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February 24, 2021

LockBit Ransomware Analysis: Compromised Credentials

Darktrace examines how a LockBit ransomware attack that took place over just four hours was caused by one compromised credential. Read more here.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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24
Feb 2021

Lockbit ransomware found

LockBit ransomware was recently identified by Darktrace's Cyber AI during a trial with a retail company in the US. After an initial foothold was established via a compromised administrative credential, internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, and encryption of files occurred simultaneously, allowing the ransomware to steamroll through the digital system in just a few hours.

This incident serves as the latest reminder that ransomware campaigns now move through organizations at a speed that far outpaces human responders, demonstrating the need for machine-speed Autonomous Response to contain the threat before damage is done.

Lockbit ransomware defined

First discovered in 2019, LockBit is a relatively new family of ransomware that quickly exploits commonly available protocols and tools like SMB and PowerShell. It was originally known as ‘ABCD’ due the filename extension of the encrypted files, before it started using the current .lockbit extension. Since those early beginnings, it has evolved into one of the most calamitous strains of malware to date, asking for an average ransom of around $40,000 per organization.

As cyber-criminals level up the speed and scale of their attacks, ransomware remains a critical concern for organizations across every industry. In the past 12 months, Darktrace has observed an increase of over 20% in ransomware incidents across its customer base. Attackers are constantly developing new threat variants targeting exploits, utilizing off-the-shelf tools, and profiting from the burgeoning Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) business model.

How does LockBit work?

In a typical attack, a threat actor will spend days or weeks inside a system, manually screening for the best way to grind the victim’s business to a halt. This phase tends to expose multiple indicators of compromise such as command and control (C2) beaconing, which Darktrace AI identifies in real time.

LockBit, however, only requires the presence of a human for a number of hours, after which it propagates through a system and infects other hosts on its own, without the need for human oversight. Crucially, the malware performs reconnaissance and continues to spread during the encryption phase. This allows it to cause maximal damage faster than other manual approaches.

AI-powered defense is essential in fighting back against these machine-driven attacks, which have the capacity to spread at speed and scale, and often go undetected by signature-based security tools. Cyber AI augments human teams by not only detecting the subtle signs of a threat, but autonomously responding in seconds, quicker than any human can be expected to react.

Ransomware analysis: Breaking down a LockBit attack with AI

Figure 1: Timeline of attack on the infected host and the encryption host. The infected host was the device initially infected with LockBit, which then spread to the encryption host, the device which performed the encryption.

Initial compromise

The attack commenced when a cyber-criminal gained access to a single privileged credential – either through a brute-force attack on an externally facing device, as seen in previous LockBit ransomware attacks, or simply with a phishing email. With the use of this credential, the device was able to spread and encrypt files within hours of the initial infection.

Had the method of infiltration been via phishing attack, a route that has become increasingly popular in recent months, Darktrace/Email would have withheld the email and stripped the malicious payloads, and so prevented the attack from the outset.

Limiting permissions, the use of strong passwords, and multi-factor authentication (MFA), are critical in preventing the exploitation of standard network protocols in such attacks.

Internal reconnaissance

At 14:19 local time, the first of many WMI commands (ExecMethod) to multiple internal destinations was performed by an internal IP address over DCE-RPC. This series of commands occurred throughout the encryption process. Given these commands were unusual in the context of the normal ‘pattern of life’ for the organization, Darktrace DETECT alerted the security team to each of these connections.

Within three minutes, the device had started to write executable files over SMB to hidden shares on multiple destinations – many of which were the same. File writes to hidden shares are ordinarily restricted. However, the unauthorized use of an administrative credential granted these privileges. The executable files were written to the Windows / Temp directory. Filenames had a similar formatting: .*eck[0-9]?.exe

Darktrace identified each of these SMB writes as a potential threat, since such administrative activity was unexpected from the compromised device.

The WMI commands and executable file writes continued to be made to multiple destinations. In less than two hours, the ExecMethod command was delivered to a critical device – the ‘encryption host’ – shortly followed by an executable file write (eck3.exe) to its hidden c$ share.

LockBit’s script has the capability to check its current privileges and, if non-administrative, it attempts to bypass using Windows User Account Control (UAC). This particular host did provide the required privileges to the process. Once this device was infected, encryption began.

File encryption

Only one second after encryption had started, Darktrace alerted on the unusual file extension appendage in addition to the previous, high-fidelity alerts for earlier stages of the attack lifecycle.

A recovery file – ‘Restore-My-Files.txt’ – was identified by Darktrace one second after the first encryption event. 8,998 recovery files were written, one to each encrypted folder.

Figure 2: An example of Darktrace’s Threat Visualizer showcasing anomalous SMB connections, with model breaches represented by dots.

The encryption host was a critical device that regularly utilized SMB. Exploiting SMB is a popular tactic for cyber-criminals. Such tools are so frequently used that it is difficult for signature-based detection methods to identify quickly whether their activity is malicious or not. In this case, Darktrace’s ‘Unusual Activity’ score for the device was elevated within two seconds of the first encryption, indicating that the device was deviating from its usual pattern of behavior.

Throughout the encryption process, Darktrace also detected the device performing network reconnaissance, enumerating shares on 55 devices (via srvsvc) and scanning over 1,000 internal IP addresses on nine critical TCP ports.

During this time, ‘Patient Zero’ – the initially infected device – continued to write executable files to hidden file shares. LockBit was using the initial device to spread the malware across the digital estate, while the ‘encryption host’ performed reconnaissance and encrypted the files simultaneously.

Despite Cyber AI detecting the threat even before the encryption had begun, the security team did not have eyes on Darktrace at the time of the attack. The intrusion was thus allowed to continue and over 300,000 files were encrypted and appended with the .lockbit extension. Four servers and 15 desktop devices were affected, before the attack was stopped by the administrators.

The rise of ‘hit and run’ ransomware

While most ransomware resides inside an organization for days or weeks, LockBit’s self-governing nature allows the attacker to ‘hit and run’, deploying the ransomware with minimal interaction required after the initial intrusion. The ability to detect anomalous activity across the entire digital infrastructure in real time is therefore crucial in LockBit’s prevention.

WMI and SMB are relied upon by the vast majority of companies around the world, and yet they were utilized in this attack to propagate through the system and encrypt hundreds of thousands of files. The prevalence and volume of these connections make them near-impossible to monitor with humans or signature-based detection techniques alone.

Moreover, the uniqueness of every enterprise’s digital estate impedes signature-based detection from effectively alerting on internal connections and the volume of such connections. Darktrace, however, uses machine learning to understand the individual pattern of behavior for each device, in this case allowing it to highlight the unusual internal activity as it occurred.

The organization involved did not have Darktrace RESPOND – Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology – configured in active mode. If enabled, RESPOND would have surgically blocked the initial WMI operations and SMB drive writes that triggered the attack whilst allowing the critical network devices to continue standard operations. Even if the foothold had been established, RESPOND would have enforced the ‘pattern of life’ of the encryption host, preventing the cascade of encryption over SMB. This demonstrates the importance of meeting machine-speed attacks with autonomous cyber security, which reacts in real time to sophisticated threats when human security teams cannot.

LockBit has the ability to encrypt thousands of files in just seconds, even when targeting well-prepared organizations. This type of ransomware, with built-in worm-like functionality, is expected to become increasingly common over 2021. Such attacks can move at a speed which no human security team alone can match. Darktrace’s approach, which uses unsupervised machine learning, can respond in seconds to these rapid attacks and shut them down in their earliest stages.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Isabel Finn for her insights on the above threat find.

Darktrace model detections:

  • Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Network Scan – Low Anomaly Score
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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September 4, 2026

Darktrace Advances Incident Investigation and AI-Agent Security with OpenAI Daybreak Models

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Earlier this year, Darktrace joined OpenAI’s Daybreak Defense Network to explore how their cyber capabilities can be integrated within Darktrace products and services to transform how security teams move from signal to action.

At the heart of this work is Darktrace's behavioral understanding of customer environments and identification of complex security incidents, combined with OpenAI models that can add context to help explain why an incident matters and its potential impact on the business. By bringing these capabilities into defensive workflows security teams already use, the goal is to give defenders not just greater visibility, but the context and guidance they need to act with confidence.

Since joining the program, we've been working with OpenAI to explore how these capabilities can address specific security challenges for defenders.

The problem we're solving

Attackers continue to change how they operate, including by using AI to increase the speed and scale of some techniques. Security teams are already managing a large volume of alerts, and the question isn't just what's happening, but how it could affect the organization. Even when an incident is fully investigated and correlated, technical severity alone doesn't tell a security team how much it actually matters to the business. That same challenge extends to internal AI adoption. As organizations adopt more AI systems and agents, security teams need visibility into their behavior, access and activity, along with the broader business context needed to identify and investigate potential risk.

Darktrace's Adaptive AI™ builds a detailed, organization-specific picture of what's normal for each environment, and uses that picture to investigate threats and identify complex security activity across domains. OpenAI's models can build on Darktrace's correlated, technically prioritized incidents by adding context that can help defenders understand what may be at stake.

What we're building

Our work is focused on two areas: supporting security investigation and response, and helping defenders identify risky behavior across enterprise AI systems and agents.

The first aligns Darktrace's behavioral understanding with OpenAI models to support  security investigation and prioritization. Darktrace's Adaptive AI continuously learns the unique patterns of normal behavior within each customer it protects, creating a deep, organization-specific understanding of its digital estate. When unusual activity emerges, OpenAI's models can draw on that context to help analysts investigate the incident, understand its significance and assess potential business consequences — reducing the need to manually assemble context from fragmented signals.

Second, we are exploring how these capabilities can support AI-agent and runtime security through Darktrace / SECURE AI™. OpenAI’s Daybreak models can build on the detections and visibility Darktrace / SECURE AI provides, connecting signals across a customer's environment and help defenders identify potentially risky behavior involving AI systems and agents. Activity that might appear isolated can instead be connected with related signals, helping defenders investigate the broader context and determine appropriate remediation.

Darktrace brings deep cybersecurity expertise, an evolving understanding of each customer's environment, and AI-driven identification of threats across the digital estate. Through the Daybreak Defense Network, Darktrace is exploring how OpenAI models can augment those capabilities in defensive security workflows — supporting incident investigation and response and improving visibility into AI-agent and runtime risk.

These capabilities are still in development, and we're excited to continue building on this work.

To learn more about how Darktrace continues to innovate to meet today's most pressing security challenges, register for our upcoming launch broadcast here.

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September 4, 2026

Botnet Behind the Camera: Mirai Katana Activity on a Video Recording Device

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Key takeaways

  • Darktrace identified a camera device infected with the Mirai/Katana botnet in a sports-sector customer environment, showing how exposed IoT devices can become active participants in wider attack chains.
  • The compromise involved suspicious Wget behavior, file downloads from rare external IPs, unusual incoming HTTP connections to video recorder management interfaces, and large outbound data transfers to infrastructure associated with botnet activity.
  • The incident highlights the importance of extending visibility and response beyond traditional endpoints, as unmanaged or overlooked connected devices can be exploited for command-and-control, malware delivery, and data exfiltration.

Mirai and the Katana variant

Mirai is a botnet that first emerged in August 2016 and is well known for launching large-scale distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, typically targeting exposed Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It identifies vulnerable IoT devices ,often by abusing default credentials or exposed services, and recruiting them into a remotely controlled botnet that can be used in DDoS campaigns [1].

Katana, one of the many variants that arose after Mirai’s source code was released publicly, was first observed in late 2020 and has been seen using more advanced capabilities, including custom command-and-control (C2), persistence mechanisms, and DDoS functionality [2].

In March 2026, research from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified Katana as a Mirai-derived DDoS botnet targeting Android-based TV set-top boxes through exposed Android Debug Bridge (ADB) access.  Observed capabilities included custom C2, runtime domain rotation, multiple DDoS methods, and an on-device compiled kernel rootkit used for persistence and stealth [3].

Darktrace’s detection of Mirai Botnet activity on a camera device

In early 2026, Darktrace identified a Network/Digital Video Recorder (NVR/DVR) on the network of a sports-sector customer that had been infected with the Mirai Katana botnet and subsequently used to exfiltrate data from the customer’s environment. Seemingly related follow-up activity was observed on the same device several months later.

In both instances, the Darktrace Security Operations Centre (SOC) alerted the customer as part of the Managed Threat Detection (MTD) service. However, as Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not fully enabled on the affected device, Darktrace was unable to proactively block the suspicious activity or prevent the compromise from continuing and recurring.

The initial compromise appears to have occurred when the affected device was seen using Wget to download Linux-based Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) files from a rare external IP, 195.177.94[.]105, which had not previously been observed in the customer’s network. Further analysis downloaded file hashes identified files related to the Mirai botnet.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into the unusual outbound connection where the ELF files were downloaded.

Within a few hours, Darktrace detected the device uploading close to 3GB of data to another external IP, 50.7.49[.]4:3017 (ASN AS30058 FDCSERVERS), suggesting that the activity was likely routed via a virtual private server (VPS) hosted by FDC Servers [2]. Attackers often abuse VPS infrastructure from legitimate cloud providers to blend in with legitimate traffic and evade IP reputation and geolocation-based detections.

Figure 2:  Darktrace’s detection of the unusual data upload activity by the affected camera device.

Darktrace continued to observe similar data transfers to multiple rare endpoints  including 171.225.223[.]53, 95.161.128[.]62, 61.7.209[.]88, 95.161.128[.]62, which have been linked to Mirai by open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of spikes in unusual external data transfer activity from the camera device.

Exploitation continued

Several months later, Darktrace identified the same exfiltration pattern on the device again, this time with stronger indications of associations with Mirai Katana botnet infection.

The device received incoming HTTP connections from 129.121.114[.]124, an external IP known to be associated with the Katana botnet IP [3]. The connections targeted the ‘/dvr/cmd’ path using the root username and user agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246.

The ‘/dvr/cmd’ path appears to be associated with the affected device’s web management functionality. This API endpoint has historically been targeted by Mirai and other IoT botnets through the exploitation of critical command injection vulnerabilities and automated botnet exploitation [4].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s  detection of HTTP connectivity from the external IP associated with Mirai Katana Botnet.

A few days later, Darktrace observed the Wget utility being used to download ELF files, including “/lil”,  from the IP 129.121.114[.]124. OSINT reporting has since associated this IP address with the Mirai Katana botnet. Notably, the IP observed earlier in the year, 195.177.94[.]105, had also hosted a file named “lil”, indicating a link between the observed activity.

Over the following days, the device received a sudden spike in connections from multiple rare external endpoints, suggesting a possible successful brute force attack. Darktrace also observed the device exfiltrating just under 4GB of data to another Mirai-associated IP address,  66.92.198[.]194, over ports 3344, 954922, and 80. Finally, the device was seen uploading data to the Mirai botnet IP 5.175.249[.]53 over port138 and exhibited an increase in UDP connections to 34.18.28[.]10 over port 9068.

Following both file download events, Darktrace identified spikes in external data transfers and connection attempts to rare destinations. While Darktrace’s Threat Research team could not confirm with high confidence that this to activity was directly associated with Mirai, it may indicate that Mirai Katana includes data exfiltration functionality.

Darktrace’s threat researchers also identified an internet-facing NTP server belonging to a separate customer receiving incoming connection attempts from the same initially observed IP, 195.177.94[.]105,over the port 123. This suggests that Mirai Katana may not exclusively target IoT devices.

Conclusion

This case demonstrates how threat actors can exploit overlooked IoT and OT devices to support broader malicious objectives. Here, a camera device infected with a botnet was used to exfiltrate data from the customer's environment, showing how peripheral assets can become active participants in an attack chain.

This case also reinforces a challenge many organizations face today: extending security visibility beyond traditional endpoints and servers. Cameras, sensors, and other connected devices often operate with limited monitoring and may fall outside established security processes, despite maintaining network connectivity and access to potentially sensitive environments. This is particularly relevant in the sports sector, where growing reliance on connected cameras, smart stadium technologies, and other IoT devices continues to expand the attack surface, as highlighted in Darktrace's Sports Sector Threat Report.

As botnets like Kata and Mirai continue to evolve, defenders need visibility across unmanaged IoT and edge devices, as well as security solutions that can recognize subtle deviations in device behavior that may indicate an emerging compromise.

Credit to Parvatha Ananthakannan (Cyber Analyst), Signe Zaharka (Principal Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Device / Significant UDP Increase

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

·      Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual DNS

·      Device / External Network Scan

·      Device / Suspicious DNS Activity

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Indicator of Compromise Type Description
195.177.94[.]105 IP C2 endpoint
50.7.49[.]4:30171 IP Possible C2 endpoint
129.121.114[.]124 IP C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n3 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://195.177.94[.]105/n2 URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/lil URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/HHn URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/JFc URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/jum URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OaSf URL Likely C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/OPWg URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/vHwK URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/VLv URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/WbJ URL Possible C2 endpoint
hxxp://129.121.114[.]124/zkR URL Possible C2 endpoint
Ab17883ae4c3bc6afa18c439166eeeb4b03186e3093d984e3a95f573e0fcb7d8 SHA-256 Mirai payload
3d587e809dac49d34a3f717e072fd0aebe5e71db63333e45c81577d6b4266f87 SHA-256 Mirai payload
Bf6e81733a7e209d3dce80d15bf3c5d300752d961fae6b45d90c9bbe7f8c89a2 SHA-256 Possible payload
f25488303813ab1ec0eaa71562938601aac185e8aaf93adb84522557f7cf4dd6 SHA-256 Possible payload
0cb4ff6b71f4423184bfa35c34e9090297637208b0e30205d4b224e56abde2ef SHA-256 Possible payload
19c24cbeaf06b2e7697083f33a85521a9315105c784691bde7420fde4cc69410 SHA-256 Likely Mirai payload
1e74f734fff8df91f4f7172d0de10c421eca78aeb800e8a48e16bc5dbde5d20e SHA-256 Possible payload
6e71f7763d1f29d5712106ebb122e281c32787540aa2342b0fe5351d585d18d7 SHA-256 Possible payload
71f4ff7cdb6d6a7d2673c543c5d2535093afbd707b20a5b9ddf735466c1105c1 SHA-256 Possible payload
76db7ee73ebf15e48a3cb24a074d92248671ef2c6ed3bc3e708377341fb7674d SHA-256 Possible payload
da87a65f7beb438e61f0b61964fed8aa305a380f569042f84c55eca8fa7929b8 SHA-256 Possible payload
e15809eb6ba66477175270d62cfa53e4bf278595f69938708c81c4bc457930fe SHA-256 Mirai payload

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic Technique ID Technique / Sub-technique
Initial Access T1659 Content Injection
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1571 Non-Standard Port
Reconnaissance T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks
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About the author
Parvatha Ananthakannan
Cyber Analyst
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