February 27, 2025

New Threat on the Prowl: Investigating Lynx Ransomware

Lynx ransomware, emerging in 2024, targets finance, architecture, and manufacturing sectors with phishing and double extortion. Read on for Darktrace's findings.

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Feb 2025

What is Lynx ransomware?

In mid-2024, a new ransomware actor named Lynx emerged in the threat landscape. This Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) strain is known to target organizations in the finance, architecture, and manufacturing sectors [1] [2]. However, Darktrace’s Threat Research teams also identified Lynx incidents affecting energy and retail organizations in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific (APAC) regions. Despite being a relatively new actor, Lynx’s malware shares large portions of its source code with the INC ransomware variant, suggesting that the group may have acquired and repurposed the readily available INC code to develop its own strain [2].

What techniques does Lynx ransomware group use?

Lynx employs several common attack vectors, including phishing emails which result in the download and installation of ransomware onto systems upon user interaction. The group poses a sophisticated double extortion threat to organizations, exfiltrating sensitive data prior to encryption [1]. This tactic allows threat actors to pressure their targets by threatening to release sensitive information publicly or sell it if the ransom is not paid. The group has also been known to gradually release small batches of sensitive information (i.e., “drip” data) to increase pressure.

Once executed, the malware encrypts files and appends the extension ‘.LYNX’ to all encrypted files. It eventually drops a Base64 encoded text file as a ransom note (i.e., README.txt) [1]. Should initial file encryption attempts fail, the operators have been known to employ privilege escalation techniques to ensure full impact [2].

In the Annual Threat Report 2024, Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified Lynx ransomware as one of the top five most significant threats, impacting both its customers and the broader threat landscape.

Darktrace Coverage of Lynx Ransomware

In cases of Lynx ransomware observed across the Darktrace customer base, Darktrace / NETWORK identified and suggested Autonomous Response actions to contain network compromises from the onset of activity.

Detection of lateral movement

One such Lynx compromise occurred in December 2024 when Darktrace observed multiple indicators of lateral movement on a customer network. The lateral movement activity started with a high volume of attempted binds to the service control endpoint of various destination devices, suggesting SMB file share enumeration. This activity also included repeated attempts to establish internal connections over destination port 445, as well as other privileged ports. Spikes in failed internal connectivity, such as those exhibited by the device in question, can indicate network scanning. Elements of the internal connectivity also suggested the use of the attack and reconnaissance tool, Nmap.

Indicators of compromised administrative credentials

Although an initial access point could not be confirmed, the widespread use of administrative credentials throughout the lateral movement process demonstrated the likely compromise of such privileged usernames and passwords. The operators of the malware frequently used both 'admin' and 'administrator' credentials throughout the incident, suggesting that attackers may have leveraged compromised default administrative credentials to gain access and escalate privileges. These credentials were observed on numerous devices across the network, triggering Darktrace models that detect unusual use of administrative usernames via methods like NTLM and Kerberos.

Data exfiltration

The lateral movement and reconnaissance behavior was then followed by unusual internal and external data transfers. One such device exhibited an unusual spike in internal data download activity, downloading around 150 GiB over port 3260 from internal network devices. The device then proceeded to upload large volumes of data to the external AWS S3 storage bucket: wt-prod-euwest1-storm.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws[.]com. Usage of external cloud storage providers is a common tactic to avoid detection of exfiltration, given the added level of legitimacy afforded by cloud service provider domains.

Furthermore, Darktrace observed the device exhibiting behavior suggesting the use of the remote management tool AnyDesk when it made outbound TCP connections to hostnames such as:

relay-48ce591e[.]net[.]anydesk[.]com

relay-c9990d24[.]net[.]anydesk[.]com

relay-da1ad7b4[.]net[.]anydesk[.]com

Tools like AnyDesk can be used for legitimate administrative purposes. However, such tools are also commonly leveraged by threat actors to enable remote access and further compromise activity. The activity observed from the noted device during this time suggests the tool was used by the ransomware operators to advance their compromise goals.

The observed activity culminated in the encryption of thousands of files with the '.Lynx' extension. Darktrace detected devices performing uncommon SMB write and move operations on the drives of destination network devices, featuring the appending of the Lynx extension to local host files. Darktrace also identified similar levels of SMB read and write sizes originating from certain devices. Parallel volumes of SMB read and write activity strongly suggest encryption, as the malware opens, reads, and then encrypts local files on the hosted SMB disk share. This encryption activity frequently highlighted the use of the seemingly-default credential: "Administrator".

In this instance, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was configured to only take action upon human confirmation, meaning the customer’s security team had to manually apply any suggested actions. Had the deployment been fully autonomous, Darktrace would have blocked connectivity to and from the affected devices, giving the customer additional time to contain the attack and enforce existing network behavior patterns while the IT team responded accordingly.

Conclusion

As reported by Darktrace’s Threat Research team in the Annual Threat Report 2024, both new and old ransomware strains were prominent across the threat landscape last year. Due to the continually improving security postures of organizations, ransomware actors are forced to constantly evolve and adopt new tactics to successfully carry out their attacks.

The Lynx group’s use of INC source code, for example, suggests a growing accessibility for threat actors to launch new ransomware strains based on existing code – reducing the cost, resources, and expertise required to build new malware and carry out an attack. This decreased barrier to entry will surely lead to an increased number of ransomware incidents, with attacks not being limited to experienced threat actors.

While Darktrace expects ransomware strains like Lynx to remain prominent in the threat landscape in 2025 and beyond, Darktrace’s ability to identify and respond to emerging ransomware incidents – as demonstrated here – ensures that customers can safeguard their networks and resume normal business operations as quickly as possible, even in an increasingly complex threat landscape.

Credit to Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst).

[related-resource]

Appendices

References

1. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/inc-ransomware-rebrand-to-lynx/

2. https://cybersecsentinel.com/lynx-ransomware-strikes-new-targets-unveiling-advanced-encryption-techniques/

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

· Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

· Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Active Threat SMB Write Block

· Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

· Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

· Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Network Scan Block

· Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

· Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

· Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Pattern of Life Block

· Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Darktrace / NETWORK Model Alerts

· Device::Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

· Device::Suspicious Network Scan Activity

· Anomalous File::Internal::Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

· Device::SMB Lateral Movement

· Compliance::SMB Drive Write

· Compromise::Ransomware::Suspicious SMB Activity

· Anomalous File::Internal::Unusual SMB Script Write

· Device::Network Scan

· Device::Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

· Device::RDP Scan

· Unusual Activity::Anomalous SMB Move & Write

· Anomalous Connection::Sustained MIME Type Conversion

· Compromise::Ransomware::SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

· Unusual Activity::Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity

· Device::ICMP Address Scan

· Compromise::Ransomware::Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

· Anomalous Connection::Suspicious Read Write Ratio

· Anomalous File::Internal::Masqueraded Executable SMB Write

· Compliance::Possible Unencrypted Password File On Server

· User::New Admin Credentials on Client

· Compliance::Remote Management Tool On Server

· User::New Admin Credentials on Server

· Anomalous Connection::Unusual Admin RDP Session

· Anomalous Connection::Download and Upload

· Anomalous Connection::Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

· Unusual Activity::Unusual File Storage Data Transfer

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

- ‘. LYNX’ - File Extension - Lynx Ransomware file extension appended to encrypted files

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

(Technique Name - Tactic - ID - Sub-Technique of)

Taint Shared Content - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1080

Data Encrypted for - Impact - IMPACT T1486

Rename System Utilities - DEFENSE EVASION - T1036.003 - T1036

Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025.

Inside the SOC

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Product Marketing Specialist

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June 5, 2025

Unpacking ClickFix: Darktrace’s detection of a prolific social engineering tactic

What is ClickFix and how does it work?

Amid heightened security awareness, threat actors continue to seek stealthy methods to infiltrate target networks, often finding the human end user to be the most vulnerable and easily exploited entry point.

ClickFix baiting is an exploitation of the end user, making use of social engineering techniques masquerading as error messages or routine verification processes, that can result in malicious code execution.

Since March 2024, the simplicity of this technique has drawn attention from a range of threat actors, from individual cybercriminals to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups such as APT28 and MuddyWater, linked to Russia and Iran respectively, introducing security threats on a broader scale [1]. ClickFix campaigns have been observed affecting organizations in across multiple industries, including healthcare, hospitality, automotive and government [2][3].

Actors carrying out these targeted attacks typically utilize similar techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) to gain initial access. These include spear phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, or exploiting trust in familiar online platforms, such as GitHub, to deliver malicious payloads [2][3]. Often, a hidden link within an email or malvertisements on compromised legitimate websites redirect the end user to a malicious URL [4]. These take the form of ‘Fix It’ or fake CAPTCHA prompts [4].

From there, users are misled into believing they are completing a human verification step, registering a device, or fixing a non-existent issue such as a webpage display error. As a result, they are guided through a three-step process that ultimately enables the execution of malicious PowerShell commands:

Open a Windows Run dialog box [press Windows Key + R]
Automatically or manually copy and paste a malicious PowerShell command into the terminal [press CTRL+V]
And run the prompt [press ‘Enter’] [2]

Once the malicious PowerShell command is executed, threat actors then establish command and control (C2) communication within the targeted environment before moving laterally through the network with the intent of obtaining and stealing sensitive data [4]. Malicious payloads associated with various malware families, such as XWorm, Lumma, and AsyncRAT, are often deployed [2][3].

Attack timeline of ClickFix cyber attack

Based on investigations conducted by Darktrace’s Threat Research team in early 2025, this blog highlights Darktrace’s capability to detect ClickFix baiting activity following initial access.

Darktrace’s coverage of a ClickFix attack chain

Darktrace identified multiple ClickFix attacks across customer environments in both Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and the United States. The following incident details a specific attack on a customer network that occurred on April 9, 2025.

Although the initial access phase of this specific attack occurred outside Darktrace’s visibility, other affected networks showed compromise beginning with phishing emails or fake CAPTCHA prompts that led users to execute malicious PowerShell commands.

Darktrace’s visibility into the compromise began when the threat actor initiated external communication with their C2 infrastructure, with Darktrace / NETWORK detecting the use of a new PowerShell user agent, indicating an attempt at remote code execution.

Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.

Download of Malicious Files for Lateral Movement

A few minutes later, the compromised device was observed downloading a numerically named file. Numeric files like this are often intentionally nondescript and associated with malware. In this case, the file name adhered to a specific pattern, matching the regular expression: /174(\d){7}/. Further investigation into the file revealed that it contained additional malicious code designed to further exploit remote services and gather device information.

Figure 2: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.

The file contained a script that sent system information to a specified IP address using an HTTP POST request, which also processed the response. This process was verified through packet capture (PCAP) analysis conducted by the Darktrace Threat Research team.

By analyzing the body content of the HTTP GET request, it was observed that the command converts the current time to Unix epoch time format (i.e., 9 April 2025 13:26:40 GMT), resulting in an additional numeric file observed in the URI: /1744205200.

Figure 3: PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.

Across Darktrace’s investigations into other customers' affected by ClickFix campaigns, both internal information discovery events and further execution of malicious code were observed.

Data Exfiltration

By following the HTTP stream in the same PCAP, the Darktrace Threat Research Team assessed the activity as indicative of data exfiltration involving system and device information to the same command-and-control (C2) endpoint, , 193.36.38[.]237. This endpoint was flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [5].

Further analysis of Darktrace’s Advanced Search logs showed that the attacker’s malicious code scanned for internal system information, which was then sent to a C2 server via an HTTP POST request, indicating data exfiltration

Figure 5: Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.

Actions on objectives

Around ten minutes after the initial C2 communications, the compromised device was observed connecting to an additional rare endpoint, 188.34.195[.]44. Further analysis of this endpoint confirmed its association with ClickFix campaigns, with several OSINT vendors linking it to previously reported attacks [6].

In the final HTTP POST request made by the device, Darktrace detected a file at the URI /init1234 in the connection logs to the malicious endpoint 188.34.195[.]44, likely depicting the successful completion of the attack’s objective, automated data egress to a ClickFix C2 server.

Darktrace / NETWORK grouped together the observed indicators of compromise (IoCs) on the compromised device and triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert, a high-priority detection model designed to identify activity indicative of the early stages of an attack. These models are monitored and triaged 24/7 by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection service, ensuring customers are promptly notified of malicious activity as soon as it emerges.

Figure 6: Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

In the incident outlined above, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode. As a result, while actions to block specific connections were suggested, they had to be manually implemented by the customer’s security team. Due to the speed of the attack, this need for manual intervention allowed the threat to escalate without interruption.

However, in a different example, Autonomous Response was fully enabled, allowing Darktrace to immediately block connections to the malicious endpoint (138.199.156[.]22) just one second after the initial connection in which a numerically named file was downloaded [7].

Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.

This customer was also subscribed to our Managed Detection and Response service, Darktrace’s SOC extended a ‘Quarantine Device’ action that had already been autonomously applied in order to buy their security team additional time for remediation.

Figure 8: Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.

Conclusion

ClickFix baiting is a widely used tactic in which threat actors exploit human error to bypass security defenses. By tricking end point users into performing seemingly harmless, everyday actions, attackers gain initial access to systems where they can access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection identifies early indicators of targeted attacks without relying on prior knowledge or IoCs. By continuously learning each device’s unique pattern of life, Darktrace detects subtle deviations that may signal a compromise. In this case, Darktrace's Autonomous Response, when operating in a fully autonomous mode, was able to swiftly contain the threat before it could progress further along the attack lifecycle.

Credit to Keanna Grelicha (Cyber Analyst) and Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

NETWORK Models

Device / New PowerShell User Agent
Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
Device / Suspicious Domain
Device / New User Agent and New IP
Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block
Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block
Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block
Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

· 141.193.213[.]11 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· 141.193.213[.]10 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· 64.94.84[.]217 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· 138.199.156[.]22 – IP address – C2 server

· 94.181.229[.]250 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· 216.245.184[.]181 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· 212.237.217[.]182 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· 168.119.96[.]41 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· 193.36.38[.]237 – IP address – C2 server

· 188.34.195[.]44 – IP address – C2 server

· 205.196.186[.]70 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top – Hostname – C2 server

· shorturl[.]at/UB6E6 – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· tlgrm-redirect[.]icu – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

· diagnostics.medgenome[.]com – Hostname – Compromised Website

· /1741714208 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1741718928 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1743871488 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1741200416 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1741356624 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /ttt – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1741965536 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1.txt – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1744205184 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1744139920 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1744134352 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1744125600 – URI – Possible malicious file

· /1[.]php?s=527 – URI – Possible malicious file

· 34ff2f72c191434ce5f20ebc1a7e823794ac69bba9df70721829d66e7196b044 – SHA-256 Hash – Possible malicious file

· 10a5eab3eef36e75bd3139fe3a3c760f54be33e3 – SHA-1 Hash – Possible malicious file

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique

Spearphishing Link - INITIAL ACCESS - T1566.002 - T1566

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

PowerShell - EXECUTION - T1059.001 - T1059

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Automated Exfiltration - EXFILTRATION - T1020 - T1020.001

References

[1] https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/emerging-threats/clickfix-another-deceptive-social-engineering-technique/

[2] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape

[3] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/understanding-the-clickfix-attack/

[4] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/clickfix-the-social-engineering-technique-hackers-use-to-manipulate-victims/

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/193.36.38.237/detection

[6] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.34.195.44/community

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/138.199.156.22/detection

About the author

Keanna Grelicha

Cyber Analyst

Blog

Proactive Security

June 4, 2025

Beyond Discovery: Adding Intelligent Vulnerability Validation to Darktrace / Attack Surface Management

Introducing Exploit Prediction Assessment

Security teams are drowning in vulnerability alerts, but only a fraction of those issues pose a real threat. The new Exploit Prediction Assessment feature in Darktrace / Attack Surface Management helps teams cut through the noise by validating which vulnerabilities on their external attack surface can be actively exploited.

Instead of relying solely on CVSS scores or waiting for patch cycles, Exploit Prediction Assessment uses safe, targeted simulations to test whether exposed systems can be compromised, delivering fast, evidence-based results in under 72 hours.

This capability augments traditional pen testing and complements existing ASM workflows by transforming passive discovery into actionable insight. With EPA, security teams move from reacting to long lists of potential vulnerabilities to making confident, risk-based decisions on what actually matters.

Key highlights of Exploit Prediction Assessment

Simulated attacks to validate real risk

Exploit Prediction Assessment conducts safe, simulated attacks on assets with potential security vulnerabilities that have been identified by Darktrace / Attack Surface Management. This real-time testing validates your systems' susceptibility to compromise by confirming which vulnerabilities are present and exploitable on your attack surface.

Prioritize what matters most

Confirmed security risks can be prioritized for mitigation, ensuring that the most critical threats are promptly addressed. This takes the existing letter ranking system and brings it a step further by drilling down to yet another level. Even in the most overwhelming situations, teams will be able to act on a pragmatic, clear-cut plan.

Fast results, tailored to your environment

Customers set the scope of the Exploit Prediction Assessment within Darktrace / Attack Surface Management and receive the results of the surgical vulnerability testing within 72 hours. Users will see 1 of 2 shields:

1. A green shield with a check mark: Meaning no vulnerabilities were found on scanned CVEs for the asset.

2. A red shield with a red x: Meaning at least one vulnerability was found on scanned CVEs for the asset.

Why it's a game changer

Traditionally, attack surface management tools have focused on identifying exposed assets and vulnerabilities but lacked the context to determine which issues posed the greatest risk. Without context on what’s exploitable, security teams are left triaging long lists of potential risks, operating in isolation from broader business objectives. This misalignment ultimately leads to both weakened risk posture and cross team communication and execution.

This is where Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) becomes essential. Introduced by Gartner, CTEM is a framework that helps organizations continuously assess, validate, and improve their exposure to real-world threats. The goal isn’t just visibility, it’s to understand how an attacker could move through your environment today, and what to fix first to stop them.

Exploit Prediction Assessment brings this philosophy to life within Darktrace / Attack Surface Management. By safely simulating exploit attempts against identified vulnerabilities, it validates which exposures are truly at risk—transforming ASM from a discovery tool into a risk-based decision engine.

This capability directly supports the validation and prioritization phases of CTEM, helping teams focus on exploitable vulnerabilities rather than theoretical ones. This shift from visibility to action reduces the risk of critical vulnerabilities in the technology stack being overlooked, turning overwhelming vulnerability data into focused, clear actionable insights.

As attack surfaces continue to grow and change, organizations need more than static scans they need continuous, contextual insight. Exploit Prediction Assessment ensures your ASM efforts evolve with the threat landscape, making CTEM a practical reality, not just a strategy.

Exploit Prediction Assessment in action

With Darktrace / Attack Surface Management organizations can get Exploit Prediction Assessment, and the cyber risk team no longer guesses which vulnerabilities matter most. Instead, they identify several externally exposed areas of their attack surface, then use the feature to surgically test for exploitability across these exposed endpoints. Within 72 hours, they receive a report:

Positive outcome: Based on information in the html or the headers it seems that a vulnerable software version is running on an externally exposed infrastructure. By running a targeted attack on this infrastructure, we can confirm that it cannot be abused.

Negative outcome: Based on information in the html or the headers it seems that a vulnerable software version is running on an externally exposed infrastructure. By running a targeted attack on this infrastructure, we can confirm that it can be exploited, so we can predict it being exploited.

This second outcome changes everything. The team immediately prioritizes the exploitable asset for patching and takes the necessary adjustments to mitigate exposure until the fix is deployed.

Instead of spreading their resources thin across dozens of alerts, they focus on what poses a real threat, saving time, reducing risk, and demonstrating actionable results to stakeholders.

Conclusion

Exploit Predication Assessment bolsters Darktrace’s commitment to proactive cybersecurity. It supports intelligent prioritization of vulnerabilities, keeping organizations ahead of emerging threats. With this new addition to / Attack Surface Management, teams have another tool to empower a more efficient approach to addressing security gaps in real-time.

Stay tuned for more updates and insights on how Darktrace continues to develop a culture of proactive security across the entire ActiveAI Security Platform.

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About the author

Kelland Goodin

Product Marketing Specialist

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Check out this article by Darktrace: New Threat on the Prowl: Investigating Lynx Ransomware

New Threat on the Prowl: Investigating Lynx Ransomware

What is Lynx ransomware?

What techniques does Lynx ransomware group use?

Darktrace Coverage of Lynx Ransomware

Detection of lateral movement

Indicators of compromised administrative credentials

Data exfiltration

Conclusion

Appendices

References

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

Darktrace / NETWORK Model Alerts

List of IoCs

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

Unpacking ClickFix: Darktrace’s detection of a prolific social engineering tactic

Beyond Discovery: Adding Intelligent Vulnerability Validation to Darktrace / Attack Surface Management

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Blog

Network

June 5, 2025

Unpacking ClickFix: Darktrace’s detection of a prolific social engineering tactic

What is ClickFix and how does it work?

Darktrace’s coverage of a ClickFix attack chain

Download of Malicious Files for Lateral Movement

Data Exfiltration

Actions on objectives

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Conclusion

Appendices

NETWORK Models

Autonomous Response Models

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

References

Blog

Proactive Security

June 4, 2025

Beyond Discovery: Adding Intelligent Vulnerability Validation to Darktrace / Attack Surface Management

Introducing Exploit Prediction Assessment

Key highlights of Exploit Prediction Assessment

Simulated attacks to validate real risk

Prioritize what matters most

Fast results, tailored to your environment

Why it's a game changer

Exploit Prediction Assessment in action

Conclusion