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December 2, 2019

Containing Cyber Threats with Autonomous Response

Autonomous response technology can stop cyber threats in their tracks. Discover how these solutions enable rapid threat containment.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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02
Dec 2019
“The next phase in our journey toward autonomous security is Autonomous Response decision-making.”

Lawrence Pingree, Research Vice President, Gartner

We’ve talked extensively on this blog about Autonomous Response: the AI-powered technology that, according to Gartner, represents a paradigm shift in cyber defense. As the first such Autonomous Response tool, Darktrace Antigena has already thwarted countless cyber-attacks, from a spear phishing campaign against a major city to an IoT smart locker attack targeting a popular amusement park. Antigena’s surgical intervention afforded their security teams the time they needed to investigate — stopping the clock in seconds by containing just the malicious behavior.

For all its benefits, however, Autonomous Response does have one drawback: it can make for slightly anticlimactic blog posts. In place of captivating, step-by-step descriptions of malware spreading throughout the enterprise and inflicting irrevocable damage, Antigena case studies end a mere moment after they start, with the “patient zero” employee completely unaware of the compromise that could have been.

In this particular case, however, Antigena was deployed in Human Confirmation Mode — a starter mode wherein the AI’s actions must first be approved by the security team. Absent such approval, the result was both an in-depth look at a sophisticated ransomware attack, as well as a remarkable illustration of how Antigena reacted in real time to every stage of that attack’s lifecycle:

Initial download

Patient zero here was a device that Darktrace detected downloading an executable file from a server with which no other devices on the network had ever communicated. Downloads like this one regularly bypass conventional endpoint tools, since they cannot be programmed in advance to catch the full range of unpredictable future threats. By contrast, because Darktrace AI learned the typical behavior of the company’s unique users and devices while ‘on the job’, it easily determined the download to be anomalous.

Figure 1: Darktrace alerts on the 100% rare connection and subsequent download — as it occurs.

Had Antigena been in Active Mode at the time, this would have marked the end of the blog post. By blocking all connections to the associated IP and port, Antigena would have instantly stopped the download — without otherwise impacting the device at all.

Figure 2: Antigena, in Human Confirmation Mode, recommends that it block the suspicious activity.

Command and control

Following the download, Darktrace observed the device making an HTTP GET request to the same rare endpoint. The continuation of this suspicious activity precipitated an escalation in Antigena’s recommended response, which would now have blocked all outgoing traffic from the breached device to prevent any infection from spreading.

Darktrace then detected the device making yet more unusual external connections to endpoints that, in many cases, had self-signed SSL certificates. Such self-signed certificates do not require verification by a trusted authority and are therefore frequently utilized by cyber-criminals. As a consequence, the outgoing connections from our infected device are likely the installed malware communicating with its command and control infrastructure, as Darktrace flagged below:

Figure 3: Darktrace alerts on the suspicious SSL certificates.

Figure 4: Antigena recommends taking action to block the connections in question.

Internal reconnaissance

Beyond the unusual external activity observed from the breached device, it also began to deviate significantly from its typical pattern of internal behavior. Indeed, Darktrace detected the device making over 160,000 failed internal connections on two key ports: Remote Desktop Protocol port 3389 and SMB port 445. This activity — known as network scanning — provides crucial reconnaissance, giving the attacker insight into the network structure, the services available on each device, and any potential vulnerabilities. Ports 3389 and 445 are especially common targets.

Figure 5: Darktrace tracks this ransomware attack at every step, though the security team does not mount a response in time.

The unusual external connections to self-signed SSL certificates, combined with the highly anomalous internal connectivity from the device, would have caused Antigena to escalate further. Alas, the attack proceeds.

Darktrace detected no further anomalous activity from patient zero for the next four days — perhaps a mechanism to remain under the radar. Yet this period of dormancy concluded when, once again, the device connected to a rare domain with a self-signed SSL certificate, likely reaching out to its command and control infrastructure for additional instructions.

Lateral movement

A day later — in a sign that suggests the prior scanning was somewhat fruitful — the infected device performed a large amount of unusual SMB activity consistent with the malware attempting to move laterally across the network. Darktrace picked up on the breached device sending unusual outgoing SMB writes to the remote administration tool PsExec to a total of 38 destination devices, 28 of which it compromised with a malicious file.

Darktrace recognized this activity as highly anomalous for the particular device, as it doesn’t usually communicate with these destination devices in this manner. Antigena would therefore would have surgically blocked the remote administration behavior by first containing the patient zero device to its normal ‘pattern of life’, and then by escalating to blocking all outgoing connections from the device if lateral movement had continued. Antigena’s escalation can be seen below: the first action is taken at 08:03, the second, more severe action at 08:43.

Figure 6: Darktrace repeatedly alerts on the unusual SMB traffic with high confidence — thanks to its evolving understanding of the device’s typical ‘pattern of life’.
Figure 7: Antigena again recommends immediate intervention, this time to impede lateral movement.

Encryption

Darktrace observed the first sign of the ransomware’s ultimate objective — encrypting files — on a different device, which also performed a large volume of unusual SMB activity. After accessing a multitude of SMB shares that it hadn’t accessed previously, it systematically appended those files with the .locked extension. When all was said and done, this encryption activity was seen from no less than 40 internal devices.

In Active Mode, Antigena Ransomware Block would have fully quarantined the devices — a culmination of increasingly severe Antigena actions from the initial infection of patient zero, to the command and control communication, to the internal reconnaissance, to the lateral movement, and finally to the file encryption.

Figure 8: Antigena Ransomware Block was fully armed and prepared to fight back against the infection.

The case for boring blog posts

No other approach to cyber security is able to track ransomware so comprehensively throughout its lifecycle, as programming legacy tools to flag all remote administration behavior, for instance, would inundate security teams with thousands of false positive alerts. Thus, only Darktrace’s understanding ‘self’ for each infected device can shed light on such activities — in the rare cases when they are anomalous.

Figure 9: An overview of Darktrace’s myriad warnings throughout the five-day attack with each colored dot representing a high-confidence alert.

However, intriguing though it may be to track this lifecycle to conclusion, the technology to write far less intriguing blog posts already exists and is already proven. Autonomous Response will render this kind of threat story a relic of the past, and for organizations with sensitive data and critical intellectual property to safeguard, the days of boring security blogs cannot come soon enough.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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June 27, 2025

Patch and Persist: Darktrace’s Detection of Blind Eagle (APT-C-36)

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What is Blind Eagle?

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombian organizations.

Blind Eagle characteristically targets government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure [1][2].

Attacks carried out by Blind Eagle actors typically start with a phishing email and the group have been observed utilizing various Remote Access Trojans (RAT) variants, which often have in-built methods for hiding command-and-control (C2) traffic from detection [3].

What we know about Blind Eagle from a recent campaign

Since November 2024, Blind Eagle actors have been conducting an ongoing campaign targeting Colombian organizations [1].

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

Despite Microsoft patching this vulnerability in November 2024 [1][4], Blind Eagle actors have continued to exploit the minimal interaction mechanism, though no longer with the intent of harvesting NTLMv2 password hashes. Instead, phishing emails are sent to targets containing a malicious URL which, when clicked, initiates the download of a malicious file. This file is then triggered by minimal user interaction.

Clicking on the file triggers a WebDAV request, with a connection being made over HTTP port 80 using the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19044’. WebDAV is a transmission protocol which allows files or complete directories to be made available through the internet, and to be transmitted to devices [5]. The next stage payload is then downloaded via another WebDAV request and malware is executed on the target device.

Attackers are notified when a recipient downloads the malicious files they send, providing an insight into potential targets [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of Blind Eagle

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be  associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia.

Within a period of just five hours, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device being redirected through a rare external location, downloading multiple executable files, and ultimately exfiltrating data from the customer’s environment.

Since the customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network, no actions were taken to contain the compromise, allowing it to escalate until the customer’s security team responded to the alerts provided by Darktrace.

Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers have since linked this endpoint with phishing and malware campaigns [9].

The device then proceeded to download the executable file hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe.

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.

The device was then observed making unusual connections to the rare endpoint 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and performing unusual external data activity.

This dynamic DNS endpoint allows a device to access an endpoint using a domain name in place of a changing IP address. Dynamic DNS services ensure the DNS record of a domain name is automatically updated when the IP address changes. As such, malicious actors can use these services and endpoints to dynamically establish connections to C2 infrastructure [6].

Further investigation into this dynamic endpoint using OSINT revealed multiple associations with previous likely Blind Eagle compromises, as well as Remcos malware, a RAT commonly deployed via phishing campaigns [7][8][10].

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.

Shortly after this, Darktrace observed the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’, indicating usage of the aforementioned transmission protocol WebDAV. The device was subsequently observed connected to an endpoint associated with Github and downloading data, suggesting that the device was retrieving a malicious tool or payload. The device then began to communicate to the malicious endpoint diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com over the new TCP port 1512 [11].

Around this time, the device was also observed uploading data to the endpoints 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com, with transfers of 60 MiB and 5.6 MiB observed respectively.

Figure 4: UI graph showing external data transfer activity.

This chain of activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK. These high-priority model alerts are designed to trigger in response to higher fidelity indicators of compromise (IoCs), suggesting that a device is performing activity consistent with a compromise.

 Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.

A second Enhanced Monitoring model was also triggered by this device following the download of the aforementioned executable file (hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe) and the observed increase in C2 activity.

Following this activity, Darktrace continued to observe the device beaconing to the 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com endpoint.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of the affected device’s broader connectivity throughout the course of the attack.

As the affected customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response configured at the time, the attack was able to progress unabated. Had Darktrace been properly enabled, it would have been able to take a number of actions to halt the escalation of the attack.

For example, the unusual beaconing connections and the download of an unexpected file from an uncommon location would have been shut down by blocking the device from making external connections to the relevant destinations.

Conclusion

The persistence of Blind Eagle and ability to adapt its tactics, even after patches were released, and the speed at which the group were able to continue using pre-established TTPs highlights that timely vulnerability management and patch application, while essential, is not a standalone defense.

Organizations must adopt security solutions that use anomaly-based detection to identify emerging and adapting threats by recognizing deviations in user or device behavior that may indicate malicious activity. Complementing this with an autonomous decision maker that can identify, connect, and contain compromise-like activity is crucial for safeguarding organizational networks against constantly evolving and sophisticated threat actors.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson (Senior Cyber Analyst), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

IoC – Type - Confidence
Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045 – User Agent

62[.]60[.]226[.]112 – IP – Medium Confidence

hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe – Payload Download – Medium Confidence

21ene.ip-ddns[.]com – Dynamic DNS Endpoint – Medium Confidence

diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com  - Hostname – Medium Confidence

Darktrace’s model alert coverage

Anomalous File / Suspicious HTTP Redirect
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Github Download
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Device / Large Number of Model Alert

Mitre Attack Mapping:

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access - T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access ICS - T0862 – Supply Chain Compromise
Initial Access ICS - T0865 – Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access ICS - T0817 - Drive-by Compromise
Resource Development - T1588.001 – Malware
Lateral Movement ICS - T0843 – Program Download
Command and Control - T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control - T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control - T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Command and Control - T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms
Command and Control ICS - T0869 – Standard Application Layer Protocol
Evasion ICS - T0849 – Masquerading
Exfiltration - T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration - T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

References

1)    https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/blind-eagle-and-justice-for-all/

2)    https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2025/04/kpmg-ctip-blind-eagle-01-apr-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

3)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-remote-access-trojan/#:~:text=They%20might%20be%20attached%20to,remote%20access%20or%20system%20administration

4)    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451

5)    https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/know-how/webdav/

6)    https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dynamic-dns-resolution-as-an-obfuscation-technique

7)    https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1437795

8)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/remcos-malware/

9)    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b3189db6ddc578005cb6986f86e9680e7f71fe69f87f9498fa77ed7b1285e268

10) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/21ene.ip-ddns.com

11) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/diciembrenotasenclub.longmusic.com/community

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Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst

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June 18, 2025

Darktrace Collaborates with Microsoft: Unifying Email Security with a Shared Vision

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In today’s threat landscape, email remains the most targeted vector for cyberattacks. Organizations require not only multi-layered defenses but also advanced, integrated systems that work collaboratively to proactively mitigate threats before they cause damage

That’s why we’re proud to announce a new integration between Darktrace / EMAIL and Microsoft Defender for Office 365, delivering a Unified Quarantine experience that empowers security teams with seamless visibility, control, and response across both platforms.

This announcement builds on a strong and growing collaboration. In 2024, Darktrace was honored as Microsoft UK Partner of the Year and recognized as a Security Trailblazer at the annual Microsoft Security 20/20 Awards, a testament to our shared commitment to innovation and customer-centric security.

A Shared Mission: Stopping Threats at Machine Speed

This integration is more than a technical milestone,as it’s a reflection of a shared mission: to protect organizations from both known and unknown threats, with efficiency, accuracy, and transparency.

  • Microsoft Defender for Office 365 delivers a comprehensive security framework that safeguards Microsoft 365 email and collaboration workloads leveraging advanced AI, global threat intelligence and information on known attack infrastructure.
  • Darktrace / EMAIL complements this with Self-Learning AI that understands the unique communication patterns within each organization, detecting subtle anomalies that evade traditional detection methods.

Together, we’re delivering multi-layered, adaptive protection that’s greater than the sum of its parts.

“Our integration with Microsoft gives security teams the tools they need to act faster and more precisely to detect and respond to threats,” said Jill Popelka, CEO of Darktrace. “Together, we’re strengthening defenses where it matters most to our customers: at the inbox.”

Unified Quarantine: One View, Total Clarity

The new Unified Quarantine experience gives customers a single pane of glass to view and manage email threatsregardless of which product took action. This means:

  • Faster investigations with consolidated visibility
  • Clear attribution of actions and outcomes across both platforms
  • Streamlined workflows for security teams managing complex environments

“This integration is a testament to the power of combining Microsoft’s global threat intelligence with Darktrace’s unique ability to understand the ‘self’ of an organization,” said Jack Stockdale, CTO of Darktrace. “Together, we’re delivering a new standard in proactive, adaptive email security.”

A New Era of Collaborative Cyber Defense

This collaboration represents a broader shift in cybersecurity: from siloed tools to integrated ecosystems. As attackers become more sophisticated, defenders must move faster, smarter, and in unison.

Through this integration, Darktrace and Microsoft establish a new standard for collaboration between native and third-party security solutions, enhancing not only threat detection but also comprehensive understanding and proactive measures against threats.

We’re excited to bring this innovation to our customers and continue building a future where AI and human expertise collaborate to secure the enterprise.

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About the author
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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