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August 7, 2024

How Darktrace’s AI Applies a Zero-Trust Mentality within Critical Infrastructure Supply Chains

Darktrace prevented a Critical National Infrastructure organization from falling victim to a SharePoint phishing attack originating from one of its trusted suppliers. This blog discusses common perceptions of zero-trust in email security, how AI that uses anomaly-based threat detection embodies core zero-trust principles and the relevance of this approach to securing CNI bodies with complex but interdependent supply chains from Cloud account compromise. 
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst
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07
Aug 2024

Note: In order to name anonymity, real organization names have been replaced, all names used in this blog are fictitious.

What are critical national infrastructure sectors?

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors encompass of assets, systems, and networks essential to the functioning of society. Any disruption or destruction of these sectors could have wide-reaching and potentially disastrous effects on a country’s economy, security and/or healthcare services [1].

Cyber risks across Transportation Systems sector

Transportation Systems is one such CNI sector comprising of interconnected networks of fixed and mobile assets managed by both public and private operators. These systems are highly interdependent with other CNI sectors too. As such, the digital technologies this sector relies on – such as positioning and tracking, signaling, communications, industrial system controls, and data and business management – are often interconnected through different networks and remote access terminals. This interconnectedness creates multiple entry points that need to be security across the supply.

Digital transformation has swept through CNI sectors in recent years, including Transportation Systems. These organizations are now increasingly dependent on third-party and cloud providers for data storage and transmission, making their supply chains vulnerable to exploitation by malicious actors [2].

The exploitation of legitimate and popular cloud services mirrors the well-known “living-off-the-land” techniques, which are not being adapted to the cloud along with the resources they support. In one recent case previously discussed by Darktrace, for example, a phishing attack attempted to abuse Dropbox to deliver malicious payloads.

Zero-Trust within CNI Sectors

One recommended approach to secure an organization’s supply chain and cloud environments is the implementation of zero-trust strategies, which remove inherent trust within the network [3] [4]. The principle of “never trust, always verify” is widely recognized as an architectural design, with 63% of organizations surveyed by Gartner reportedly implementing a zero-trust strategy, but in most cases to less than 50% of their environments [5]

Although this figure reflects the reality and challenge of balancing operations and security, demands from the threat landscape and supply chain risks mean that organizations must adopt zero-trust principles in areas not traditionally considered part of network architecture, such as email and cloud environments.

Email is often the primary entry point for cyber-attacks with Business Email Compromise (BEC) being a major threat to CNI organizations. However, the application of zero-trust principles to secure email environments is still not well understood. Common misconceptions include:

  • “Positively identifying known and trusted senders” – Maintaining a list of “known and trusted senders” contradicts the zero-trust model, which assumes that no entity is inherently trustworthy.
  • “Using DMARC, DKIM and SPF” – While these protocols offer some protection, they are often insufficient on their own, as they can be bypassed and do not protect against email account takeovers. Research published from Darktrace’s last two threat reports consistently shows that at least 60% of phishing emails detected by Darktrace had bypassed Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC) [6] [7].  
  • “Mapping transaction flows between internal and external users to determine what access is required/not required” – Although this aligns with the principles of least privilege, it is too static for today’s dynamic supply chains and evolving digital infrastructure. This approach also suggests the existence of “trusted” access routes into a network.

Attack Overview

In July 2024, Darktrace / EMAIL™ detected and contained a sophisticated phishing attack leveraging Microsoft SharePoint. This attack exploited the trusted relationship between a Darktrace customer in the public transport sector and a compromised supplier. Traditional methods, such as those detailed above, would likely have failed to defend against such an advanced threat. However, Darktrace’s behavioral analysis and zero-trust approach to email security allowed it to successfully identify and neutralize the attack, preventing any potential disruption.

Initial Intrusion Attempt

The observed phishing attack by Darktrace would suggest that the customer’s supplier was targeted by a similar campaign beforehand. This initial breach likely allowed the attacker to use the now compromised account as a vector to compromise additional accounts and networks.

On July 9, Darktrace / EMAIL identified a significant spike in inbound emails from “supplier@engineeringcompany[.]com”. The emails appeared to be legitimate notifications sent via SharePoint and contained a file named “Payment Applications Docs”.

Email correspondence in the weeks around the phishing attack.
Figure 1: Email correspondence in the weeks around the phishing attack. The sender is an established correspondent with ongoing communications prior to and after the attack, however there is a significant spike in incoming emails on the day of the attack.

This reflects a common technique in malicious social engineering attempts, where references to payment are used to draw attention and prompt a response. Darktrace observed a large number of recipients within the organization receiving the same file, suggesting that the motive was likely credential harvesting rather than financial gain. Financially motivated attacks typically require a more targeted, ‘under-the-radar’ approach to be successful.

These phishing emails were able to bypass the customer’s email gateways as they were sent from a trusted and authoritative source, SharePoint, and utilized an email address with which the customer had previously corresponded. The compromised account was likely whitelisted by traditional email security tools that rely on SPF, DKIM, and DMAC, allowing the malicious emails to evade detection.

Autonomous Response

Darktrace / EMAIL analysis of the unusual characteristics of the phishing email in relation to the supplier’s typical behaviour, despite the email originating from a legitimate SharePoint notification.
Figure 2: Darktrace / EMAIL analysis of the unusual characteristics of the phishing email in relation to the supplier’s typical behavior, despite the email originating from a legitimate SharePoint notification.

However, Darktrace / EMAIL did not use these static rules to automatically trust the email. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI detected the following anomalies:

  • Although the sender was known, it was not normal for the supplier to share files with the customer via SharePoint.
  • The supplier initiated an unusually large number of file shares in a short period of time, indicating potential spam activity.
  • The SharePoint link had wide access permissions, which is unusual for a sensitive payment document legitimately shared between established contacts.

Darktrace understood that the email activity constituted a significant deviation in expected behavior between the sender and customer, regardless of the known sender and use of a legitimate filesharing platform like SharePoint.

As a result, Darktrace took action to hold more than 100 malicious emails connected to the phishing attack, preventing them from landing in recipient inboxes in the first instance.  By taking a behavioral approach to securing customer email environments, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI embodies the principles of zero trust, assessing each interaction in real-time against a user’s dynamic baseline rather than relying on static and often inaccurate rules to define trust.

Conclusion

Cloud services, such as SharePoint, offer significant advantages to the transportation sector by streamlining data exchange with supply chain partners and facilitating access to information for analytics and planning. However, these benefits come with notable risks. If a cloud account is compromised, unauthorized access to sensitive information could lead to extortion and lateral movement into mission-critical systems for more damaging attacks on CNI. Even a brief disruption in cloud access can have severe economic repercussions due to the sector’s dependence on these services for resource coordination and the cascading impacts on other critical systems [9].

While supply chain resilience is often evaluated based on a supplier’s initial compliance with baseline standards, organizations must be wary of potential future threats and focus on post-implementation security. It is essential for organizations to employ strategies to protect their assets from attacks that would exploit vulnerabilities within the trusted supply chain. Given that CNI and the transportation sector are prime targets for state-sponsored actors and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, the complex and interconnected nature of their supply chains opens the door for opportunistic attackers.

Defenders face the challenge of ensuring secure access and collaboration across numerous, dynamic assets, often without full visibility. Therefore, security solutions must be as dynamic as the threats they face, avoiding reliance on static rules. Real-time assessment of devices behavior, even if deemed trusted by end-users and human security teams, is crucial for maintaining security.

Darktrace’s AI-driven threat detection aligns with the zero-trust principle of assuming the risk of a breach. By leveraging AI that learns an organization’s specific patterns of life, Darktrace provides a tailored security approach ideal for organizations with complex supply chains.

Credit to Nicole Wong, Senior Cyber Analyst Consultant and Ryan Traill, Threat Content Lead

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Key model alerts:

  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + New Unknown Link
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Bad Display Text
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Distant Recipient Interaction with Domain
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Sender Surge
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Wide Access Sharepoint Link

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Resource Development • Compromise Accounts: Cloud Accounts • T1586.003

Initial Access • Supply Chain Compromise • T1195

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors

[2]  https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/126313/pdf/

[3] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-161r1.pdf

[4] https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/press-releases/2023/11/15/cloud-security-alliance-launches-the-industry-s-first-authoritative-zero-trust-training-and-credential-the-certificate-of-competence-in-zero-trust-cczt

[5] https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/5286863#:~:text=Summary,anticipate%20staffing%20and%20cost%20increases.

[6] https://darktrace.com/threat-report-2023

[7] https://darktrace.com/resources/first-6-half-year-threat-report-2024

[8] https://dfrlab.org/2023/07/10/critical-infrastructure-and-the-cloud-policy-for-emerging-risk/#transportation

[9] https://access-national-risk-register.service.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/risk-scenario/cyber-attack-transport-sector

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst

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August 8, 2025

Ivanti Under Siege: Investigating the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-4427 & CVE-2025-4428)

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Ivanti & Edge infrastructure exploitation

Edge infrastructure exploitations continue to prevail in today’s cyber threat landscape; therefore, it was no surprise that recent Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) vulnerabilities CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428 were exploited targeting organizations in critical sectors such as healthcare, telecommunications, and finance across the globe, including across the Darktrace customer base in May 2025.

Exploiting these types of vulnerabilities remains a popular choice for threat actors seeking to enter an organization’s network to perform malicious activity such as cyber espionage, data exfiltration and ransomware detonation.

Vulnerabilities in Ivanti EPMM

Ivanti EPMM allows organizations to manage and configure enterprise mobile devices. On May 13, 2025, Ivanti published a security advisory [1] for their Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) devices addressing a medium and high severity vulnerability:

  • CVE-2025-4427, CVSS: 5.6: An authentication bypass vulnerability
  • CVE-2025-4428, CVSS: 7.2: Remote code execution vulnerability

Successfully exploiting both vulnerabilities at the same time could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution from an unauthenticated threat actor, which could allow them to control, manipulate, and compromise managed devices on a network [2].

Shortly after the disclosure of these vulnerabilities, external researchers uncovered evidence that they were being actively exploited in the wild and identified multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to post-exploitation activities for these vulnerabilities [2] [3]. Research drew particular attention to the infrastructure utilized in ongoing exploitation activity, such as leveraging the two vulnerabilities to eventually deliver malware contained within ELF files from Amazon Web Services (AWS) S3 bucket endpoints and to deliver KrustyLoader malware for persistence. KrustyLoader is a Rust based malware that was discovered being downloaded in compromised Ivanti Connect Secure systems back in January 2024 when the zero-day critical vulnerabilities; CVE-2024-21887 and CVE-2023-46805 [10].

This suggests the involvement of the threat actor UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor [3].

In addition to exploring the post-exploit tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed for these vulnerabilities across Darktrace’s customer base, this blog will also examine the subtle changes and similarities in the exploitation of earlier Ivanti vulnerabilities—specifically Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Policy Secure (PS) vulnerabilities CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 in early 2024, as well as CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283, which affected CS, PS, and Zero Trust Access (ZTA) in January 2025.

Darktrace Coverage

In May 2025, shortly after Ivanti disclosed vulnerabilities in their EPMM product, Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified attack patterns potentially linked to the exploitation of these vulnerabilities across multiple customer environments. The most noteworthy attack chain activity observed included exploit validation, payload delivery via AWS S3 bucket endpoints, subsequent delivery of script-based payloads, and connections to dpaste[.]com, possibly for dynamic payload retrieval. In a limited number of cases, connections were also made to an IP address associated with infrastructure linked to SAP NetWeaver vulnerability CVE-2025-31324, which has been investigated by Darktrace in an earlier case.

Exploit Validation

Darktrace observed devices within multiple customer environments making connections related to Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST). These included a range of DNS requests and connections, most of which featured a user agent associated with the command-line tool cURL, directed toward associated endpoints. The hostnames of these endpoints consisted of a string of randomly generated characters followed by an OAST domain, such as 'oast[.]live', 'oast[.]pro', 'oast[.]fun', 'oast[.]site', 'oast[.]online', or 'oast[.]me'. OAST endpoints can be leveraged by malicious actors to trigger callbacks from targeted systems, such as for exploit validation. This activity, likely representing the initial phase of the attack chain observed across multiple environments, was also seen in the early stages of previous investigations into the exploitation of Ivanti vulnerabilities [4]. Darktrace also observed similar exploit validation activity during investigations conducted in January 2024 into the Ivanti CS vulnerabilities CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887.

Payload Delivery via AWS

Devices across multiple customer environments were subsequently observed downloading malicious ELF files—often with randomly generated filenames such as 'NVGAoZDmEe'—from AWS S3 bucket endpoints like 's3[.]amazonaws[.]com'. These downloads occurred over HTTP connections, typically using wget or cURL user agents. Some of the ELF files were later identified to be KrustyLoader payloads using open-source intelligence (OSINT). External researchers have reported that the KrustyLoader malware is executed in cases of Ivanti EPMM exploitation to gain and maintain a foothold in target networks [2].

In one customer environment, after connections were made to the endpoint fconnect[.]s3[.]amazonaws[.]com, Darktrace observed the target system downloading the ELF file mnQDqysNrlg via the user agent Wget/1.14 (linux-gnu). Further investigation of the file’s SHA1 hash (1dec9191606f8fc86e4ae4fdf07f09822f8a94f2) linked it to the KrustyLoader malware [5]. In another customer environment, connections were instead made to tnegadge[.]s3[.]amazonaws[.]com using the same user agent, from which the ELF file “/dfuJ8t1uhG” was downloaded. This file was also linked to KrustyLoader through its SHA1 hash (c47abdb1651f9f6d96d34313872e68fb132f39f5) [6].

The pattern of activity observed so far closely mirrors previous exploits associated with the Ivanti vulnerabilities CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 [4]. As in those cases, Darktrace observed exploit validation using OAST domains and services, along with the use of AWS endpoints to deliver ELF file payloads. However, in this instance, the delivered payload was identified as KrustyLoader malware.

Later-stage script file payload delivery

In addition to the ELF file downloads, Darktrace also detected other file downloads across several customer environments, potentially representing the delivery of later-stage payloads.

The downloaded files included script files with the .sh extension, featuring randomly generated alphanumeric filenames. One such example is “4l4md4r.sh”, which was retrieved during a connection to the IP address 15.188.246[.]198 using a cURL-associated user agent. This IP address was also linked to infrastructure associated with the SAP NetWeaver remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2025-31324, which enables remote code execution on NetWeaver Visual Composer. External reporting has attributed this infrastructure to a China-nexus state actor [7][8][9].

In addition to the script file downloads, devices on some customer networks were also observed making connections to pastebin[.]com and dpaste[.]com, two sites commonly used to host or share malicious payloads or exploitation instructions [2]. Exploits, including those targeting Ivanti EPMM vulnerabilities, can dynamically fetch malicious commands from sites like dpaste[.]com, enabling threat actors to update payloads. Unlike the previously detailed activity, this behavior was not identified in any prior Darktrace investigations into Ivanti-related vulnerabilities, suggesting a potential shift in the tactics used in post-exploitation stages of Ivanti attacks.

Conclusion

Edge infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as those found in Ivanti EPMM and investigated across customer environments with Darktrace / NETWORK, have become a key tool in the arsenal of attackers in today’s threat landscape. As highlighted in this investigation, while many of the tactics employed by threat actors following successful exploitation of vulnerabilities remain the same, subtle shifts in their methods can also be seen.

These subtle and often overlooked changes enable threat actors to remain undetected within networks, highlighting the critical need for organizations to maintain continuous extended visibility, leverage anomaly based behavioral analysis, and deploy machine speed intervention across their environments.

Credit to Nahisha Nobregas (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Anna Gilbertson (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

Mid-High Confidence IoCs

(IoC – Type - Description)

-       trkbucket.s3.amazonaws[.]com – Hostname – C2 endpoint

-       trkbucket.s3.amazonaws[.]com/NVGAoZDmEe – URL – Payload

-       tnegadge.s3.amazonaws[.]com – Hostname – C2 endpoint

-       tnegadge.s3.amazonaws[.]com/dfuJ8t1uhG – URL – Payload

-       c47abdb1651f9f6d96d34313872e68fb132f39f5 - SHA1 File Hash – Payload

-       4abfaeadcd5ab5f2c3acfac6454d1176 - MD5 File Hash - Payload

-       fconnect.s3.amazonaws[.]com – Hostname – C2 endpoint

-       fconnect.s3.amazonaws[.]com/mnQDqysNrlg – URL - Payload

-       15.188.246[.]198 – IP address – C2 endpoint

-       15.188.246[.]198/4l4md4r.sh?grep – URL – Payload

-       185.193.125[.]65 – IP address – C2 endpoint

-       185.193.125[.]65/c4qDsztEW6/TIGHT_UNIVERSITY – URL – C2 endpoint

-       d8d6fe1a268374088fb6a5dc7e5cbb54 – MD5 File Hash – Payload

-       64.52.80[.]21 – IP address – C2 endpoint

-       0d8da2d1.digimg[.]store – Hostname – C2 endpoint

-       134.209.107[.]209 – IP address – C2 endpoint

Darktrace Model Detections

-       Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

-       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

-       Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

-       Compliance / Pastebin

-       Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

-       Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

-       Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

-       Anomalous File / Incoming ELF File

-       Device / Suspicious Domain

-       Device / New User Agent

-       Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

-       Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

-       Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

-       Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

-       Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

-       Compromise / Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

-       Device / Attack and Recon Tools

-       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

-       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

-       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device

References

1.     https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM?language=en_US

2.     https://blog.eclecticiq.com/china-nexus-threat-actor-actively-exploiting-ivanti-endpoint-manager-mobile-cve-2025-4428-vulnerability

3.     https://www.wiz.io/blog/ivanti-epmm-rce-vulnerability-chain-cve-2025-4427-cve-2025-4428

4.     https://www.darktrace.com/blog/the-unknown-unknowns-post-exploitation-activities-of-ivanti-cs-ps-appliances

5.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ac91c2c777c9e8638ec1628a199e396907fbb7dcf9c430ca712ec64a6f1fcbc9/community

6.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f3e0147d359f217e2aa0a3060d166f12e68314da84a4ecb5cb205bd711c71998/community

7.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/15.188.246.198

8.     https://blog.eclecticiq.com/china-nexus-nation-state-actors-exploit-sap-netweaver-cve-2025-31324-to-target-critical-infrastructures

9.     https://www.darktrace.com/blog/tracking-cve-2025-31324-darktraces-detection-of-sap-netweaver-exploitation-before-and-after-disclosure

10.  https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/krustyloader-rust-malware-linked-to-ivanti-connectsecure-compromises

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein.

Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.

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About the author
Nahisha Nobregas
SOC Analyst

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August 7, 2025

How CDR & Automated Forensics Transform Cloud Incident Response

cloud security investigation guy on computer doing workDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction: Cloud investigations

In cloud security, speed, automation and clarity are everything. However, for many SOC teams, responding to incidents in the cloud is often very difficult especially when attackers move fast, infrastructure is ephemeral, and forensic skills are scarce.

In this blog we will walk through an example that shows exactly how Darktrace Cloud Detection and Response (CDR) and automated cloud forensics together, solve these challenges, automating cloud detection, and deep forensic investigation in a way that’s fast, scalable, and deeply insightful.

The Problem: Cloud incidents are hard to investigate

Security teams often face three major hurdles when investigating cloud detections:

Lack of forensic expertise: Most SOCs and security teams aren’t natively staffed with forensics specialists.

Ephemeral infrastructure: Cloud assets spin up and down quickly, leaving little time to capture evidence.

Lack of existing automation: Gathering forensic-level data often requires manual effort and leaves teams scrambling around during incidents — accessing logs, snapshots, and system states before they disappear. This process is slow and often blocked by permissions, tooling gaps, or lack of visibility.

How Darktrace augments cloud investigations

1. Darktrace’s CDR finds anomalous activity in the cloud

An alert is generated for a large outbound data transfer from an externally facing EC2 instance to a rare external endpoint. It’s anomalous, unexpected, and potentially serious.

2. AI-led investigation stitches together the incident for a SOC analyst to look into

When a security incident unfolds, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst TM is the first to surface it, automatically correlating behaviors, surfacing anomalies, and presenting a cohesive incident summary. It’s fast, detailed, and invaluable.

Once the incident is created, more questions are raised.

  • How were the impacted resources compromised?
  • How did the attack unfold over time – what tools and malware were used?
  • What data was accessed and exfiltrated?

What you’ll see as a SOC analyst: The incident begins in Darktrace’s Threat Visualizer, where a Cyber AI Analyst incident has been generated automatically highlighting large anomalous data transfer to a suspicious external IP. This isn’t just another alert, it’s a high-fidelity signal backed by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI.

Cyber AI Analyst incident created for anomalous outbound data transfer
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst incident created for anomalous outbound data transfer

The analyst can then immediately pivot to Darktrace / CLOUD’s architecture view (see below), gaining context on the asset’s environment, ingress/egress points, connected systems, potential attack paths and whether there are any current misconfigurations detected on the asset.

Darktrace / CLOUD architecture view providing critical cloud context
Figure 2: Darktrace / CLOUD architecture view providing critical cloud context

3. Automated forensic capture — No expertise required

Then comes the game-changer, Darktrace’s recent acquisition of Cado enhances its cloud forensics capabilities. From the first alert triggered, Darktrace has already kicked in and automatically processed and analyzed a full volume capture of the EC2. Everything, past and present, is preserved. No need for manual snapshots, CLI commands, or specialist intervention.

Darktrace then provides a clear timeline highlighting the evidence and preserving it. In our example we identify:

  • A brute-force attempt on a file management app, followed by a successful login
  • A reverse shell used to gain unauthorized remote access to the EC2
  • A reverse TCP connection to the same suspicious IP flagged by Darktrace
  • Attacker commands showing how the data was split and prepared for exfiltration
  • A file (a.tar) created from two sensitive archives: product_plans.zip and research_data.zip

All of this is surfaced through the timeline view, ranked by significance using machine learning. The analyst can pivot through time, correlate events, and build a complete picture of the attack — without needing cloud forensics expertise.

Darktrace even gives the ability to:

  • Download and inspect gathered files in full detail, enabling teams to verify exactly what data was accessed or exfiltrated.
  • Interact with the file system as if it were live, allowing investigators to explore directories, uncover hidden artifacts, and understand attacker movement with precision.
Figure 3 Cado critical forensic investigation automated insights
Figure 3: Cado critical forensic investigation automated insights
Figure 4: Cado forensic file analysis of reverse shell and download option
Figure 5: a.tar created from two sensitive archives: product_plans.zip and research_data.zip
Figure 6: Traverse the full file system of the asset

Why this matters?

This workflow solves the hardest parts of cloud investigation:

  1. Capturing evidence before it disappears
  2. Understanding attacker behavior in detail - automatically
  3. Linking detections to impact with full incident visibility

This kind of insight is invaluable for organizations especially regulated industries, where knowing exactly what data was affected is critical for compliance and reporting. It’s also a powerful tool for detecting insider threats, not just external attackers.

Darktrace / CLOUD and Cado together acts as a force multiplier helping with:

  • Reducing investigation time from hours to minutes
  • Preserving ephemeral evidence automatically
  • Empowering analysts with forensic-level visibility

Cloud threats aren’t slowing down. Your response shouldn’t either. Darktrace / CLOUD + Cado gives your SOC the tools to detect, contain, and investigate cloud incidents — automatically, accurately, and at scale.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Adam Stevens
Director of Product, Cloud Security
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