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November 6, 2022

Behind Yanluowang: Unveiling Cyber Threat Tactics

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06
Nov 2022
Discover the latest insights into the Yanluowang leak organization, uncovering its members and tactics.

Background of Yanluowang

Yanluowang ransomware, also known as Dryxiphia, was first spotted in October 2021 by Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team. However, it has been operational since August 2021, when a threat actor used it to attack U.S. corporations. Said attack shared similar TTPs with ransomware Thieflock, designed by Fivehands ransomware gangs. This connection alluded to a possible link between the two through the presence or influence of an affiliate. The group has been known for successfully ransoming organisations globally, particularly those in the financial, manufacturing, IT services, consultancy, and engineering sectors.

Yanluowang attacks typically begin with initial reconnaissance, followed by credential harvesting and data exfiltration before finally encrypting the victim’s files. Once deployed on compromised networks, Yanluowang halts hypervisor virtual machines, all running processes and encrypts files using the “.yanluowang” extension. A file with name README.txt, containing a ransom note is also dropped. The note also warns victims against contacting law enforcement, recovery companies or attempting to decrypt the files themselves. Failure to follow this advice would result in distributed denial of service attacks against a victim, its employees and business partners. Followed by another attack, a few weeks later, in which all the victim’s files would be deleted.

The group’s name “Yanluowang” was inspired by the Chinese mythological figure Yanluowang, suggesting the group’s possible Chinese origin. However, the recent leak of chat logs belonging to the group, revealed those involved in the organisation spoke Russian. 

 Leak of Yanluowang’s chat logs

 On the 31st of October, a Twitter user named @yanluowangleaks shared the matrix chat and server leaks of the Yanluowang ransomware gang, alongside the builder and decryption source. In total, six files contained internal conversations between the group’s members. From the analysis of these chats, at least eighteen people have been involved in Yanluowang operations.

Twitter account where the leaks and decryption source were shared
Figure 1: Twitter account where the leaks and decryption source were shared

Potential members: ‘@killanas', '@saint', '@stealer', '@djonny', '@calls', '@felix', '@win32', '@nets', '@seeyousoon', '@shoker', '@ddos', '@gykko', '@loader1', '@guki', '@shiwa', '@zztop', '@al', '@coder1'

Most active members: ‘@saint’, ‘@killanas’, ‘@guki’, ‘@felix’, ‘@stealer’. 

To make the most sense out of the data that we analyzed, we combined the findings into two categories: tactics and organization.

Tactics 

From the leaked chat logs, several insights into the group’s operational security and TTPs were gained. Firstly, members were not aware of each other’s offline identities. Secondly, discussions surrounding security precautions for moving finances were discussed by members @killanas and @felix. The two exchanged recommendations on reliable currency exchange platforms as well as which ones to avoid that were known to leak data to law enforcement. The members also expressed paranoia over being caught with substantial amounts of money and therefore took precautions such as withdrawing smaller amounts of cash or using QR codes for withdrawals.

Additionally, the chat logs exposed the TTPs of Yanluowang. Exchanges between the group’s members @stealer, @calls and @saint, explored the possibilities of conducting attacks against critical infrastructure. One of these members, @call, was also quick to emphasise that Yanluowang would not target the critical infrastructure of former Soviet countries. Beyond targets, the chat logs also highlighted Yanluowang’s use of the ransomware, PayloadBIN but also that attacks that involved it may potentially have been misattributed to another ransomware actor, Evil Corp.

Further insight surrounding Yanluowang’s source code was also gained as it was revealed that it had been previously published on XSS.is as a downloadable file. The conversations surrounding this revealed that two members, @killanas and @saint, suspected @stealer was responsible for the leak. This suspicion was supported by @saint, defending another member whom he had known for eight years. It was later revealed that the code had been shared after a request to purchase it was made by a Chinese national. @saint also used their personal connections to have the download link removed from XSS.is. These connections indicate that some members of Yanluowang are well embedded in the ransomware and wider cybercrime community.

Another insight gained from the leaked chat logs was an expression by @saint in support of Ukraine, stating, “We stand with Ukraine” on the negotiation page of Yanluowang’s website. This action reflects a similar trend observed among threat actors where they have taken sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Regarding Yanluowang’s engagement with other groups, it was found that a former member of Conti had joined the group. This inference was made by @saint when a conversation regarding the Conti leak revolved around the possible identification of the now Yanluowang member @guki, in the Conti files. It was also commented that Conti was losing a considerable number of its members who were then looking for new work. Conversations about other ransomware groups were had with the mentioning of the REVIL group by @saint, specifically stating that five arrested members of the gang were former classmates. He backed his statement by attaching the article about it, to which @djonny replies that those are indeed REVIL members and that he knows it from his sources.

Organization 

When going through the chat logs, several observations were made that can offer some insights into the group's organizational structure. In one of the leaked files, user @saint was the one to publish the requirements for the group's ".onion" website and was also observed instructing other users on the tasks they had to complete. Based on this, @saint could be considered the leader of the group. Additionally, there was evidence indicating that a few users could be in their 30s or 40s, while most participants are in their 20s.

More details regarding Yanluowang's organizational structure were discussed deeper into the leak. The examples indicate various sub-groups within the Yanlouwang group and that a specific person coordinates each group. From the logs, there is a high probability that @killanas is the leader of the development team and has several people working under him. It is also possible that @stealer is on the same level as @killanas and is potentially the supervisor of another team within the group. This was corroborated when @stealer expressed concerns about the absence of certain group members on several occasions. There is also evidence showing that he was one of three people with access to the source code of the group. 

Role delineation within the group was also quite clear, with each user having specific tasks: DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, social engineering, victim negotiations, pentesting or development, to mention a few. When it came to recruiting new members, mostly pentesters, Yanluowang would recruit through XSS.is and Exploit.in forums.

Underground analysis and members’ identification 

From the leaked chat logs, several “.onion” URLs were extracted; however, upon further investigation, each site had been taken offline and removed from the TOR hashring. This suggests that Yanluowang may have halted all operations. One of the users on XSS.is posted a picture showing that the Yanluowang onion website was hacked, stating, “CHECKMATE!! YANLUOWANG CHATS HACKED @YANLUOWANGLEAKS TIME’S UP!!”.

Figure 2: The screenshot of Yanluowang website on Tor (currently offline)

After learning that Yanluowang used Russian Web Forums, we did an additional search to see what we could find about the group and the mentioned nicknames. 

By searching through XSS.Is we managed to identify the user registered as @yanluowang. The date of the registration on the forum dates to 15 March 2022. Curiously, at the time of analysis, we noticed the user was online. There were in total 20 messages posted by @yanluowang, with a few publications indicating the group is looking for new pentesters.

Figure 3: The screenshot of Yanluowang profile on XSS.is 

Figure 4: The screenshot of Yanluowang posts about pentester recruitment on XSS.is 

While going through the messages, it was noticed the reaction posted by another user identified as @Sa1ntJohn, which could be the gang member @saint.

Figure 5: The screenshot of Sa1ntJohn’s profile on XSS.is

Looking further, we identified that user @Ekranoplan published three links to the website doxbin.com containing information about three potential members of the YanLuoWang gang: @killanas/coder, @hardbass and @Joe/Uncle. The profile information was published by the user @Xander2727.

Figure 6: The screenshot of Yanlouwang member-profile leak on XSS.is
Figure 7: The screenshot of @hardbass Yanlouwang member profile leak
Figure 8: The screenshot of @killanas/coder Yanlouwang member profile leak.

If the provided information is correct, two group members are Russian and in their 30s, while another member is Ukrainian and in his 20s. One of the members, @killanas, who was also referenced in chat logs, is identified as the lead developer of the Yanluowang group; giving the interpretation of the chat leaks a high-level of confidence. Another two members, who were not referenced in the logs, took roles as Cracked Software/Malware provider and English translator/Victim Negotiator.

Implications for the wider ransomware landscape

To conclude with the potential implications of this leak, we have corroborated the evidence gathered throughout this investigation and employed contrarian analytical techniques. The ascertained implications that follow our mainline judgement, supporting evidence and our current analytical view on the matter can be categorized into three key components of this leak:

Impact on the ransomware landscape

The leak of Yanluowang’s chat logs has several implications for the broader ransomware landscape. This leak, much like the Conti leak in March, spells the end for Yanluowang operations for the time being, given how much of the group’s inner workings it has exposed. This could have an adverse effect. While Yanluowang did not control as large of a share of the ransomware market as Conti did, their downfall will undoubtedly create a vacuum space for established groups for their market share. The latter being a consequence of the release of their source code and build tools. 

Source code

The release of Yanluowang’s source code has several outcomes. If the recipients have no malintent, it could aid in reverse engineering the ransomware, like how a decryption tool for Yanluowng was released earlier this year. An alternative scenario is that the publication of the source code will increase the reach and deployment of this ransomware in the future, in adapted or modified versions by other threat actors. Reusing leaked material is notorious among ransomware actors, as seen in the past, when Babuk’s source code was leaked and led to the development of several variants based on this leak, including Rook and Pandora. This could also make it harder to attribute attacks to one specific group.

Members

The migration of unexposed Yanluowang members to other ransomware gangs could further add to the proliferation of ransomware groups. Such forms of spreading ransomware have been documented in the past when former Conti members repurposed their tactics to join efforts with an initial access broker, UAC-0098. Yet, the absence of evidence from members expressing and/or acting upon this claim requires further investigation and analysis. However, as there is no evidence of absence – this implication is based on the previously observed behavior from members of other ransomware gangs.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Taisiia Garkava
Security Analyst
Dillon Ashmore
Security and Research
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March 18, 2025

Survey findings: How is AI Impacting the SOC?

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There’s no question that AI is already impacting the SOC – augmenting, assisting, and filling the gaps left by staff and skills shortages. We surveyed over 1,500 cybersecurity professionals from around the world to uncover their attitudes to AI cybersecurity in 2025. Our findings revealed striking trends in how AI is changing the way security leaders think about hiring and SOC transformation. Download the full report for the big picture, available now.

Download the full report to explore these findings in depth

The AI-human conundrum

Let’s start with some context. As the cybersecurity sector has rapidly evolved to integrate AI into all elements of cyber defense, the pace of technological advancement is outstripping the development of necessary skills. Given the ongoing challenges in security operations, such as employee burnout, high turnover rates, and talent shortages, recruiting personnel to bridge these skills gaps remains an immense challenge in today’s landscape.

But here, our main findings on this topic seem to contradict each other.

There’s no question over the impact of AI-powered threats – nearly three-quarters (74%) agree that AI-powered threats now pose a significant challenge for their organization.  

When we look at how security leaders are defending against AI-powered threats, over 3 out of 5 (62%) see insufficient personnel to manage tools and alerts as the biggest barrier.  

Yet at the same time, increasing cyber security staff is at the bottom of the priority list for survey participants, with only 11% planning to increase cybersecurity staff in 2025 – less than in 2024. What 64% of stakeholders are committed to, however, is adding new AI-powered tools onto their existing security stacks.

The conclusion? Due to pressures around hiring, defensive AI is becoming integral to the SOC as a means of augmenting understaffed teams.

How is AI plugging skills shortages in the SOC?

As explored in our recent white paper, the CISO’s Guide to Navigating the Cybersecurity Skills Shortage, 71% of organizations report unfilled cybersecurity positions, leading to the estimation that less than 10% of alerts are thoroughly vetted. In this scenario, AI has become an essential multiplier to relieve the burden on security teams.

95% of respondents agree that AI-powered solutions can significantly improve the speed and efficiency of their defenses. But how?

The area security leaders expect defensive AI to have the biggest impact is on improving threat detection, followed by autonomous response to threats and identifying exploitable vulnerabilities.

Interestingly, the areas that participants ranked less highly (reducing alert fatigue and running phishing simulation), are the tasks that AI already does well and can therefore be used already to relieve the burden of manual, repetitive work on the SOC.

Different perspectives from different sides of the SOC

CISOs and SecOps teams aren’t necessarily aligned on the AI defense question – while CISOs tend to see it as a strategic game-changer, SecOps teams on the front lines may be more sceptical, wary of its real-world reliability and integration into workflows.  

From the data, we see that while less than a quarter of execs doubt that AI-powered solutions will block and automatically respond to AI threats, about half of SecOps aren’t convinced. And only 17% of CISOs lack confidence in the ability of their teams to implement and use AI-powered solutions, whereas over 40% those in the team doubt their own ability to do so.

This gap feeds into the enthusiasm that executives share about adding AI-driven tools into the stack, while day-to-day users of the tools are more interested in improving security awareness training and improving cybersecurity tool integration.

Levels of AI understanding in the SOC

AI is only as powerful as the people who use it, and levels of AI expertise in the SOC can make or break its real-world impact. If security leaders want to unlock AI’s full potential, they must bridge the knowledge gap—ensuring teams understand not just the different types of AI, but where it can be applied for maximum value.

Only 42% of security professionals are confident that they fully understand all the types of AI in their organization’s security stack.

This data varies between job roles – executives report higher levels of understanding (60% say they know exactly which types of AI are being used) than participants in other roles. Despite having a working knowledge of using the tools day-to-day, SecOps practitioners were more likely to report having a “reasonable understanding” of the types of AI in use in their organization (42%).  

Whether this reflects a general confidence in executives rather than technical proficiency it’s hard to say, but it speaks to the importance of AI-human collaboration – introducing AI tools for cybersecurity to plug the gaps in human teams will only be effective if security professionals are supported with the correct education and training.  

Download the full report to explore these findings in depth

The full report for Darktrace’s State of AI Cybersecurity is out now. Download the paper to dig deeper into these trends, and see how results differ by industry, region, organization size, and job title.  

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March 18, 2025

Darktrace's Detection of State-Linked ShadowPad Malware

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An integral part of cybersecurity is anomaly detection, which involves identifying unusual patterns or behaviors in network traffic that could indicate malicious activity, such as a cyber-based intrusion. However, attribution remains one of the ever present challenges in cybersecurity. Attribution involves the process of accurately identifying and tracing the source to a specific threat actor(s).

Given the complexity of digital networks and the sophistication of attackers who often use proxies or other methods to disguise their origin, pinpointing the exact source of a cyberattack is an arduous task. Threat actors can use proxy servers, botnets, sophisticated techniques, false flags, etc. Darktrace’s strategy is rooted in the belief that identifying behavioral anomalies is crucial for identifying both known and novel threat actor campaigns.

The ShadowPad cluster

Between July 2024 and November 2024, Darktrace observed a cluster of activity threads sharing notable similarities. The threads began with a malicious actor using compromised user credentials to log in to the target organization's Check Point Remote Access virtual private network (VPN) from an attacker-controlled, remote device named 'DESKTOP-O82ILGG'.  In one case, the IP from which the initial login was carried out was observed to be the ExpressVPN IP address, 194.5.83[.]25. After logging in, the actor gained access to service account credentials, likely via exploitation of an information disclosure vulnerability affecting Check Point Security Gateway devices. Recent reporting suggests this could represent exploitation of CVE-2024-24919 [27,28]. The actor then used these compromised service account credentials to move laterally over RDP and SMB, with files related to the modular backdoor, ShadowPad, being delivered to the  ‘C:\PerfLogs\’ directory of targeted internal systems. ShadowPad was seen communicating with its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, 158.247.199[.]185 (dscriy.chtq[.]net), via both HTTPS traffic and DNS tunneling, with subdomains of the domain ‘cybaq.chtq[.]net’ being used in the compromised devices’ TXT DNS queries.

Darktrace’s Advanced Search data showing the VPN-connected device initiating RDP connections to a domain controller (DC). The device subsequently distributes likely ShadowPad-related payloads and makes DRSGetNCChanges requests to a second DC.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s Advanced Search data showing the VPN-connected device initiating RDP connections to a domain controller (DC). The device subsequently distributes likely ShadowPad-related payloads and makes DRSGetNCChanges requests to a second DC.
Event Log data showing a DC making DNS queries for subdomains of ‘cbaq.chtq[.]net’ to 158.247.199[.]185 after receiving SMB and RDP connections from the VPN-connected device, DESKTOP-O82ILGG.
Figure 2: Event Log data showing a DC making DNS queries for subdomains of ‘cbaq.chtq[.]net’ to 158.247.199[.]185 after receiving SMB and RDP connections from the VPN-connected device, DESKTOP-O82ILGG.

Darktrace observed these ShadowPad activity threads within the networks of European-based customers in the manufacturing and financial sectors.  One of these intrusions was followed a few months later by likely state-sponsored espionage activity, as detailed in the investigation of the year in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2024.

Related ShadowPad activity

Additional cases of ShadowPad were observed across Darktrace’s customer base in 2024. In some cases, common C2 infrastructure with the cluster discussed above was observed, with dscriy.chtq[.]net and cybaq.chtq[.]net both involved; however, no other common features were identified. These ShadowPad infections were observed between April and November 2024, with customers across multiple regions and sectors affected.  Darktrace’s observations align with multiple other public reports that fit the timeframe of this campaign.

Darktrace has also observed other cases of ShadowPad without common infrastructure since September 2024, suggesting the use of this tool by additional threat actors.

The data theft thread

One of the Darktrace customers impacted by the ShadowPad cluster highlighted above was a European manufacturer. A distinct thread of activity occurred within this organization’s network several months after the ShadowPad intrusion, in October 2024.

The thread involved the internal distribution of highly masqueraded executable files via Sever Message Block (SMB) and WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation), the targeted collection of sensitive information from an internal server, and the exfiltration of collected information to a web of likely compromised sites. This observed thread of activity, therefore, consisted of three phrases: lateral movement, collection, and exfiltration.

The lateral movement phase began when an internal user device used an administrative credential to distribute files named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ and 'ProgramData\Oracle\duxwfnfo' to the c$ share on another internal system.  

Darktrace model alert highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ to the c$ share on another device.
Figure 3: Darktrace model alert highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Oracle\java.log’ to the c$ share on another device.

Over the next few days, Darktrace detected several other internal systems using administrative credentials to upload files with the following names to the c$ share on internal systems:

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Oracle\Java\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Oracle\Java\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\wksprt.exe

ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Abletech\Client\webservices.dll

ProgramData\Abletech\Client\client.exe

ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\rzrmxrwfvp

ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\3DxWare.exe

ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\webservices.dll

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\updater.exe

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\webservices.dll

ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\imtrqjsaqmm

Cyber AI Analyst highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll’ to the c$ share on an internal system.
Figure 4: Cyber AI Analyst highlighting an SMB write of a file named ‘ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll’ to the c$ share on an internal system.

The threat actor appears to have abused the Microsoft RPC (MS-RPC) service, WMI, to execute distributed payloads, as evidenced by the ExecMethod requests to the IWbemServices RPC interface which immediately followed devices’ SMB uploads.  

Cyber AI Analyst data highlighting a thread of activity starting with an SMB data upload followed by ExecMethod requests.
Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst data highlighting a thread of activity starting with an SMB data upload followed by ExecMethod requests.

Several of the devices involved in these lateral movement activities, both on the source and destination side, were subsequently seen using administrative credentials to download tens of GBs of sensitive data over SMB from a specially selected server.  The data gathering stage of the threat sequence indicates that the threat actor had a comprehensive understanding of the organization’s system architecture and had precise objectives for the information they sought to extract.

Immediately after collecting data from the targeted server, devices went on to exfiltrate stolen data to multiple sites. Several other likely compromised sites appear to have been used as general C2 infrastructure for this intrusion activity. The sites used by the threat actor for C2 and data exfiltration purport to be sites for companies offering a variety of service, ranging from consultancy to web design.

Screenshot of one of the likely compromised sites used in the intrusion. 
Figure 6: Screenshot of one of the likely compromised sites used in the intrusion.

At least 16 sites were identified as being likely data exfiltration or C2 sites used by this threat actor in their operation against this organization. The fact that the actor had such a wide web of compromised sites at their disposal suggests that they were well-resourced and highly prepared.  

Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device slowly exfiltrating data to the external endpoint, yasuconsulting[.]com.
Figure 7: Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device slowly exfiltrating data to the external endpoint, yasuconsulting[.]com.
Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device downloading nearly 1 GB of data from an internal system just before uploading a similar volume of data to another suspicious endpoint, www.tunemmuhendislik[.]com    
Figure 8: Darktrace model alert highlighting an internal device downloading nearly 1 GB of data from an internal system just before uploading a similar volume of data to another suspicious endpoint, www.tunemmuhendislik[.]com  

Cyber AI Analyst spotlight

Cyber AI Analyst identifying and piecing together the various steps of a ShadowPad intrusion.
Figure 9: Cyber AI Analyst identifying and piecing together the various steps of a ShadowPad intrusion.  
Cyber AI Analyst Incident identifying and piecing together the various steps of the data theft activity.
Figure 10: Cyber AI Analyst Incident identifying and piecing together the various steps of the data theft activity.

As shown in the above figures, Cyber AI Analyst’s ability to thread together the different steps of these attack chains are worth highlighting.

In the ShadowPad attack chains, Cyber AI Analyst was able to identify SMB writes from the VPN subnet to the DC, and the C2 connections from the DC. It was also able to weave together this activity into a single thread representing the attacker’s progression.

Similarly, in the data exfiltration attack chain, Cyber AI Analyst identified and connected multiple types of lateral movement over SMB and WMI and external C2 communication to various external endpoints, linking them in a single, connected incident.

These Cyber AI Analyst actions enabled a quicker understanding of the threat actor sequence of events and, in some cases, faster containment.

Attribution puzzle

Publicly shared research into ShadowPad indicates that it is predominantly used as a backdoor in People’s Republic of China (PRC)-sponsored espionage operations [5][6][7][8][9][10]. Most publicly reported intrusions involving ShadowPad  are attributed to the China-based threat actor, APT41 [11][12]. Furthermore, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) recently shared their assessment that ShadowPad usage is restricted to clusters associated with APT41 [13]. Interestingly, however, there have also been public reports of ShadowPad usage in unattributed intrusions [5].

The data theft activity that later occurred in the same Darktrace customer network as one of these ShadowPad compromises appeared to be the targeted collection and exfiltration of sensitive data. Such an objective indicates the activity may have been part of a state-sponsored operation. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), artifacts, and C2 infrastructure observed in the data theft thread appear to resemble activity seen in previous Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)-linked intrusion activities [15] [16] [17] [18] [19].

The distribution of payloads to the following directory locations appears to be a relatively common behavior in DPRK-sponsored intrusions.

Observed examples:

C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\  

C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\  

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\  

C:\ProgramData\Abletech\Client\  

C:\ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\  

C:\ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\

Additionally, the likely compromised websites observed in the data theft thread, along with some of the target URI patterns seen in the C2 communications to these sites, resemble those seen in previously reported DPRK-linked intrusion activities.

No clear evidence was found to link the ShadowPad compromise to the subsequent data theft activity that was observed on the network of the manufacturing customer. It should be noted, however, that no clear signs of initial access were found for the data theft thread – this could suggest the ShadowPad intrusion itself represents the initial point of entry that ultimately led to data exfiltration.

Motivation-wise, it seems plausible for the data theft thread to have been part of a DPRK-sponsored operation. DPRK is known to pursue targets that could potentially fulfil its national security goals and had been publicly reported as being active in months prior to this intrusion [21]. Furthermore, the timing of the data theft aligns with the ratification of the mutual defense treaty between DPRK and Russia and the subsequent accused activities [20].

Darktrace assesses with medium confidence that a nation-state, likely DPRK, was responsible, based on our investigation, the threat actor applied resources, patience, obfuscation, and evasiveness combined with external reporting, collaboration with the cyber community, assessing the attacker’s motivation and world geopolitical timeline, and undisclosed intelligence.

Conclusion

When state-linked cyber activity occurs within an organization’s environment, previously unseen C2 infrastructure and advanced evasion techniques will likely be used. State-linked cyber actors, through their resources and patience, are able to bypass most detection methods, leaving anomaly-based methods as a last line of defense.

Two threads of activity were observed within Darktrace’s customer base over the last year: The first operation involved the abuse of Check Point VPN credentials to log in remotely to organizations’ networks, followed by the distribution of ShadowPad to an internal domain controller. The second operation involved highly targeted data exfiltration from the network of one of the customers impacted by the previously mentioned ShadowPad activity.

Despite definitive attribution remaining unresolved, both the ShadowPad and data exfiltration activities were detected by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, with Cyber AI Analyst playing a significant role in identifying and piecing together the various steps of the intrusion activities.  

Credit to Sam Lister (R&D Detection Analyst), Emma Foulger (Principal Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (VP), and the Darktrace Threat Research team.

Appendices

Darktrace / NETWORK model alerts

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Compliance / SMB Drive Write  

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

User / New Admin Credentials on Client  

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Short Period)

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Device / Multiple C2 Model Alerts

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound  

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

(Technique name – Tactic ID)

ShadowPad malware threads

Initial Access - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

Initial Access - External Remote Services (T1133)

Privilege Escalation - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001)

Defense Evasion - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002)

Command and Control - Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

Command and Control - Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: DNS (T1071.004)

Data theft thread

Resource Development - Compromise Infrastructure: Domains (T1584.001)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001)

Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002)

Execution - Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)

Defense Evasion - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)

Defense Evasion - Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)

Lateral Movement - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002)

Collection - Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039)

Command and Control - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)

Command and Control - Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)

Command and Control - Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002)

Exfiltration - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041)

Exfiltration - Data Transfer Size Limits (T1030)

List of indicators of compromise (IoCs)

IP addresses and/or domain names (Mid-high confidence):

ShadowPad thread

- dscriy.chtq[.]net • 158.247.199[.]185 (endpoint of C2 comms)

- cybaq.chtq[.]net (domain name used for DNS tunneling)  

Data theft thread

- yasuconsulting[.]com (45.158.12[.]7)

- hobivan[.]net (94.73.151[.]72)

- mediostresbarbas.com[.]ar (75.102.23[.]3)

- mnmathleague[.]org (185.148.129[.]24)

- goldenborek[.]com (94.138.200[.]40)

- tunemmuhendislik[.]com (94.199.206[.]45)

- anvil.org[.]ph (67.209.121[.]137)

- partnerls[.]pl (5.187.53[.]50)

- angoramedikal[.]com (89.19.29[.]128)

- awork-designs[.]dk (78.46.20[.]225)

- digitweco[.]com (38.54.95[.]190)

- duepunti-studio[.]it (89.46.106[.]61)

- scgestor.com[.]br (108.181.92[.]71)

- lacapannadelsilenzio[.]it (86.107.36[.]15)

- lovetamagotchith[.]com (203.170.190[.]137)

- lieta[.]it (78.46.146[.]147)

File names (Mid-high confidence):

ShadowPad thread:

- perflogs\1.txt

- perflogs\AppLaunch.exe

- perflogs\F4A3E8BE.tmp

- perflogs\mscoree.dll

Data theft thread

- ProgramData\Oracle\java.log

- ProgramData\Oracle\duxwfnfo

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Oracle\Java\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Oracle\Java\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\wksprt.exe

- ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Abletech\Client\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\Abletech\Client\client.exe

- ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\rzrmxrwfvp

- ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\3DxWare.exe

- ProgramData\3Dconnexion\3DxWare\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\updater.exe

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\webservices.dll

- ProgramData\IDMComp\UltraCompare\imtrqjsaqmm

- temp\HousecallLauncher64.exe

Attacker-controlled device hostname (Mid-high confidence)

- DESKTOP-O82ILGG

References  

[1] https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/shadowpad-how-attackers-hide-backdoor-in-software-used-by-hundreds-of-large-companies-around-the-world  

[2] https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2017/08/07172148/ShadowPad_technical_description_PDF.pdf

[3] https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities

[4] https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/

[5] https://assets.sentinelone.com/c/Shadowpad?x=P42eqA

[6] https://www.cyfirma.com/research/the-origins-of-apt-41-and-shadowpad-lineage/

[7] https://www.csoonline.com/article/572061/shadowpad-has-become-the-rat-of-choice-for-several-state-sponsored-chinese-apts.html

[8] https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/shadowpad-new-activity-from-the-winnti-group

[9] https://cymulate.com/threats/shadowpad-privately-sold-malware-espionage-tool/

[10] https://www.secureworks.com/research/shadowpad-malware-analysis

[11] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/chinese-hacking-group-apt41-compromised-taiwanese-government-affiliated-research-institute-with-shadowpad-and-cobaltstrike-2/

[12] https://hackerseye.net/all-blog-items/tails-from-the-shadow-apt-41-injecting-shadowpad-with-sideloading/

[13] https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scatterbrain-unmasking-poisonplug-obfuscator

[14] https://www.domaintools.com/wp-content/uploads/conceptualizing-a-continuum-of-cyber-threat-attribution.pdf

[15] https://www.nccgroup.com/es/research-blog/north-korea-s-lazarus-their-initial-access-trade-craft-using-social-media-and-social-engineering/  

[16] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/01/28/zinc-attacks-against-security-researchers/

[17] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/  

[18] https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/  

[19] https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2021/01/Lazarus_malware2.html  

[20] https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-unlawful-arms-transfer-by-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-russia/

[21] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/25/2003510137/-1/-1/1/Joint-CSA-North-Korea-Cyber-Espionage-Advance-Military-Nuclear-Programs.PDF  

[22] https://kyivindependent.com/first-north-korean-troops-deployed-to-front-line-in-kursk-oblast-ukraines-military-intelligence-says/

[23] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/04/frequent-freeloader-part-i-secret-blizzard-compromising-storm-0156-infrastructure-for-espionage/  

[24] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/12/11/frequent-freeloader-part-ii-russian-actor-secret-blizzard-using-tools-of-other-groups-to-attack-ukraine/  

[25] https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/chamelgang-attacking-critical-infrastructure-with-ransomware/    

[26] https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/state-backed-hackers-using-ransomware.html/  

[27] https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/check-point-research-explains-shadow-pad-nailaolocker-and-its-protection/

[28] https://www.orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/cert-news/meet-nailaolocker-a-ransomware-distributed-in-europe-by-shadowpad-and-plugx-backdoors

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About the author
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst
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