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September 20, 2022

Modern Extortion: Detecting Data Theft From the Cloud

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Sep 2022
Darktrace highlights a handful of data theft incidents on shared cloud platforms, showing that cloud computing can be a vulnerable place for modern extortion.

Ransomware Industry

The ransomware industry has benefitted from a number of factors in recent years: inadequate cyber defenses, poorly regulated cryptocurrency markets, and geopolitical tensions have allowed gangs to extort increasingly large ransoms while remaining sheltered from western law enforcement [1]. However, one of the biggest success stories of the ransomware industry has been the adaptability and evolution of attacker TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures). The WannaCry and NotPetya attacks of 2017 popularized a form of ransomware which used encryption algorithms to hold data to ransom in exchange for a decryption key. Last year in 2021, almost all ransomware strains evolved to use double extortion tactics: holding stolen data to ransom as well as encrypted data [2]. Now, some ransomware gangs have dropped encryption entirely, and are using data theft as their sole means of extortion. 

Using data theft for extortion is not new. In 2020 the Finnish psychotherapy center Vastaamo had over 40,000 patient records stolen. Impacted patients were told that their psychiatric transcripts would be published online if they failed to pay a Bitcoin ransom. [3]. A later report by BlackFog in May 2021 predicted data theft extortion would become one of the key emerging cybersecurity trends that year [4]. Adoption of offline back-ups and endpoint detection had made encryption harder, while a large-scale move to Cloud and SaaS platforms offered new vectors for data theft. By moving from data encryption to data exfiltration, ransomware attackers pivoted from targeting data availability within the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) to threatening data confidentiality.

In November 2021, Darktrace detected a data theft incident following the compromise of two SaaS accounts within an American tech customer’s Office365 environment. The client was a longstanding user of Darktrace DETECT/Network, and was in the process of expanding their coverage by trialing Darktrace DETECT+RESPOND/ Apps + Cloud.

Attack Overview

On November 23rd 2021, an Ask the Expert (ATE) ticket was raised prompting investigation into a breached SaaS model, ‘SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use’, and the activities of a user (censored as UserA) over the prior week.

1. Office365: UserA 

The account UserA had been logging in from an unusual location in Nigeria on November 21st. At the time of the incident there were no flags of malicious activity from this IP in widely used OSINT sources. It is also highly probable the attacker was not located in Nigeria but using Nigerian infrastructure in order to hide their true location. Regardless, the location of the login from this IP and ASN was considered highly unusual for users within the customer’s digital estate. The specific user in question most commonly accessed their account from IP ranges located in the US.

Figure 1: In the Geolocation tab of the External Sites Summary on the SaaS Console, UserA was seen logging in from Nigeria when previous logins were exclusively from USA

Further investigation revealed an additional anomaly in the Outlook Web activity of UserA. The account was using the Firefox browser to access their account for the first time in at least 4 weeks (the maximum period for which the customer stored such data). SaaS logs detailing the access of confidential folders and other suspicious actions were identified using the Advanced Search (AS) query:

@fields.saas_actor:"UserA@[REDACTED]" AND @fields.saas_software:"Firefox"

Most actions were ‘MailItemsAccessed’ events originating from IPs located in Nigeria [5,6] and one other potentially malicious IP located in the US [7].

‘MailItemsAccessed’ is part of the new Advanced Audit functionality from Microsoft and can be used to determine when email data is accessed by mail protocols and clients. A bind mail access type denotes an individual access to an email message [8]. 

Figure 2: AS logs shows UserA had not used Firefox to access Office365 for at least 4 weeks prior to the unusual login on the 21st November

Below are details of the main suspicious SaaS activities: 

·      Time: 2021-11-21 09:05:25 - 2021-11-22 16:57:39 UTC

·      SaaS Actor: UserA@[REDACTED]

·      SaaS Service: Office365

·      SaaS Service Product: Exchange

·      SaaS Software: Firefox

·      SaaS Office365 Parent Folders:

          o   \Accounts/Passwords
          o   \Invoices
          o   \Sent Items
          o   \Inbox
          o   \Recoverable Items\Deletions

·      SaaS Event:

          o   MailItemsAccessed
          o   UserLoggedIn
          o   Update

·      SaaS Office365 Mail Access Type: Bind (47 times)

·      Source IP addresses:

          o   105.112.59[.]83
          o   105.112.36[.]212
          o   154.6.17[.]16
          o   45.130.83[.]129

·      SaaS User Agents: 

          o   Client=OWA;Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0;
          o   Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0

·      Total SaaS logs: 57 

At the start of the month on the 5th November, the user had also been seen logging in from a potentially malicious endpoint [9] in Europe, performing ‘MailItemsAccessed’ and ‘Updates’ events with subjects and a resource location related to invoices and wire transfers from the Sent items folder. This suggests the initial compromise had been earlier in the month, giving the threat actor time to make preparations for the final stages of the attack.

Figure 3: Event log showing the activity of UserA from IP 45.135.187[.]108 

2. Office365: UserB 

Looking into the model breach ‘SaaS / Access / Suspicious Credential Use And Login User-Agent’, it was seen that a second account, UserB, was also observed logging in from a rare and potentially malicious location in Bangladesh [7]. Similar to UserA, this user had previously logged in exclusively from the USA, and no other accounts within the digital estate had been observed interacting with the Bangladeshi IP address. The login event appeared to bypass MFA (Multi-factor Authentication) and a suspicious user agent, BAV2ROPC, was used. Against misconfigured accounts, this Microsoft user agent is commonly used by attackers to bypass MFA on Office365. It targets Exchange’s Basic Authentication (normally used in POP3/IMAP4 conditions) and results in an OAuth flow which circumvents the additional password security brought by MFA [10].  

During the session, additional resources were accessed which appear to be associated with bill and invoice payments. In addition, on the 4th November, two new suspicious email rules named “..” were created from rare IPs (107.10.56[.]48 and 76.189.202[.]66). This type of behavior is commonly seen during SaaS compromises to delete or forward emails. Typically, an email rule created by a human user will be named to reflect the change being made, such as ‘Move emails from Legal to Urgent’. In contrast, malicious email rules are often short and undescriptive. The rule “..” is likely to blend in without arousing suspicion, while also being easy for the attacker to create and remember. 

Details of these rule changes are as follows:

·      Time: 2021-11-04 13:25:06, 2021-11-05 15:50:00 [UTC]
·      SaaS Service: Office365
·      SaaS Service Product: Exchange
·      SaaS Status Message: True
·      SaaS Source IP addresses: 107.10.56[.]48, 76.189.202[.]66
·      SaaS Account Name: O365
·      SaaS Actor: UserB@[REDACTED]
·      SaaS Event: SetInboxRule
·      SaaS Office365 Modified Property Names:
          o   AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob, Force, Identity, MoveToFolder, Name, FromAddressContainsWords, StopProcessingRules
          o   AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob, Force, Identity, Name, FromAddressContainsWords, StopProcessingRules
·      SaaS Resource Name: .. 

During cloud account compromises, attackers will often use sync operations to download emails to their local email client. During the operations, these clients typically download a large set of mail items from the cloud to a local computer. If the attacker is able to sync all mail items to their mail client, the entire mailbox can be compromised. The attacker is able to disconnect from the account and review and search the email without generating additional event logs. 

Both accounts UserA and UserB were observed using ‘MailItemsAccessed’ sync operations between the 1st and 23rd November when this attack occurred. However, based on the originating IP of the sync operations, the activity is likely to have been initiated by the legitimate, US-based users. Once the security team were able to confirm the events were expected and legitimate, they could establish that the contents of the mailbox were not a part of the data breach. 

Accomplish Mission

After gaining access to the Office365 accounts, sensitive data was downloaded by the attackers to their local system. Either on or before 14th December, the attacker had seemingly uploaded the documents onto a data leak website. In total, 130MB of data had been made available for download in two separate packages. The packages included audit and accounting financial documents, with file extensions such as DB, XLSX, and PDF.

Figure 4: The two data packages uploaded by the attacker and the extracted contents

In a sample of past SaaS activity of UserA, the subject and attachments appear related to the ‘OUTSTANDING PREPAY WIRES 2021’ excel document found from the data leak website in Figure 4, suggesting a further possibility that the account was associated with the leaked data. 

Historic SaaS activity associated with UserA: 

·      Time: 2021-11-05 21:21:18 [UTC]
·      SaaS Office365 Logon Type: Owner
·      Protocol: OFFICE365
·      SaaS Account Name: O365
·      SaaS Actor: UserA@[REDACTED].com
·      SaaS Event: Send
·      SaaS Service: Office365
·      SaaS Service Product: Exchange
·      SaaS Status Message: Succeeded
·      SaaS Office365 Attachment: WIRE 2021.xlsx (92406b); image.png (9084b); image.png (1454b); image.png (1648b); image.png (1691b); image.png (1909b); image.png (2094b)
·      SaaS Office365 Subject: Wires 11/8/21
·      SaaS Resource Location: \Drafts
·      SaaS User Agent: Client=OWA;Action=ViaProxy 

Based on the available evidence, it is highly likely that the data packages contain the data stolen during the account compromise the previous month.  

Once the credentials of an Office365 account are stolen, an attacker can not only access the user's mailbox, but also a full range of Office365 applications such as SharePoint folders, Teams Chat, or files in the user's OneDrive [11]. For example, files shared in Teams chat are stored in OneDrive for Business in a folder named Microsoft Teams Chat Files in the default Document library on SharePoint. One of the files visible on the data leak website, called ‘[REDACTED] CONTRACT.3.1.2020.pdf’, was also observed in the default document folder of a third user account (UserC) within the victim organization, suggesting the compromised accounts may have been able to access shared files stored on other accounts by moving laterally via other O365 applications such as Teams. 

One example can be seen in the below AS logs: 

·      Time: 2021-11-11 01:58:35 [UTC]
·      SaaS Resource Type: File
·      Protocol: OFFICE365
·      SaaS Account Name: 0365
·      SaaS Actor: UserC@[REDACTED]
·      SaaS Event: FilePreviewed
·      SaaS Service Product: OneDrive
·      SaaS Metric: ResourceViewed
·      SaaS Office365 Application Name: Media Analysis and Transformation Service
·      SaaS Office365 File Extension: pdf
·      SaaS Resource Location: https://[REDACTED]-my.sharepoint.com/personal/userC_[REDACTED]_com/Documents/Microsoft Teams Chat Files/[REDACTED] CONTRACT 3.1.2020.pdf
·      SaaS Resource Name: [REDACTED] CONTRACT 3.1.2020.pdf
·      SaaS Service: Office365
·      SaaS Service Product: OneDrive
·      SaaS User Agent: OneDriveMpc-Transform_Thumbnail/1.0 

In the period between the 1st and 30th November, the customer’s Darktrace DETECT/Apps trial had raised multiple high-level alerts associated with SaaS account compromise, but there was no evidence of file encryption.  

Establish Foothold 

Looking back at the start of the attack, it is unclear exactly how the attacker evaded the customer’s pre-existing security stack. At the time of the incident, the victim was using a Barracuda email gateway and Microsoft 365 Threat Management for their cloud environment. 

Darktrace detected no indication the accounts were compromised via credential bruteforcing, which would have enabled the attacker to bypass the Azure Active Directory smart lockout (if enabled). The credentials may have been harvested via a phishing campaign which successfully evaded the list of known ‘bad’ domains maintained by their email gateway.  

Upon gaining access to the account, the Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps anomaly detection policies would have been expected to raise an alert [12]. In this instance, the unusual login from Nigeria occurred over 16 hours after the previous login from the US, potentially evading anomaly detection policies such as the ‘Impossible Travel’ rule. 

Figure 5: Event log showing the user accessing mail from USA a day before the suspicious usage from Nigeria 

Darktrace Coverage

Darktrace DETECT 

Throughout this event, high scoring model breaches associated with the attack were visible in the customer’s SaaS Console. In addition, there were two Cyber AI Analyst incidents for ‘Possible Account Hijack’ associated with the two compromised SaaS Office365 accounts, UserA and UserB. The visibility given by Darktrace DETECT also enabled the security team to confirm which files had been accessed and were likely part of the data leak.

Figure 6: Example Cyber AI Analyst incident of UserB SaaS Office365 account

Darktrace RESPOND

In this incident, the attackers successfully compromised O365 accounts in order to exfiltrate customer data. Whilst Darktrace RESPOND/Apps was being trialed and suggested several actions, it was configured in human confirmation mode. The following RESPOND/Apps actions were advised for these activities:  

·      ‘Antigena [RESPOND] Unusual Access Block’ triggered by the successful login from an unusual IP address, would have actioned the ‘Block IP’ inhibitor, preventing access to the account from the unusual IP for up to 24 hours
·      ‘Suspicious Source Activity Block’, triggered by the suspicious user agent used to bypass MFA, would have actioned the ‘Disable User’ inhibitor, disabling the user account for up to 24 hours 

During this incident, Darktrace RESPOND/Network was being used in fully autonomous mode in order to prevent the threat actor from pivoting into the network. The security team were unable to conclusively say if any attempts by the attacker to do this had been made. 

Concluding Thoughts  

Data theft extortion has become a widely used attack technique, and ransomware gangs may increasingly use this technique alone to target organizations without secure data encryption and storage policies.  

This case study describes a SaaS data theft extortion incident which bypassed MFA and existing security tools. The attacker appeared to compromise credentials without bruteforce activity, possibly with the use of social engineering through phishing. However, from the first new login, Darktrace DETECT identified the unusual credential use in spite of it being an existing account. Had Darktrace RESPOND/Apps been configured, it would have autonomously responded to halt this login and prevent the attacker from accomplishing their data theft mission.

Thanks to Oakley Cox, Brianna Leddy and Shuh Chin Goh for their contributions.

Appendices

References 

[1] https://securelist.com/new-ransomware-trends-in-2022/106457/

[2] https://www.itpro.co.uk/security/ransomware/367624/the-rise-of-double-extortion-ransomware

[3] https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2020/10/vastaamo-psychotherapy-data-breach-sees-the-most-vulnerable-victims-extorted

[4] https://www.blackfog.com/shift-from-ransomware-to-data-theft-extortion/

[5] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/105.112.59.83

[6] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/105.112.36.212

[7] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/45.130.83.129

[8] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/mailitemsaccessed-forensics-investigations?view=o365-worldwide

[9] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/45.135.187.108

[10] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.137.20.65/details

[11] https://tidorg.com/new-bec-phishing-attack-steals-office-365-credentials-and-bypasses-mfa/

[12] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/responding-to-a-compromised-email-account?view=o365-worldwide

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Adrianne Marques
Senior Research Analyst
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September 6, 2024

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Inside the SOC

Lifting the Fog: Darktrace’s Investigation into Fog Ransomware

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Introduction to Fog Ransomware

As ransomware attacks continue to be launched at an alarming rate, Darktrace’s Threat Research team has identified that familiar strains like Akira, LockBit, and BlackBasta remain among the most prevalent threats impacting its customers, as reported in the First 6: Half-Year Threat Report 2024. Despite efforts by law agencies, like dismantling the infrastructure of cybercriminals and shutting down their operations [2], these groups continue to adapt and evolve.

As such, it is unsurprising that new ransomware variants are regularly being created and launched to get round law enforcement agencies and increasingly adept security teams. One recent example of this is Fog ransomware.

What is Fog ransomware?

Fog ransomware is strain that first appeared in the wild in early May 2024 and has been observed actively using compromised virtual private network (VPN) credentials to gain access to organization networks in the education sector in the United States.

Darktrace's detection of Fog Ransomware

In June 2024, Darktrace observed instances of Fog ransomware across multiple customer environments. The shortest time observed from initial access to file encryption in these attacks was just 2 hours, underscoring the alarming speed with which these threat actors can achieve their objectives.

Darktrace identified key activities typical of a ransomware kill chain, including enumeration, lateral movement, encryption, and data exfiltration. In most cases, Darktrace was able to successfully halt the progression Fog attacks in their early stages by applying Autonomous Response actions such as quarantining affected devices and blocking suspicious external connections.

To effectively illustrate the typical kill chain of Fog ransomware, this blog focuses on customer environments that did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response enabled. In these cases, the attack progressed unchecked and reached its intended objectives until the customer received Darktrace’s alerts and intervened.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Fog Ransomware

Initial Intrusion

After actors had successfully gained initial access into customer networks by exploiting compromised VPN credentials, Darktrace observed a series of suspicious activities, including file shares, enumeration and extensive scanning. In one case, a compromised domain controller was detected making outgoing NTLM authentication attempts to another internal device, which was subsequently used to establish RDP connections to a Windows server running Hyper-V.

Given that the source was a domain controller, the attacker could potentially relay the NTLM hash to obtain a domain admin Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Additionally, incoming NTLM authentication attempts could be triggered by tools like Responder, and NTLM hashes used to encrypt challenge response authentication could be abused by offline brute-force attacks.

Darktrace also observed the use of a new administrative credential on one affected device, indicating that malicious actors were likely using compromised privileged credentials to conduct relay attacks.

Establish Command-and-Control Communication (C2)

In many instances of Fog ransomware investigated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team, devices were observed making regular connections to the remote access tool AnyDesk. This was exemplified by consistent communication with the endpoint “download[.]anydesk[.]com” via the URI “/AnyDesk.exe”. In other cases, Darktrace identified the use of another remote management tool, namely SplashTop, on customer servers.

In ransomware attacks, threat actors often use such legitimate remote access tools to establish command-and-control (C2) communication. The use of such services not only complicates the identification of malicious activities but also enables attackers to leverage existing infrastructure, rather than having to implement their own.

Internal Reconnaissance

Affected devices were subsequently observed making an unusual number of failed internal connections to other internal locations over ports such as 80 (HTTP), 3389 (RDP), 139 (NetBIOS) and 445 (SMB). This pattern of activity strongly indicated reconnaissance scanning behavior within affected networks. A further investigation into these HTTP connections revealed the URIs “/nice ports”/Trinity.txt.bak”, commonly associated with the use of the Nmap attack and reconnaissance tool.

Simultaneously, some devices were observed engaging in SMB actions targeting the IPC$ share and the named pipe “srvsvc” on internal devices. Such activity aligns with the typical SMB enumeration tactics, whereby attackers query the list of services running on a remote host using a NULL session, a method often employed to gather information on network resources and vulnerabilities.

Lateral Movement

As attackers attempted to move laterally through affected networks, Darktrace observed suspicious RDP activity between infected devices. Multiple RDP connections were established to new clients, using devices as pivots to propagate deeper into the networks, Following this, devices on multiple networks exhibited a high volume of SMB read and write activity, with internal share drive file names being appended with the “.flocked” extension – a clear sign of ransomware encryption. Around the same time, multiple “readme.txt” files were detected being distributed across affected networks, which were later identified as ransom notes.

Further analysis of the ransom note revealed that it contained an introduction to the Fog ransomware group, a summary of the encryption activity that had been carried out, and detailed instructions on how to communicate with the attackers and pay the ransom.

Packet capture (PCAP) of the ransom note file titled “readme.txt”.
Figure 1: Packet capture (PCAP) of the ransom note file titled “readme.txt”.

Data Exfiltration

In one of the cases of Fog ransomware, Darktrace’s Threat Research team observed potential data exfiltration involving the transfer of internal files to an unusual endpoint associated with the MEGA file storage service, “gfs302n515[.]userstorage[.]mega[.]co[.]nz”.

This exfiltration attempt suggests the use of double extortion tactics, where threat actors not only encrypt victim’s data but also exfiltrate it to threaten public exposure unless a ransom is paid. This often increases pressure on organizations as they face the risk of both data loss and reputational damage caused by the release of sensitive information.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst autonomously investigated what initially appeared to be unrelated events, linking them together to build a full picture of the Fog ransomware attack for customers’ security teams. Specifically, on affected networks Cyber AI Analyst identified and correlated unusual scanning activities, SMB writes, and file appendages that ultimately suggested file encryption.

Cyber AI Analyst’s analysis of encryption activity on one customer network.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst’s analysis of encryption activity on one customer network.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analysts breakdown of the investigation process between the linked incident events on one customer network.

Conclusion

As novel and fast-moving ransomware variants like Fog persist across the threat landscape, the time taken for from initial compromise to encryption has significantly decreased due to the enhanced skill craft and advanced malware of threat actors. This trend particularly impacts organizations in the education sector, who often have less robust cyber defenses and significant periods of time during which infrastructure is left unmanned, and are therefore more vulnerable to quick-profit attacks.

Traditional security methods may fall short against these sophisticated attacks, where stealthy actors evade detection by human-managed teams and tools. In these scenarios Darktrace’s AI-driven product suite is able to quickly detect and respond to the initial signs of compromise through autonomous analysis of any unusual emerging activity.

When Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was active, it swiftly mitigated emerging Fog ransomware threats by quarantining devices exhibiting malicious behavior to contain the attack and blocking the exfiltration of sensitive data, thus preventing customers from falling victim to double extortion attempts.

Credit to Qing Hong Kwa (Senior Cyber Analyst and Deputy Analyst Team Lead, Singapore) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections:

- Anomalous Server Activity::Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

- Anomalous Connection::SMB Enumeration

- Anomalous Connection::Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB

- Anomalous Connection::Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

- Anomalous File::Internal::Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

- Compliance::Possible Cleartext LDAP Authentication

- Compliance::Remote Management Tool On Server

- Compliance::SMB Drive Write

- Compromise::Ransomware::SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

- Compromise::Ransomware::Possible Ransom Note Write

- Compromise::Ransomware::Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

- Device::Attack and Recon Tools

- User::New Admin Credentials on Client

- Unusual Activity::Anomalous SMB Move & Write

- Unusual Activity::Internal Data Transfer

- Unusual Activity::Unusual External Data Transfer

- Unusual Activity::Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Darktrace Model Detections:

- Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

- Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

- Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block

- Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Ransomware Block

- Antigena::Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

- Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

- Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

- Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

- Antigena::Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

- Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Internal Data Transfer Block

- Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

- Antigena::Network::Insider Threat::Antigena SMB Enumeration Block

AI Analyst Incident Coverage

- Encryption of Files over SMB

- Scanning of Multiple Devices

- SMB Writes of Suspicious Files

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

(Technique Name) – (Tactic) – (ID) – (Sub-Technique of)

Data Obfuscation - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001

Remote System Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1018

SMB/Windows Admin Shares - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.002 - T1021

Rename System Utilities - DEFENSE EVASION - T1036.003 - T1036

Network Sniffing - CREDENTIAL ACCESS, DISCOVERY - T1040

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - EXFILTRATION - T1041

Data Staged - COLLECTION - T1074

Valid Accounts - DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - T1078

Taint Shared Content - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1080

File and Directory Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1083

Email Collection - COLLECTION - T1114

Automated Collection - COLLECTION - T1119

Network Share Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1135

Exploit Public-Facing Application - INITIAL ACCESS - T1190

Hardware Additions - INITIAL ACCESS - T1200

Remote Access Software - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1219

Data Encrypted for Impact - IMPACT - T1486

Pass the Hash - DEFENSE EVASION, LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1550.002 - T1550

Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 - T1567

Lateral Tool Transfer - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1570

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC – Type – Description

/AnyDesk.exe - Executable File - Remote Access Management Tool

gfs302n515[.]userstorage[.]mega[.]co[.]nz- Domain - Exfiltration Domain

*.flocked - Filename Extension - Fog Ransomware Extension

readme.txt - Text File - Fog Ransom Note

xql562evsy7njcsngacphcerzjfecwotdkobn3m4uxu2gtqh26newid[.]onion - Onion Domain - Threat Actor’s Communication Channel

References

[1] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lost-in-the-fog-a-new-ransomware-threat/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/assessing-the-disruptions-of-ransomware-gangs

[3] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/30167-fog-ransomware

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About the author
Ryan Traill
Threat Content Lead

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September 11, 2024

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What you need to know about FAA Security Protection Regulations 2024

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Overview of FAA Rules 2024

Objective

The goal of the Federal Aviation Administration amended rules is to create new design standards that protect airplane systems from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI), which can pose safety risks. The timely motivation for this goal is due to the ongoing trend in aircraft design, which features a growing integration of airplane, engine, and propeller systems, along with expanded connectivity to both internal and external data networks and services.

“This proposed rulemaking would impose new design standards to address cybersecurity threats for transport category airplanes, engines, and propellers. The intended effect of this proposed action is to standardize the FAA’s criteria for addressing cybersecurity threats, reducing certification costs and time while maintaining the same level of safety provided by current special conditions.” (1)

Background

Increasing integration of aircraft systems with internal and external networks raises cybersecurity vulnerability concerns.

Key vulnerabilities include:  

  • Field Loadable Software
  • Maintenance laptops
  • Public networks (e.g., Internet)
  • Wireless sensors
  • USB devices
  • Satellite communications
  • Portable devices and flight bags  

Requirements for Applicants

Applicants seeking design approval must:

  • Provide isolation or protection from unauthorized access
  • Prevent inadvertent or malicious changes to aircraft systems
  • Establish procedures to maintain cybersecurity protections

Purpose

“These changes would introduce type certification and continued airworthiness requirements to protect the equipment, systems, and networks of transport category airplanes, engines, and propellers against intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI)1 that could create safety hazards. Design approval applicants would be required to identify, assess, and mitigate such hazards, and develop Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) that would ensure such protections continue in service.” (1)

Key points:

  • Introduce new design standards to address cybersecurity threats for transport category airplanes, engines, and propellers.
  • Aim to reduce certification costs and time while maintaining safety levels similar to current special conditions

Applicant Responsibilities for Identifying, Assessing, and Mitigating IUEI Risks

The proposed rule requires applicants to safeguard airplanes, engines, and propellers from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI). To do this, they must:

  1. Identify and assess risks: Find and evaluate any potential electronic threats that could harm safety.
  2. Mitigate risks: Take steps to prevent these threats from causing problems, ensuring the aircraft remain safe and functional.

Let’s break down each of the requirements:

Performing risk analysis

“For such identification and assessment of security risk, the applicant would be required to perform a security risk analysis to identify all threat conditions associated with the system, architecture, and external or internal interfaces.”(3)

Challenge

The complexity and variety of OT devices make it difficult and time-consuming to identify and associate CVEs with assets. Security teams face several challenges:

  • Prioritization Issues: Sifting through extensive CVE lists to prioritize efforts is a struggle.
  • Patch Complications: Finding corresponding patches is complicated by manufacturer delays and design flaws.
  • Operational Constraints: Limited maintenance windows and the need for continuous operations make it hard to address vulnerabilities, often leaving them unresolved for years.
  • Inadequate Assessments: Standard CVE assessments may not fully capture the risks associated with increased connectivity, underscoring the need for a contextualized risk assessment approach.

This highlights the need for a more effective and tailored approach to managing vulnerabilities in OT environments.

Assessing severity of risks

“The FAA would expect such risk analysis to assess the severity of the effect of threat conditions on associated assets (system, architecture, etc.), consistent with the means of compliance the applicant has been using to meet the FAA’s special conditions on this topic.” (3)

Challenge

As shown by the MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques for ICS matrices, threat actors can exploit many avenues beyond just CVEs. To effectively defend against these threats, security teams need a broader perspective, considering lateral movement and multi-stage attacks.

Challenges in Vulnerability Management (VM) cycles include:

  • Initiation: VM cycles often start with email updates from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), listing new CVEs from the NIST database.
  • Communication: Security practitioners must survey and forward CVE lists to networking teams at facilities that might be running the affected assets. Responses from these teams are inconsistent, leading vulnerability managers to push patches that may not fit within limited maintenance windows.
  • Asset Tracking: At many OT locations, determining if a company is running a specific firmware version can be extremely time-consuming. Teams often rely on spreadsheets and must perform manual checks by physically visiting production floors ("sneaker-netting").
  • Coordination: Plant engineers and centralized security teams must exchange information to validate asset details and manually score vulnerabilities, further complicating and delaying remediation efforts.

Determine likelihood of exploitation

“Such assessment would also need to analyze these vulnerabilities for the likelihood of exploitation.” (3)

Challenge

Even when a vulnerability is identified, its actual impact can vary significantly based on the specific configurations, processes, and technologies in use within the organization. This creates challenges for OT security practitioners:

  • Risk Assessment: Accurately assessing and prioritizing the risk becomes difficult without a clear understanding of how the vulnerability affects their unique systems.
  • Decision-Making: Practitioners may struggle to determine whether immediate action is necessary, balancing the risk of operational downtime against the need for security.
  • Potential Consequences: This uncertainty can lead to either leaving critical systems exposed or causing unnecessary disruptions by applying measures that aren't truly needed.

This complexity underscores the challenge of making informed, timely decisions in OT security environments.

Vulnerability mitigation

“The proposed regulation would then require each applicant to 'mitigate' the vulnerabilities, and the FAA expects such mitigation would occur through the applicant’s installation of single or multilayered protection mechanisms or process controls to ensure functional integrity, i.e., protection.” (3)

Challenge

OT security practitioners face a constant challenge in balancing security needs with the requirement to maintain operational uptime. In many OT environments, especially in critical infrastructure, applying security patches can be risky:

  • Risk of Downtime: Patching can disrupt essential processes, leading to significant financial losses or even safety hazards.
  • Operational Continuity vs. Security: Practitioners often prioritize operational continuity, sometimes delaying timely security updates.
  • Alternative Strategies: To protect systems without direct patching, they must implement compensating controls, further complicating security efforts.

This delicate balance between security and uptime adds complexity to the already challenging task of securing OT environments.

Establishing procedures/playbooks

“Finally, each applicant would be required to include the procedures within their instructions for continued airworthiness necessary to maintain such protections.” (3)

Challenge

SOC teams typically have a lag before their response, leading to a higher dwell time and bigger overall costs. On average, only 15% of the total cost of ransomware is affiliated with the ransom itself (2). The rest is cost from business interruption. This means it's crucial that organizations can respond and recover earlier. 

Darktrace / OT enabling compliance and enhanced cybersecurity

Darktrace's OT solution addresses the complex challenges of cybersecurity compliance in Operational Technology (OT) environments by offering a comprehensive approach to risk management and mitigation.

Key risk management features include:

  • Contextualized Risk Analysis: Darktrace goes beyond traditional vulnerability scoring, integrating IT, OT, and CVE data with MITRE techniques to map critical attack paths. This helps in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their exposure, difficulty of exploitation, and network impact.
  • Guidance on Remediation: When patches are unavailable, Darktrace provides alternative strategies to bolster defenses around vulnerable assets, ensuring unpatched systems are not left exposed—a critical need in OT environments where operational continuity is essential.
  • AI-Driven Adaptability: Darktrace's AI continuously adapts to your organization as it grows; refining incident response playbooks bespoke to your environment in real-time. This ensures that security teams have the most up-to-date, tailored strategies, reducing response times and minimizing the impact of security incidents.

Ready to learn more?  

Darktrace / OT doesn’t just offer risk management capabilities. It is the only solution  
that leverages Self-Learning AI to understand your normal business operations, allowing you to detect and stop insider, known, unknown, and zero-day threats at scale.  

Dive deeper into how Darktrace / OT secures critical infrastructure organizations with in-depth insights on its advanced capabilities. Download the Darktrace / OT Solution Brief to explore the technology behind its AI-driven protection and see how it can transform your OT security strategy.

Curious about how Darktrace / OT enhances aviation security? Explore our customer story on Brisbane Airport to see how our solution is transforming security operations in the aviation sector.  

References

  1. https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/313646831/Catch_Me_if_You_Can.pdf
  1. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransom-payment-is-roughly-15-percent-of-the-total-cost-of-ransomware-attacks/
  1. https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-17916.pdf?mod=djemCybersecruityPro&tpl=cs
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About the author
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology
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