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August 4, 2020

How to Prevent Spear Phishing Attacks Post Twitter Hack

Twitter confirmed spear phishing as the cause of last month's attack. Learn about the limits of current defenses against spear phishing and how AI can stop it.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product
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04
Aug 2020

Twitter has now confirmed that it was a “phone spear phishing attack” targeting a small number of their employees that allowed hackers to access 130 high-profile user accounts and fool thousands of people into giving away money via bitcoin.

Spear phishing involves targeted texts or emails aimed at individuals in an attempt to ‘hook’ them into opening an attachment or malicious link. This attack highlights the limitations in the security controls adopted by even some of the largest and most tech-savvy organizations out there, who continue to fall victim to this well-known attack technique.

The incident has been described by Twitter as a “coordinated social engineering attack” that “successfully targeted employees with access to internal systems and tools.”

Though the specific nature of the attack remains unclear, it likely followed a similar pattern to the series of threat finds detailed elsewhere on the Darktrace Blog: impersonating trusted colleagues or platforms, such as WeTransfer, Microsoft Teams or even Twitter itself, with an urgent message coaxing an employee into clicking on a disguised URL and inputting their credentials on a fake login page.

When an employee inputs their credentials, that data is recorded and beaconed back to the attacker, who will then use these login details to access internal systems — which, in this case, allowed them to subsequently take control of celebrities’ Twitter accounts and send out the damaging Tweets that left thousands out of pocket.

Training the workforce is not enough

Twitter says in a statement that this incident has forced them to “accelerate several of [their] pre-existing security workstreams.” But the suggestion that they will continue to organize “ongoing company-wide phishing exercises throughout the year” indicates an over-reliance on the ability of humans to identify these malicious email attacks that are getting more and more advanced, and harder to distinguish from genuine communication.

Cyber-criminals are now using AI to create fake profiles, personalize messages and replicate communication patterns, at a speed and scale that no human ever could. In this threat landscape, there can no longer be a reliance solely on educating the workforce, as the difference between a malicious email and legitimate communication becomes almost imperceptible. This has led to an acceptance that we must rely on technology to help us catch the subtle signs of attack, when humans alone fail to do so.

The legacy approach: no playbook for new attacks

The majority of communications security systems are not where they need to be, and this is particularly true for the email realm. Most tools in use today rely on static blacklists of rules and signatures that analyze emails in isolation, against known ‘bads’. Methods like looking for IP addresses or file hashes associated with phishing have had limited success in stopping attackers, who have devised simple techniques to bypass them.

As we have explored previously, attackers are constantly changing their approach, purchasing new domains en masse, experimenting with novel strains of malware, and manipulating headers to get around common validation checks. It is due to these developments that Secure Email Gateways (SEGs) become antiquated almost the moment they are updated.

The mean lifetime of an attack has reduced from 2.1 days in 2018 to 0.5 days in 2020. As soon as an SEG identifies a domain or a file hash as malicious, cyber-criminals change their attack infrastructure and launch a new wave of fresh attacks. Their fundamental means of operation renders legacy security tools incapable of evolving with the threat landscape, and it is for this reason that over 94% of cyber-attacks today start with an email.

How Cyber AI catches the threats others miss

However, one area where email security has seen great progress even in the last two years is the application of AI to spot the subtle features of advanced email attacks, even those that leverage novel malware. This approach allows security tools to move away from the binary decision-making that comes with asking “Is this email ‘bad’?” and moving to the far more useful question of “does this belong?”

This form of what we’re calling ‘layered AI’ combines supervised and unsupervised machine learning, enabling it to spot the subtle deviations from learned ‘patterns of life’ that are indicative of a cyber-threat.

Supervised machine learning models can be trained on millions of emails to find subtle patterns undetectable by humans and detect new variations of known threat types. These models are able to find the real-world intentions behind an email: by training on millions of spear phishing emails, for example, a system can find patterns associated with this type of email attack and accurately classify a future email as spear phishing.

In addition, unsupervised machine learning models can be trained on all available email data for an organization to find unknown variations of unknown threat types — that is, the ‘unknown unknowns,’ the combinations never before seen. Ultimately this is what enables a system to ask that critical question “does this belong?” and spot genuine anomalies that fall outside of the norm.

Layering both of these applications of AI allows us to make determinations such as: ‘this is a phishing email and it doesn’t belong’, dramatically improving the system’s accuracy and allowing it to interrupt only the malicious emails – since there could be phishy-looking emails that are legitimate! It also enables us to act in proportion to the threat identified: locking links and attachments in some cases, or holding back emails entirely in others.

This form of ‘layered AI’ requires an advanced understanding of mathematics and machine learning that takes years of research and development. With that experience, Cyber AI has proven itself capable of catching the full range of advanced attacks targeting the inbox, from spear phishing and impersonation attempts, to account takeovers and supply chain attacks. Once implemented, it takes only a week before any new organization can derive value, and thousands of customers now rely on Cyber AI to protect both their email realm and wider network.

Plenty more phish in the sea

This will not be the last time this year that a cyber-attack caused by spear phishing makes the headlines. Just this week, it was revealed that Russian-backed cyber-criminals stole sensitive documents on US-UK trade talks after successful spear phishing, and the technique may well have played a part in ongoing vaccine research espionage that surfaced in July.

With the US presidential race heating up, it was recently revealed that fewer than 3 out of 10 election administrators have basic controls to prevent phishing. This attack method may come to not only damage organizations and their reputation, but also to undermine the trust that serves as the bedrock of democracy. Now is the time to start recognizing the very real threat that email attackers represent, and to prepare our defenses accordingly.

Learn more about AI email security

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product

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July 1, 2025

Pre-CVE Threat Detection: 8 Examples Identifying Malicious Activity Prior to Public Disclosure of a Vulnerability

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Can you detect cyber threats before the world knows about them?

Every year, tens of thousands of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are disclosed, over 40,000 in 2024 alone [1], and a predicted higher number for 2025 by the Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

However, cybercriminals don't wait for disclosure. They exploit zero-days while defenders remain in the dark.

Traditional, signature-based tools struggle to detect these early-stage threats. That’s why anomaly detection is becoming essential for organizations seeking pre-CVE detection.

Understanding the gap between zero-day attacks and public CVE disclosure

When a vulnerability is discovered, the standard practice is to report it to the vendor or the responsible organization, allowing them to develop and distribute a patch or fix before the details are made public. This is known as responsible disclosure.

The gap between exploitation of a zero-day and the disclosure of the vulnerability can sometimes be considerable, and retroactively attempting to identify successful exploitation on your network can be challenging, particularly if taking a signature-based approach.

However, abnormal behaviors in networks or systems, such as unusual login patterns or data transfers, can indicate attempted cyber-attacks, insider threats, or compromised systems.

Detecting threats without relying on CVE disclosure

Since Darktrace does not rely on rules or signatures, it can detect malicious activity that is anomalous even without full context of the specific device or asset in question.

For example, during the Fortinet exploitation late last year, the Darktrace Threat Research team were investigating a different Fortinet vulnerability, namely CVE 2024-23113, for exploitation when Mandiant released a security advisory around CVE 2024-47575, which aligned closely with Darktrace’s findings.

Retrospective analysis like this is used by Darktrace’s threat researchers to better understand detections across the threat landscape and to add additional context.

Below are eight examples from the past year where Darktrace detected malicious activity days or even weeks before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

ten examples from the past year where Darktrace detected malicious activity days or even weeks before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

Trends in pre-cve exploitation

The attack vs. patch race

In many cases, the disclosure of an exploited vulnerability can be off the back of an incident response investigation related to a compromise by an advanced threat actor using a zero-day. Once the vulnerability is registered and publicly disclosed as having been exploited, it can kick off a race between the attacker and defender.

Skilled nation-state actors

Nation-state actors, highly skilled with significant resources, are known to use a range of capabilities to achieve their target, including zero-day use. Often, pre-CVE activity is “low and slow”, last for months with high operational security.

After CVE disclosure, the barriers to entry lower, allowing less skilled and less resourced attackers, like some ransomware gangs, to exploit the vulnerability and cause harm. This is why two distinct types of activity are often seen: pre and post disclosure of an exploited vulnerability.

Examples of exploitation

Darktrace saw this consistent story line play out during several of the Fortinet and PAN OS threat actor campaigns highlighted above last year, where nation-state actors were seen exploiting vulnerabilities first, followed by ransomware gangs impacting organizations [2].

The same applies with the recent SAP Netweaver exploitations being tied to a China based threat actor earlier this spring with subsequent ransomware incidents being observed [3].

You spotted the anomaly but did you stop the breach?

Anomaly-based detection offers the benefit of identifying malicious activity even before a CVE is disclosed; however, security teams still need to quickly contain and isolate the activity.

For example, during the Ivanti chaining exploitation in the early part of 2025, a customer had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network. As a result, Darktrace was able to contain the compromise and shut down any ongoing suspicious connectivity by blocking internal connections and enforcing a “pattern of life” on the affected device.

This pre-CVE detection and response by Darktrace occurred 11 days before any public disclosure, demonstrating the value of an anomaly-based approach.

In some cases, customers have even reported that Darktrace stopped malicious exploitation of devices several days before a public disclosure of a vulnerability.

For example, During the ConnectWise exploitation, a customer informed the team that Darktrace had detected malicious software being installed via remote access. Upon further investigation, four servers were found to be impacted, while Autonomous Response had blocked outbound connections and enforced patterns of life on impacted devices.

Conclusion

By continuously analyzing behavioral patterns, systems can spot unusual activities and patterns from users, systems, and networks to detect anomalies that could signify a security breach.

Through ongoing monitoring and learning from these behaviors, anomaly-based security systems can detect threats that traditional signature-based solutions might miss, while also providing detailed insights into threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This type of behavioral intelligence supports pre-CVE detection, allows for a more adaptive security posture, and enables systems to evolve with the ever-changing threat landscape.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO), Emma Fougler (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

References and further reading:

  1. https://www.first.org/blog/20250607-Vulnerability-Forecast-for-2025
  2. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/fortimanager-zero-day-exploitation-cve-2024-47575
  3. https://thehackernews.com/2025/05/china-linked-hackers-exploit-sap-and.html

Realted Darktrace blogs:

*Self-reported by customer, confirmed afterwards.

**Updated January 2024 blog now reflects current findings

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June 27, 2025

Patch and Persist: Darktrace’s Detection of Blind Eagle (APT-C-36)

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What is Blind Eagle?

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombian organizations.

Blind Eagle characteristically targets government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure [1][2].

Attacks carried out by Blind Eagle actors typically start with a phishing email and the group have been observed utilizing various Remote Access Trojans (RAT) variants, which often have in-built methods for hiding command-and-control (C2) traffic from detection [3].

What we know about Blind Eagle from a recent campaign

Since November 2024, Blind Eagle actors have been conducting an ongoing campaign targeting Colombian organizations [1].

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

Despite Microsoft patching this vulnerability in November 2024 [1][4], Blind Eagle actors have continued to exploit the minimal interaction mechanism, though no longer with the intent of harvesting NTLMv2 password hashes. Instead, phishing emails are sent to targets containing a malicious URL which, when clicked, initiates the download of a malicious file. This file is then triggered by minimal user interaction.

Clicking on the file triggers a WebDAV request, with a connection being made over HTTP port 80 using the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19044’. WebDAV is a transmission protocol which allows files or complete directories to be made available through the internet, and to be transmitted to devices [5]. The next stage payload is then downloaded via another WebDAV request and malware is executed on the target device.

Attackers are notified when a recipient downloads the malicious files they send, providing an insight into potential targets [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of Blind Eagle

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be  associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia.

Within a period of just five hours, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device being redirected through a rare external location, downloading multiple executable files, and ultimately exfiltrating data from the customer’s environment.

Since the customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network, no actions were taken to contain the compromise, allowing it to escalate until the customer’s security team responded to the alerts provided by Darktrace.

Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers have since linked this endpoint with phishing and malware campaigns [9].

The device then proceeded to download the executable file hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe.

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.

The device was then observed making unusual connections to the rare endpoint 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and performing unusual external data activity.

This dynamic DNS endpoint allows a device to access an endpoint using a domain name in place of a changing IP address. Dynamic DNS services ensure the DNS record of a domain name is automatically updated when the IP address changes. As such, malicious actors can use these services and endpoints to dynamically establish connections to C2 infrastructure [6].

Further investigation into this dynamic endpoint using OSINT revealed multiple associations with previous likely Blind Eagle compromises, as well as Remcos malware, a RAT commonly deployed via phishing campaigns [7][8][10].

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.

Shortly after this, Darktrace observed the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’, indicating usage of the aforementioned transmission protocol WebDAV. The device was subsequently observed connected to an endpoint associated with Github and downloading data, suggesting that the device was retrieving a malicious tool or payload. The device then began to communicate to the malicious endpoint diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com over the new TCP port 1512 [11].

Around this time, the device was also observed uploading data to the endpoints 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com, with transfers of 60 MiB and 5.6 MiB observed respectively.

Figure 4: UI graph showing external data transfer activity.

This chain of activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK. These high-priority model alerts are designed to trigger in response to higher fidelity indicators of compromise (IoCs), suggesting that a device is performing activity consistent with a compromise.

 Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.

A second Enhanced Monitoring model was also triggered by this device following the download of the aforementioned executable file (hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe) and the observed increase in C2 activity.

Following this activity, Darktrace continued to observe the device beaconing to the 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com endpoint.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of the affected device’s broader connectivity throughout the course of the attack.

As the affected customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response configured at the time, the attack was able to progress unabated. Had Darktrace been properly enabled, it would have been able to take a number of actions to halt the escalation of the attack.

For example, the unusual beaconing connections and the download of an unexpected file from an uncommon location would have been shut down by blocking the device from making external connections to the relevant destinations.

Conclusion

The persistence of Blind Eagle and ability to adapt its tactics, even after patches were released, and the speed at which the group were able to continue using pre-established TTPs highlights that timely vulnerability management and patch application, while essential, is not a standalone defense.

Organizations must adopt security solutions that use anomaly-based detection to identify emerging and adapting threats by recognizing deviations in user or device behavior that may indicate malicious activity. Complementing this with an autonomous decision maker that can identify, connect, and contain compromise-like activity is crucial for safeguarding organizational networks against constantly evolving and sophisticated threat actors.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson (Senior Cyber Analyst), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

IoC – Type - Confidence
Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045 – User Agent

62[.]60[.]226[.]112 – IP – Medium Confidence

hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe – Payload Download – Medium Confidence

21ene.ip-ddns[.]com – Dynamic DNS Endpoint – Medium Confidence

diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com  - Hostname – Medium Confidence

Darktrace’s model alert coverage

Anomalous File / Suspicious HTTP Redirect
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Github Download
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Device / Large Number of Model Alert

Mitre Attack Mapping:

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access - T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access ICS - T0862 – Supply Chain Compromise
Initial Access ICS - T0865 – Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access ICS - T0817 - Drive-by Compromise
Resource Development - T1588.001 – Malware
Lateral Movement ICS - T0843 – Program Download
Command and Control - T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control - T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control - T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Command and Control - T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms
Command and Control ICS - T0869 – Standard Application Layer Protocol
Evasion ICS - T0849 – Masquerading
Exfiltration - T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration - T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

References

1)    https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/blind-eagle-and-justice-for-all/

2)    https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2025/04/kpmg-ctip-blind-eagle-01-apr-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

3)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-remote-access-trojan/#:~:text=They%20might%20be%20attached%20to,remote%20access%20or%20system%20administration

4)    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451

5)    https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/know-how/webdav/

6)    https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dynamic-dns-resolution-as-an-obfuscation-technique

7)    https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1437795

8)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/remcos-malware/

9)    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b3189db6ddc578005cb6986f86e9680e7f71fe69f87f9498fa77ed7b1285e268

10) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/21ene.ip-ddns.com

11) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/diciembrenotasenclub.longmusic.com/community

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About the author
Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst
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