware/Indicators: Suspicious executables (‘a157496.exe’, ‘83b87b2.exe’); abuse of RPC service LSM_API_service
    • Data exfiltration: Large amount of data exfiltrated via FTP and other channels to rare external endpoint (194.165.16[.]13)
    • C2 communications: HTTP/SSL traffic linked to Cobalt Strike, including PowerShell request for sihost64.dll
    • Darktrace analysis: Flagged unusual SMB writes, malicious file transfers, and large-scale exfiltration as highly anomalous. Confirmed widespread encryption activity targeting numerous devices and shares.

    Full story:

    The most recent instance of Qilin observed by Darktrace took place in May 2024 and involved a customer in the US.

    In this case, Darktrace initially detected affected devices using unusual administrative and default credentials. Then Darktrace observed additional Internal systems conducting abnormal activity such as:

    • Making extensive suspicious DCE-RPC requests to a range of internal locations
    • Performing network scanning
    • Making unusual internal RDP connections
    • And transferring suspicious executable files like 'a157496.exe' and '83b87b2.exe'.  

    SMB writes of the file "LSM_API_service" were also observed, activity which was considered 100% unusual by Darktrace; this is an RPC service that can be abused to enumerate logged-in users and steal their tokens. Various repeated connections likely representative of C2 communications were detected via both HTTP and SSL to rare external endpoints linked in OSINT to Cobalt Strike use. During these connections, HTTP GET requests for the following URIs were observed:

    /asdffHTTPS

    /asdfgdf

    /asdfgHTTP

    /download/sihost64.dll

    Notably, this included a GET request a DLL file named "sihost64.dll" from a domain controller using PowerShell.  

    Over 102 GB of data may have been transferred to another previously unseen endpoint, 194.165.16[.]13, via the unencrypted File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Additionally, many non-FTP connections to the endpoint could be observed, over which more than 783 GB of data was exfiltrated. Regarding file encryption activity, a wide range of destination devices and shares were targeted.

    Figure 2: Advanced Search graph displaying the total volume of data transferred over FTP to a malicious IP.

    During investigations, Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified an additional customer, also based in the United States, where similar data exfiltration activity was observed in April 2024. Although no indications of ransomware encryption were detected on the network, multiple similarities were observed with the case discussed just prior. Notably, the same exfiltration IP and protocol (194.165.16[.]13 and FTP, respectively) were identified in both cases. Additional HTTP connectivity was further observed to another IP using a self-signed certificate (i.e., CN=ne[.]com,OU=key operations,O=1000,L=,ST=,C=KM) located within the same ASN (i.e., AS48721 Flyservers S.A.). Some of the URIs seen in the GET requests made to this endpoint were the same as identified in that same previous case.

    Information regarding another device also making repeated connections to the same IP was described in the second event of the same Cyber AI Analyst incident. Following this C2 connectivity, network scanning was observed from a compromised domain controller, followed by additional reconnaissance and lateral movement over the DCE-RPC and SMB protocols. Darktrace again observed SMB writes of the file "LSM_API_service", as in the previous case, activity which was also considered 100% unusual for the network. These similarities suggest the same actor or affiliate may have been responsible for activity observed, even though no encryption was observed in the latter case.

    Figure 3: First event of the Cyber AI Analyst investigation following the compromise activity.

    According to researchers at Microsoft, some of the IoCs observed on both affected accounts are associated with Pistachio Tempest, a threat actor reportedly associated with ransomware distribution. The Microsoft threat actor naming convention uses the term "tempest" to reference criminal organizations with motivations of financial gain that are not associated with high confidence to a known non-nation state or commercial entity. While Pistachio Tempest’s TTPs have changed over time, their key elements still involve ransomware, exfiltration, and extortion. Once they've gained access to an environment, Pistachio Tempest typically utilizes additional tools to complement their use of Cobalt Strike; this includes the use of the SystemBC RAT and the SliverC2 framework, respectively. It has also been reported that Pistacho Tempest has experimented with various RaaS offerings, which recently included Qilin ransomware[4].

    Conclusion

    Qilin is a RaaS group that has gained notoriety recently due to high-profile attacks perpetrated by its affiliates. Despite this, the group likely includes affiliates and actors who were previously associated with other ransomware groups. These individuals bring their own modus operandi and utilize both known and novel TTPs and IoCs that differ from one attack to another.

    Darktrace’s anomaly-based technology is inherently threat-agnostic, treating all RaaS variants equally regardless of the attackers’ tools and infrastructure. Deviations from a device’s ‘learned’ pattern of behavior during an attack enable Darktrace to detect and contain potentially disruptive ransomware attacks.

    [related-resource]

    Credit to: Alexandra Sentenac, Emma Foulger, Justin Torres, Min Kim, Signe Zaharka for their contributions.

    References

    [1] https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/agenda-qilin/  

    [2] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/qilin-ransomware/

    [3] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/h/new-golang-ransomware-agenda-customizes-attacks.html

    [4] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/pistachio-tempest

    [5] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/h/new-golang-ransomware-agenda-customizes-attacks.html

    [6] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/790240/agenda-qilin-ransomware-id-random-10-char;-recover-readmetxt-support/

    [7] https://github.com/threatlabz/ransomware_notes/tree/main/qilin

    Darktrace Model Detections

    Internal Reconnaissance

    Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

    Device / Network Scan

    Device / RDP Scan

    Device / ICMP Address Scan

    Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

    Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

    Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

    Device / Attack and Recon Tools

    Lateral Movement

    Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

    Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

    Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

    Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

    Device / SMB Lateral Movement

    Compliance / SMB Drive Write

    Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

    Anomalous Connection / Anomalous DRSGetNCChanges Operation

    Anomalous Server Activity / Domain Controller Initiated to Client

    User / New Admin Credentials on Client

    C2 Communication

    Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

    Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

    Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External

    Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

    Device / Increased External Connectivity

    Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

    Compromise / New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port

    Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

    Device / Suspicious Domain

    Device / Increased External Connectivity

    Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

    Compromise / Botnet C2 Behaviour

    Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

    Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

    Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

    Exfiltration

    Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

    Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

    Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

    Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

    Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

    Compliance / FTP / Unusual Outbound FTP

    File Encryption

    Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

    Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion

    Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

    Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Write

    Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Read

    Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

    IoC List

    IoC – Type – Description + Confidence

    93.115.25[.]139 IP C2 Server, likely associated with SystemBC

    194.165.16[.]13 IP Probable Exfiltration Server

    91.238.181[.]230 IP C2 Server, likely associated with Cobalt Strike

    ikea0[.]com Hostname C2 Server, likely associated with Cobalt Strike

    lebondogicoin[.]com Hostname C2 Server, likely associated with Cobalt Strike

    184.168.123[.]220 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]219 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]236 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]241 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]247 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]251 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]252 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]229 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]246 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    184.168.123[.]230 IP Possible C2 Infrastructure

    gfs440n010.userstorage.me ga.co[.]nz Hostname Possible Exfiltration Server. Not inherently malicious; associated with MEGA file storage.

    gfs440n010.userstorage.me ga.co[.]nz Hostname Possible Exfiltration Server. Not inherently malicious; associated with MEGA file storage.

    Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

    This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025

    Inside the SOC
    Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
    Written by
    Alexandra Sentenac
    Cyber Analyst

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    October 13, 2025

    Inside Akira’s SonicWall Campaign: Darktrace’s Detection and Response

    akira sonicwallDefault blog imageDefault blog image

    Introduction: Background on Akira SonicWall campaign

    Between July and August 2025, security teams worldwide observed a surge in Akira ransomware incidents involving SonicWall SSL VPN devices [1]. Initially believed to be the result of an unknown zero-day vulnerability, SonicWall later released an advisory announcing that the activity was strongly linked to a previously disclosed vulnerability, CVE-2024-40766, first identified over a year earlier [2].

    On August 20, 2025, Darktrace observed unusual activity on the network of a customer in the US. Darktrace detected a range of suspicious activity, including network scanning and reconnaissance, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. One of the compromised devices was later identified as a SonicWall virtual private network (VPN) server, suggesting that the incident was part of the broader Akira ransomware campaign targeting SonicWall technology.

    As the customer was subscribed to the Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team was able to rapidly triage critical alerts, restrict the activity of affected devices, and notify the customer of the threat. As a result, the impact of the attack was limited - approximately 2 GiB of data had been observed leaving the network, but any further escalation of malicious activity was stopped.

    Threat Overview

    CVE-2024-40766 and other misconfigurations

    CVE-2024-40766 is an improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall’s SonicOS, affecting Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices running SonicOS version 7.0.1 5035 and earlier [3]. The vulnerability was disclosed on August 23, 2024, with a patch released the same day. Shortly after, it was reported to be exploited in the wild by Akira ransomware affiliates and others [4].

    Almost a year later, the same vulnerability is being actively targeted again by the Akira ransomware group. In addition to exploiting unpatched devices affected by CVE-2024-40766, security researchers have identified three other risks potentially being leveraged by the group [5]:

    *The Virtual Office Portal can be used to initially set up MFA/TOTP configurations for SSLVPN users.

    Thus, even if SonicWall devices were patched, threat actors could still target them for initial access by reusing previously stolen credentials and exploiting other misconfigurations.

    Akira Ransomware

    Akira ransomware was first observed in the wild in March 2023 and has since become one of the most prolific ransomware strains across the threat landscape [6]. The group operates under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model and frequently uses double extortion tactics, pressuring victims to pay not only to decrypt files but also to prevent the public release of sensitive exfiltrated data.

    The ransomware initially targeted Windows systems, but a Linux variant was later observed targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines [7]. In 2024, it was assessed that Akira would continue to target ESXi hypervisors, making attacks highly disruptive due to the central role of virtualisation in large-scale cloud deployments. Encrypting the ESXi file system enables rapid and widespread encryption with minimal lateral movement or credential theft. The lack of comprehensive security protections on many ESXi hypervisors also makes them an attractive target for ransomware operators [8].

    Victimology

    Akira is known to target organizations across multiple sectors, most notably those in manufacturing, education, and healthcare. These targets span multiple geographic regions, including North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia-Pacific [9].

    Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].
    Figure 1: Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].

    Common Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) [7][10]

    Initial Access
    Targets remote access services such as RDP and VPN through vulnerability exploitation or stolen credentials.

    Reconnaissance
    Uses network scanning tools like SoftPerfect and Advanced IP Scanner to map the environment and identify targets.

    Lateral Movement
    Moves laterally using legitimate administrative tools, typically via RDP.

    Persistence
    Employs techniques such as Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, and tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials. Known to create new domain accounts to maintain access.

    Command and Control
    Utilizes remote access tools including AnyDesk, RustDesk, Ngrok, and Cloudflare Tunnel.

    Exfiltration
    Uses tools such as FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, and Rclone. Data is exfiltrated via protocols like FTP and SFTP, or through cloud storage services such as Mega.

    Darktrace’s Coverage of Akira ransomware

    Reconnaissance

    Darktrace first detected of unusual network activity around 05:10 UTC, when a desktop device was observed performing a network scan and making an unusual number of DCE-RPC requests to the endpoint mapper (epmapper) service. Network scans are typically used to identify open ports, while querying the epmapper service can reveal exposed RPC services on the network.

    Multiple other devices were also later seen with similar reconnaissance activity, and use of the Advanced IP Scanner tool, indicated by connections to the domain advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.

    Lateral movement

    Shortly after the initial reconnaissance, the same desktop device exhibited unusual use of administrative tools. Darktrace observed the user agent “Ruby WinRM Client” and the URI “/wsman” as the device initiated a rare outbound Windows Remote Management (WinRM) connection to two domain controllers (REDACTED-dc1 and REDACTED-dc2). WinRM is a Microsoft service that uses the WS-Management (WSMan) protocol to enable remote management and control of network devices.

    Darktrace also observed the desktop device connecting to an ESXi device (REDACTED-esxi1) via RDP using an LDAP service credential, likely with administrative privileges.

    Credential access

    At around 06:26 UTC, the desktop device was seen fetching an Active Directory certificate from the domain controller (REDACTED-dc1) by making a DCE-RPC request to the ICertPassage service. Shortly after, the device made a Kerberos login using the administrative credential.

    Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the of anomalous certificate download and subsequent Kerberos login.

    Further investigation into the device’s event logs revealed a chain of connections that Darktrace’s researchers believe demonstrates a credential access technique known as “UnPAC the hash.”

    This method begins with pre-authentication using Kerberos’ Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT), allowing the client to use an X.509 certificate to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution Center (KDC) instead of a password.

    The next stage involves User-to-User (U2U) authentication when requesting a Service Ticket (ST) from the KDC. Within Darktrace's visibility of this traffic, U2U was indicated by the client and service principal names within the ST request being identical. Because PKINIT was used earlier, the returned ST contains the NTLM hash of the credential, which can then be extracted and abused for lateral movement or privilege escalation [11].

    Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12].
    Figure 4: Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12]
    Figure 5: Device event log showing the Kerberos Login and Kerberos Ticket events

    Analysis of the desktop device’s event logs revealed a repeated sequence of suspicious activity across multiple credentials. Each sequence included a DCE-RPC ICertPassage request to download a certificate, followed by a Kerberos login event indicating PKINIT pre-authentication, and then a Kerberos ticket event consistent with User-to-User (U2U) authentication.

    Darktrace identified this pattern as highly unusual. Cyber AI Analyst determined that the device used at least 15 different credentials for Kerberos logins over the course of the attack.

    By compromising multiple credentials, the threat actor likely aimed to escalate privileges and facilitate further malicious activity, including lateral movement. One of the credentials obtained via the “UnPAC the hash” technique was later observed being used in an RDP session to the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2).

    C2 / Additional tooling

    At 06:44 UTC, the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) was observed initiating a connection to temp[.]sh, a temporary cloud hosting service. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting indicates that this service is commonly used by threat actors to host and distribute malicious payloads, including ransomware [13].

    Shortly afterward, the ESXi device was observed downloading an executable named “vmwaretools” from the rare external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69, using the user agent “Wget.” The repeated outbound connections to this IP suggest potential command-and-control (C2) activity.

    Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
    Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
    Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.
    Figure 7: Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.

    Data exfiltration

    The first signs of data exfiltration were observed at around 7:00 UTC. Both the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) and a likely SonicWall VPN device were seen uploading approximately 2 GB of data via SSH to the rare external endpoint 66.165.243[.]39 (AS29802 HVC-AS). OSINT sources have since identified this IP as an indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with the Akira ransomware group, known to use it for data exfiltration [14].

    Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.
    Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.

    Cyber AI Analyst

    Throughout the course of the attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst autonomously investigated the anomalous activity as it unfolded and correlated related events into a single, cohesive incident. Rather than treating each alert as isolated, Cyber AI Analyst linked them together to reveal the broader narrative of compromise. This holistic view enabled the customer to understand the full scope of the attack, including all associated activities and affected assets that might otherwise have been dismissed as unrelated.

    Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.
    Figure 9: Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.

    Containing the attack

    In response to the multiple anomalous activities observed across the network, Darktrace's Autonomous Response initiated targeted mitigation actions to contain the attack. These included:

    • Blocking connections to known malicious or rare external endpoints, such as 137.184.243[.]69, 66.165.243[.]39, and advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.
    • Blocking internal traffic to sensitive ports, including 88 (Kerberos), 3389 (RDP), and 49339 (DCE-RPC), to disrupt lateral movement and credential abuse.
    • Enforcing a block on all outgoing connections from affected devices to contain potential data exfiltration and C2 activity.
    Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.
    Figure 10: Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.

    Managed Detection and Response

    As this customer was an MDR subscriber, multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts—high-fidelity models designed to detect activity indicative of compromise—were triggered across the network. These alerts prompted immediate investigation by Darktrace’s SOC team.

    Upon determining that the activity was likely linked to an Akira ransomware attack, Darktrace analysts swiftly acted to contain the threat. At around 08:05 UTC, devices suspected of being compromised were quarantined, and the customer was promptly notified, enabling them to begin their own remediation procedures without delay.

    A wider campaign?

    Darktrace’s SOC and Threat Research teams identified at least three additional incidents likely linked to the same campaign. All targeted organizations were based in the US, spanning various industries, and each have indications of using SonicWall VPN, indicating it had likely been targeted for initial access.

    Across these incidents, similar patterns emerged. In each case, a suspicious executable named “vmwaretools” was downloaded from the endpoint 85.239.52[.]96 using the user agent “Wget”, bearing some resemblance to the file downloads seen in the incident described here. Data exfiltration was also observed via SSH to the endpoints 107.155.69[.]42 and 107.155.93[.]154, both of which belong to the same ASN also seen in the incident described in this blog: S29802 HVC-AS. Notably, 107.155.93[.]154 has been reported in OSINT as an indicator associated with Akira ransomware activity [15]. Further recent Akira ransomware cases have been observed involving SonicWall VPN, where no similar executable file downloads were observed, but SSH exfiltration to the same ASN was. These overlapping and non-overlapping TTPs may reflect the blurring lines between different affiliates operating under the same RaaS.

    Lessons from the campaign

    This campaign by Akira ransomware actors underscores the critical importance of maintaining up-to-date patching practices. Threat actors continue to exploit previously disclosed vulnerabilities, not just zero-days, highlighting the need for ongoing vigilance even after patches are released. It also demonstrates how misconfigurations and overlooked weaknesses can be leveraged for initial access or privilege escalation, even in otherwise well-maintained environments.

    Darktrace’s observations further reveal that ransomware actors are increasingly relying on legitimate administrative tools, such as WinRM, to blend in with normal network activity and evade detection. In addition to previously documented Kerberos-based credential access techniques like Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, this campaign featured the use of UnPAC the hash to extract NTLM hashes via PKINIT and U2U authentication for lateral movement or privilege escalation.

    Credit to Emily Megan Lim (Senior Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), and Sam Lister (Specialist Security Researcher)

    Appendices

    Darktrace Model Detections

    Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

    Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

    Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

    Anomalous Connection / Possible Data Staging and External Upload

    Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

    Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing

    Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

    Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

    Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long Remote Desktop Session

    Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long SSH Session

    Anomalous Connection / Unusual Long SSH Session

    Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

    Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

    Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

    Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

    Compliance / Default Credential Usage

    Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Alert

    Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

    Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

    Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

    Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

    Device / Anomalous Certificate Download Activity

    Device / Anomalous SSH Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

    Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

    Device / Attack and Recon Tools

    Device / ICMP Address Scan

    Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

    Device / Network Range Scan

    Device / Network Scan

    Device / New User Agent To Internal Server

    Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

    Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

    Device / RDP Scan

    Device / Reverse DNS Sweep

    Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

    Device / UDP Enumeration

    Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

    Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

    User / Multiple Uncommon New Credentials on Device

    User / New Admin Credentials on Client

    User / New Admin Credentials on Server

    Enhanced Monitoring Models

    Compromise / Anomalous Certificate Download and Kerberos Login

    Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

    Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device

    Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

    Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

    Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

    Antigena/Autonomous Response Models

    Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

    Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

    Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

    Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

    Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

    Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

    Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

    Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

    Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

    Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

    Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

    Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

    Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

    Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Repeated Antigena Alerts

    List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

    ·      66.165.243[.]39 – IP Address – Data exfiltration endpoint

    ·      107.155.69[.]42 – IP Address – Probable data exfiltration endpoint

    ·      107.155.93[.]154 – IP Address – Likely Data exfiltration endpoint

    ·      137.184.126[.]86 – IP Address – Possible C2 endpoint

    ·      85.239.52[.]96 – IP Address – Likely C2 endpoint

    ·      hxxp://85.239.52[.]96:8000/vmwarecli  – URL – File download

    ·      hxxp://137.184.126[.]86:8080/vmwaretools – URL – File download

    MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

    Initial Access – T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application

    Reconnaissance – T1590.002 – Gather Victim Network Information: DNS

    Reconnaissance – T1590.005 – Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses

    Reconnaissance – T1592.004 – Gather Victim Host Information: Client Configurations

    Reconnaissance – T1595 – Active Scanning

    Discovery – T1018 – Remote System Discovery

    Discovery – T1046 – Network Service Discovery

    Discovery – T1083 – File and Directory Discovery

    Discovery – T1135 – Network Share Discovery

    Lateral Movement – T1021.001 – Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

    Lateral Movement – T1021.004 – Remote Services: SSH

    Lateral Movement – T1021.006 – Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

    Lateral Movement – T1550.002 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

    Lateral Movement – T1550.003 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

    Credential Access – T1110.001 – Brute Force: Password Guessing

    Credential Access – T1649 – Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

    Persistence, Privilege Escalation – T1078 – Valid Accounts

    Resource Development – T1588.001 – Obtain Capabilities: Malware

    Command and Control – T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

    Command and Control – T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer

    Command and Control – T1573 – Encrypted Channel

    Collection – T1074 – Data Staged

    Exfiltration – T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

    Exfiltration – T1048 – Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

    References

    [1] https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/sonicwall-investigating-potential-ssl.html

    [2] https://www.sonicwall.com/support/notices/gen-7-and-newer-sonicwall-firewalls-sslvpn-recent-threat-activity/250804095336430

    [3] https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0015

    [4] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-akira-ransomware-campaign-targeting-sonicwall-sslvpn-accounts/

    [5] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/dr-akira-ransomware-group-utilizing-sonicwall-devices-for-initial-access/

    [6] https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf

    [7] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a

    [8] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/akira-ransomware-continues-to-evolve/

    [9] https://www.ransomware.live/map?year=2025&q=akira

    [10] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024/
    [11] https://labs.lares.com/fear-kerberos-pt2/#UNPAC

    [12] https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/unpac-the-hash

    [13] https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/derailing-akira-cyber-threat-intelligence)

    [14] https://fieldeffect.com/blog/update-akira-ransomware-group-targets-sonicwall-vpn-appliances

    [15] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-july-2025-uptick-in-akira-ransomware-activity-targeting-sonicwall-ssl-vpn/

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    About the author
    Emily Megan Lim
    Cyber Analyst

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    September 30, 2025

    Out of Character: Detecting Vendor Compromise and Trusted Relationship Abuse with Darktrace

    vendor email compromiseDefault blog imageDefault blog image

    What is Vendor Email Compromise?

    Vendor Email Compromise (VEC) refers to an attack where actors breach a third-party provider to exploit their access, relationships, or systems for malicious purposes. The initially compromised entities are often the target’s existing partners, though this can extend to any organization or individual the target is likely to trust.

    It sits at the intersection of supply chain attacks and business email compromise (BEC), blending technical exploitation with trust-based deception. Attackers often infiltrate existing conversations, leveraging AI to mimic tone and avoid common spelling and grammar pitfalls. Malicious content is typically hosted on otherwise reputable file sharing platforms, meaning any shared links initially seem harmless.

    While techniques to achieve initial access may have evolved, the goals remain familiar. Threat actors harvest credentials, launch subsequent phishing campaigns, attempt to redirect invoice payments for financial gain, and exfiltrate sensitive corporate data.

    Why traditional defenses fall short

    These subtle and sophisticated email attacks pose unique challenges for defenders. Few busy people would treat an ongoing conversation with a trusted contact with the same level of suspicion as an email from the CEO requesting ‘URGENT ASSISTANCE!’ Unfortunately, many traditional secure email gateways (SEGs) struggle with this too. Detecting an out-of-character email, when it does not obviously appear out of character, is a complex challenge. It’s hardly surprising, then, that 83% of organizations have experienced a security incident involving third-party vendors [1].  

    This article explores how Darktrace detected four different vendor compromise campaigns for a single customer, within a two-week period in 2025.  Darktrace / EMAIL successfully identified the subtle indicators that these seemingly benign emails from trusted senders were, in fact, malicious. Due to the configuration of Darktrace / EMAIL in this customer’s environment, it was unable to take action against the malicious emails. However, if fully enabled to take Autonomous Response, it would have held all offending emails identified.

    How does Darktrace detect vendor compromise?

    The answer lies at the core of how Darktrace operates: anomaly detection. Rather than relying on known malicious rules or signatures, Darktrace learns what ‘normal’ looks like for an environment, then looks for anomalies across a wide range of metrics. Despite the resourcefulness of the threat actors involved in this case, Darktrace identified many anomalies across these campaigns.

    Different campaigns, common traits

    A wide variety of approaches was observed. Individuals, shared mailboxes and external contractors were all targeted. Two emails originated from compromised current vendors, while two came from unknown compromised organizations - one in an associated industry. The sender organizations were either familiar or, at the very least, professional in appearance, with no unusual alphanumeric strings or suspicious top-level domains (TLDs). Subject line, such as “New Approved Statement From [REDACTED]” and “[REDACTED] - Proposal Document” appeared unremarkable and were not designed to provoke heightened emotions like typical social engineering or BEC attempts.

    All emails had been given a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating Microsoft did not consider them to be spam or malicious [2]. They also passed authentication checks (including SPF, and in some cases DKIM and DMARC), meaning they appeared to originate from an authentic source for the sender domain and had not been tampered with in transit.  

    All observed phishing emails contained a link hosted on a legitimate and commonly used file-sharing site. These sites were often convincingly themed, frequently featuring the name of a trusted vendor either on the page or within the URL, to appear authentic and avoid raising suspicion. However, these links served only as the initial step in a more complex, multi-stage phishing process.

    A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
    Figure 1: A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
    Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.
    Figure 2: Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.

    If followed, the recipient would be redirected, sometimes via CAPTCHA, to fake Microsoft login pages designed to capturing credentials, namely http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html and https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html#.

    The latter made use of homoglyphs to deceive the user, with a link referencing ‘s3cure0line’, rather than ‘secureonline’. Post-incident investigation using open-source intelligence (OSINT) confirmed that the domains were linked to malicious phishing endpoints [3] [4].

    Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
    Figure 3: Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
    Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.
    Figure 4: Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.

    Darktrace Anomaly Detection

    Some senders were unknown to the network, with no previous outbound or inbound emails. Some had sent the email to multiple undisclosed recipients using BCC, an unusual behavior for a new sender.  

    Where the sender organization was an existing vendor, Darktrace recognized out-of-character behavior, in this case it was the first time a link to a particular file-sharing site had been shared. Often the links themselves exhibited anomalies, either being unusually prominent or hidden altogether - masked by text or a clickable image.

    Crucially, Darktrace / EMAIL is able to identify malicious links at the time of processing the emails, without needing to visit the URLs or analyze the destination endpoints, meaning even the most convincing phishing pages cannot evade detection – meaning even the most convincing phishing emails cannot evade detection. This sets it apart from many competitors who rely on crawling the endpoints present in emails. This, among other things, risks disruption to user experience, such as unsubscribing them from emails, for instance.

    Darktrace was also able to determine that the malicious emails originated from a compromised mailbox, using a series of behavioral and contextual metrics to make the identification. Upon analysis of the emails, Darktrace autonomously assigned several contextual tags to highlight their concerning elements, indicating that the messages contained phishing links, were likely sent from a compromised account, and originated from a known correspondent exhibiting out-of-character behavior.

    A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.
    Figure 5: Tags assigned to offending emails by Darktrace / EMAIL.

    Figure 6: A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.

    Out-of-character behavior caught in real-time

    In another customer environment around the same time Darktrace / EMAIL detected multiple emails with carefully crafted, contextually appropriate subject lines sent from an established correspondent being sent to 30 different recipients. In many cases, the attacker hijacked existing threads and inserted their malicious emails into an ongoing conversation in an effort to blend in and avoid detection. As in the previous, the attacker leveraged a well-known service, this time ClickFunnels, to host a document containing another malicious link. Once again, they were assigned a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating that they were not considered malicious.

    The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.
    Figure 7: The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.

    This time, however, the customer had Darktrace / EMAIL fully enabled to take Autonomous Response against suspicious emails. As a result, when Darktrace detected the out-of-character behavior, specifically, the sharing of a link to a previously unused file-sharing domain, and identified the likely malicious intent of the message, it held the email, preventing it from reaching recipients’ inboxes and effectively shutting down the attack.

    Figure 8: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of malicious emails inserted into an existing thread.*

    *To preserve anonymity, all real customer names, email addresses, and other identifying details have been redacted and replaced with fictitious placeholders.

    Legitimate messages in the conversation were assigned an Anomaly Score of 0, while the newly inserted malicious emails identified and were flagged with the maximum score of 100.

    Key takeaways for defenders

    Phishing remains big business, and as the landscape evolves, today’s campaigns often look very different from earlier versions. As with network-based attacks, threat actors are increasingly leveraging legitimate tools and exploiting trusted relationships to carry out their malicious goals, often staying under the radar of security teams and traditional email defenses.

    As attackers continue to exploit trusted relationships between organizations and their third-party associates, security teams must remain vigilant to unexpected or suspicious email activity. Protecting the digital estate requires an email solution capable of identifying malicious characteristics, even when they originate from otherwise trusted senders.

    Credit to Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst), Patrick Anjos (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), Kiri Addison (Director of Product)

    Appendices

    IoC - Type - Description + Confidence  

    - http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html#p – fake Microsoft login page

    - https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html# - link to domain used in homoglyph attack

    MITRE ATT&CK Mapping  

    Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

    Initial Access - Phishing – (T1566)  

    References

    1.     https://gitnux.org/third-party-risk-statistics/

    2.     https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-spam-spam-confidence-level-scl-about

    3.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/5df9aae8f78445a590f674d7b64c69630c1473c294ce5337d73732c03ab7fca2/detection

    4.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/695d0d173d1bd4755eb79952704e3f2f2b87d1a08e2ec660b98a4cc65f6b2577/details

    The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

    Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

    Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

    The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content

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    About the author
    Jennifer Beckett
    Cyber Analyst
    Your data. Our AI.
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