Detecting Metamorphic Malware with Darktrace's AI Technology
Detect metamorphic malware with Darktrace's AI. Learn how it uncovers self-modifying cyber-attacks and stops threats that evade traditional security measures.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
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30
Jul 2017
Some of the most insidious threats that Darktrace finds use self-modifying technology to hide their presence on the network. These attacks can dynamically change their threat signatures, automatically extract data, and spread without a human controller.
Recently, we discovered anomalous activity on the network of a major US university. After investigation, we found that the anomaly was the ‘Smoke Malware Loader’ which employs numerous techniques to evade internal security. Most notably, the malware generates fake traffic to hide its presence.
Darktrace observed the initial infection when three anomalous executables were transferred over plain text. The malware did not match any known threat signatures, allowing it to bypass the network’s perimeter controls.
C1ulyq1wLrMBs6LG00 on Thu Sep 8, 13:19:01 Co2eAJ2GifEkWut700 on Thu Sep 8, 12:09:52 CdcZeu200UOsuf5u00 on Wed Sep 14, 16:38:44
The connections originated from a suspicious external domain that the company had never communicated with before:
lago666[.]com (91.243.193.149)
Both the anomalous download and the beaconing activity represented major deviations from the unique ‘pattern of life’ learned by the Enterprise Immune System.
Although the payload circumvented the network’s perimeter security, the company also had an alternate security system monitoring network flow. This tool raised an alert when the download occurred, but it was deemed a ‘false positive’ because the malware proceeded to install new, previously unknown versions of the executable to the Windows registry.
After the self-modifying modules were uploaded to the company device, a large number of HTTP POST requests were sent against /smk/log.php to the following domains:
The malware attempted to transfer data to these external destinations, but to hide its tracks, the remote machine replied with a fake 404 error code. These connections were deemed highly anomalous by Darktrace’s AI algorithms.
Since the payload was designed to be compatible with the password grabber module2 – which is often deployed side-by-side with Smoke Malware Loader – the data attempting to leave the network likely contained user credentials and passwords.
In conjunction with the initial transfer, another anomalous file was then delivered to a different device. This activity indicated that the threat actor was likely attempting to move laterally across the network:
hxxp://cdn.che[.]moe/izgmcx.exe (connection UID: CGH6uV3G5tdKSNY800) to 10.1.105.117 on Mon Sep 12 at 08:02:03.
Darktrace detected each anomaly in real time as the situation developed. By using AI algorithms to continuously learn normal behavior, Darktrace was able to monitor the malware’s changing threat signature.
Traditional security tools – no matter how advanced – are incapable of detecting such sophisticated threats. Legacy controls rely on rules and signatures, and these threats are specifically designed to bypass rules and signatures.
Darktrace’s real-time threat detection allowed the university’s security team to quarantine the infected devices before the malware could burrow deeper into the network, and before the attacker could use the passwords to further compromise the network. Darktrace then assisted the security team as they remediated the situation and changed their security protocols and passwords.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
ClearFake: From Fake CAPTCHAs to Blockchain-Driven Payload Retrieval
What is ClearFake?
As threat actors evolve their techniques to exploit victims and breach target networks, the ClearFake campaign has emerged as a significant illustration of this continued adaptation. ClearFake is a campaign observed using a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites, impacting sectors such as e‑commerce, travel, and automotive. First identified in mid‑2023, ClearFake is frequently leveraged to socially engineer victims into installing fake web browser updates.
In ClearFake compromises, victims are steered toward compromised WordPress sites, often positioned by attackers through search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. Once on the site, users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA. This counterfeit challenge is designed to appear legitimate while enabling the execution of malicious code. When a victim interacts with the CAPTCHA, a PowerShell command containing a download string is retrieved and executed.
Attackers commonly abuse the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA) in these operations. Recent campaigns have also incorporated Smart Chain endpoints, such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org,” to obtain configuration code. The primary payload delivered through ClearFake is typically an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer, enabling credential theft, data exfiltration, and persistent access [1].
Darktrace’s Coverage of ClearFake
Darktrace / ENDPOINT first detected activity likely associated with ClearFake on a single device on over the course of one day on November 18, 2025. The system observed the execution of “mshta.exe,” the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host utility. It also noted a repeated process command referencing “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru”, indicating suspicious external activity. Subsequent analysis of this endpoint using open‑source intelligence (OSINT) indicated that it was a malicious, domain generation algorithm (DGA) endpoint [2].
Figure 1: The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.
This activity indicates that mshta.exe was used to contact a remote server, “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru/rpxacc64mshta,” and execute the associated HTA file to initiate the next stage of the attack. OSINT sources have since heavily flagged this server as potentially malicious [3].
The first argument in this process uses the MSHTA utility to execute the HTA file hosted on the remote server. If successful, MSHTA would then run JavaScript or VBScript to launch PowerShell commands used to retrieve malicious payloads, a technique observed in previous ClearFake campaigns. Darktrace also detected unusual activity involving additional Microsoft executables, including “winlogon.exe,” “userinit.exe,” and “explorer.exe.” Although these binaries are legitimate components of the Windows operating system, threat actors can abuse their normal behavior within the Windows login sequence to gain control over user sessions, similar to the misuse of mshta.exe.
EtherHiding cover
Darktrace also identified additional ClearFake‑related activity, specifically a connection to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org, a legitimate BNB Smart Chain endpoint. This activity was triggered by injected JavaScript on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com, where the script initiated an eth_call POST request to the Smart Chain endpoint.
Figure 2: Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.
EtherHiding is a technique in which threat actors leverage blockchain technology, specifically smart contracts, as part of their malicious infrastructure. Because blockchain is anonymous, decentralized, and highly persistent, it provides threat actors with advantages in evading defensive measures and traditional tracking [4].
In this case, when a user visits a compromised WordPress site, injected base64‑encoded JavaScript retrieved an ABI string, which was then used to load and execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain.
Figure 3: JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.
Conducting malware analysis on this instance, the Base64 decoded into a JavaScript loader. A POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org was then used to retrieve a hex‑encoded ABI string that loads and executes the contract. The JavaScript also contained hex and Base64‑encoded functions that decoded into additional JavaScript, which attempted to retrieve a payload hosted on GitHub at “github[.]com/PrivateC0de/obf/main/payload.txt.” However, this payload was unavailable at the time of analysis.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the executable file and the malicious hostname.
Autonomous Response
As Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled on this customer’s network, Darktrace was able to take swift mitigative action to contain the ClearFake‑related activity early, before it could lead to potential payload delivery. The affected device was blocked from making external connections to a number of suspicious endpoints, including 188.114.96[.]6, *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, and neighb0rrol1[.]ru, ensuring that no further malicious connections could be made and no payloads could be retrieved.
Autonomous Response also acted to prevent the executable mshta.exe from initiating HTA file execution over HTTPS from this endpoint by blocking the attempted connections. Had these files executed successfully, the attack would likely have resulted in the retrieval of an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer.
Figure 6: Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.
Conclusion
ClearFake continues to be observed across multiple sectors, but Darktrace remains well‑positioned to counter such threats. Because ClearFake’s end goal is often to deliver malware such as information stealers and malware loaders, early disruption is critical to preventing compromise. Users should remain aware of this activity and vigilant regarding fake CAPTCHA pop‑ups. They should also monitor unusual usage of MSHTA and outbound connections to domains that mimic formats such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org” [1].
In this case, Darktrace was able to contain the attack before it could successfully escalate and execute. The attempted execution of HTA files was detected early, allowing Autonomous Response to intervene, stopping the activity from progressing. As soon as the device began communicating with weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, an Autonomous Response inhibitor triggered and interrupted the connections.
As ClearFake continues to rise, users should stay alert to social engineering techniques, including ClickFix, that rely on deceptive security prompts.
Credit to Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)
Appendices
Darktrace Model Detections
Process / New Executable Launched
Endpoint / Anomalous Use of Scripting Process
Endpoint / New Suspicious Executable Launched
Endpoint / Process Connection::Unusual Connection from New Process
Autonomous Response Models
Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL - Malicious Domain
188.114.96[.]6 – IP – Suspicious Domain
*.neighb0rrol1[.]ru – URL – Malicious Domain
MITRE Tactics
Initial Access, Drive-by Compromise, T1189
User Execution, Execution, T1204
Software Deployment Tools, Execution and Lateral Movement, T1072
The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch
The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance
The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.
Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.
Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026
1. Credential-driven attacks are surging
Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.
2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge
Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.
Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.
3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion
Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.
Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles
This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.
4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.
VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.
Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.
5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.
State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.
Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.
6. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.
Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.
Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.
Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape
The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.
As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.
Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.
Acknowledgements:
The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.
![The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c82e78da2d2ce709ae48c_unknown.png)
![Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c8366f0bb2cc1b6d45b83_unknown.png)
![JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c86643749feb018e9c675_161%208361%2C.png)
![Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c86886decd09446e998af_unknown.png)
