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February 27, 2025

Fighting the Real Enemy: The Importance of Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure Between Email Security Vendors

This blog explores an exploitation capability observed by Darktrace in another email security vendor’s link rewriting and the steps Darktrace took to inform and resolve the issue.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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27
Feb 2025

Part of being a cybersecurity vendor is recognizing our responsibility to the security community – while vendor competition exists, it pales in comparison to the threat of our shared adversary: malicious threat actors.

Darktrace is proud to be contributing to the shared mission of fighting attackers; without goodwill among defenders that task is made more difficult for everyone. Through collaboration, we can advance security standards across the board and make the world a safer place.  

With that in mind, Darktrace recently observed an exploitation capability latent in a competing email security vendor’s link rewriting infrastructure, which posed a risk to organizations. Following identification, Darktrace was able to report it to the vendor following their disclosure process. We’ll explore the vulnerability, the potential impact it may have had, how it could have been resolved, and the steps Darktrace took to raise it with the vendor.  

Please note that the following vulnerability we’re about to expose has already been resolved, so there is no risk of it being exploited by others. While keeping this vendor anonymous, we also want to thank them for their cordial response and swift remediation of the issue.

For more information about vulnerability disclosure best practices, refer to the UK National Cyber Security Center’s Vulnerability Disclosure Toolkit.

Details of the vulnerability

Let’s take a look at the weakness Darktrace identified in the link rewriting infrastructure.

In January 2025, Darktrace observed that links generated by a URL rewriting infrastructure could be re-engineered by a malicious actor to point to a URL of their choosing. In this way, a threat actor could effectively use the vendor’s domain to create a malicious domain under their control.

Because a majority of security vendors default to trust from known-safe domains, using one of these links as the payload greatly enhances the likelihood of that email being allow-listed to bypass email security, network URL filtering, and other such security tools, to reach the inbox. This issue meant any adversary could have abused the vendor’s safelink structure to deliver a malicious phishing link payload to any organization. It is likely this exploitation capability could have been found and abused at scale if not addressed.

The problem with said vendor’s link rewriting process was in using standard base-64 encoding instead of randomized encoding, so that anyone could replace the value of the parameter “b=” which contains a base64-encoded form of the original link with a base64-encoded form of a URL of their choosing.

This also posed issues from a privacy perspective. If, for example the encoded link was a SharePoint file, all the included folder names would be available for anyone to see in plaintext.

Example of a phishing attack caught by Darktrace that uses another email security solution’s compromised safelink
Fig 1: Example of a phishing attack caught by Darktrace that uses another email security solution’s compromised safelink

How the vulnerability was resolved

The solution for developers is to ensure the use of randomized encoding when developing link rewriting infrastructure to close the possibility of safelinks being deciphered and re-engineered by malicious actors.

Once Darktrace found this link issue we followed the vendor’s disclosure process to report the potential risk to customers and the wider community, while also conducting a review to ensure that Darktrace customers and their supply chains remained safe. We continued to follow up with the company directly to ensure that the vulnerability was fixed.

This instance highlights the importance of vendors having clear and visible vulnerability disclosure processes (such as RFC9116) and being available to listen to the security community in case of disclosures of this nature.

Why Darktrace was obliged to disclose this vulnerability

Here, Darktrace had two responsibilities: to the security community and to our customers.

As a company whose mission is to protect organizations today and for an ever-changing future, we will never stand by if there is a known risk. If attackers had used the safelinks to create new attacks, any organization could have been exposed due to the inherent trust in this vendor’s links within services that distribute or maintain global whitelists, harm which could have been multiplied by the interlinked nature of supply chains.

This means that not only the vendor’s customers were exposed, but any organization with their safelink in a whitelist was also exposed to this vulnerability. For Darktrace customers, an attack using this link would have been detected and stopped across various service offerings, and a secondary escalation by our Cyber AI Analyst would ensure security teams were aware. Even so, Darktrace has a responsibility to these customers to do everything in its power to minimize their exposure to risk, even if it comes from within their own security stack.

Why Darktrace customers remain protected

If a Darktrace / EMAIL, Darktrace / NETWORK, or any other Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform customer was exposed to this type of vulnerability, our unique Self-Learning AI approach and defense-in-depth philosophy means they stay protected.

Darktrace / EMAIL doesn’t approach links from a binary perspective – as safe, or unsafe – instead every link is analyzed for hundreds of metrics including the content and context in which it was delivered. Because every user’s normal behavior is baselined, Darktrace can immediately detect anomalies in link-sharing patterns that may point to a threat. Furthermore, our advanced link analysis includes metrics on how links perform within a browser and in-depth visual analysis, to detect even well-disguised payloads.

None of Darktrace’s customers were compromised as a result of this vulnerability. But should a customer have clicked on a similar malicious link, that’s where a platform approach to security comes in. Detecting threats that traverse domains is one strength of the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform. Our AI correlates data from across the digital estate to spot suspicious activity in the network, endpoint or cloud that may have originated from a malicious email. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst then performs triage and investigation of alerts to raise those of high importance to an incident, allowing for human-analyst validation and escalation.

As demonstrated by finding this vulnerability in another vendor, Darktrace’s R&D teams are always thinking like an attacker as they develop our products, to allow us to remain one step ahead for our customers.

Conclusion

We hope this example can be useful to developers working on link rewriting infrastructure, or to vendors figuring out how to proceed with a disclosure to another vendor. We’re pleased to have been able to collaborate with said vendor in this instance, and hope that it serves to illustrate the importance of defenders working together towards the common goal of keeping organizations safe from hostile cyber actors.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
The Darktrace Community

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October 15, 2025

How a Major Civil Engineering Company Reduced MTTR across Network, Email and the Cloud with Darktrace

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Asking more of the information security team

“What more can we be doing to secure the company?” is a great question for any cyber professional to hear from their Board of Directors. After successfully defeating a series of attacks and seeing the potential for AI tools to supercharge incoming threats, a UK-based civil engineering company’s security team had the answer: Darktrace.

“When things are coming at you at machine speed, you need machine speed to fight it off – it’s as simple as that,” said their Information Security Manager. “There were incidents where it took us a few hours to get to the bottom of what was going on. Darktrace changed that.”

Prevention was also the best cure. A peer organization in the same sector was still in business continuity measures 18 months after an attack, and the security team did not want to risk that level of business disruption.

Legacy tools were not meeting the team’s desired speed or accuracy

The company’s native SaaS email platform took between two and 14 days to alert on suspicious emails, with another email security tool flagging malicious emails after up to 24 days. After receiving an alert, responses often took a couple of days to coordinate. The team was losing precious time.

Beyond long detection and response times, the old email security platform was no longer performing: 19% of incoming spam was missed. Of even more concern: 6% of phishing emails reached users’ inboxes, and malware and ransomware email was also still getting through, with 0.3% of such email-borne payloads reaching user inboxes.

Choosing Darktrace

“When evaluating tools in 2023, only Darktrace had what I was looking for: an existing, mature, AI-based cybersecurity solution. ChatGPT had just come out and a lot of companies were saying ‘AI this’ and ‘AI that’. Then you’d take a look, and it was all rules- and cases-based, not AI at all,” their Information Security Manager.

The team knew that, with AI-enabled attacks on the horizon, a cybersecurity company that had already built, fielded, and matured an AI-powered cyber defense would give the security team the ability to fend off machine-speed attacks at the same pace as the attackers.

Darktrace accomplishes this with multi-layered AI that learns each organization’s normal business operations. With this detailed level of understanding, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI can recognize unusual activity that may indicate a cyber-attack, and works to neutralize the threat with precise response actions. And it does this all at machine speed and with minimal disruption.

On the morning the team was due to present its findings, the session was cancelled – for a good reason. The Board didn’t feel further discussion was necessary because the case for Darktrace was so conclusive. The CEO described the Darktrace option as ‘an insurance policy we can’t do without’.

Saving time with Darktrace / EMAIL

Darktrace / EMAIL reduced the discovery, alert, and response process from days or weeks to seconds .

Darktrace / EMAIL automates what was originally a time-consuming and repetitive process. The team has recovered between eight and 10 working hours a week by automating much of this process using / EMAIL.

Today, Darktrace / EMAIL prevents phishing emails from reaching employees’ inboxes. The volume of hostile and unsolicited email fell to a third of its original level after Darktrace / EMAIL was set up.

Further savings with Darktrace / NETWORK and Darktrace / IDENTITY

Since its success with Darktrace / EMAIL, the company adopted two more products from the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform – Darktrace / NETWORK and Darktrace / IDENTITY.

These have further contributed to cost savings. An initial plan to build a 24/7 SOC would have required hiring and retaining six additional analysts, rather than the two that currently use Darktrace, costing an additional £220,000 per year in salary. With Darktrace, the existing analysts have the tools needed to become more effective and impactful.

An additional benefit: Darktrace adoption has lowered the company’s cyber insurance premiums. The security team can reallocate this budget to proactive projects.

Detection of novel threats provides reassurance

Darktrace’s unique approach to cybersecurity added a key benefit. The team’s previous tool took a rules-based approach – which was only good if the next attack featured the same characteristics as the ones on which the tool was trained.

“Darktrace looks for anomalous behavior, and we needed something that detected and responded based on use cases, not rules that might be out of date or too prescriptive,” their Information Security Manager. “Our existing provider could take a couple of days to update rules and signatures, and in this game, speed is of the essence. Darktrace just does everything we need - without delay.”

Where rules-based tools must wait for a threat to emerge before beginning to detect and respond to it, Darktrace identifies and protects against unknown and novel threats, speeding identification, response, and recovery, minimizing business disruption as a result.

Looking to the future

With Darktrace in place, the UK-based civil engineering company team has reallocated time and resources usually spent on detection and alerting to now tackle more sophisticated, strategic challenges. Darktrace has also equipped the team with far better and more regularly updated visibility into potential vulnerabilities.

“One thing that frustrates me a little is penetration testing; our ISO accreditation mandates a penetration test at least once a year, but the results could be out of date the next day,” their Information Security Manager. “Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management will give me that view in real time – we can run it daily if needed - and that’s going to be a really effective workbench for my team.”

As the company looks to further develop its security posture, Darktrace remains poised to evolve alongside its partner.

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October 14, 2025

Inside Akira’s SonicWall Campaign: Darktrace’s Detection and Response

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Introduction: Background on Akira SonicWall campaign

Between July and August 2025, security teams worldwide observed a surge in Akira ransomware incidents involving SonicWall SSL VPN devices [1]. Initially believed to be the result of an unknown zero-day vulnerability, SonicWall later released an advisory announcing that the activity was strongly linked to a previously disclosed vulnerability, CVE-2024-40766, first identified over a year earlier [2].

On August 20, 2025, Darktrace observed unusual activity on the network of a customer in the US. Darktrace detected a range of suspicious activity, including network scanning and reconnaissance, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. One of the compromised devices was later identified as a SonicWall virtual private network (VPN) server, suggesting that the incident was part of the broader Akira ransomware campaign targeting SonicWall technology.

As the customer was subscribed to the Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team was able to rapidly triage critical alerts, restrict the activity of affected devices, and notify the customer of the threat. As a result, the impact of the attack was limited - approximately 2 GiB of data had been observed leaving the network, but any further escalation of malicious activity was stopped.

Threat Overview

CVE-2024-40766 and other misconfigurations

CVE-2024-40766 is an improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall’s SonicOS, affecting Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices running SonicOS version 7.0.1 5035 and earlier [3]. The vulnerability was disclosed on August 23, 2024, with a patch released the same day. Shortly after, it was reported to be exploited in the wild by Akira ransomware affiliates and others [4].

Almost a year later, the same vulnerability is being actively targeted again by the Akira ransomware group. In addition to exploiting unpatched devices affected by CVE-2024-40766, security researchers have identified three other risks potentially being leveraged by the group [5]:

*The Virtual Office Portal can be used to initially set up MFA/TOTP configurations for SSLVPN users.

Thus, even if SonicWall devices were patched, threat actors could still target them for initial access by reusing previously stolen credentials and exploiting other misconfigurations.

Akira Ransomware

Akira ransomware was first observed in the wild in March 2023 and has since become one of the most prolific ransomware strains across the threat landscape [6]. The group operates under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model and frequently uses double extortion tactics, pressuring victims to pay not only to decrypt files but also to prevent the public release of sensitive exfiltrated data.

The ransomware initially targeted Windows systems, but a Linux variant was later observed targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines [7]. In 2024, it was assessed that Akira would continue to target ESXi hypervisors, making attacks highly disruptive due to the central role of virtualisation in large-scale cloud deployments. Encrypting the ESXi file system enables rapid and widespread encryption with minimal lateral movement or credential theft. The lack of comprehensive security protections on many ESXi hypervisors also makes them an attractive target for ransomware operators [8].

Victimology

Akira is known to target organizations across multiple sectors, most notably those in manufacturing, education, and healthcare. These targets span multiple geographic regions, including North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia-Pacific [9].

Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].

Common Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) [7][10]

Initial Access
Targets remote access services such as RDP and VPN through vulnerability exploitation or stolen credentials.

Reconnaissance
Uses network scanning tools like SoftPerfect and Advanced IP Scanner to map the environment and identify targets.

Lateral Movement
Moves laterally using legitimate administrative tools, typically via RDP.

Persistence
Employs techniques such as Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, and tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials. Known to create new domain accounts to maintain access.

Command and Control
Utilizes remote access tools including AnyDesk, RustDesk, Ngrok, and Cloudflare Tunnel.

Exfiltration
Uses tools such as FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, and Rclone. Data is exfiltrated via protocols like FTP and SFTP, or through cloud storage services such as Mega.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Akira ransomware

Reconnaissance

Darktrace first detected of unusual network activity around 05:10 UTC, when a desktop device was observed performing a network scan and making an unusual number of DCE-RPC requests to the endpoint mapper (epmapper) service. Network scans are typically used to identify open ports, while querying the epmapper service can reveal exposed RPC services on the network.

Multiple other devices were also later seen with similar reconnaissance activity, and use of the Advanced IP Scanner tool, indicated by connections to the domain advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.

Lateral movement

Shortly after the initial reconnaissance, the same desktop device exhibited unusual use of administrative tools. Darktrace observed the user agent “Ruby WinRM Client” and the URI “/wsman” as the device initiated a rare outbound Windows Remote Management (WinRM) connection to two domain controllers (REDACTED-dc1 and REDACTED-dc2). WinRM is a Microsoft service that uses the WS-Management (WSMan) protocol to enable remote management and control of network devices.

Darktrace also observed the desktop device connecting to an ESXi device (REDACTED-esxi1) via RDP using an LDAP service credential, likely with administrative privileges.

Credential access

At around 06:26 UTC, the desktop device was seen fetching an Active Directory certificate from the domain controller (REDACTED-dc1) by making a DCE-RPC request to the ICertPassage service. Shortly after, the device made a Kerberos login using the administrative credential.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the of anomalous certificate download and subsequent Kerberos login.

Further investigation into the device’s event logs revealed a chain of connections that Darktrace’s researchers believe demonstrates a credential access technique known as “UnPAC the hash.”

This method begins with pre-authentication using Kerberos’ Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT), allowing the client to use an X.509 certificate to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution Center (KDC) instead of a password.

The next stage involves User-to-User (U2U) authentication when requesting a Service Ticket (ST) from the KDC. Within Darktrace's visibility of this traffic, U2U was indicated by the client and service principal names within the ST request being identical. Because PKINIT was used earlier, the returned ST contains the NTLM hash of the credential, which can then be extracted and abused for lateral movement or privilege escalation [11].

Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12].
Figure 4: Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12]
Figure 5: Device event log showing the Kerberos Login and Kerberos Ticket events

Analysis of the desktop device’s event logs revealed a repeated sequence of suspicious activity across multiple credentials. Each sequence included a DCE-RPC ICertPassage request to download a certificate, followed by a Kerberos login event indicating PKINIT pre-authentication, and then a Kerberos ticket event consistent with User-to-User (U2U) authentication.

Darktrace identified this pattern as highly unusual. Cyber AI Analyst determined that the device used at least 15 different credentials for Kerberos logins over the course of the attack.

By compromising multiple credentials, the threat actor likely aimed to escalate privileges and facilitate further malicious activity, including lateral movement. One of the credentials obtained via the “UnPAC the hash” technique was later observed being used in an RDP session to the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2).

C2 / Additional tooling

At 06:44 UTC, the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) was observed initiating a connection to temp[.]sh, a temporary cloud hosting service. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting indicates that this service is commonly used by threat actors to host and distribute malicious payloads, including ransomware [13].

Shortly afterward, the ESXi device was observed downloading an executable named “vmwaretools” from the rare external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69, using the user agent “Wget.” The repeated outbound connections to this IP suggest potential command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.
Figure 7: Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.

Data exfiltration

The first signs of data exfiltration were observed at around 7:00 UTC. Both the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) and a likely SonicWall VPN device were seen uploading approximately 2 GB of data via SSH to the rare external endpoint 66.165.243[.]39 (AS29802 HVC-AS). OSINT sources have since identified this IP as an indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with the Akira ransomware group, known to use it for data exfiltration [14].

Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.

Cyber AI Analyst

Throughout the course of the attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst autonomously investigated the anomalous activity as it unfolded and correlated related events into a single, cohesive incident. Rather than treating each alert as isolated, Cyber AI Analyst linked them together to reveal the broader narrative of compromise. This holistic view enabled the customer to understand the full scope of the attack, including all associated activities and affected assets that might otherwise have been dismissed as unrelated.

Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.
Figure 9: Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.

Containing the attack

In response to the multiple anomalous activities observed across the network, Darktrace's Autonomous Response initiated targeted mitigation actions to contain the attack. These included:

  • Blocking connections to known malicious or rare external endpoints, such as 137.184.243[.]69, 66.165.243[.]39, and advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.
  • Blocking internal traffic to sensitive ports, including 88 (Kerberos), 3389 (RDP), and 49339 (DCE-RPC), to disrupt lateral movement and credential abuse.
  • Enforcing a block on all outgoing connections from affected devices to contain potential data exfiltration and C2 activity.
Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.
Figure 10: Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.

Managed Detection and Response

As this customer was an MDR subscriber, multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts—high-fidelity models designed to detect activity indicative of compromise—were triggered across the network. These alerts prompted immediate investigation by Darktrace’s SOC team.

Upon determining that the activity was likely linked to an Akira ransomware attack, Darktrace analysts swiftly acted to contain the threat. At around 08:05 UTC, devices suspected of being compromised were quarantined, and the customer was promptly notified, enabling them to begin their own remediation procedures without delay.

A wider campaign?

Darktrace’s SOC and Threat Research teams identified at least three additional incidents likely linked to the same campaign. All targeted organizations were based in the US, spanning various industries, and each have indications of using SonicWall VPN, indicating it had likely been targeted for initial access.

Across these incidents, similar patterns emerged. In each case, a suspicious executable named “vmwaretools” was downloaded from the endpoint 85.239.52[.]96 using the user agent “Wget”, bearing some resemblance to the file downloads seen in the incident described here. Data exfiltration was also observed via SSH to the endpoints 107.155.69[.]42 and 107.155.93[.]154, both of which belong to the same ASN also seen in the incident described in this blog: S29802 HVC-AS. Notably, 107.155.93[.]154 has been reported in OSINT as an indicator associated with Akira ransomware activity [15]. Further recent Akira ransomware cases have been observed involving SonicWall VPN, where no similar executable file downloads were observed, but SSH exfiltration to the same ASN was. These overlapping and non-overlapping TTPs may reflect the blurring lines between different affiliates operating under the same RaaS.

Lessons from the campaign

This campaign by Akira ransomware actors underscores the critical importance of maintaining up-to-date patching practices. Threat actors continue to exploit previously disclosed vulnerabilities, not just zero-days, highlighting the need for ongoing vigilance even after patches are released. It also demonstrates how misconfigurations and overlooked weaknesses can be leveraged for initial access or privilege escalation, even in otherwise well-maintained environments.

Darktrace’s observations further reveal that ransomware actors are increasingly relying on legitimate administrative tools, such as WinRM, to blend in with normal network activity and evade detection. In addition to previously documented Kerberos-based credential access techniques like Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, this campaign featured the use of UnPAC the hash to extract NTLM hashes via PKINIT and U2U authentication for lateral movement or privilege escalation.

Credit to Emily Megan Lim (Senior Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), and Sam Lister (Specialist Security Researcher)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Possible Data Staging and External Upload

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long Remote Desktop Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long SSH Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Long SSH Session

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compliance / Default Credential Usage

Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Alert

Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

Device / Anomalous Certificate Download Activity

Device / Anomalous SSH Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Device / Network Range Scan

Device / Network Scan

Device / New User Agent To Internal Server

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / UDP Enumeration

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

User / Multiple Uncommon New Credentials on Device

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Enhanced Monitoring Models

Compromise / Anomalous Certificate Download and Kerberos Login

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Antigena/Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Repeated Antigena Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

·      66.165.243[.]39 – IP Address – Data exfiltration endpoint

·      107.155.69[.]42 – IP Address – Probable data exfiltration endpoint

·      107.155.93[.]154 – IP Address – Likely Data exfiltration endpoint

·      137.184.126[.]86 – IP Address – Possible C2 endpoint

·      85.239.52[.]96 – IP Address – Likely C2 endpoint

·      hxxp://85.239.52[.]96:8000/vmwarecli  – URL – File download

·      hxxp://137.184.126[.]86:8080/vmwaretools – URL – File download

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access – T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application

Reconnaissance – T1590.002 – Gather Victim Network Information: DNS

Reconnaissance – T1590.005 – Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses

Reconnaissance – T1592.004 – Gather Victim Host Information: Client Configurations

Reconnaissance – T1595 – Active Scanning

Discovery – T1018 – Remote System Discovery

Discovery – T1046 – Network Service Discovery

Discovery – T1083 – File and Directory Discovery

Discovery – T1135 – Network Share Discovery

Lateral Movement – T1021.001 – Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Lateral Movement – T1021.004 – Remote Services: SSH

Lateral Movement – T1021.006 – Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

Lateral Movement – T1550.002 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

Lateral Movement – T1550.003 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

Credential Access – T1110.001 – Brute Force: Password Guessing

Credential Access – T1649 – Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

Persistence, Privilege Escalation – T1078 – Valid Accounts

Resource Development – T1588.001 – Obtain Capabilities: Malware

Command and Control – T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer

Command and Control – T1573 – Encrypted Channel

Collection – T1074 – Data Staged

Exfiltration – T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Exfiltration – T1048 – Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

References

[1] https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/sonicwall-investigating-potential-ssl.html

[2] https://www.sonicwall.com/support/notices/gen-7-and-newer-sonicwall-firewalls-sslvpn-recent-threat-activity/250804095336430

[3] https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0015

[4] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-akira-ransomware-campaign-targeting-sonicwall-sslvpn-accounts/

[5] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/dr-akira-ransomware-group-utilizing-sonicwall-devices-for-initial-access/

[6] https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf

[7] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a

[8] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/akira-ransomware-continues-to-evolve/

[9] https://www.ransomware.live/map?year=2025&q=akira

[10] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024/
[11] https://labs.lares.com/fear-kerberos-pt2/#UNPAC

[12] https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/unpac-the-hash

[13] https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/derailing-akira-cyber-threat-intelligence)

[14] https://fieldeffect.com/blog/update-akira-ransomware-group-targets-sonicwall-vpn-appliances

[15] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-july-2025-uptick-in-akira-ransomware-activity-targeting-sonicwall-ssl-vpn/

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About the author
Emily Megan Lim
Cyber Analyst
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