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October 14, 2024

How Triada Affects Banking and Communication Apps

Explore the intricacies of the Triada Trojan and its targeting of communication and banking apps. Learn how to safeguard against this threat.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst
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14
Oct 2024

The rise of android malware

Recently, there has been a significant increase in malware strains targeting mobile devices, with a growing number of Android-based malware families, such as banking trojans, which aim to steal sensitive banking information from organizations and individuals worldwide.

These malware families attempt to access users’ accounts to steal online banking credentials and cookies, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and conduct automatic transactions to steal funds [1]. They often masquerade as legitimate software or communications from social media platforms to compromise devices. Once installed, they use tactics such as keylogging, dumping cached credentials, and searching the file system for stored passwords to steal credentials, take over accounts, and potentially perform identity theft [1].

One recent example is the Antidot Trojan, which infects devices by disguising itself as an update page for Google Play. It establishes a command-and-control (C2) channel with a server, allowing malicious actors to execute commands and collect sensitive data [2].

Despite these malware’s ability to evade detection by standard security software, for example, by changing their code [3], Darktrace recently detected another Android malware family, Triada, communicating with a C2 server and exfiltrating data.

Triada: Background and tactics

First surfacing in 2016, Triada is a modular mobile trojan known to target banking and financial applications, as well as popular communication applications like WhatsApp, Facebook, and Google Mail [4]. It has been deployed as a backdoor on devices such as CTV boxes, smartphones, and tablets during the supply chain process [5]. Triada can also be delivered via drive-by downloads, phishing campaigns, smaller trojans like Leech, Ztorg, and Gopro, or more recently, as a malicious module in applications such as unofficial versions of WhatsApp, YoWhatsApp, and FM WhatsApp [6] [7].

How does Triada work?

Once downloaded onto a user’s device, Triada collects information about the system, such as the device’s model, OS version, SD card space, and list of installed applications, and sends this information to a C2 server. The server then responds with a configuration file containing the device’s personal identification number and settings, including the list of modules to be installed.

After a device has been successfully infected by Triada, malicious actors can monitor and intercept incoming and outgoing texts (including two-factor authentication messages), steal login credentials and credit card information from financial applications, divert in-application purchases to themselves, create fake messaging and email accounts, install additional malicious applications, infect devices with ransomware, and take control of the camera and microphone [4] [7].

For devices infected by unofficial versions of WhatsApp, which are downloaded from third-party app stores [9] and from mobile applications such as Snaptube and Vidmate , Triada collects unique device identifiers, information, and keys required for legitimate WhatsApp to work and sends them to a remote server to register the device [7] [12]. The server then responds by sending a link to the Triada payload, which is downloaded and launched. This payload will also download additional malicious modules, sign into WhatsApp accounts on the target’s phone, and request the same permissions as the legitimate WhatsApp application, such as access to SMS messages. If granted, a malicious actor can sign the user up for paid subscriptions without their knowledge. Triada then collects information about the user’s device and mobile operator and sends it to the C2 server [9] [12].

How does Triada avoid detection?

Triada evades detection by modifying the Zygote process, which serves as a template for every application in the Android OS. This enables the malware to become part of every application launched on a device [3]. It also substitutes system functions and conceals modules from the list of running processes and installed apps, ensuring that the system does not raise the alarm [3]. Additionally, as Triada connects to a C2 server on the first boot, infected devices remain compromised even after a factory reset [4].

Triada attack overview

Across multiple customer deployments, devices were observed making a large number of connections to a range of hostnames, primarily over encrypted SSL and HTTPS protocols. These hostnames had never previously been observed on the customers’ networks and appear to be algorithmically generated. Examples include “68u91.66foh90o[.]com”, “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com”, “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”, and “is5jg.3zweuj[.]com”.

External Sites Summary Graph showing the rarity of the hostname “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com” on a customer network.
Figure 1: External Sites Summary Graph showing the rarity of the hostname “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com” on a customer network.

Most of the IP addresses associated with these hostnames belong to an ASN associated with the cloud provider Alibaba (i.e., AS45102 Alibaba US Technology Co., Ltd). These connections were made over a range of high number ports over 1000, most commonly over 30000 such as 32091, which Darktrace recognized as extremely unusual for the SSL and HTTPS protocols.

Screenshot of a Model Alert Event log showing a device connecting to the endpoint “is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com” over port 32091.
Figure 2: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event log showing a device connecting to the endpoint “is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com” over port 32091.

On several customer deployments, devices were seen exfiltrating data to hostnames which also appeared to be algorithmically generated. This occurred via HTTP POST requests containing unusual URI strings that were made without a prior GET request, indicating that the infected device was using a hardcoded list of C2 servers.

Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “i8xps1” to the hostname “72zf6.rxqfd[.]com.
Figure 3: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “i8xps1” to the hostname “72zf6.rxqfd[.]com.
 Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “sqyjyadwwq” to the hostname “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.
Figure 4: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “sqyjyadwwq” to the hostname “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.

These connections correspond with reports that devices affected by Triada communicate with the C2 server to transmit their information and receive instructions for installing the payload.

A number of these endpoints have communicating files associated with the unofficial WhatsApp versions YoWhatsApp and FM WhatsApp [11] [12] [13] . This could indicate that the devices connecting to these endpoints were infected via malicious modules in the unofficial versions of WhatsApp, as reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [10] [12]. It could also mean that the infected devices are using these connections to download additional files from the C2 server, which could infect systems with additional malicious modules related to Triada.

Moreover, on certain customer deployments, shortly before or after connecting to algorithmically generated hostnames with communicating files linked to YoWhatsApp and FM WhatsApp, devices were also seen connecting to multiple endpoints associated with WhatsApp and Facebook.

Figure 5: Screenshot from a device’s event log showing connections to endpoints associated with WhatsApp shortly after it connected to “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.

These surrounding connections indicate that Triada is attempting to sign in to the users’ WhatsApp accounts on their mobile devices to request permissions such as access to text messages. Additionally, Triada sends information about users’ devices and mobile operators to the C2 server.

The connections made to the algorithmically generated hostnames over SSL and HTTPS protocols, along with the HTTP POST requests, triggered multiple Darktrace models to alert. These models include those that detect connections to potentially algorithmically generated hostnames, connections over ports that are highly unusual for the protocol used, unusual connectivity over the SSL protocol, and HTTP POSTs to endpoints that Darktrace has determined to be rare for the network.

Conclusion

Recently, the use of Android-based malware families, aimed at stealing banking and login credentials, has become a popular trend among threat actors. They use this information to perform identity theft and steal funds from victims worldwide.

Across affected customers, multiple devices were observed connecting to a range of likely algorithmically generated hostnames over SSL and HTTPS protocols. These devices were also seen sending data out of the network to various hostnames via HTTP POST requests without first making a GET request. The URIs in these requests appeared to be algorithmically generated, suggesting the exfiltration of sensitive network data to multiple Triada C2 servers.

This activity highlights the sophisticated methods used by malware like Triada to evade detection and exfiltrate data. It underscores the importance of advanced security measures and anomaly-based detection systems to identify and mitigate such mobile threats, protecting sensitive information and maintaining network integrity.

Credit to: Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Security Analyst) and Anna Gilbertson (Cyber Security Analyst).

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Model Alert Coverage

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTS to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connections / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL

Compromise / DGA Beacon

Compromise / Domain Fluxing

Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Compromise / Unusual Connections to Rare Lets Encrypt

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

AI Analyst Incident Coverage

Unusual Repeated Connections to Multiple Endpoints

Possible SSL Command and Control

Unusual Repeated Connections

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Ioc – Type - Description

  • is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 68u91[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 9yrh7[.]mea5ms[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 4a5x2[.]fs4ah[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • jmll4[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • mrswd[.]wo87sf[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • lptkw[.]s4xx6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ya27fw[.]k6zix6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • w0g25[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • kivr8[.]wd6vy[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • iuwe64[.]ct8pc6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • qefgn[.]8z0le[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • a6y0x[.]xu0h7[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • wewjyw[.]qb6ges[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • vx9dle[.]n0qq3z[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 72zf6[.]rxqfd[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • dwq[.]fsdw4f[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • tqq6g[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 1rma1[.]4f8uq[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 0fdwa[.]7j3gj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 5a7en[.]1e42t[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • gmcp4[.]1e42t[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • g7190[.]rt14v[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • goyvi[.]2l2wa[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • zq6kk[.]ca0qf[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • sv83k[.]bn3avv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 9sae7h[.]ct8pc6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • jpygmk[.]qt7tqr[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • av2wg[.]rt14v[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ugbrg[.]osz1p[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • hw2dm[.]wtws9k[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • kj9atb[.]hai8j1[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • pls9b[.]b0vb3[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8rweau[.]j7e7r[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • wkc5kn[.]j7e7r[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • v58pq[.]mpvflv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • zmai4k[.]huqp3e[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • eajgum[.]huqp3e[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • mxl9zg[.]kv0pzv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ad1x7[.]mea5ms[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • ixhtb[.]s9gxw8[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • vg1ne[.]uhabq9[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • q5gd0[.]birxpk[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • dycsw[.]h99n6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • a3miu[.]h99n6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • qru62[.]5qwu8b5[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 3eox8[.]abxkoop[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 0kttj[.]bddld[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • gjhdr[.]xikuj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • zq6kk[.]wm0hd[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.219[.]234 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.244[.]205 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.243[.]182 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.240[.]127 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.219.123[.]139 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.219.196[.]124 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.217[.]73 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.251[.]253 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.194[.]254 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.251[.]34 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 8.222.216[.]105 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 47.245.83[.]167 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 198.200.54[.]56 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 47.236.113[.]126 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • 47.241.47[.]128 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
  • /iyuljwdhxk - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /gvuhlbzknh - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /sqyjyadwwq - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /cncyz3 - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /42k0zk - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /75kdl5 - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /i8xps1 - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /84gcjmo - URI - Triada C2 URI
  • /fkhiwf - URI - Triada C2 URI

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique Name - Tactic - ID - Sub-Technique of

Data Obfuscation - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001

Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

Standard Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL ICS - T0869

Non-Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1095

Masquerading - EVASION ICS - T0849

Man in the Browser - COLLECTION - T1185

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 -T1071

External Proxy - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1090.002 - T1090

Domain Generation Algorithms - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1568.002 - T1568

Web Services - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1583.006 - T1583

DNS - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.004 - T1071

Fast Flux DNS - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1568.001 - T1568

One-Way Communication - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1102.003 - T1102

Digital Certificates - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1587.003 - T1587

References

[1] https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/cyber-security/what-is-trojan/what-is-a-banking-trojan/

[2] https://cyberfraudcentre.com/the-rise-of-the-antidot-android-banking-trojan-a-comprehensive-guide

[3] https://www.zimperium.com/glossary/banking-trojans/

[4] https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/what-is-triada-malware/

[5] https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/malware-infected-devices-retailers/

[6] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/24926-triada-trojan-android

[7] https://securelist.com/malicious-whatsapp-mod-distributed-through-legitimate-apps/107690/

[8] https://securityboulevard.com/2024/02/impact-of-badbox-and-peachpit-malware-on-android-devices/

[9] https://threatpost.com/custom-whatsapp-build-malware/168892/

[10] https://securelist.com/triada-trojan-in-whatsapp-mod/103679/

[11] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/is5jg.3zweuj.com/relations

[12] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/92n7au.uhabq9.com/relations

[13] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/68u91.66foh90o.com/relations

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst

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June 16, 2026

Hola VPN Abuse: From Proxy Traffic to Malware and Cryptomining

hola vpn malware cryptominingDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

In enterprise environments, non-compliant software traffic can introduce unexpected exposure by creating unmanaged paths for outbound connectivity. Hola VPN is a notable example because of its peer-to-peer design, which can effectively turn user devices into routing or exit nodes for other parties’ traffic, shifting the risk profile from that of a traditional virtual private network (VPN) to something closer to a distributed proxy.

As a result, the appearance of Hola-related activity, whether from prior installation or unintended background connections, should be treated with caution.  Such activity may provide a foothold for malicious behavior, including lateral movement or command-and-control communication.

This blog explores how Hola-associated activity appeared as part of broader patterns of suspicious behavior observed across the Darktrace customer base.

The campaign

In February and March 2026, Darktrace observed similar anomalous activity across multiple customer environments, with affected devices showing consistent behavioral patterns. These included connections to multiple *.hola[.]org endpoints using Hola-related user agents, suggesting interaction with Hola infrastructure rather than isolated or incidental traffic.

Following these connections, affected customer environments showed downloads of suspicious executable files from rare external endpoints 188.241.219[.]55 and 184.241.218[.]111. Both endpoints have been flagged as potentially malicious by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [1][2].

These downloads were conducted using consistent user agents across impacted customers, specifically ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408’ and ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.251.389’, suggesting a possible association with Hola-related activity.

Notably, this pattern aligns with recent reporting that, in some cases, Hola distributed an undeclared executable component, me[.]exe, which was later assessed to be a likely Monero-mining binary introduced via a compromised delivery pipeline [3].

Case Study 1

Darktrace first observed a new device on January 19, 2026, within a customer environment based in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. On the same day it appeared on the network, the device communicated with multiple pieces of Hola VPN-linked infrastructure before downloading a binary from a hola[.]org subdomain.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.

Subsequent Darktrace telemetry revealed a recurring pattern of activity from the day the device was first observed through to March 4, 2026. During this period, the device repeatedly issued HTTP GET requests to the URI /bwfile?size=1048576, each returning a 200 OK response, indicating successful file retrieval.

This behavior was accompanied by a POST request to /bwfile, followed by an additional GET request for a significantly larger file at /bwfile?size=26214400, suggesting a deliberate and structured file transfer pattern.

Notably, the binary download activity was not tied to a single static host. Instead, it was observed across multiple URLs that changed over time while remaining within the same hola[.]org domain. This pattern suggests the use of rotating or distributed delivery infrastructure rather than a fixed endpoint.

Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.
Figure 2: Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.

Across these events, the activity was consistently associated with the user agent Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408, further linking the traffic to Hola-related service components. Amid these persistent and unusual connections, on February 22, Darktrace observed the device connecting to 188.241.219[.]55/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe, resulting in the download of an executable file.

 File transfer event showing the download of an executable  from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.
Figure 3: File transfer event showing the download of an executable  from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.

Based on its file hash, the downloaded file was assessed as a likely Trojan downloader [4], with import hash (imphash) values showing similarities to samples linked to Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and Stealc according to OSINT [5]. Overall, this sequence of activity suggests that Hola-related connectivity may have been leveraged as part of a broader malware delivery chain.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

Due to the highly unusual activity observed, Darktrace Autonomous Response was triggered by the device’s behavior. However, as the customer deployment was configured in “Human Confirmation” mode, manual approval was required before any action could be taken.

Had the deployment been set to “Fully Autonomous” mode, Darktrace would have automatically:

  1. Blocked connections to the associated ports and external endpoints
  2. Prevented all outgoing network connections from the device
  3. Enforced the device’s established ‘pattern of life’, allowing normal activity to continue while restricting any anomalous behavior
Figure 4: Example of a Darktrace Autonomous Response model highlighting the action that would have been taken, demonstrating how the system identifies anomalous behavior and applies targeted containment measures to restrict suspicious network activity.

Case Study 2

While the first case focused on anomalous activity from a newly observed device, Darktrace also identified cases in which devices had already been communicating with Hola-related endpoints prior to the suspected campaign. This may suggest pre-existing Hola usage within the environment, potentially increasing exposure and creating an avenue for subsequent suspicious activity.

One case involved three devices within a customer network based in the Americas (AMS). In this instance, a different payload was identified: me[.]exe, a potentially malicious cryptocurrency miner also referred to as HolaMonitorService[.]exe [6][7]. The downloads were observed from infrastructure similar to that seen in Case 1, including an IP address within the same 188.241.0.0/16 subnet.

Connections to *.hola[.]org, alongside the use of potential Hola-related user agents consistent with those in Case 1, were also identified, further suggesting a link between the observed activity and Hola-associated infrastructure.

Darktrace observed activity indicative of unusual VPN usage on the first affected device on February 2, followed by telemetry suggesting potential Tor usage. This was later followed by the download of me[.]exe on March 10 from 188.241.218[.]111. Notably, this device was the earliest among the three within the deployment to exhibit the presence of the suspicious executable.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst detection highlighting the download of a suspicious executable from a similar external endpoint in a separate deployment.

On March 5, 2026, the second affected device exhibited a slightly different progression, initiating connections to http-test1[.]hola[.]org using the user agent ‘hola_get’. This activity was followed by the download of me[.]exe from the same endpoint on March 13, consistent with the broader pattern of Hola-related downloads observed across the environment.

 Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.
Figure 6: Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.

The final affected device within this customer’s network demonstrated a more limited but related pattern, also downloading me[.]exe on March 17 using the same ‘hola_get’ user agent.

While the earlier Hola VPN usage observed across the deployment may not have been directly related to the suspected malware campaign, it may nonetheless have contributed to reduced visibility. The presence of pre-existing Hola-related traffic could have obscured malicious activity, making it more difficult to distinguish legitimate usage from attacker-driven behavior and, in turn, hindering the timely identification of the emerging compromise.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

For this deployment, the customer had their Autonomous Response capability configured in “Fully Autonomous” mode, allowing Darktrace to take action without human intervention. As a result, the system was able to autonomously disrupt the activity as soon as relevant events were identified through model detections.

Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response actions taken against suspicious activity linked to Hola VPN.

Suspected cryptomining activity

As previously noted, some of the observed executable payloads appear to be linked to cryptomining malware. Across a subset of affected customer environments, this assessment was further supported by subsequent device activity consistent with Monero mining. Affected devices established follow-on connections to multiple external endpoints aligned with known mining infrastructure, indicating post-download execution.

Considering the broader sequence of activity, this pattern may point to a wider form of abuse in which legitimate VPN-related traffic is used to mask or facilitate malicious behavior following compromise.

On several devices, the download of executable files, including a newly observed peer[.]exe, was followed by alerts indicative of cryptocurrency mining activity. Mining-related credentials such as ‘x’ were observed using the Minergate protocol to communicate with endpoints within the 89.125.255.0/24 subnet and 188.241.218[.]111, the same endpoint involved in earlier download activity. Additional credentials appeared to reflect device-specific CPU identifiers, for example ‘12th Gen Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-1235U’.

Observed mining methods included login, submit, and job, consistent with active participation in a pool-based mining workflow rather than passive or incidental contact. The login method indicates that the host authenticated to the mining service as a worker, job reflects the assignment of computational tasks, and submit shows completed work being returned to the pool [8]. This sequence suggests that affected devices were actively contributing processing resources as part of an unauthorized distributed mining operation.

The presence of unauthorized cryptominers can lead to degraded system performance and reduced device stability. Beyond the immediate resource impact, such activity often serves as an indicator of a broader compromise rather than an isolated issue. This may increase the risk of further malware deployment, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement, particularly in environments where the initial intrusion has not been fully contained.

Conclusion

Across affected environments, detections such as unusual VPN usage, connections to Hola infrastructure, anomalous HTTP activity, suspicious file downloads, and subsequent cryptomining behavior were linked into a single, evolving incident narrative. This aggregation provided a clearer view of attack progression, enabling security teams to understand not just isolated alerts, but the full sequence of compromise from initial contact through to post-exploitation.

Ultimately, these activities show that the risk posed by non-compliant software such as Hola VPN can extend far beyond simple policy violations. What began as traffic to Hola-related infrastructure was, in multiple cases, followed by behavior suggesting deliberate misuse, including suspicious executable downloads using Hola-related user agents and, in some instances, evidence of active cryptomining. These were not isolated anomalies, but elements of a broader pattern in which seemingly benign proxy or VPN-related communications may have created a pathway for malicious delivery and unauthorized resource exploitation.

The significance of this activity lies not only in the downloads or mining, but in what it reveals about an attacker’s ability to blend malicious operations into traffic associated with software that may already have a foothold in the environment. When unapproved software operates within an enterprise, it can reduce visibility, blur the distinction between legitimate and malicious traffic, and create opportunities to extend compromise in ways that are persistent and difficult to detect. Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enables these behavioral distinctions to be identified, regardless of whether the device is new or long established within the network.

Credit to Min Kim (Associate Principal Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.219.55

[2]  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.218.111

[3] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/you-do-surprise-me-exe-an-unexpected-executable-in-hola-browser

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/detection

[5] https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/

[6] https://any.run/report/4cdeb5df217764a8b6a20d518b76ccb30cbe623365a13d9dcd40900950f1ed99/de3a756a-3101-4369-8922-52c586c939fb

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721/community

[8] https://bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/stratum

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity

·      Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining (EM)

·      Device / New User Agent

·      Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Tor Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

·      Antigena / Network / External threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC –Type -Description + Confidence

188.241.219[.]55 - IP Address - Malware distribution source

188.241.218[.]111 - IP Address -Malware distribution source

hxxp://188.241.218[.]111:8080/me[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/peer[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

C8088f3c8bc3542eb1ad78a7cc5306d866c8ac81 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

b595a6de0f6a18975b29e6f8ebe604956a173478 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

e9139a2e0839e8b9e5c9787ea936347ae56e5460 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c2e80073e4cafe757d5643bd8fd45f28ad89bff9 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

695355eceedcdd337d8fcbd35e6a531cda75b847 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

f0b0d8068a1b9ab5d68a8a46842d72b870b292e7 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

a21c8b8cabc7670ea45bc175e185a0f9bfcf4733 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

0353ca44b9f397d8f492db0b2f7a1d00a9e4406a - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

56824c8a110e35ab303dc27a6c758cd50c36174c - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

c141fa0fa505fe7f9ad5dd21d9d4d6d411739682 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0417ec988b16f1267065185a6eea98f0bd2e17cd - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c54f7eaaeb3e0b528cd2584bdcb3a4b13cc0f8a2 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

11c78f15fafd53f8cc5a52b828d7cbf2a99e0b09 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0258bf7dbb0123247db29e8799991140bbdbd9bb - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

b46043a06dd9bbd63e4214d5fbc7fd56e1ff0618 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

753afdecd9f5402d004e8e5f768170ae9a468ca5 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

8f533c7cb1524b00f7b0311c2ea8603298d6b2ca - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

3a3bc6a5b4db1a4e961abcb002d26fe9d5e5c349 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

897f70eb41d302b045fcb05ed0693675e778ce57 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

6ddd5644809606e3dc1e2cc06059c3f5e6176f85 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

68a94f7cdcaf8853ea99251c1ecc67ae9b32eba8 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1659 -Initial Access, Command and Control -Content Injection

T1588.001 -Resource Development -Malware

T1189 -Initial Access -Drive-by Compromise

T1105 -Command and Control -Ingress Tool Transfer

T1657 -Impact -Financial Theft

T1497.001 -Impact -Compute Hijacking

T1496 -Impact -Resource Hijacking

T1210 -Lateral Movement -Exploitation of Remote Services

T1036.012 -Stealth -Browser Fingerprint

T1071.001 -Command and Control -Web Protocols

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About the author
Min Kim
Cyber Security Analyst

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June 12, 2026

Cybersecurity for the Sports Sector: The Threats Facing a Digitized Industry in 2026

Sports Stadium cybersecurityDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Securing sporting events in 2026

When you walk into a stadium on game day, you are entering a small smart city. Ticketing, turnstiles, payments, public Wi-Fi for tens of thousands of fans, CCTV, lighting, even the HVAC all run on connected systems. The experience for fans has become unmatched, but that dependency has created a much larger attack surface than people may realize.

Our latest threat research backs that up. In the past year, a survey that Darktrace commissioned found that 84% of respondents from professional sports organizations had at least one cyber incident, and 57% were hit more than once. For a sector that relies on the impact of the live moment, those numbers translate directly into operational risk.

Why sports is a target for cyber attacks

Sport is a highly visible target with fixed timelines, so attackers know exactly when disruption will have the most impact. It also holds valuable data, athlete medical records, contracts, sponsorship deals, which carry financial, reputational, and regulatory risk if exposed. At the same time, delivery depends on a wide set of third parties: ticketing providers, broadcasters, cloud services, stadium technology. Any of those connections can become an entry point. Put visibility, timing, data, and dependency together, and you get an environment where even a small foothold can turn into a visible, time-critical incident.

How attackers target email and identity

Email and identity remain the front door. From October 2025 through March 2026, Darktrace / EMAIL™ detected more than 116,000 phishing emails aimed at sports organizations across our customer base, and our sports customers received 19% more phishing emails than organizations in other sectors. The numbers tell the story:

BY THE NUMBERS

  • 21% of phishing emails were aimed at VIPs.
  • 37% used novel social engineering.
  • 84% of malicious emails passed DMARC authentication

A large proportion of these emails passed authentication checks, which means traditional security controls are no longer a reliable barrier. Attackers are not relying on spoofed domains – they're using legitimate infrastructure and trusted platforms. Behavior matters. Once an account is compromised, the behavior shifts quickly. Login patterns change, inbox rules are created to hide responses, and accounts start being used for internal discovery or further phishing. These aren’t high-noise events. They sit in normal workflows, which is why they’re often missed.

Ransomware tells a similar story. In one case inside a sports deployment, attackers had quietly been moving data to an outside server for a full two weeks before they triggered encryption. By the time the ransom note appeared, the outcome was already set. That sequence shows up consistently is access first, movement next, disruption last. If detection starts at encryption, it’s already too late.

Why AI is an emerging blind spot in sports

The increasing adoption of AI is expanding the potential attack surface. 72% of the security professionals we surveyed expect AI to increase their cyber risk over the next year, and yet 35% are already using or planning to use it in stadium operations, the most critical functions to protect. In addition to prompt injection and AI build risks, shadow AI is becoming a more immediate issue. Staff are already putting sensitive data—performance metrics, scouting reports, contracts, health data—into tools with little or no governance. The upside is clear, but so is the exposure—and it is happening before most organizations have any visibility or control. At the same time, attackers are using the same technology to scale phishing and social engineering. The net effect is simple: more exposure, at higher speed.

How can cybersecurity professionals prepare

Across high profile events, Darktrace’s experience shows that effective cyber defense includes preparation, real‑time visibility, and the ability to respond dynamically and decisively when timing, complexity, and public exposure converge.

There are a few strategic implications for cybersecurity teams:

  • Get behavioral visibility across IT and OT, not just corporate systems.
  • Treat identity as your control plane. Most attacks in this sector start with credentials, not malware. MFA with behavioral detection helps solve that challenge.
  • Control third party and AI access the same way you control your own environment.
  • Rehearse response for live conditions, where decisions happen in minutes. Detection and response need to account for non-ideal conditions when engineers are under pressure and time constrained. In sport, timing is what turns small issues into major incidents. The same activity that would be manageable midweek becomes critical during a live event.

Why 2026 raises the cybersecurity stakes for sports

With the 2026 World Cup about to stretch across three countries and dozens of host cities, the attack surface is wide and the schedule is unforgiving.

Geopolitical signaling is raising the threat profile further. Previous international sporting events have demonstrated that nation‑state actors use the cyber domain to signal intent, influence narratives, or retaliate symbolically. In the context of the 2026 World Cup, Russia’s continued exclusion from international sport, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, US defensive support to Ukraine, and Iran’s likely participation in the tournament introduce additional motivations for state‑aligned and non‑traditional affiliated actors to operate below the threshold of armed conflict. This doesn’t require new techniques—just the right timing and visibility.

In practice, this comes down to preparation: knowing what normal looks like across IT and OT, controlling third-party access, and spotting when behavior shifts.

In sport, disruption does not build slowly—it happens in real time and in public. By that point, the groundwork has already been set, long before the whistle goes.

About this research

Findings are based on Darktrace threat-research telemetry across sports-sector customer deployments (Q4 2025–Q1 2026) and a survey of 875 IT cybersecurity professionals in the US, UK, Australia, and Germany, fielded by Opinion Matters between May 28 and June 3, 2026. Read the full report for complete methodology, incident analysis, and strategic recommendations.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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