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September 21, 2022

Modern Extortion: Detecting Data Theft From the Cloud

Darktrace highlights a handful of data theft incidents on shared cloud platforms, showing that cloud computing can be a vulnerable place for modern extortion.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Adrianne Marques
Senior Research Analyst
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21
Sep 2022

Ransomware Industry

The ransomware industry has benefitted from a number of factors in recent years: inadequate cyber defenses, poorly regulated cryptocurrency markets, and geopolitical tensions have allowed gangs to extort increasingly large ransoms while remaining sheltered from western law enforcement [1]. However, one of the biggest success stories of the ransomware industry has been the adaptability and evolution of attacker TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures). The WannaCry and NotPetya attacks of 2017 popularized a form of ransomware which used encryption algorithms to hold data to ransom in exchange for a decryption key. Last year in 2021, almost all ransomware strains evolved to use double extortion tactics: holding stolen data to ransom as well as encrypted data [2]. Now, some ransomware gangs have dropped encryption entirely, and are using data theft as their sole means of extortion. 

Using data theft for extortion is not new. In 2020 the Finnish psychotherapy center Vastaamo had over 40,000 patient records stolen. Impacted patients were told that their psychiatric transcripts would be published online if they failed to pay a Bitcoin ransom. [3]. A later report by BlackFog in May 2021 predicted data theft extortion would become one of the key emerging cybersecurity trends that year [4]. Adoption of offline back-ups and endpoint detection had made encryption harder, while a large-scale move to Cloud and SaaS platforms offered new vectors for data theft. By moving from data encryption to data exfiltration, ransomware attackers pivoted from targeting data availability within the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) to threatening data confidentiality.

In November 2021, Darktrace detected a data theft incident following the compromise of two SaaS accounts within an American tech customer’s Office365 environment. The client was a longstanding user of Darktrace DETECT/Network, and was in the process of expanding their coverage by trialing Darktrace DETECT+RESPOND/ Apps + Cloud.

Attack Overview

On November 23rd 2021, an Ask the Expert (ATE) ticket was raised prompting investigation into a breached SaaS model, ‘SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use’, and the activities of a user (censored as UserA) over the prior week.

1. Office365: UserA 

The account UserA had been logging in from an unusual location in Nigeria on November 21st. At the time of the incident there were no flags of malicious activity from this IP in widely used OSINT sources. It is also highly probable the attacker was not located in Nigeria but using Nigerian infrastructure in order to hide their true location. Regardless, the location of the login from this IP and ASN was considered highly unusual for users within the customer’s digital estate. The specific user in question most commonly accessed their account from IP ranges located in the US.

Figure 1: In the Geolocation tab of the External Sites Summary on the SaaS Console, UserA was seen logging in from Nigeria when previous logins were exclusively from USA

Further investigation revealed an additional anomaly in the Outlook Web activity of UserA. The account was using the Firefox browser to access their account for the first time in at least 4 weeks (the maximum period for which the customer stored such data). SaaS logs detailing the access of confidential folders and other suspicious actions were identified using the Advanced Search (AS) query:

@fields.saas_actor:"UserA@[REDACTED]" AND @fields.saas_software:"Firefox"

Most actions were ‘MailItemsAccessed’ events originating from IPs located in Nigeria [5,6] and one other potentially malicious IP located in the US [7].

‘MailItemsAccessed’ is part of the new Advanced Audit functionality from Microsoft and can be used to determine when email data is accessed by mail protocols and clients. A bind mail access type denotes an individual access to an email message [8]. 

Figure 2: AS logs shows UserA had not used Firefox to access Office365 for at least 4 weeks prior to the unusual login on the 21st November

Below are details of the main suspicious SaaS activities: 

·      Time: 2021-11-21 09:05:25 - 2021-11-22 16:57:39 UTC

·      SaaS Actor: UserA@[REDACTED]

·      SaaS Service: Office365

·      SaaS Service Product: Exchange

·      SaaS Software: Firefox

·      SaaS Office365 Parent Folders:

          o   \Accounts/Passwords
          o   \Invoices
          o   \Sent Items
          o   \Inbox
          o   \Recoverable Items\Deletions

·      SaaS Event:

          o   MailItemsAccessed
          o   UserLoggedIn
          o   Update

·      SaaS Office365 Mail Access Type: Bind (47 times)

·      Source IP addresses:

          o   105.112.59[.]83
          o   105.112.36[.]212
          o   154.6.17[.]16
          o   45.130.83[.]129

·      SaaS User Agents: 

          o   Client=OWA;Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0;
          o   Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:80.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/80.0

·      Total SaaS logs: 57 

At the start of the month on the 5th November, the user had also been seen logging in from a potentially malicious endpoint [9] in Europe, performing ‘MailItemsAccessed’ and ‘Updates’ events with subjects and a resource location related to invoices and wire transfers from the Sent items folder. This suggests the initial compromise had been earlier in the month, giving the threat actor time to make preparations for the final stages of the attack.

Figure 3: Event log showing the activity of UserA from IP 45.135.187[.]108 

2. Office365: UserB 

Looking into the model breach ‘SaaS / Access / Suspicious Credential Use And Login User-Agent’, it was seen that a second account, UserB, was also observed logging in from a rare and potentially malicious location in Bangladesh [7]. Similar to UserA, this user had previously logged in exclusively from the USA, and no other accounts within the digital estate had been observed interacting with the Bangladeshi IP address. The login event appeared to bypass MFA (Multi-factor Authentication) and a suspicious user agent, BAV2ROPC, was used. Against misconfigured accounts, this Microsoft user agent is commonly used by attackers to bypass MFA on Office365. It targets Exchange’s Basic Authentication (normally used in POP3/IMAP4 conditions) and results in an OAuth flow which circumvents the additional password security brought by MFA [10].  

During the session, additional resources were accessed which appear to be associated with bill and invoice payments. In addition, on the 4th November, two new suspicious email rules named “..” were created from rare IPs (107.10.56[.]48 and 76.189.202[.]66). This type of behavior is commonly seen during SaaS compromises to delete or forward emails. Typically, an email rule created by a human user will be named to reflect the change being made, such as ‘Move emails from Legal to Urgent’. In contrast, malicious email rules are often short and undescriptive. The rule “..” is likely to blend in without arousing suspicion, while also being easy for the attacker to create and remember. 

Details of these rule changes are as follows:

·      Time: 2021-11-04 13:25:06, 2021-11-05 15:50:00 [UTC]
·      SaaS Service: Office365
·      SaaS Service Product: Exchange
·      SaaS Status Message: True
·      SaaS Source IP addresses: 107.10.56[.]48, 76.189.202[.]66
·      SaaS Account Name: O365
·      SaaS Actor: UserB@[REDACTED]
·      SaaS Event: SetInboxRule
·      SaaS Office365 Modified Property Names:
          o   AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob, Force, Identity, MoveToFolder, Name, FromAddressContainsWords, StopProcessingRules
          o   AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob, Force, Identity, Name, FromAddressContainsWords, StopProcessingRules
·      SaaS Resource Name: .. 

During cloud account compromises, attackers will often use sync operations to download emails to their local email client. During the operations, these clients typically download a large set of mail items from the cloud to a local computer. If the attacker is able to sync all mail items to their mail client, the entire mailbox can be compromised. The attacker is able to disconnect from the account and review and search the email without generating additional event logs. 

Both accounts UserA and UserB were observed using ‘MailItemsAccessed’ sync operations between the 1st and 23rd November when this attack occurred. However, based on the originating IP of the sync operations, the activity is likely to have been initiated by the legitimate, US-based users. Once the security team were able to confirm the events were expected and legitimate, they could establish that the contents of the mailbox were not a part of the data breach. 

Accomplish Mission

After gaining access to the Office365 accounts, sensitive data was downloaded by the attackers to their local system. Either on or before 14th December, the attacker had seemingly uploaded the documents onto a data leak website. In total, 130MB of data had been made available for download in two separate packages. The packages included audit and accounting financial documents, with file extensions such as DB, XLSX, and PDF.

Figure 4: The two data packages uploaded by the attacker and the extracted contents

In a sample of past SaaS activity of UserA, the subject and attachments appear related to the ‘OUTSTANDING PREPAY WIRES 2021’ excel document found from the data leak website in Figure 4, suggesting a further possibility that the account was associated with the leaked data. 

Historic SaaS activity associated with UserA: 

·      Time: 2021-11-05 21:21:18 [UTC]
·      SaaS Office365 Logon Type: Owner
·      Protocol: OFFICE365
·      SaaS Account Name: O365
·      SaaS Actor: UserA@[REDACTED].com
·      SaaS Event: Send
·      SaaS Service: Office365
·      SaaS Service Product: Exchange
·      SaaS Status Message: Succeeded
·      SaaS Office365 Attachment: WIRE 2021.xlsx (92406b); image.png (9084b); image.png (1454b); image.png (1648b); image.png (1691b); image.png (1909b); image.png (2094b)
·      SaaS Office365 Subject: Wires 11/8/21
·      SaaS Resource Location: \Drafts
·      SaaS User Agent: Client=OWA;Action=ViaProxy 

Based on the available evidence, it is highly likely that the data packages contain the data stolen during the account compromise the previous month.  

Once the credentials of an Office365 account are stolen, an attacker can not only access the user's mailbox, but also a full range of Office365 applications such as SharePoint folders, Teams Chat, or files in the user's OneDrive [11]. For example, files shared in Teams chat are stored in OneDrive for Business in a folder named Microsoft Teams Chat Files in the default Document library on SharePoint. One of the files visible on the data leak website, called ‘[REDACTED] CONTRACT.3.1.2020.pdf’, was also observed in the default document folder of a third user account (UserC) within the victim organization, suggesting the compromised accounts may have been able to access shared files stored on other accounts by moving laterally via other O365 applications such as Teams. 

One example can be seen in the below AS logs: 

·      Time: 2021-11-11 01:58:35 [UTC]
·      SaaS Resource Type: File
·      Protocol: OFFICE365
·      SaaS Account Name: 0365
·      SaaS Actor: UserC@[REDACTED]
·      SaaS Event: FilePreviewed
·      SaaS Service Product: OneDrive
·      SaaS Metric: ResourceViewed
·      SaaS Office365 Application Name: Media Analysis and Transformation Service
·      SaaS Office365 File Extension: pdf
·      SaaS Resource Location: https://[REDACTED]-my.sharepoint.com/personal/userC_[REDACTED]_com/Documents/Microsoft Teams Chat Files/[REDACTED] CONTRACT 3.1.2020.pdf
·      SaaS Resource Name: [REDACTED] CONTRACT 3.1.2020.pdf
·      SaaS Service: Office365
·      SaaS Service Product: OneDrive
·      SaaS User Agent: OneDriveMpc-Transform_Thumbnail/1.0 

In the period between the 1st and 30th November, the customer’s Darktrace DETECT/Apps trial had raised multiple high-level alerts associated with SaaS account compromise, but there was no evidence of file encryption.  

Establish Foothold 

Looking back at the start of the attack, it is unclear exactly how the attacker evaded the customer’s pre-existing security stack. At the time of the incident, the victim was using a Barracuda email gateway and Microsoft 365 Threat Management for their cloud environment. 

Darktrace detected no indication the accounts were compromised via credential bruteforcing, which would have enabled the attacker to bypass the Azure Active Directory smart lockout (if enabled). The credentials may have been harvested via a phishing campaign which successfully evaded the list of known ‘bad’ domains maintained by their email gateway.  

Upon gaining access to the account, the Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps anomaly detection policies would have been expected to raise an alert [12]. In this instance, the unusual login from Nigeria occurred over 16 hours after the previous login from the US, potentially evading anomaly detection policies such as the ‘Impossible Travel’ rule. 

Figure 5: Event log showing the user accessing mail from USA a day before the suspicious usage from Nigeria 

Darktrace Coverage

Darktrace DETECT 

Throughout this event, high scoring model breaches associated with the attack were visible in the customer’s SaaS Console. In addition, there were two Cyber AI Analyst incidents for ‘Possible Account Hijack’ associated with the two compromised SaaS Office365 accounts, UserA and UserB. The visibility given by Darktrace DETECT also enabled the security team to confirm which files had been accessed and were likely part of the data leak.

Figure 6: Example Cyber AI Analyst incident of UserB SaaS Office365 account

Darktrace RESPOND

In this incident, the attackers successfully compromised O365 accounts in order to exfiltrate customer data. Whilst Darktrace RESPOND/Apps was being trialed and suggested several actions, it was configured in human confirmation mode. The following RESPOND/Apps actions were advised for these activities:  

·      ‘Antigena [RESPOND] Unusual Access Block’ triggered by the successful login from an unusual IP address, would have actioned the ‘Block IP’ inhibitor, preventing access to the account from the unusual IP for up to 24 hours
·      ‘Suspicious Source Activity Block’, triggered by the suspicious user agent used to bypass MFA, would have actioned the ‘Disable User’ inhibitor, disabling the user account for up to 24 hours 

During this incident, Darktrace RESPOND/Network was being used in fully autonomous mode in order to prevent the threat actor from pivoting into the network. The security team were unable to conclusively say if any attempts by the attacker to do this had been made. 

Concluding Thoughts  

Data theft extortion has become a widely used attack technique, and ransomware gangs may increasingly use this technique alone to target organizations without secure data encryption and storage policies.  

This case study describes a SaaS data theft extortion incident which bypassed MFA and existing security tools. The attacker appeared to compromise credentials without bruteforce activity, possibly with the use of social engineering through phishing. However, from the first new login, Darktrace DETECT identified the unusual credential use in spite of it being an existing account. Had Darktrace RESPOND/Apps been configured, it would have autonomously responded to halt this login and prevent the attacker from accomplishing their data theft mission.

Thanks to Oakley Cox, Brianna Leddy and Shuh Chin Goh for their contributions.

Appendices

References 

[1] https://securelist.com/new-ransomware-trends-in-2022/106457/

[2] https://www.itpro.co.uk/security/ransomware/367624/the-rise-of-double-extortion-ransomware

[3] https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2020/10/vastaamo-psychotherapy-data-breach-sees-the-most-vulnerable-victims-extorted

[4] https://www.blackfog.com/shift-from-ransomware-to-data-theft-extortion/

[5] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/105.112.59.83

[6] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/105.112.36.212

[7] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/45.130.83.129

[8] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/mailitemsaccessed-forensics-investigations?view=o365-worldwide

[9] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/45.135.187.108

[10] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.137.20.65/details

[11] https://tidorg.com/new-bec-phishing-attack-steals-office-365-credentials-and-bypasses-mfa/

[12] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/responding-to-a-compromised-email-account?view=o365-worldwide

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Adrianne Marques
Senior Research Analyst

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August 3, 2026

Why Trust is the New Attack Surface: Darktrace’s Mid-Year Threat Update 2026

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In early 2026, a React2Shell honeypot purpose-built by Darktrace analysts was compromised in less than two hours after deployment. That single data point captures the pace of the threat landscape in the first half of 2026, but speed tells only part of the story.

The shift over the past six months has moved away from traditional malware and vulnerability-centric attacks and toward the abuse of trusted identities, platforms, and infrastructure. Identities, Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) platforms, cloud entitlements, automation frameworks, and non-human identities have become the preferred attack paths as organizations adopt AI at scale.

Attackers are increasingly operating inside the relationships, services, and authenticated channels that defenders and users are conditioned to rely on, rather than breaking in from the outside.

What has changed since 2025?

In 2025, identity became the new perimeter as attackers increasingly bypassed traditional exploitation in favor of trusted accounts, SaaS platforms, and emerging AI-enabled tradecraft. The first half of 2026 marks the next stage of that evolution. Identity remains central, but the trust challenge now extends far beyond accounts to email authentication, cloud entitlements, software supply chains, AI gateways, remote administration tooling, and non-human identities.

Theme 2025 (Mid-Year / Annual) H1 2026
Identity Credentials remained the weak link; identity emerged as the new perimeter. Identity remains the entry point, but trust has become the new attack surface.
Cloud & SaaS SaaS-targeted ransomware continued to rise. Cloud and SaaS became the attacker's preferred operating environment.
AI Large Language Models (LLMs) were suspected of influencing phishing shifts. LLM-generated malware, compromised AI proxies, and the abuse of AI identities emerged.
Attack Surface Scale & Speed Exponential growth of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), with public proof-of-concepts appearing faster. Cloud and AI adoption expanded the attack surface, while AI accelerated exploitation. One honeypot was compromised in under two hours.
Supply Chain Legitimate services were increasingly abused. Trusted maintainers and CI/CD workflows were weaponized.

Identity and email: trust signals under pressure

Email remains the most reliable route to a trusted identity, and the data shows attackers investing in quality over noise. In the first half of 2026, 67% of phishing emails passed DMARC. Authentication alone is no longer sufficient to stop most phishing attempts. VIP users were targeted in 25.8% of phishing, consistent with 2025's “over 25%” figure, but drifting upward throughout the period. Crucially, phishing sophistication continued to increase: 37% of phishing contained a high volume of text, up from 32% in the first half of 2025, while 39% featured novel social engineering techniques, suggesting attackers are further customizing to specific targets.

The most prevalent threats affecting Darktrace customers were also among the most identity-centric: information stealers, with dedicated StealC and AMOS campaigns running through the half-year. Their prevalence is, fundamentally, an identity story. Credentials harvested by infostealers often become the initial access vector for far higher-impact intrusions later in the attack chain. Crucially, the delivery method rarely requires exploitation of a technical weakness. ClickFix social engineering, which tricks users into running malicious code themselves, remained a common distribution route. One recent campaign impacted Darktrace customers across 17 countries, with the United States the most affected. The compromise did not begin with a software flaw, but with a trusted user taking a trusted action.

Supply chain: Trust weaponized at scale

March and April reinforced the same lesson: trust has become a supply-chain vulnerability. The Axios compromise abused trust in a widely used maintainer, while the Trivy campaign leveraged trusted CI/CD infrastructure, release artifacts, and container images to push malicious code through legitimate development workflows.

The clearest example was a February–March campaign in which devices downloaded malicious payloads while using Hola VPN, later linked to an issue within Hola's own delivery pipeline. Darktrace's Threat Research team identified associated activity through recurring anomalous behavior across multiple customers before a public advisory was released.

More recently, attackers abused legitimate blockchain infrastructure to distribute infostealers, including AMOS and Phexia. Popular tools like VPNs, often used by users with limited security resources, combined with legitimate command-and-control (C2) infrastructure enables attackers to reach a far wider victim base while frustrating defenders who cannot simply block the associated endpoints.

For defenders, the challenge is no longer identifying malicious infrastructure, but recognizing when trusted infrastructure begins behaving maliciously.

Cloud and SaaS: from target to terrain

Through May and June, activity involving device registration, cloud data theft, SaaS abuse, RDP expansion, and remote management tooling suggested that attackers increasingly view cloud and SaaS not simply as targets, but as their preferred operating environment.

In one Darktrace case a single compromised SaaS account triggered activity across email, SaaS, and network layers, including inbox rule changes, phishing propagation, and connections to suspicious infrastructure. None of these indicators were decisive in isolation, but together they revealed a clear intrusion. Increasingly, attackers do not need to bypass trust controls in these environments; they inherit them through compromised identities, delegated access, and legitimate administration tools. This is the natural progression of 2025's SaaS-targeted ransomware trend: the platforms on which businesses operate are increasingly the same platforms on which adversaries operate.

AI: accelerant, attack surface, and trusted but risky actor

If trust is the attack surface, AI is where that surface is expanding fastest. Across the Darktrace customer base, AI service connections per deployment rose 13% in the first half of 2026, surpassing 16 million connections, while the typical organization now interacts with seven different AI providers. AI is no longer at the edge of the enterprise; it is embedded in day-to-day business operations. That shift creates three distinct problems, all of which were observed by Darktrace in the first half of 2026.

1. AI as an attack multiplier

Darktrace identified AI-generated malware exploiting React2Shell, in which an attacker used an LLM to produce working exploit code and deploy it at scale. Similar activity is increasingly appearing across the wider threat landscape, suggesting that the barrier to effective offensive operations is collapsing. As demonstrated by the recent JadePuffer case, in which an agentic threat actor exploited a vulnerability in an internet-facing server before launching a fully automated ransomware attack, AI is accelerating the path from vulnerability disclosure to operational exploitation [1].

2. AI as an attack surface

The AI layer itself is now worth probing. At an automation technology manufacturer, a compromised LLM proxy was used as a steppingstone toward additional AI services; when that failed, the attacker pivoted to cryptomining. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst pieced the intrusion together and Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service alerted the customer, containing it before it could progress further. The practitioner lesson is clear: treat AI gateways, proxies, and model endpoints as production cloud workloads because attackers already do.

3. AI as a trusted but potentially risky actor

Darktrace / SECURE AI observations suggest the most common real-world risk is quieter still: employees entering personal identifiable information (PII), tax records, identity documents, company financial data, HR records, and personal medical data into LLM prompts, alongside widespread shadow AI use and increased AI usage from mobile devices. Across nearly 280,000 prompts submitted by almost 28,000 users over 28 days, Darktrace identified that approximately 1% of these prompts (or 2,945 instances) contained sensitive data*.

*Prompt data was analyzed in aggregate and anonymized form to protect user privacy.

For defenders, the challenge is context: knowing when legitimate business use crosses into material risk without breaking privacy or user trust. As organizations increasingly trust AI systems to access, process, and share sensitive information at machine speed, AI must be secured and monitored alongside identities, applications, and cloud infrastructure.

Speed and geopolitics: faster operations, longer-term objectives

Several investigations in the first half of the year showed how quickly attackers operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, validating exploitation through Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) infrastructure and trusted cloud services before patching cycles can be completed. React2Shell was compromised in two hours, while BeyondTrust exploitation followed in less than a day. Against this backdrop, state-aligned actors continue to prioritize long-term access, intelligence collection, and pre-positioning through legitimate services, cloud infrastructure, and trusted relationships. Operations linked to China, Russia, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) shared a common characteristic: a focus on persistence and strategic positioning rather than immediate disruption.

China: Darktrace observed Chinese-nexus actors prioritizing long-term access through trusted services, dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading, and modular intrusion chains consistent with activity documented in Crimson Echo reporting and associated with Twill Typhoon tradecraft.

Iran: Darktrace's ZionSiphon investigation highlighted Iranian-linked interest in operational technology (OT) environments, blending espionage objectives with infrastructure disruption capabilities.

Russia: Darktrace investigations, alongside wider industry reporting, highlighted Russian reliance on trusted relationships and supply-chain targeting for long-term intelligence on Ukraine related support [2].

DPRK: Darktrace observed DPRK-linked activity combining rapid vulnerability weaponization with persistent access techniques, including Axios supply-chain compromise, React2Shell exploitation and stealthy macOS intrusions

While objectives differed across actors, the tradecraft was remarkably consistent: trusted services, legitimate infrastructure, and persistent access remained more valuable than immediate disruption.

The defender shift

Across identity compromise, supply-chain attacks, SaaS abuse, AI infrastructure targeting, and state-aligned operations, attackers increasingly succeed by operating through trusted systems rather than breaking through defensive controls. Trusted users, trusted software, trusted infrastructure, and increasingly trusted AI systems all became viable attack paths.

For defenders, the challenge is no longer simply determining whether an action is allowed; it is determining whether that action makes sense in its wider context. Authentication, reputation, and provenance remain important, but they are no longer sufficient on their own. As attackers increasingly operate within trusted systems, the strongest signal is often a behavioral deviation: identifying when trusted activity no longer aligns with expected behavior.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Daniel Levy (Threat Hunting Data Scientist)


Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendix 1: Threat Research Methodology

Darktrace’s Threat Research team conducts extensive research across customer deployments to identify active threats, pinpoint key Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), and provide relevant threat intelligence. This research leverages Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection and involves thorough analysis and contextualization by the Threat Research team. Detected threats are promptly reported to the relevant customer security teams. When a customer has Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology enabled, these threats are swiftly mitigated to prevent escalation.

Between January 1 and June 30, 2026, Darktrace investigated a wide range of cyber threats across its customer base. Many were identified as campaign-like activities targeting multiple customers, where clusters of similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and IoCs were seen affecting a significant number of customers within a short timeframe.

Statistics related to email are derived from aggregated Darktrace / EMAIL data across all cloud-hosted customer deployments between January 1 and June 30, 2026. Standard data-quality filtering was applied to exclude anomalous observations prior to aggregation. Regional statistics are based on relevant subsets of this dataset.

Appendix 2: Campaigns - Regional and Sector Trends

While the above broad themes defined the threat landscape over the last six months, campaign clustering across the Darktrace customer base revealed how they manifested differently across sectors, regions, and industries.

Darktrace’s Threat Research team investigates a range of threats affecting its customer base. Through this research, campaign-like clusters of activity have been identified, in which common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), as well as infrastructure, are observed impacting a significant number of customers within a short timeframe.

Sectors and industries are classified using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to ensure consistent categorization. While the sector and regional insights in this report reflect broader global trends, they are also influenced by the distribution of Darktrace's customer base. For example, Finance, Manufacturing, and Education are strongly represented among Darktrace customers, which may result in a higher number of observed cases in these sectors. This reflects customer distribution rather than necessarily indicating elevated sector-specific risk. Similarly, regional trends may be influenced by the geographic distribution of Darktrace customers.

Analysis of campaign clusters identified by the Darktrace Threat Research team during the first half of 2026 revealed distinct regional trends.

  • Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA) dominated with 60% of all campaign cluster cases targeting this region.
  • The Americas (AMS) was the next most affected region, with 30% of campaign cluster cases.
  • The Asia-Pacific and Japan (APJ) region was less affected by campaign clusters, potentially indicating that threat actors placed a lower priority on the region and instead focused their efforts elsewhere.

Sector targeting also varied considerably by region:

  • In EMEA, the Information and Communication was the most affected by a significant margin, representing 25% of all cases.
  • In contrast, AMS targeting was more evenly distributed, with the Education, Public administration and defence, and Financial Insurance activities sectors all forming over 20% of AMS regional cases.
  • Across APJ, campaign activity was spread more equally, with no single sector emerging as a dominant target.

Several countries also stood out within their respective regions:

  • The United States accounted for 60% of all campaign clusters within AMS.
  • Japan represented 40% of campaign customer cases across APJ.
  • In EMEA, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe each accounted for 23% of identified cases, both being involved in a variety of campaign types.

Inside the SOC & Threat Research 2026 Monthly Progression: From Access to Impact

Month Dominant Themes
January Voice phishing, VPS infrastructure, WebSocket C2, RMM abuse, ransomware, infostealers (StealC), and trojanized installers (7-Zip).
February Voice phishing, VPN intrusion, edge infrastructure compromise (BeyondTrust), and RMM abuse.
March Sustained supply chain compromise (Hola VPN, Axios, Trivy), malicious browser extensions, phishing, and discovery tools.
April Account creation abuse, payload delivery, VPN credential abuse, Fortinet exploitation, and botnet activity.
May PowerShell, EtherHiding, data exfiltration, VPN access, business email compromise (BEC), ClickFix, and infostealers (AMOS).
June RDP abuse, device registration, RMM usage, voice phishing, cloud data theft, botnet activity, blockchain abuse, ClickFix, and infostealers (AMOS).

Appendix 3: Bibliography

External

[1] https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/jadepuffer-first-complete-llm-driven-ransomware-attack

[2] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/c/pawn-storm-targets-govt-infra.html

Darktrace Reading

1.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/ai-llm-generated-malware-used-to-exploit-react2shell

2.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/2025-cyber-threat-landscape-darktraces-mid-year-review

3.        https://www.darktrace.com/resources/annual-threat-report-2026

4.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/when-trust-becomes-the-attack-surface-supply-chain-attacks-in-an-era-of-automation-and-implicit-trust

5.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/hola-vpn-abuse-from-proxy-traffic-to-malware-and-cryptomining

6.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/security-after-signatures-operating-in-a-world-of-pre-cve-disclosure-exploitation-collapsed-trust-boundaries-and-autonomous-systems

7.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/when-ai-infrastructure-becomes-part-of-the-attack-surface

8.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/cve-2026-1731-how-darktrace-sees-the-beyondtrust-exploitation-wave-unfolding

9.        https://www.darktrace.com/resource/understanding-chinese-nexus-cyber-tradecraft

10.   https://www.darktrace.com/blog/chinese-apt-campaign-targets-entities-with-updated-fdmtp-backdoor

11.  https://www.darktrace.com/blog/inside-zionsiphon-darktraces-analysis-of-ot-malware-targeting-israeli-water-systems

12.  https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

13.  https://www.darktrace.com/blog/from-click-to-command-behavioral-detection-of-applescript-led-macos-intrusions

14.  https://www.darktrace.com/blog/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector-six-trends-to-watch

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence

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August 3, 2026

Building Operational Resilience Across Mission-Critical Marine Services

Marine cargo shipDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Mission-Critical Marine Services

This marine organization supports offshore energy production, export infrastructure, and regional logistics, delivering critical services through its diverse fleet and a regional shorebase footprint. To power rapid mobilization and 24/7 operational readiness, the organization has embraced cloud adoption and digital transformation, reshaping how crews, contractors, and shore-based teams access services.

While technology modernization has enhanced operations, it has also introduced new security complexities.

  • From perimeter to identity: As access becomes more distributed, identity has become the primary security control, elevating the risk of credential compromise and privilege misuse.
  • From confidentiality to availability and resilience: As cloud platforms increasingly underpin fleet and operational systems, cyber incidents can disrupt services and safety.
  • From isolated tools to unified visibility:  Because Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) often intersect, and legacy systems coexist with modern cloud platforms, fragmented monitoring makes it harder to understand risk and respond decisively across domains.
“Our cybersecurity priorities expanded along with our business goals, placing availability and resilience at the forefront. The impact of a potential threat became an operational risk, which elevated cybersecurity from an IT issue to an operational safety and resilience enabler.” - Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Manager.

A Unified, AI-Driven Platform for IT and OT

To strengthen visibility, detection, and response across its highly distributed environment, the customer adopted the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™ in 2022.

Darktrace’s contextual detection capability was a key driver. Unlike traditional tools that rely on known threat signatures, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI learns “normal” behavior to identify emerging threats and correlate visibility across the customer's siloed on-premises and cloud domains.

Today, the customer relies on:

  • Darktrace / EMAIL™ to reduce phishing risk and minimize disruption from legacy mail controls and false positives
  • Darktrace / IDENTITY™ to support identity-centric security as cloud access expands across vessels and shore-based operations
  • Darktrace / NETWORK™ to strengthen oversight across the broader environment, including operational contexts where IT and OT intersect
  • Darktrace / CLOUD™ (Azure), added in 2024, to extend detection and response into Azure and support cloud transformation without treating cloud as a separate security silo
  • Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery to strengthen incident readiness and recovery planning
  • Darktrace Managed Detection and Response Services to provide 24/7/365 monitoring and support

This combination supports a single operating model for the customer: security that can adapt as the environment changes while remaining practical for a lean team responsible for safeguarding both business operations and safety-critical services.

Extending cloud protection without complexity

As the customer accelerated cloud adoption, it expanded coverage in 2024 with Darktrace / CLOUD for Azure to bring cloud workloads under the same AI-driven visibility and response model – without adding operational burden. “This matters in hybrid environments because attacks rarely stay in one place,” explains the ICT Manager. “A compromised identity can trigger activity in the cloud, which can open pathways back into on-premises systems.”

In parallel, Darktrace / CLOUD’s posture management capabilities support governance and audit readiness by surfacing misconfigurations and exposure risks earlier, before they become incidents.

A Stronger, Faster, More Resilient Business

Since adopting Darktrace, the customer has strengthened cyber resilience while reducing operational burden on its small ICT team.

Darktrace continuously analyzes millions of individual events that can contribute to a wider incident. Within a single month, the solution autonomously investigated 88% of all potential threats, taking appropriate action within just 39.4 seconds on average.

Autonomous capabilities ensure threats are stopped and contained until the ICT team can investigate. In one standout instance, Darktrace autonomously blocked malicious links during a mass phishing/spam event before other controls flagged the threat. the ICT Manager later confirmed Microsoft reported the link as malicious, but Darktrace had already acted to prevent delivery and reduce exposure.

“Whether something happens during off hours, while we’re on vacation, or when our attention is focused elsewhere, we’re confident Darktrace will take control and stop a threat before it spreads,” says the ICT Manager.

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI combines multiple AI methods and advanced techniques to improve threat detection, investigation, and response dramatically reducing alert overload and manual triage. Within a single month, the solution saved the customer's IT group 411 equivalent human investigation hours.

“For a lean team supporting a 24/7 operational footprint, this autonomous action eliminates the constant firefighting and stress, giving us the space to focus on higher-value priorities.”- Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Manager.

Protecting communications without disruption

the customer experienced friction from legacy email and network controls prior to Darktrace, which generated high false positive rates, disrupted legitimate communications, created operational drag, and added workload for ICT. With Darktrace / EMAIL learning normal email behavior and applying context-aware actions, the team reduced unnecessary interruptions while maintaining protection.

“That shift matters in marine services, where business communications directly support coordination across vessels, shore bases, clients, ports, and regulators,” says the ICT Manager. “Darktrace doesn’t just block more threats, it autonomously makes decisions that preserve operational continuity and enable my team to focus on credible threats instead of chasing volume.”

Delivering clarity and confidence

Darktrace has reduced manual triage by correlating activity across email, identity, network, and cloud, providing the context needed to prioritize what matters without requiring the ICT team to stitch together evidence across multiple tools.

“With unified visibility we can identify patterns across domains, make informed decisions about where risk actually exists, and align security actions with operational impact rather than theoretical threats,” explains the ICT Manager. “I can now prioritize effort and investment across our ICT landscape with far greater confidence.”

Regular Executive Threat Reports reinforce operational confidence by giving leadership clear visibility into threats Darktrace has handled autonomously, supporting decisive action when needed and confidence to avoid unnecessary disruption when it isn’t.

Scaling Securely in a Hybrid World

As the customer advances its cloud transformation, the ICT Manager sees the Darktrace partnership evolving into a foundational layer of resilience and assurance, supporting scale, governance, and operational confidence in an increasingly cloud-centric environment.

Key priorities include:

  • Shifting from hybrid visibility to cloud-first resilience, using continuous monitoring and posture insights to reduce exposure earlier
  • Strengthening governance and audit readiness, especially as critical workloads and sensitive data expand in Azure and expectations rise under regulatory and client assurance requirements
  • Increasing reliance on autonomous response and AI investigation as the number of identities, workloads, and access paths grows faster than headcount
  • Deepening cross-domain correlation so cloud signals further enrich decision-making, supporting faster containment and more confident prioritization

“As we accelerate our cloud strategy, Darktrace will play an even more strategic role,” says the ICT Manager, “providing the guidance, technology, and expertise that allow us to grow with confidence and innovate securely.”

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