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April 10, 2023

Detecting Malicious Email Activity & AI Impersonating

Discover how two different phishing attempts from some known and unknown senders used a payroll diversion and credential sealing box link to harm users.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Isabelle Cheong
Cyber Security Analyst
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10
Apr 2023

Social engineering has become widespread in the cyber threat landscape in recent years, and the near-universal use of social media today has allowed attackers to research and target victims more effectively. Social engineering involves manipulating users to carry out actions such as revealing sensitive information like login credentials or credit card details. It can also lead to user account compromises, causing huge disruption to an organization’s digital estate. 

As people use social media platforms not only for personal reasons, but also for business purposes, attackers gain information they can exploit in social engineering attacks. For example, a threat actor may attempt to impersonate a known individual or legitimate service to take advantage of a user’s established trust. This is a highly successful method of social engineering because mimicking known contacts makes it difficult for traditional security tools that rely on deny-lists to detect the attack.

In October 2022, Darktrace identified and responded to two separate malicious email campaigns in which threat actors attempted to impersonate known contacts in an effort to compromise customer devices. As it learns the normal behavior of every user in the email system, Darktrace was able to instantly detect these threats and mitigate them autonomously, preventing significant disruption to the customer networks.

Payroll Diversion Fraud Attempt Impersonating a Former Employee 

While a customer in the Canadian energy sector was trialing Darktrace in October 2022, Darktrace/Email™ identified a suspicious email seemingly sent from an employee within the organization. The email was sent to the Senior Director of Human Resources (HR) with a subject line of “Change in payroll Direct Deposit.” The email requested a change in bank account information for an employee. However, Darktrace recognized that the sender was using a free mail address that contained random letters, indicating it may have been algorithmically generated. Since this incident occurred during a trial, Darktrace/Email was not configured to take action. Otherwise, it would have prevented the email from landing in the inbox. In this case though, the email went through, bypassing all other security tools in place.

Although the email was from an unknown sender, the HR director believed the email could have been legitimate as the employee who appeared to be the sender had left the organization seven days prior and no longer had access to their corporate email account. However, after reviewing it in the Darktrace/Email dashboard, the customer grew suspicious and contacted the former employee directly to verify if the request was legitimate. The former employee validated the suspicions by confirming they had sent no such email.

Further investigation by the customer revealed that the former employee had been vocal about their departure on various social media platforms. This gave threat actors valuable information to believably impersonate the former employee and defraud the organization. 

Such attempts to target organizations’ HR departments and divert payroll are common tactics for cyber-criminals and are often identified by Darktrace/Email across the customer base. Darktrace/Email is able to instantly identify the indicators associated with these spoofing attempts and immediately bring them to the attention of the customer’s security team. 

Using Legitimate File Sharing Service to Share a Phishing Link 

On October 7, 2022, a customer in the Singaporean construction sector was targeted by a phishing campaign attempting to impersonate a law firm known to the organization. Almost 200 employees received an email with the subject line “Accepted: Valuation Agreement.” 

Figure 1: Sample of an UI view of the message held showing anomaly indicators, history, association, and validation.

Four days earlier, Darktrace observed communication between another email address associated with the law firm and an employee of the customer. Darktrace/Email noted that it was the first time this correspondent had sent emails to the customer. 

Figure 2: Metrics showing how well the sender’s domain is known within the digital environment.

The emails contained a highly unusual link to a file sharing service, (hxxps://ssvilvensstokes[.]app[.]box[.]com/notes), hidden behind the text “PREVIEW OR PRINT COPY OF DOCUMENT HERE.” Darktrace analysts investigated this event further and found that around 30 similar URLs had been identified as suspicious using OSINT security tools in October 2022, suggesting the customer was not the only target of this phishing campaign.

Figure 3: Preview of the phishing email’s body.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s evaluation of the link contained in the phishing email.

Additional OSINT work revealed that the link directed to a website which appeared to host a PDF file named “Valuation Agreement.” The recipient would then be prompted to follow another link (hulking-citrine-krypton[.]glitch[.]me), again hidden behind the text “OPEN OR ACCESS DOCUMENT HERE” to view the file. Subsequently, the user would be prompted to enter their Microsoft 365 credentials. 

Figure 5: The page displayed when the phishing link was clicked, viewed in a sandbox environment.
Figure 6: Example of a page shown when recipient clicks the second link, accessing “hulking-citrine-krypton[.]glitch[.]me”. 

This page contained the text “This document has been scanned for viruses by Norton Antivirus Security.” This is another example of threat actors’ employing social engineering techniques by impersonating well-known brands, such as established security vendors, to gain the trust of users and increase their likelihood of success.

It is highly probable that a real employee of the law firm had their account hijacked and that a malicious actor was exploiting it to send out these phishing emails en masse as part of a supply chain attack. In such cases, malicious actors rely on their targets’ trust of known contacts to not question departures from their normal conversations. 

Darktrace was able to instantly detect multiple anomalies in these emails, despite the fact that they were seemingly sent by known correspondents. The activity detected automatically triggered model breaches associated with unexpected and visually prominent links. As a result, Darktrace/Email responded by locking the link, stopping users from being able to click it.

Darktrace subsequently identified additional emails from this sender attempting to target other recipients within the company, triggering the model breaches associated with a surge in email sending indicative of a phishing campaign. In response, Darktrace/Email autonomously acted and filed these emails as junk. As more emails were detected across the customer’s environment, the anomaly score of the sender increased and Darktrace ultimately held back over 160 malicious emails, safeguarding recipients from potential account compromise.           

The following Darktrace/Email models were breached throughout the course of this phishing campaign:

  • Unusual/Sender Surge 
  • Unusual/Undisclosed Recipients 
  • Antigena Anomaly 
  • Association/Unlikely Recipient Association 
  • Link/Low Link Association 
  • Link/Visually Prominent Link 
  • Link/Visually Prominent Link Unexpected For Sender 
  • Unusual/New Sender Wide Distribution
  • Unusual/Undisclosed Recipients + New Address Known Domain

Conclusion

Social engineering plays a role in many of the major threats challenging current email cyber security, as attackers can use it to manipulate users into transferring money, revealing credentials, clicking malicious links, and more. 

The above threat stories happened before language generating AI became mainstream with the release of ChatGPT in December 2022. Now, it is even easier for malicious actors to generate sophisticated social engineering emails. By using social media posts as input, social engineering emails written by generative AI can be highly targeted and produced at scale. They often avoid the flags users are trained to look for, like poor grammar and spelling mistakes, and can hide payloads or forgo them entirely.

To mitigate the risk of possible social engineering attempts, it is recommended that organizations implement social media policies that advise employees to be cautious of what they post online and enact procedures to verify if fund transfer requests are legitimate.

Yet these policies are not enough on their own. Darktrace/Email can identify suspicious email traits, whether an email is sent from a known correspondent or an unknown sender. With Self-Learning AI, it knows an organization’s users better than any impersonator could. In this way, Darktrace/Email detects anomalies within emails and neutralizes malicious components at machine-speed, stopping attacks at their earliest stages, before employees fall victim. 

Appendices

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Domain:

hxxps://ssvilvensstokes[.]app[.]box[.]com/notes/*?s=* - 1st external link (seen in email)

hxxps://hulking-citrine-krypton[.]glitch[.]me/flk.html - 2nd external link, masked behind “OPEN OR ACCESS DOCUMENT HERE”

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Isabelle Cheong
Cyber Security Analyst

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May 5, 2026

When Trust Becomes the Attack Surface: Supply-Chain Attacks in an Era of Automation and Implicit Trust

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Software supply-chain attacks in 2026

Software supply-chain attacks now represent the primary threat shaping the 2026 security landscape. Rather than relying on exploits at the perimeter, attackers are targeting the connective tissue of modern engineering environments: package managers, CI/CD automation, developer systems, and even the security tools organizations inherently trust.

These incidents are not isolated cases of poisoned code. They reflect a structural shift toward abusing trusted automation and identity at ecosystem scale, where compromise propagates through systems designed for speed, not scrutiny. Ephemeral build runners, regardless of provider, represent high‑trust, low‑visibility execution zones.

The Axios compromise and the cascading Trivy campaign illustrate how quickly this abuse can move once attacker activity enters build and delivery workflows. This blog provides an overview of the latest supply chain and security tool incidents with Darktrace telemetry and defensive actions to improve organizations defensive cyber posture.

1. Why the Axios Compromise Scaled

On 31 March 2026, attackers hijacked the npm account of Axios’s lead maintainer, publishing malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 that silently pulled in a malicious dependency, plain‑crypto‑[email protected]. Axios is a popular HTTP client for node.js and  processes 100 million weekly downloads and appears in around 80% of cloud and application environments, making this a high‑leverage breach [1].

The attack chain was simple yet effective:

  • A compromised maintainer account enabled legitimate‑looking malicious releases.
  • The poisoned dependency executed Remote Access Trojans (RATs) across Linux, macOS and Windows systems.
  • The malware beaconed to a remote command-and-control (C2) server every 60 seconds in a loop, awaiting further instructions.
  • The installer self‑cleaned by deleting malicious artifacts.

All of this matters because a single maintainer compromise was enough to project attacker access into thousands of trusted production environments without exploiting a single vulnerability.

A view from Darktrace

Multiple cases linked with the Axios compromise were identified across Darktrace’s customer base in March 2026, across both Darktrace / NETWORK and Darktrace / CLOUD deployments.

In one Darktrace / CLOUD deployment, an Azure Cloud Asset was observed establishing new external HTTP connectivity to the IP 142.11.206[.]73 on port 8000. Darktrace deemed this activity as highly anomalous for the device based on several factors, including the rarity of the endpoint across the network and the unusual combination of protocol and port for this asset. As a result, the triggering the "Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port" model was triggered in Darktrace / CLOUD. Detection was driven by environmental context rather than a known indicator at the time. Subsequent reporting later classified the destination as malicious in relation to the Axios supply‑chain compromise, reinforcing the gap that often exists between initial attacker activity and the availability of actionable intelligence. [5]

Additionally, shortly before this C2 connection, the device was observed communicating with various endpoints associated with the NPM package manager, further reinforcing the association with this attack.

Darktrace’s detection of the unusual external connection to 142.11[.]206[.]73 via port 8000.  
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the unusual external connection to 142.11[.]206[.]73 via port 8000.  

Within Axios cases observed within Darktrace / NETWORK customer environments, activity generally focused on the use of newly observed cURL user agents in outbound connections to the C2 URL sfrclak[.]com/6202033, alongside the download of malicious files.

In other cases, Darktrace / NETWORK customers with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint integration received alerts flagging newly observed system executables and process launches associated with C2 communication.

A Security Integration Alert from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint associated with the Axios supply chain attack.
Figure 2: A Security Integration Alert from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint associated with the Axios supply chain attack.

2. Why Trivy bypassed security tooling trust

Between late February and March 22, 2026, the threat group TeamPCP leveraged credentials from a previous incident to insert malicious artifacts across Trivy’s distribution ecosystem, including its CI automation, release binaries, Visual Studio Code extensions, and Docker container images [2].

While public reporting has emphasized GitHub Actions, Darktrace telemetry highlights attacker execution within CI/CD runner environments, including ephemeral build runners. These execution contexts are typically granted broad trust and limited visibility, allowing malicious activity within build automation to blend into expected operational workflows, regardless of provider.

This was a coordinated multi‑phase attack:

  • 75 of 76  of trivy-action tags and all setup‑trivy tags were force‑pushed to deliver a malicious payload.
  • A malicious binary (v0.69.4) was distributed across all major distribution channels.
  • Developer machines were compromised, receiving a persistent backdoor and a self-propagating worm.
  • Secrets were exfiltrated at scale, including SSH keys, Kuberenetes tokens, database passwords, and cloud credentials across Amazon Web Service (AWS), Azure, and Google Cloud Platform (GCP).

Within Darktrace’s customer base, an AWS EC2 instance monitored by Darktrace / CLOUD  appeared to have been impacted by the Trivy attack. On March 19, the device was seen connecting to the attacker-controlled C2 server scan[.]aquasecurtiy[.]org (45.148.10[.]212), triggering the model 'Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server’ in Darktrace / CLOUD.

Despite this limited historical context, Darktrace assessed this activity as suspicious due to the rarity of the destination endpoint across the wider deployment. This resulted in the triggering of a model alert and the generation of a Cyber AI Analyst incident to further analyze and correlate the attack activity.

TeamPCP’s continued abused of GitHub Actions against security and IT tooling has also been observed more recently in Darktrace’s customer base. On April 22, an AWS asset was seen connecting to the C2 endpoint audit.checkmarx[.]cx (94.154.172[.]43). The timing of this activity suggests a potential link to a malicious Bitwarden package distributed by the threat actor, which was only available for a short timeframe on April 22. [4][3]

Figure 3: A model alert flagging unusual external connectivity from the AWS asset, as seen in Darktrace / CLOUD .

While the Trivy activity originated within build automation, the underlying failure mode mirrors later intrusions observed via management tooling. In both cases, attackers leveraged platforms designed for scale and trust to execute actions that blended into normal operational noise until downstream effects became visible.

Quest KACE: Legacy Risk, Real Impact

The Quest KACE System Management Appliance (SMA) incident reinforces that software risk is not confined to development pipelines alone. High‑trust infrastructure and management platforms are increasingly leveraged by adversaries when left unpatched or exposed to the internet.

Throughout March 2026, attackers exploited CVE 2025-32975 to authentication on outdated, internet-facing KACE appliances, gaining administrative control and pushing remote payloads into enterprise environments. Organizations still running pre-patch versions effectively handed adversaries a turnkey foothold, reaffirming a simple strategic truth: legacy management systems are now part of the supply-chain threat surface, and treating them as “low-risk utilities” is no longer defensible [3].

Within the Darktrace customer base, a potential case was identified in mid-March involving an internet-facing server that exhibited the use of a new user agent alongside unusual file downloads and unexpected external connectivity. Darktrace identified the device downloading file downloads from "216.126.225[.]156/x", "216.126.225[.]156/ct.py" and "216.126.225[.]156/n", using the user agents, "curl/8.5.0" & "Python-urllib/3.9".

The timeframe and IoCs observed point towards likely exploitation of CVE‑2025‑32975. As with earlier incidents, the activity became visible through deviations in expected system behavior rather than through advance knowledge of exploitation or attacker infrastructure. The delay between observed exploitation and its addition to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalogue underscores a recurring failure: retrospective validation cannot keep pace with adversaries operating at automation speed.

The strategic pattern: Ecosystem‑scale adversaries

The Axios and Trivy compromises are not anomalies; they are signals of a structural shift in the threat landscape. In this post-trust era, the compromise of a single maintainer, repository token, or CI/CD tag can produce large-scale blast radiuses with downstream victims numbering in the thousands. Attackers are no longer just exploiting vulnerabilities; they are exploiting infrastructure privileges, developer trust relationships, and automated build systems that the industry has generally under secured.

Supply‑chain compromise should now be treated as an assumed breach scenario, not a specialized threat class, particularly across build, integration, and management infrastructure. Organizations must operate under the assumption that compromise will occur within trusted software and automation layers, not solely at the network edge or user endpoint. Defenders should therefore expect compromise to emerge from trusted automation layers before it is labelled, validated, or widely understood.

The future of supply‑chain defense lies in continuous behavioral visibility, autonomous detection across developer and build environments, and real‑time anomaly identification.

As AI increasingly shapes software development and security operations, defenders must assume adversaries will also operate with AI in the loop. The defensive edge will come not from predicting specific compromises, but from continuously interrogating behavior across environments humans can no longer feasibly monitor at scale.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISCO), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References:

1)         https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hackers-hijack-axios-npm-package/

2)         https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/trivy-hack-spreads-infostealer-via.html

3)         https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/hackers-exploit-cve-2025-32975-cvss-100.html

4)         https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-the-third-coming----inside-the-bitwarden-cli-2026-4-0-supply-chain-attack

5)         https://socket.dev/blog/axios-npm-package-compromised?trk=public_post_comment-text

IoCs

- 142.11.206[.]73 – IP Address – Axios supply chain C2

- sfrclak[.]com – Hostname – Axios supply chain C2

- hxxp://sfrclak[.]com:8000/6202033 - URI – Axios supply chain payload

- 45.148.10[.]212 – IP Address – Trivy supply chain C2

- scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org – Hostname - Trivy supply chain C2

- 94.154.172[.]43 – IP Address - Checkmarx/Bitwarden supply chain C2

- audit.checkmarx[.]cx – Hostname - Checkmarx/Bitwarder supply chain C2

- 216.126.225[.]156 – IP Address – Quest KACE exploitation C2

- 216.126.225[.]156/32 - URI – Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- 216.126.225[.]156/ct.py - URI - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- 216.126.225[.]156/n - URI - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- 216.126.225[.]156/x - URI - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- e1ec76a0e1f48901566d53828c34b5dc – MD5 - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- d3beab2e2252a13d5689e9911c2b2b2fc3a41086 – SHA1 - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- ab6677fcbbb1ff4a22cc3e7355e1c36768ba30bbf5cce36f4ec7ae99f850e6c5 – SHA256 - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- 83b7a106a5e810a1781e62b278909396 – MD5 - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- deb4b5841eea43cb8c5777ee33ee09bf294a670d – SHA1 - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

- b1b2f1e36dcaa36bc587fda1ddc3cbb8e04c3df5f1e3f1341c9d2ec0b0b0ffaf – SHA256 - Possible Quest KACE exploitation payload

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

Device / New User Agent

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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May 5, 2026

How email-delivered prompt injection attacks can target enterprise AI – and why it matters

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What are email-delivered prompt injection attacks?

As organizations rapidly adopt AI assistants to improve productivity, a new class of cyber risk is emerging alongside them: email-delivered AI prompt injection. Unlike traditional attacks that target software vulnerabilities or rely on social engineering, this is the act of embedding malicious or manipulative instructions into content that an AI system will process as part of its normal workflow. Because modern AI tools are designed to ingest and reason over large volumes of data, including emails, documents, and chat histories, they can unintentionally treat hidden attacker-controlled text as legitimate input.  

At Darktrace, our analysis has shown an increase of 90% in the number of customer deployments showing signals associated with potential prompt injection attempts since we began monitoring for this type of activity in late 2025. While it is not always possible to definitively attribute each instance, internal scoring systems designed to identify characteristics consistent with prompt injection have recorded a growing number of high-confidence matches. The upward trend suggests that attackers are actively experimenting with these techniques.

Recent examples of prompt injection attacks

Two early examples of this evolving threat are HashJack and ShadowLeak, which illustrate prompt injection in practice.

HashJack is a novel prompt injection technique discovered in November 2025 that exploits AI-powered web browsers and agentic AI browser assistants. By hiding malicious instructions within the URL fragment (after the # symbol) of a legitimate, trusted website, attackers can trick AI web assistants into performing malicious actions – potentially inserting phishing links, fake contact details, or misleading guidance directly into what appears to be a trusted AI-generated output.

ShadowLeak is a prompt injection method to exfiltrate PII identified in September 2025. This was a flaw in ChatGPT (now patched by OpenAI) which worked via an agent connected to email. If attackers sent the target an email containing a hidden prompt, the agent was tricked into leaking sensitive information to the attacker with no user action or visible UI.

What’s the risk of email-delivered prompt injection attacks?

Enterprise AI assistants often have complete visibility across emails, documents, and internal platforms. This means an attacker does not need to compromise credentials or move laterally through an environment. If successful, they can influence the AI to retrieve relevant information seamlessly, without the labor of compromise and privilege escalation.

The first risk is data exfiltration. In a prompt injection scenario, malicious instructions may be embedded within an ordinary email. As in the ShadowLeak attack, when AI processes that content as part of a legitimate task, it may interpret the hidden text as an instruction. This could result in the AI disclosing sensitive data, summarizing confidential communications, or exposing internal context that would otherwise require significant effort to obtain.

The second risk is agentic workflow poisoning. As AI systems take on more active roles, prompt injection can influence how they behave over time. An attacker could embed instructions that persist across interactions, such as causing the AI to include malicious links in responses or redirect users to untrusted resources. In this way, the attacker inserts themselves into the workflow, effectively acting as a man-in-the-middle within the AI system.

Why can’t other solutions catch email-delivered prompt injection attacks?

AI prompt injection challenges many of the assumptions that traditional email security is built on. It does not fit the usual patterns of phishing, where the goal is to trick a user into clicking a link or opening an attachment.  

Most security solutions are designed to detect signals associated with user engagement: suspicious links, unusual attachments, or social engineering cues. Prompt injection avoids these indicators entirely, meaning there are fewer obvious red flags.

In this case, the intention is actually the opposite of user solicitation. The objective is simply for the email to be delivered and remain in the inbox, appearing benign and unremarkable. The malicious element is not something the recipient is expected to engage with, or even notice.

Detection is further complicated by the nature of the prompts themselves. Unlike known malware signatures or consistent phishing patterns, injected prompts can vary widely in structure and wording. This makes simple pattern-matching approaches, such as regex, unreliable. A broad rule set risks generating large numbers of false positives, while a narrow one is unlikely to capture the diversity of possible injections.

How does Darktrace catch these types of attacks?

The Darktrace approach to email security more generally is to look beyond individual indicators and assess context, which also applies here.  

For example, our prompt density score identifies clusters of prompt-like language within an email rather than just single occurrences. Instead of treating the presence of a phrase as a blocking signal, the focus is on whether there is an unusual concentration of these patterns in a way that suggests injection. Additional weighting can be applied where there are signs of obfuscation. For example, text that is hidden from the user – such as white font or font size zero – but still readable by AI systems can indicate an attempt to conceal malicious prompts.

This is combined with broader behavioral signals. The same communication context used to detect other threats remains relevant, such as whether the content is unusual for the recipient or deviates from normal patterns.

Ask your email provider about email-delivered AI prompt injection

Prompt injection targets not just employees, but the AI systems they rely on, so security approaches need to account for both.

Though there are clear indications of emerging activity, it remains to be seen how popular prompt injection will be with attackers going forward. Still, considering the potential impact of this attack type, it’s worth checking if this risk has been considered by your email security provider.

Questions to ask your email security provider

  • What safeguards are in place to prevent emails from influencing AI‑driven workflows over time?
  • How do you assess email content that’s benign for a human reader, but may carry hidden instructions intended for AI systems?
  • If an email contains no links, no attachments, and no social engineering cues, what signals would your platform use to identify malicious intent?

Visit the Darktrace / EMAIL product hub to discover how we detect and respond to advanced communication threats.  

Learn more about securing AI in your enterprise.

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About the author
Kiri Addison
Senior Director of Product
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