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February 8, 2024

How CoinLoader Hijacks Networks

Discover how Darktrace decrypted the CoinLoader malware hijacking networks for cryptomining. Learn about the tactics and protection strategies employed.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Signe Zaharka
Principal Cyber Analyst
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08
Feb 2024

About Loader Malware

Loader malware was a frequent topic of conversation and investigation within the Darktrace Threat Research team throughout 2023, with a wide range of existing and novel variants affecting a significant number of Darktrace customers, as detailed in Darktrace’s inaugural End of Year Threat Report. The multi-phase nature of such compromises poses a significant threat to organizations due to the need to defend against multiple threats at the same time.

CoinLoader, a variant of loader malware first observed in the wild in 2018 [1], is an example of one of the more prominent variant of loaders observed by Darktrace in 2023, with over 65 customers affected by the malware. Darktrace’s Threat Research team conducted a deep dive investigation into the patterns of behavior exhibited by devices infected with CoinLoader in the latter part of 2023, with compromises observed in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA), Asia-Pacific (APAC) and the Americas.

The autonomous threat detection capabilities of Darktrace DETECT™ allowed for the effective identification of these CoinLoader infections whilst Darktrace RESPOND™, if active, was able to quickly curtail attacker’s efforts and prevent more disruptive, and potentially costly, secondary compromises from occurring.

What is CoinLoader?

Much like other strains of loader, CoinLoader typically serves as a first stage malware that allows threat actors to gain initial access to a network and establish a foothold in the environment before delivering subsequent malicious payloads, including adware, botnets, trojans or pay-per-install campaigns.

CoinLoader is generally propagated through trojanized popular software or game installation archive files, usually in the rar or zip formats. These files tend can be easily obtained via top results displayed in search engines when searching for such keywords as "crack" or "keygen" in conjunction with the name of the software the user wishes to pirate [1,2,3,4]. By disguising the payload as a legitimate programme, CoinLoader is more likely to be unknowingly downloaded by endpoint users, whilst also bypassing traditional security measures that trust the download.

It also has several additional counter-detection methods including using junk code, variable obfuscation, and encryption for shellcode and URL schemes. It relies on dynamic-link library (DLL) search order hijacking to load malicious DLLs to legitimate executable files. The malware is also capable of performing a variety of checks for anti-virus processes and disabling endpoint protection solutions.

In addition to these counter-detection tactics, CoinLoader is also able to prevent the execution of its malicious DLL files in sandboxed environments without the presence of specific DNS cache records, making it extremely difficult for security teams and researchers to analyze.

In 2020 it was reported that CoinLoader compromises were regularly seen alongside cryptomining activity and even used the alias “CoinMiner” in some cases [2]. Darktrace’s investigations into CoinLoader in 2023 largely confirmed this theory, with around 15% of observed CoinLoader connections being related to cryptomining activity.

Cryptomining malware consumes large amounts of a hijacked (or cryptojacked) device's resources to perform complex mathematical calculations and generate income for the attacker all while quietly working in the background. Cryptojacking can lead to high electricity costs, device slow down, loss of functionality, and in the worst case scenario can be a potential fire hazard.

Darktrace Coverage of CoinLoader

In September 2023, Darktrace observed several cases of CoinLoader that served to exemplify the command-and-control (C2) communication and subsequent cryptocurrency mining activities typically observed during CoinLoader compromises. While the initial infection method in these cases was outside of Darktrace’s purview, it likely occurred via socially engineered phishing emails or, as discussed earlier, trojanized software downloads.

Command-and-Control Activity

CoinLoader compromises observed across the Darktrace customer base were typically identified by encrypted C2 connections over port 433 to rare external endpoints using self-signed certificates containing "OU=IT,O=MyCompany LLC,L=San Francisco,ST=California,C=US" in their issue fields.

All observed CoinLoader C2 servers were associated with the ASN of MivoCloud, a Virtual Private Server (VPS) hosting service (AS39798 MivoCloud SRL). It had been reported that Russian-state sponsored threat actors had previously abused MivoCloud’s infrastructure in order to bypass geo-blocking measures during phishing attacks against western nations [5].

Darktrace observed that the majority of CoinLoader infrastructure utilized IP addresses in the 185.225.0.0/19 range and were associated with servers hosted in Romania, with just one instance of an IP address based in Moldova. The domain names of these servers typically followed the naming pattern ‘*[a-d]{1}[.]info’, with 'ams-updatea[.]info’, ‘ams-updateb[.]info’, ‘ams-updatec[.]info’, and ‘ams-updated[.]info’ routinely identified on affected networks.

Researchers found that CoinLoader typically uses DNS tunnelling in order to covertly exchange information with attacker-controlled infrastructure, including the domains ‘candatamsnsdn[.]info’, ‘mapdatamsnsdn[.]info’, ‘rqmetrixsdn[.]info’ [4].

While Darktrace did not observe these particular domains, it did observer similar DNS lookups to a similar suspicous domain, namely ‘ucmetrixsdn[.]info’, in addition to the aforementioned HTTPS C2 connections.

Cryptomining Activity and Possible Additional Tooling

After establishing communication channels with CoinLoader servers, affected devices were observed carrying out a range of cryptocurrency mining activities. Darktrace detected devices connecting to multiple MivoCloud associated IP addresses using the MinerGate protocol alongside the credential “x”, a MinerGate credential observed by Darktrace in previous cryptojacking compromises, including the Sysrv-hello botnet.

Figure 1: Darktrace DETECT breach log showing an alerted mining activity model breach on an infected device.
Figure 2: Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst providing details about unusual repeated connections to multiple endpoints related to CoinLoader cryptomining.

In a number of customer environments, Darktrace observed affected devices connected to endpoints associated with other malware such as the Andromeda botnet and the ViperSoftX information stealer. It was, however, not possible to confirm whether CoinLoader had dropped these additional malware variants onto infected devices.

On customer networks where Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in autonomous response mode, Darktrace was able to take swift targeted steps to shut down suspicious connections and contain CoinLoader compromises. In one example, following DETECT’s initial identification of an affected device connecting to multiple MivoCloud endpoints, RESPOND autonomously blocked the device from carrying out such connections, effectively shutting down C2 communication and preventing threat actors carrying out any cryptomining activity, or downloading subsequent malicious payloads. The autonomous response capability of RESPOND provides customer security teams with precious time to remove infected devices from their network and action their remediation strategies.

Figure 3: Darktrace RESPOND autonomously blocking CoinLoader connections on an affected device.

Additionally, customers subscribed to Darktrace’s Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service would be alerted about potential CoinLoader activity observed on their network, prompting Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) to triage and investigate the activity, allowing customers to prioritize incidents that require immediate attention.

Conclusion

By masquerading as free or ‘cracked’ versions of legitimate popular software, loader malware like CoinLoader is able to indiscriminately target a large number of endpoint users without arousing suspicion. What’s more, once a network has been compromised by the loader, it is then left open to a secondary compromise in the form of potentially costly information stealers, ransomware or, in this case, cryptocurrency miners.

While urging employees to think twice before installing seemingly legitimate software unknown or untrusted locations is an essential first step in protecting an organization against threats like CoinLoader, its stealthy tactics mean this may not be enough.

In order to fully safeguard against such increasingly widespread yet evasive threats, organizations must adopt security solutions that are able to identify anomalies and subtle deviations in device behavior that could indicate an emerging compromise. The Darktrace suite of products, including DETECT and RESPOND, are well-placed to identify and contain these threats in the first instance and ensure they cannot escalate to more damaging network compromises.

Credit to: Signe Zaharka, Senior Cyber Security Analyst, Paul Jennings, Principal Analyst Consultant

Appendix

Darktrace DETECT Model Detections

  • Anomalous Connection/Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Anomalous Connection/Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Anomalous Connection/Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection/Repeated Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection/Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection/Young or Invalid Certificate SSL Connections to Rare
  • Anomalous Server Activity/Rare External from Server
  • Compromise/Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Compromise/Beacon for 4 Days
  • Compromise/Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Compromise/Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise/High Priority Crypto Currency Mining
  • Compromise/High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Compromise/Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
  • Compromise/New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port
  • Compromise/Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP
  • Compromise/Repeating Connections Over 4 Days
  • Compromise/Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise/SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Compromise/Suspicious File and C2
  • Compromise/Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External
  • Device/ Anomalous Github Download
  • Device/ Suspicious Domain
  • Device/Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert
  • Device/New Failed External Connections

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Hostname C2 Server

ams-updatea[.]info

ams-updateb[.]info

ams-updatec[.]info

ams-updated[.]info

candatamsna[.]info

candatamsnb[.]info

candatamsnc[.]info

candatamsnd[.]info

mapdatamsna[.]info

mapdatamsnb[.]info

mapdatamsnc[.]info

mapdatamsnd[.]info

res-smarta[.]info

res-smartb[.]info

res-smartc[.]info

res-smartd[.]info

rqmetrixa[.]info

rqmetrixb[.]info

rqmetrixc[.]info

rqmetrixd[.]info

ucmetrixa[.]info

ucmetrixb[.]info

ucmetrixc[.]info

ucmetrixd[.]info

any-updatea[.]icu

IoC - IP Address - C2 Server

185.225[.]16.192

185.225[.]16.61

185.225[.]16.62

185.225[.]16.63

185.225[.]16.88

185.225[.]17.108

185.225[.]17.109

185.225[.]17.12

185.225[.]17.13

185.225[.]17.135

185.225[.]17.14

185.225[.]17.145

185.225[.]17.157

185.225[.]17.159

185.225[.]18.141

185.225[.]18.142

185.225[.]18.143

185.225[.]19.218

185.225[.]19.51

194.180[.]157.179

194.180[.]157.185

194.180[.]158.55

194.180[.]158.56

194.180[.]158.62

194.180[.]158.63

5.252.178[.]74

94.158.246[.]124

IoC - IP Address - Cryptocurrency mining related endpoint

185.225.17[.]114

185.225.17[.]118

185.225.17[.]130

185.225.17[.]131

185.225.17[.]132

185.225.17[.]142

IoC - SSL/TLS certificate issuer information - C2 server certificate example

emailAddress=admin@example[.]ltd,CN=example[.]ltd,OU=IT,O=MyCompany LLC,L=San Francisco,ST=California,C=US

emailAddress=admin@'res-smartd[.]info,CN=res-smartd[.]info,OU=IT,O=MyCompany LLC,L=San Francisco,ST=California,C=US

CN=ucmetrixd[.]info,OU=IT,O=MyCompany LLC,L=San Francisco,ST=California,C=US

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

INITIAL ACCESS

Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190

Spearphishing Link - T1566.002

Drive-by Compromise - T1189

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095

Non-Standard Port - T1571

External Proxy - T1090.002

Encrypted Channel - T1573

Web Protocols - T1071.001

Application Layer Protocol - T1071

DNS - T1071.004

Fallback Channels - T1008

Multi-Stage Channels - T1104

PERSISTENCE

Browser Extensions

T1176

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Web Services - T1583.006

Malware - T1588.001

COLLECTION

Man in the Browser - T1185

IMPACT

Resource Hijacking - T1496

References

1. https://www.avira.com/en/blog/coinloader-a-sophisticated-malware-loader-campaign

2. https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/17909/

3. https://www.cybereason.co.jp/blog/cyberattack/5687/

4. https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/tunnel-warfare-exposing-dns-tunneling-campaigns-using-generative-models-coinloader-case-study/

5. https://securityboulevard.com/2023/02/three-cases-of-cyber-attacks-on-the-security-service-of-ukraine-and-nato-allies-likely-by-russian-state-sponsored-gamaredon/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Signe Zaharka
Principal Cyber Analyst

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October 30, 2025

WSUS Exploited: Darktrace’s Analysis of Post-Exploitation Activities Related to CVE-2025-59287

WSUS Exploited: Darktrace’s Analysis of Post-Exploitation Activities Related to CVE-2025-59287Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

On October 14, 2025, Microsoft disclosed a new critical vulnerability affecting the Windows Server Update Service (WSUS), CVE-2025-59287.  Exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to remotely execute code [1][6].

WSUS allows for centralized distribution of Microsoft product updates [3]; a server running WSUS is likely to have significant privileges within a network making it a valuable target for threat actors. While WSUS servers are not necessarily expected to be open to the internet, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has reported  thousands of publicly exposed instances that may be vulnerable to exploitation [2].

Microsoft’s initial ‘Patch Tuesday’ update for this vulnerability did not fully mitigate the risk, and so an out-of-band update followed on October 23 [4][5] . Widespread exploitation of this vulnerability started to be observed shortly after the security update [6], prompting CISA to add CVE-2025-59287 to its Known Exploited Vulnerability Catalog (KEV) on October 24 [7].

Attack Overview

The Darktrace Threat Research team have recently identified multiple potential cases of CVE-2025-59287 exploitation, with two detailed here. While the likely initial access method is consistent across the cases, the follow-up activities differed, demonstrating the variety in which such a CVE can be exploited to fulfil each attacker’s specific goals.

The first signs of suspicious activity across both customers were detected by Darktrace on October 24, the same day this vulnerability was added to CISA’s KEV. Both cases discussed here involve customers based in the United States.

Case Study 1

The first case, involving a customer in the Information and Communication sector, began with an internet-facing device making an outbound connection to the hostname webhook[.]site. Observed network traffic indicates the device was a WSUS server.

OSINT has reported abuse of the workers[.]dev service in exploitation of CVE-2025-59287, where enumerated network information gathered through running a script on the compromised device was exfiltrated using this service [8].

In this case, the majority of connectivity seen to webhook[.]site involved a PowerShell user agent; however, cURL user agents were also seen with some connections taking the form of HTTP POSTs. This connectivity appears to align closely with OSINT reports of CVE-2025-59287 post-exploitation behaviour [8][9].

Connections to webhook[.]site continued until October 26. A single URI was seen consistently until October 25, after which the connections used a second URI with a similar format.

Later on October 26, an escalation in command-and-control (C2) communication appears to have occurred, with the device starting to make repeated connections to two rare workers[.]dev subdomains (royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev & chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev), consistent with C2 beaconing. While workers[.]dev is associated with the legitimate Cloudflare Workers service, the service is commonly abused by malicious actors for C2 infrastructure. The anomalous nature of the connections to both webhook[.]site and workers[.]dev led to Darktrace generating multiple alerts including high-fidelity Enhanced Monitoring alerts and alerts for Darktrace’s Autonomous Response.

Infrastructure insight

Hosted on royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev is a Microsoft Installer file (MSI) named v3.msi.

Screenshot of v3.msi content.
Figure 1: Screenshot of v3.msi content.

Contained in the MSI file is two Cabinet files named “Sample.cab” and “part2.cab”. After extracting the contents of the cab files, a file named “Config” and a binary named “ServiceEXE”. ServiceEXE is the legitimate DFIR tool Velociraptor, and “Config” contains the configuration details, which include chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev as the server_url, suggesting that Velociraptor is being used as a tunnel to the C2. Additionally, the configuration points to version 0.73.4, a version of Velociraptor that is vulnerable to CVE-2025-6264, a privilege escalation vulnerability.

 Screenshot of Config file.
Figure 2: Screenshot of Config file.

Velociraptor, a legitimate security tool maintained by Rapid7, has been used recently in malicious campaigns. A vulnerable version of tool has been used by threat actors for command execution and endpoint takeover, while other campaigns have used Velociraptor to create a tunnel to the C2, similar to what was observed in this case [10] .

The workers[.]dev communication continued into the early hours of October 27. The most recent suspicious behavior observed on the device involved an outbound connection to a new IP for the network - 185.69.24[.]18/singapure - potentially indicating payload retrieval.

The payload retrieved from “/singapure” is a UPX packed Windows binary. After unpacking the binary, it is an open-source Golang stealer named “Skuld Stealer”. Skuld Stealer has the capabilities to steal crypto wallets, files, system information, browser data and tokens. Additionally, it contains anti-debugging and anti-VM logic, along with a UAC bypass [11].

A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 3: A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.

Case Study 2

The second case involved a customer within the Education sector. The affected device was also internet-facing, with network traffic indicating it was a WSUS server

Suspicious activity in this case once again began on October 24, notably only a few seconds after initial signs of compromise were observed in the first case. Initial anomalous behaviour also closely aligned, with outbound PowerShell connections to webhook[.]site, and then later connections, including HTTP POSTs, to the same endpoint with a cURL user agent.

While Darktrace did not observe any anomalous network activity on the device after October 24, the customer’s security integration resulted in an additional alert on October 27 for malicious activity, suggesting that the compromise may have continued locally.

By leveraging Darktrace’s security integrations, customers can investigate activity across different sources in a seamless manner, gaining additional insight and context to an attack.

A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 4: A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.

Conclusion

Exploitation of a CVE can lead to a wide range of outcomes. In some cases, it may be limited to just a single device with a focused objective, such as exfiltration of sensitive data. In others, it could lead to lateral movement and a full network compromise, including ransomware deployment. As the threat of internet-facing exploitation continues to grow, security teams must be prepared to defend against such a possibility, regardless of the attack type or scale.

By focussing on detection of anomalous behaviour rather than relying on signatures associated with a specific CVE exploit, Darktrace is able to alert on post-exploitation activity regardless of the kind of behaviour seen. In addition, leveraging security integrations provides further context on activities beyond the visibility of Darktrace / NETWORKTM, enabling defenders to investigate and respond to attacks more effectively.

With adversaries weaponizing even trusted incident response tools, maintaining broad visibility and rapid response capabilities becomes critical to mitigating post-exploitation risk.

Credit to Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO),

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

References

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59287

2.    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-exploiting-critical-windows-server-wsus-flaw-in-attacks/

3.    https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus

4.    https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/10/24/microsoft-releases-out-band-security-update-mitigate-windows-server-update-service-vulnerability-cve

5.    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59287

6.    https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/microsoft-issues-emergency-patch-for.html

7.    https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

8.    https://www.huntress.com/blog/exploitation-of-windows-server-update-services-remote-code-execution-vulnerability

9.    https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-cve-2025-59287/

10. https://blog.talosintelligence.com/velociraptor-leveraged-in-ransomware-attacks/

11. https://github.com/hackirby/skuld

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Device / New PowerShell User Agent

·       Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Security Integration / Low Severity Integration Detection

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

o   royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev – Hostname – Likely C2 Infrastructure

o   royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev/v3.msi - URI – Likely payload

o   chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

o   185.69.24[.]18 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

o   185.69.24[.]18/bin.msi - URI – Likely payload

o   185.69.24[.]18/singapure - URI – Likely payload

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content

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Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

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October 24, 2025

Patch Smarter, Not Harder: Now Empowering Security Teams with Business-Aligned Threat Context Agents

Patch Smarter, Not Harder: Now Empowering Security Teams with Business-Aligned Threat Context Agents Default blog imageDefault blog image

Most risk management programs remain anchored in enumeration: scanning every asset, cataloging every CVE, and drowning in lists that rarely translate into action. Despite expensive scanners, annual pen tests, and countless spreadsheets, prioritization still falters at two critical points.

Context gaps at the device level: It’s hard to know which vulnerabilities actually matter to your business given existing privileges, what software it runs, and what controls already reduce risk.

Business translation: Even when the technical priority is clear, justifying effort and spend in financial terms—especially across many affected devices—can delay action. Especially if it means halting other areas of the business that directly generate revenue.

The result is familiar: alert fatigue, “too many highs,” and remediation that trails behind the threat landscape. Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management addresses this by pairing precise, endpoint‑level context with clear, financial insight so teams can prioritize confidently and mobilize faster.

A powerful combination: No-Telemetry Endpoint Agent + Cost-Benefit Analysis

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management now uniquely combines technical precision with business clarity in a single workflow.  With this release, Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management delivers a more holistic approach, uniting technical context and financial insight to drive proactive risk reduction. The result is a single solution that helps security teams stay ahead of threats while reducing noise, delays, and complexity.

  • No-Telemetry Endpoint: Collects installed software data and maps it to known CVEs—without network traffic—providing device-level vulnerability context and operational relevance.
  • Cost-Benefit Analysis for Patching: Calculates ROI by comparing patching effort with potential exploit impact, factoring in headcount time, device count, patch difficulty, and automation availability.

Introducing the No-Telemetry Endpoint Agent

Darktrace’s new endpoint agent inventories installed software on devices and maps it to known CVEs without collecting network data so you can prioritize using real device context and available security controls.

By grounding vulnerability findings in the reality of each endpoint, including its software footprint and existing controls, teams can cut through generic severity scores and focus on what matters most. The agent is ideal for remote devices, BYOD-adjacent fleets, or environments standardizing on Darktrace, and is available without additional licensing cost.

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management user interface
Figure 1: Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management user interface

Built-In Cost-Benefit Analysis for Patching

Security teams often know what needs fixing but stakeholders need to understand why now. Darktrace’s new cost-benefit calculator compares the total cost to patch against the potential cost of exploit, producing an ROI for the patch action that expresses security action in clear financial terms.

Inputs like engineer time, number of affected devices, patch difficulty, and automation availability are factored in automatically. The result is a business-aligned justification for every patching decision—helping teams secure buy-in, accelerate approvals, and move work forward with one-click ticketing, CSV export, or risk acceptance.

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management Cost Benefit Analysis
Figure 2: Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management Cost Benefit Analysis

A Smarter, Faster Approach to Exposure Management

Together, the no-telemetry endpoint and Cost–Benefit Analysis advance the CTEM motion from theory to practice. You gain higher‑fidelity discovery and validation signals at the device level, paired with business‑ready justification that accelerates mobilization. The result is fewer distractions, clearer priorities, and faster measurable risk reduction. This is not from chasing every alert, but by focusing on what moves the needle now.

  • Smarter Prioritization: Device‑level context trims noise and spotlights the exposures that matter for your business.
  • Faster Decisions: Built‑in ROI turns technical urgency into executive clarity—speeding approvals and action.
  • Practical Execution: Privacy‑conscious endpoint collection and ticketing/export options fit neatly into existing workflows.
  • Better Outcomes: Close the loop faster—discover, prioritize, validate, and mobilize—on the same operating surface.

Committed to innovation

These updates are part of the broader Darktrace release, which also included:

1. Major innovations in cloud security with the launch of the industry’s first fully automated cloud forensics solution, reinforcing Darktrace’s leadership in AI-native security.

2. Darktrace Network Endpoint eXtended Telemetry (NEXT) is revolutionizing NDR with the industry’s first mixed-telemetry agent using Self-Learning AI.

3. Improvements to our OT product, purpose built for industrial infrastructure, Darktrace / OT now brings dedicated OT dashboard, segmentation-aware risk modeling, and expanded visibility into edge assets and automation protocols.

Join our Live Launch Event

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December 9, 2025

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Join our live broadcast to experience how Darktrace is eliminating blind spots for detection and response across your complete enterprise with new innovations in Agentic AI across our ActiveAI Security platform. Industry leaders from IDC will join Darktrace customers to discuss challenges in cross-domain security, with a live walkthrough reshaping the future of Network Detection & Response, Endpoint Detection & Response, Email Security, and SecOps in novel threat detection and autonomous investigations.

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